

The Vlasov Case

History of a Betrayal



Volume 1
1942–1945

Edited by
Federal Archival Agency of Russia
The Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

ibidem

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Preface

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This two-volume book is a translation of *General Vlasov: a History of Betrayal*, a three-volume compilation of documents from Russian, Belarusian, and German archives.¹ This translation would not have been possible without the enormous amount of work put in by Andrey Artizov, Andrey Sorokin and Tatiana Tsarevskaja-Diakina at RGASPI, as well as by translators and editors Amanda Blasko, Alexei Sobchenko, Kirill Savinski, and Ellen Powell. They are all gratefully thanked here. Translating into English Soviet archives that were themselves often translations from German texts mentioning places and people from the huge territories of what are today Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine runs up against multiple challenges, especially—but not only—because of the plurality of languages used simultaneously in the region. As often in such a massive work, some inconsistencies may remain, and we apologize to readers for these.

Why is it important to translate into English the Soviet archives documenting the Vlasov case? General Andrey Vlasov (1901-1946) is known to epitomize collaborationism with Nazi Germany. A famous Red Army general, he changed sides after being captured by Nazi troops in July 1942 during an attempt to break the encirclement of Leningrad. In prison, he met Captain Wilfried Strik-Strikfeldt, a former White officer who had circulated memos trying to convince the Wehrmacht of the need to support a collaborationist network inside Russia as they had in other countries. Associated with this project and under the protection of the Wehrmacht's propaganda department, Vlasov worked in the occupied territories in order to recruit Soviet prisoners of war to the Russian Liberation Army (RLA). Vlasov expected that this army made of Soviet POWs could fight along with the Wehrmacht against Stalinism. Vlasov's idea began to work only by the end of the war, in the fall of 1944.

¹ *General Vlasov: istoriia predatel'stva. V dvukh tomakh, trekh knigakh* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2015).

After the German defeat, Vlasov was repatriated to the Soviet Union, where he was executed as a war criminal and traitor on August 1, 1946. Every European country had collaborationist figures and partisans, but Vlasov is a particularly strong symbol because the Soviet Union paid the highest price in terms of deaths while fighting against Nazism. The archives selected here show in detail all the ideological and logistical articulations involved with building a collaborationist movement. However, in this preface we want to focus the reader's attention more on Vlasov's long-term legacies than on the history of collaboration itself.

One of these crucial legacies relates to the complex relationship between Vlasov and the White movement. Like Vlasov, the majority of Vlasovite military corps were former Red Army officers and soldiers: some of them were anti-Communist and especially anti-Stalinist, but it is unclear how many were also convinced monarchists who desired the re-establishment of a tsarist regime. The Russian emigration was divided into several ideological branches, ranging from monarchists to social-democrats, but those ready to cooperate with Nazi Germany to overthrow the Soviet regime mostly belonged to the monarchist group, while the small number of social-democrats had pinned their hopes on the Western Allies.

Once Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the main émigré movement ready to cooperate with Berlin was the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists (NTS). Born in 1931 among the younger generation of émigrés as the youth branch of the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS) led by White General Piotr Wrangel, NTS promoted a muscular ideology inspired by Italian fascism, which it saw as the only ideology able to fight against Bolshevism. NTS therefore joined forces with the Nazis not only with the goal of overthrowing the Soviet regime, but also because it shared many of the latter's fascist and national-socialist ideological beliefs. In the late 1930s, NTS tried unsuccessfully to court Nazi leadership; it was not until after the 1941 invasion of the USSR that several NTS figures took up employment in the Nazi ranks on the Eastern Front.

Despite multiple efforts, Vlasov had to wait until 1944, when the German defeat was already looming, to secure the support of the Nazi leadership in launching a Russian army. He then became the highest-ranking Russian officer in the service of the Third Reich, emerging—with the support of SS leader

Himmler—as head of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (*Komitet osvobodzheniia narodov Rossii*, CLPR). The CLPR was solemnly established as the official political arm and sponsor of the RLA in Prague on November 14, 1944, with Vlasov surrounded by decorated leaders of the Nazi military and SS.

This officialization pushed Vlasov to search for the support of the main figures among Russian émigrés. For instance, he sent emissaries to Paris and Zurich to meet with the Russian philosophers Ivan A. Ilyin and Boris P. Vysheslavtsev. The former refused to cooperate, while the latter agreed to join CLPR. This bifurcation would be replicated across NTS, with some figures joining Vlasov and others refusing to do so—although the higher echelons of the organization’s leadership followed Vysheslavtsev’s line, seeing Germany as their only hope of destroying the Soviet regime. Several ROVS figures, among them General Fedor F. Abramov, Alexsei A. von Lampe, and Vasilii V. Biskupskii, representative of *Russische Vertrauensstelle*, the Nazi government body dealing with the Russian émigré community, also met with the Vlasov team to discuss how ROVS’ goals of restoring monarchism in Russia could be incorporated into the CLPR program—the transcript of Vlasov’s interrogation, published in the second volume, provides much detail on these meetings. Several White officers and representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church abroad, as well as Nicholas I’s grandson and NTS founder Sergei N. Leikhtenbergskii, attended another CLPR meeting in Berlin in November 1944.²

With the Nazi defeat in May 1945, NTS had to readjust its ideological line and look for another powerful patron. The movement’s leadership turned toward the United States and United Kingdom, both of which were interested in developing strategies to contain communism in Europe. For the NTS ideologists, the doctrinal challenge was to cleanse “solidarism” of its fascist colors and move to a pro-democracy language that would speak to the Western powers.³ To do this, it was necessary to

² The most detailed account of Vlasov-NTS interactions has been studied by Vladimir Cherniaev, “Belaia emigratsiia i plan ‘Novoi Rossii’ v Manifeste CLPR,” *Nansenovskie chteniia* (St: Petersburg, 2016), pp. 238-280, available at <http://beloedelo.com/researches/article/?850>.

³ More in Benjamin Tromly, “Émigré Politics and the Cold War: The National Labor Alliance (NTS), United States Intelligence Agencies and Post-War Europe,” *Contemporary European History* (2019).

minimize *a posteriori* the connections created between NTS, on one side, and the Nazi administration and openly collaborationist movements such as Vlasov's, on the other. In late 1945, adapting himself to the new *Zeitgeist*, Viktor Baidalakov, chairman of NTS, criticized the Vlasov army for its incompetence and collusion with Nazism.⁴ In the Cold War decades, a significant proportion of NTS memory activities focused on dissociating the organization's goals of "liberating Russia" and insisting on a Christian conservative interpretation of solidarism from any trace of national-socialism; yet many NTS publications continued to promote Vlasov's memory. A large part of the White movement was also divided between those who recognized Vlasov as a partner in restoring the Romanov dynasty and those who considered it impossible to cooperate with a former Red Army officer.⁵

While doctrinal and memory conflicts inside NTS continued for decades, the organization succeeded in leveraging its new patrons and selling the competencies acquired during Nazi collaboration for a new wave of anti-Soviet covert operations. U.S. intelligence agencies and their British counterparts indeed saw in wartime collaborators a unique source of information on, and cadres for subversive operations against, the Soviet Union and co-opted a number of them, both from the Vlasov army and from NTS. Reinhard Gehlen, the chief of Nazi military intelligence on the Eastern Front, who had surrendered to the US, was brought to Washington in September 1945 to become one of the liaisons working out the basic mechanics of Nazi post-war collaboration with the Americans, including connecting the latter with Russian émigré communities and the Vlasovites.

If the ability of NTS and the Vlasovites to operate on Soviet territories after 1945 appeared quite limited, they could work more easily in satellite countries and in Western European states. Yet their main role in the 1950s was not so much in undercover operations as in the propaganda field: they played a critical role in helping the US to launch, in 1950, the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (the name bears a striking similarity to that of Vlasov's 1944 project), one of the main agencies

⁴ See A.V. Okorokov, *Fashizm i russkaia emigratsiia* (Moscow: Rusaki, 2002), p. 501.

⁵ More in Benjamin Tromly, "Reinventing Collaboration: The Vlasov Movement in the Postwar Russian Emigration," in G. Grinchenko and E. Narvselius (eds.), *Traitors, Collaborators and Deserters in Contemporary European Politics of Memory* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 87-111.

for fighting communism, which brought together not only Russians, but also Ukrainian, Balts, Poles, and other diaspora communities. The American Committee funded the creation, in 1953, of Radio Liberty, which merged in the 1970s with Radio Free Europe, part of the vanguard of the U.S. ideological front against the Soviet Union.

The Vlasov-NTS legacy also took root in Russia itself. NTS was one of the most active émigré communities distributing forbidden literature to Soviet dissidents and helping the latter's samizdats to exit the country. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, NTS moved back to Russia and transferred its small publishing house, Posev, to Moscow. Although quite inactive compared to the many other conservative movements that emerged in Russia at that time, the NTS nevertheless succeeded in securing a long-lasting legacy by inspiring a pro-White and sometimes pro-Vlasov literature.

Attempts to rehabilitate Vlasov emerged in the 1990s but gathered force in the following decade. In 2001, the small monarchist movement "For Faith and Fatherland" (*Za veru i otechestvo*) submitted a claim to the Main Military Procuracy asking for a revision of Vlasov's death sentence, stating, "Vlasov was a patriot who spent much time re-evaluating his service in the Red Army and the essence of Stalin's regime before agreeing to collaborate with the Germans."⁶ The Military Procuracy concluded that the 1991 law "On rehabilitation of the victims of political repressions" did not apply to Vlasov, and the case was closed. In 2009, the Federation Council (the Russian Senate) took a stance against the rehabilitation of Vlasov, which was then under consideration by the Synod of Bishops, the governing body of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR). In *Russia's Tragedy* (*Tragediia Rossii*, 2009), archpriest Georgii Mitrofanov asked for Vlasov to be considered not a traitor but a Russian patriot who defended his homeland against Stalinism.⁷ The same line of defense has been advanced by former Moscow mayor Gavriil Popov, one of

⁶ Valeria Korchagina and Andrei Zolotov, Jr., "It's Too Early to Forgive Vlasov," *St. Petersburg Times*, November 6, 2001, http://web.archive.org/web/20070928003436/http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=5830.

⁷ Adzhar Kurtov, "Byl li general Vlasov predatelem? Pravovaia otsenka popytok reabilitatsii," *Perspektivy*, November 11, 2009, http://www.perspektivy.info/history/byl_li_general_vlasov_predatelem_pravovaja_ocenka_popytok_reabilitatsii_2009-11-11.htm.

the famous proponents of reforms during late perestroika and now dean of a private university, the International Moscow University. In his book, *Summoning the Spirit of General Vlasov* (2007), Popov, who does not hide his ideological proximity to NTS, considers that Vlasov did not betray Russia but on the contrary embodies an anti-Stalin vision of Russia that will shape the future of the country and should be rehabilitated.⁸

More academic debates also surrounded the interpretation of the Vlasov case. Andrei Zubov, a professor at MGIMO (Moscow State Institute of International Relations), supervised the publication, in 2009, of a two-volume *History of Twentieth-Century Russia (Istoriia Rossii XXogo veka)*. The 2,000-plus page compilation involved about 40 contributing authors; a fourth edition was released in 2016. Originally, Alexander Solzhenitsyn was part of the editorial board; the Nobel laureate later retracted his support for the project, but it continues to be known as the “Solzhenitsynian” version of Russian history. Zubov’s *History* advances a very anti-Soviet narrative on Russia’s history and offers a sympathetic treatment of all those who collaborated with Nazi Germany to defeat Stalinism. Zubov claims that Nazis and Bolsheviks both wanted to destroy the Russian peasant world; thus, Stalin, too, can be called a fascist. He considers the term “Great Patriotic War” to be a product of Soviet propaganda and proposes renaming the conflict more straightforwardly as the “Soviet-Nazi war.”⁹

His interpretation drew sharp criticism from the rest of the historian community,¹⁰ and this opprobrium only increased following his opposition to the annexation of Crimea – for which he was fired from MGIMO – and his decision to join the anti-Putin liberal party PARNAS (People's Freedom Party). Zubov’s interpretation of the war is embedded in a broader conception of Russia: he is a fervent Orthodox Christian, a member of several Synodal Commissions, and one of the authors of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Social Concept.¹¹ His opinion reflects the views of

⁸ See the English version: Gavriil Popov, *Summoning the Spirit of General Vlasov* (New York: Vantage Press, 2009). The Russian original dates from 2007.

⁹ Andrei Zubov, “Andrei Zubov o termine ‘sovetsko-natsistskaia voina,’” *LiveJournal* (blog), May 12, 2010, <http://russia-xx.livejournal.com/92043.html>.

¹⁰ “7 glavnykh mifov o voine. S kommentariiami istorikov,” *The Insider*, May 8, 2015, <http://theins.ru/history/7421>.

¹¹ Al’bert Naryshkin, “Professor Zubov kak ideolog novoi vlasovshchiny,” *Politicheskaiia Rossiia*, September 1, 2016, <http://politrussia.com/control/parnas-ve>

many of the Church's high-ranking members on twentieth-century Russian history.

These historiographical debates sprung up again in 2016–2017 around the Ph.D. thesis of Kirill Aleksandrov at the St. Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences.¹² Aleksandrov, known for being an NTS sympathizer, has published several books justifying Vlasov's actions as an example of social protest against Stalinist violence. In his main book, *Russian Soldiers of the Wehrmacht: Heroes or Traitors?*, he insists that the Vlasovites had won the support of the population and were fighting for Russia's statehood and national identity against the destructive goals of both Nazism and Stalinism. His Ph.D., about Vlasov's officer corps, was validated by the defense committee in 2016, but it gave rise to several critiques within the historian community and among veterans' associations.¹³ Andrei Artizov, director of the Russian State Archives, requested that a new committee conduct a second review of the thesis, in the hope of getting the argument debunked.¹⁴ That hope was fulfilled, and Aleksandrov was ultimately refused the title of doctor of history.¹⁵

As we can see from this brief sketch, Vlasov's legacy, partly blended with memory of NTS, has had a long-lasting but understudied impact on views of twentieth-century Russia. It has contributed to developing an alternative line of interpretation of major historical events that, even if it is far from gaining majority support, has been able to secure a growing audience in the past thirty years, with the Russian Orthodox Church and groups around it now becoming more vocal in promoting this vision of the past. It is our hope that the following documents will contribute to understanding of the phenomenon of collaboration as such and of Vlasov case particularly.

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¹² Kirill Aleksandrov, "Generalitet i ofiterskie kadry vooruzhionnykh formirovaniï Komiteta osvobodzheniia narodov Rossii v 1943-1946 gg." (PhD diss., St. Petersburg Institute of History, Russian Academy of Arts, 2015). See the story of the defense at "Porokhovaia bochka istorii," *Novaia Gazeta Sankt-Peterburg*, March 25, 2016, <http://novayagazeta.spb.ru/articles/10243/>.

¹³ See Mark Edele, "Fighting Russia's History Wars: Vladimir Putin and the Codification of World War II," *History & Memory* 29, no. 2 (2017): 90-124.

¹⁴ Sergei Aksionov, "Rosarkhiv likvidiruet vlasovshchinu," *Russkaia Planeta*, April 18, 2016, <http://rusplt.ru/society/rosarkhiv-likvidiruet-vlasovshchinu-23743.html>.

¹⁵ "Ekspertnyi sovet VAK ne podderzhal dissertatsiiu o vlasovtsakh," *Fontanka*, June 2, 2017, <https://www.fontanka.ru/2017/06/02/004/>.

Introduction

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The German war against the Soviet Union was conducted under the battle cry of “racial cleansing” and the physical annihilation of those persons undesirable to the Third Reich. The Nazis never hid their contempt for the Slavs who made up the majority of the USSR’s population, nor for representatives of other “non-Aryan” ethnicities. In formulating their own Ostpolitik, Berlin strategists recognized and took into account the multi-ethnic composition of the population in the occupied territories. Even in the pre-war period, the Nazis searched the national and ethnic populations of the USSR for those who were prepared to accept the ascendant role of fascist Germany in Europe and the world—people who were capable of unfailingly carrying out the orders of their subjugators as to the exploitation, pacification, and mobilization of the Soviet population for military ends.

Such searches were prompted by the Nazis’ experience in territories they had previously occupied. During the Second World War, puppet regimes dependent entirely on Berlin were in place in Holland, Norway, France, and other European countries. These accessories to Nazism were called “quislings,” after Vidkun Quisling, the minister-president of occupied Norway. Later, the French concept of “collaborationism” gained a foothold. Those labeled collaborationists (collaborators) in France were not only the members of the pro-German Vichy government, but everyone who cooperated with the Germans.

A central figure of the collaborationist movement in the Soviet Union was General Andrei Vlasov. This fact was evidenced by the existence of the broadly popular term *vlasovtsy*, which was used to denote supporters of the fascists, even if they were not members of the Russian Liberation Army (RLA) commanded by Vlasov.

The story of Vlasov's betrayal, from the moment he became a prisoner, to his service under the Germans, and up through the trial in Moscow in 1946, is the subject of this collection, which for the first time brings together all the most important documents on this theme, drawing on the archives of Russia, Belarus, Germany, and the U.S.

Collaborationism in Western Europe has been fairly well covered in modern historiography. The situation in Eastern Europe is somewhat more complicated.

The long ideological and military confrontation between the socialist and capitalist systems heavily influenced the perception of Soviet collaborationism. Trying to survive and avoid blame, many who cooperated with the occupiers fled to the West, where they presented themselves as tragic warriors against communism who had no choice but to stand under the flag of Nazi Germany. The context of the Cold War helped many of them find employment. Great Britain, Canada, the U.S., Australia, Brazil, Argentina, and later West Germany issued them passports. The State Department and U.S. special services even did this under false pretenses: in order to avoid publicity and public protest, the names and biographies of these individuals were changed, allowing them to evade American laws, enter the country, and receive special benefits. Such loyalty on the part of the government can be explained in part by decidedly pragmatic considerations: the newly-arrived immigrants were to help the West in the event of a military conflict with the Soviet Union.¹⁶

Western governments' political sympathy with the Soviet collaborators has affected the study of this question in foreign historiography, which can be divided for the purposes of this discussion into two groups: literature coming directly from

¹⁶ NARA. Discussion of Vlasov and psychological warfare. Case 7. Part IA. RG 319. See also: NSC. 10/12. RG 273; U.S. Army P&O Hot Files. Box 10. RG 319.

participants in the events (vlasovtsy, nationalists, emigrants, etc.) and the works of professional scholars.

Like the memoirs of the German officers who worked with them, the memoirs and other publications produced by supporters of the Nazis are generally of a single type, with many authors taking the same approach. They present themselves, as a rule, in the image of heroes or victims of circumstance who turned out to be too naïve and tragically underestimated Nazism. Moreover, not a shadow of a doubt is expressed as to the correctness of their choice. The recurring theme is regret that the Germans conducted an ill-advised and incorrect policy in the East; if only they had been smarter and treated the local populations and POWs (prisoners of war) better, then the outcome of the war would have been different for the USSR. Therefore, almost all post-war memoirs and literature produced by former collaborators are of a predominantly justificatory character. Their value lies in the introduction of factual evidence into scholarly circles, but this evidence still demands critical analysis and comparison with other sources of information.

From this standpoint, the most significant works are those of two vlasovtsy, Mikhail Shatov (Kashtanov) and Vladimir Pozdniakov. Both worked under the leadership of Vlasov for a time, and after the war, living in the West, they began to assemble their own archives. Pozdniakov, who served as Vlasov's adjutant for operational matters and an organizer of one of the units of the Russian Liberation Army, witnessed many events. From a factual standpoint, his work on Vlasov is one of the best, but it is worth remembering that the author's service in U.S. intelligence and military agencies affected his framing of events.¹⁷

Between 1952 and 1957, a number of academic works on the topic appeared in the U.S. The first book, *Soviet Opposition to Stalin*, was written by George Fisher, a former U.S. military counterintelligence officer. The second, *German Rule in Russia*,

¹⁷ It would not be feasible to discuss in detail every aspect of historiographical debate in an introduction. So, we would like to draw your attention only to the most important works and to the trends in the current historiography. See: Shatoff, Michael, "*Bibliografia ODNR v gody Vtoroy Mirovoy voyny (1941-1945)*" (New York, 1961); Pozdniakov, V. V, "*Andrey Andreyevich Vlasov*" (Syracuse, 1973)

1941–1945, was authored by Aleksander Dallin (the son of the Menshevik D. Dallin), who also worked with American intelligence during the war. In terms of scope, the archival materials in Dallin's book are among the richest, such that the book maintains its significance even today. But it was written from the perspective that, "in 1941, Germany had a rare opportunity to appeal to the hidden dreams of the population of the Soviet Union." In other words, he contends that there were so many dissatisfied people in the USSR who were hostile to the communist government that the Nazis could easily have made use of them, but missed a unique opportunity to do so. This conviction seriously influences the logic of the argument and the author's conclusions.¹⁸ By the time Dallin came to revise the book for its 25th-anniversary edition, he was already more skeptical about the reality of the "opportunity," noting that, "we will never receive an answer. It will always remain open and unresolved."¹⁹

The author of the first German monograph on Vlasov was the late scientific director of the German Armed Forces Military History Research Office, Joachim Hoffman, who also wrote several works dedicated to the cooperation between the German government and local populations in the East.²⁰ It is worth noting that Hoffman was among those rightist-conservative German scholars who believe that the Nazis' attack on the USSR was of a preventative nature. He was hostile toward all things Soviet and wrote with great sarcasm about the Red Army. Moreover, he was always unusually reserved and of few words when it came to the crimes of the Nazis. His natural anti-hero is Adolf Hitler, who did not understand how to conquer other countries and did not listen to – and offended – the generals of the Wehrmacht. As it turns out, many intelligent, highly-educated, and decent German officers wanted only good for the peoples of the USSR, and they were

¹⁸ Dallin A. *German rule in Russia. 1941-1945*. Boulder. 1981. P. 674-677.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.* P. 681.

²⁰ For more information, see: Hoffman J. *Deutsche und Kalmyken, 1942-1945*. Freiburg. 1977; *Die Ostlegionen, 1941-1943*. Freiburg. 1986; *Die Geschichte der Wlassow-Armee*. Freiburg. 1986; *Kaukasien, 1942/43*. Freiburg. 1991; *Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941 – 1945: Planung, Ausführung und Dokumentation*. München. 1999.

sincere in their efforts to help them fight the communist evil. The peoples of the Soviet Union presumably did not desire war: soldiers surrendered in massive numbers, the Germans' approach was met by the local populations with almost wild enthusiasm, and they readily offered their services in the fight against the Bolsheviks. But the Führer and party officials loyal to him interfered with the military and did not allow them to organize collaboration with the locals. Hoffman tried to separate Vlasov from national-socialism, constantly seeking facts to support the "friendship" between the Russians and the Germans. Friendly relations between the vlasovtsy and the Germans did, of course, have their place, but such examples are few and contradict other facts. One such tale of "brothers in arms" is quite eloquent. After the Allies landed in France, during a battle on the Western Front, one Russian soldier – from a Russian Liberation Army battalion under the command of S. K. Bunyachenko – was seriously wounded. When the question arose of sending the wounded man to the field hospital, "the German side announced that it made no sense to treat him and it would be better simply to shoot him."²¹ A similar example is the Germans' humiliation of the families of those who served in the Russian Liberation Army, who necessarily found themselves in a refugee camp in Poland in August 1944.²²

English researcher Catherine Andreyev, a professor at Oxford University who is the daughter of a Russian emigrant, examines Vlasov's activities from a similar standpoint to that of Hoffman. In the book *Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement*, she tries to analyze the ideas and propaganda of Nazi supporters.²³ Due to Andreyev's personal sympathy with Vlasov, she tries to explain away all the unpleasant passages in the Vlasov documents and proclamations (including those supporting antisemitism, openly declaring friendship with Nazi Germany, and criticizing Anglo-American plutocracy) as being exclusively the result of the German administration's control and influence. She concludes that the true intentions of the vlasovtsy should be sought "between the lines,"

²¹ NARA. RG 238. Box 57. № 3043.

²² BA. R/6/168. Bl. 1, 15–17, 18–22.

²³ See: Andreev C. *Vlasov and Russian Liberation Movement*. Cambridge. 1987.

but cannot indicate between precisely which lines are hidden the true views and thoughts of Vlasov and his followers.

Western authors who describe Soviet collaborationism in rosy tones are united by a common methodological flaw. They recognize the fight against Bolshevism (the USSR, communism) as the most important strategic goal, the “liberating mission” that in and of itself justifies any methods and means, including allying with the Nazis. Moreover, they not only forget the famous proverb “the road to hell is paved with good intentions,” but they are unable to answer the fundamental question: did the phenomenon of betrayal exist in the years of the Soviet-German war? Their interpretation of collaborationism during the Second World War is a classic example of a double standard: to refuse to swear an oath of loyalty to France and instead follow the Nazis (Air Marshal Philippe Pétain) is betrayal, but to refuse to swear an oath of loyalty to the Soviet Union and therefore follow those same Nazis (General Vlasov) is, if not a feat of heroism, then at least a “liberation movement.”

Western and Russian scholars who study the Holocaust and the role of fascist sympathizers deserve great credit for uncovering the hateful and terroristic nature of the Nazi regime. Historians in the field agree that in the Nazis’ war “for destruction,” there was no chance, however illusory, of “another,” fairer policy that would have been attentive to local needs at that time. Slogans like “the fight for freedom,” “liberation from tyranny,” “new order,” and “united Europe,” all of which were spouted by the collaborationists, served only as a smoke screen to hide the crimes committed on a daily basis.²⁴

²⁴ Mulligan T. *The Politics of Illusion and Empire. German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1942-43*. N. Y. 1988; Schulte Th. *The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia*. Oxford, 1989; *Der national-sozialistische Krieg*. Norbert Frei, Hermann Kling (Hgs.) Frankfurt/N. Y. 1990; Chiari B. *Alltag hinter der Front. Besatzung, Kollaboration und Widerstand in Weissrussland, 1941-1944*. Düsseldorf. 1998; Gerlach Ch. *Kalkulierte Morde. Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weissrussland, 1941 bis 1944*. Hamburg, 1999; *Der deutsche Krieg im Osten 1941 - 1944 : Facetten einer Grenzüberschreitung*. Hartmann Ch. et al. (Hg.). München. 2009; Pohl D. *Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht : deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische Bevölkerung in der Sowjetunion 1941 - 1944*. Frankfurt, M. 2011; Klemann H., Kudryashov S. *Occupied Economies*. L. 2012; Ghilyazov I. “Legion «Idel-Ural»” (Moscow, 2009); “SSSR vo Vtoroy mirovoy

For understandable reasons, Vlasov's activities were always evaluated extremely negatively within Soviet historiography. For an extended period of time, the topic was entirely forbidden. The first attempts at generalization appeared only in the late 1980s with the lifting of censorship limitations, the liquidation of special storage areas, and the opening of the Russian archives.²⁵ Under the conditions of previously unheard-of freedom of opinion, works that related some rather exaggerated versions of events appeared. The pen of Viktor Ivanovich Filatov, the former editor of *The Military-Historical Journal*, for instance, turned all vlasovtsy into "Soviet intelligence agents" who were, he alleged, carrying out a secret mission authorized by Stalin to break up the enemy.²⁶ Meanwhile, the former head of the Moscow Soviet, Gavriil Kharitonovich Popov, saw in Vlasov's ideological heritage the prototype for modern Russian democracy. He therefore suggested not only rehabilitating the general, but even erecting a monument to him.²⁷

In modern Russian historiography, following the example of the West, some pro-Vlasov works appeared alongside the anti-Vlasov ones.²⁸ One famous representative of the pro-Vlasov genre is K.M. Aleksandrov. Aleksandrov's final book, *The Officer Corps of the Army of Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, 1944–1945*, was put together on the basis of archival and bibliographic materials; all the personnel surrounding the general are represented.²⁹ The author tries to present Vlasov and those around him in a positive light, considering their actions justified by the repressive policies of the

voine. Okkupatsiya. Holocaust, Stalinizm" (Moscow, 2014,) etc.

²⁵ See, for example, A.F. Katusyev and V.G. Oppokov articles in "Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal" 1990 (# 4) and 1991 (# 4, 7, 9, and 12).

²⁶ See: Filatov V. "Vlasovschina, ROA: Beliy Pyatna" (Moscow, 2005)

²⁷ See: See: Popov Gavriil, *Summoning the Spirit of General Vlasov*, New York, Vantage Press, 2009.

²⁸ See, for example, Kudryashov S.V. Reshin L.E. "Osvoboditeli. Vlasov i vlasovtsy" in *Rodina*, 1992. # 8-9, pp. 84-95; Ramanichev N. ("Vlasov i drugiye") in "Vtoraya mirovaya voina. Aktual'nye problemy." (Moscow, 1995, pp. 292-312); Kovalev B.N. "Natsistkaya okkupatsiya i kollaboratsionizm v Rossiye (1941-1944)" (Moscow, 2004,) etc.

²⁹ Aleksandrov K.M. "Ofiterskiy korpus armii general-leitenanta A.A. Vlasova 1944 – 1945" (Moscow, 2009.) See, also "Materialy po istorii Russkogo Osvoboditel'nogo Dvizheniya (1941–1945,)" (Moscow, 1997–1999. Edition I–IV)

Soviet government. He sees nothing nefarious in cooperating with the Nazis, and he as good as reanimates the old thesis propounded by post-war Vlasov-related émigrés about the “third force”: though receiving a salary from the Germans, they fought not only against Stalin, but also against Hitler (almost like the Banderist Ukrainian Insurgent Army with its two-faced tactic of “war on two fronts”).³⁰ The book leaves no doubt as to which side has the author’s sympathies. It is no accident that Aleksandrov avoids the term “collaborationism,” clearly aware that this phenomenon became anathema with the international Nuremberg Trials.

On the whole, thanks to the efforts of scholars from various countries, the study of collaborationism has made significant progress in the past decade.³¹ The tendency to study collaborationism is clearly complex—as complex as a unified Europe. Local specifics must be taken into account and the framework of the interplay between individuals and governments, as well as the role of dictatorship, violence, and terror, considered.³²

In such a context, the figure of Vlasov, for all his flair, is nothing unique or extraordinary. In every country, the Germans found local leaders who helped the occupiers leverage and control the conquered territories as well as destroy the political and ideological enemies of the Reich. Practically everywhere, supporters of the Nazis insisted that they collaborated “for the good of the Homeland,” in the name of the interests of the titular nationality and the creation of a national government, and after the war made excuses for their actions, claiming that there were no alternatives and that they were compelled to make the “heavy choice” for the “fight against Bolshevism.”³³

³⁰ See: “*Ukrainskie natsionalisticheskie organizatsii v gody Vtoroy mirovoy voyny. Dokumenty*” (Volumes 1-2, Moscow., 2012)

³¹ See detailed bibliography in: Müller R-D., Ueberschär G. R. *Hitlers Krieg im Osten 1941 - 1945: ein Forschungsbericht*. Darmstadt. 2012.

³² See examples of these trends in: Bartov O. *Murder in Our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and Representation*. N.Y. 1996; Gerlach Ch. *Extrem gewalttätige Gesellschaften*. München. 2011; *Die Wehrmacht : Mythos und Realität / im Auftr. des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes hrsg. von Rolf-Dieter Müller und Hans-Erich Volkmann*. München. 2012; *Deutsche Besatzung in der Sowjetunion 1941-1944*. Babette Quinkert, Jörg Morré (Hg.) Paderborn. 2014.

³³ *Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in den zeitweilig besetzten Gebieten der*

In the summer of 1942, after the unsuccessful offensive on the Volkhov front and the subsequent surrounding and destruction of the Second Shock Army, the Soviet leadership took great pains to save the army's commander, Lieutenant General Andrei Andreevich Vlasov, and his command unit. Having received unconfirmed information about the general's location in one of the partisan detachments, Stalin, who knew Vlasov personally, ordered that he be immediately brought out to the "Big Land," if necessary "engaging all aviation power of the front to achieve this goal."³⁴ However, this intelligence was never confirmed. Other information began to come in, including the less-than-comforting news that the commander of the Second Shock Army had been taken prisoner.

In spite of the assertions of Vlasov's supporters and the general's own claims that he had been taken prisoner in battle, Vlasov was imprisoned without a single shot or any resistance on his part. On the evening of June 11, 1942, Vlasov was stopped by peasants from the Yam-Tesovskii village council near Luga. The head of the village locked him and his companion, the cook M. Voronova, in the bath-house. Somehow, the head of the village managed to take the general's revolver from Vlasov; he later gave it to the Germans. On the morning of June 12, a group of German scouts entered the Old Believer village of Tukhovezhi in a rover. The head of the village opened the bath-house and ordered the prisoner to come out.

Sowjetunion (1941-1944). Norbert Müller et al. (Hg.) Berlin. 1991; Dahl H. F. Quisling: A Study in Treachery. Cambridge. 1999; Dean M. Collaboration in the Holocaust. Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941-1944. N. Y. 2000; Müller R.-D. An der Seite der Wehrmacht: Hitlers ausländische Helfer beim "Kreuzzug gegen den Bolschewismus" 1941-1945. Augsburg. 2012; Holocaust und Völkermorde : die Reichweite des Vergleichs / hrsg. im Auftr. des Fritz-Bauer-Instituts von Sybille Steinbacher . Frankfurt, M.; N. Y. 2012; Bundgård C. Ch.; Poulsen N. B.; Smith P. S. Under hagekors og Dannebrog : danskere i Waffen SS. København. 2005; Semiryaga, Mikhail. "Kollaboratsionizm. Prioda, tipologiya i proyavleniya v gody Vtoroy mirovoy voyni" (Moscow, 2000); Kovalev B.N. "Kollaboratsionizm v Rossii v 1941 - 1945: tipy i formy" (Novgorod, 2009,) etc.

³⁴ Decree of the Supreme Command Stavka #170518, TsAMO RF, F. 148a. Op. 376. D. 126. L. 127

“In the open door,” Sonderführer Poelchau reported to the command unit of the 18th German Army, “appeared a thin, tall Russian soldier, dressed in a typical long service shirt without insignia or medals. On his face, on a crooked nose, he wore horned glasses. The soldier said in broken German: ‘Don’t shoot. I’m General Vlasov.’ After this, he handed Oberleutnant von Schwerdtner a red leather-covered identification with the facsimile signature of Marshal Timoshenko.”³⁵ Thus began the incarceration and subsequent betrayal of a person who, in the words of writer Ilya Ehrenburg, brought people much evil.³⁶

The imprisonment of commanding officer Vlasov was a great success for the German command. The war had been going on for more than a year, and the Germans still had no high-level military or political figure whom they could turn to their side and use for propaganda purposes to break down the Red Army or suggest as a leader for the many assisting armed groups.

In August 1942, “the size of Eastern territories and the urgent necessity to make careful use of the German person” prompted the Supreme High Command of the German Army to issue Special Order No. 800, regulating the use of the local population and POWsPOW in military service. By that time, a certain terminology had already been established in relation to those mobilized. The general term “volunteers” (*Freiwillige*) was used to refer to everyone of non-German nationality, mainly from Western Europe and the Baltics, who served in the Wehrmacht and the SS. This term was used rarely for Slavs, and even then generally only at the end of the war. Russians were usually used for policing, in *Abwehr*³⁷ counterintelligence units, and as the so-called *hiwi* (*Hilfswillige*, “voluntary helpers”).³⁸ Special Order No. 800 served to limit the spheres in which “volunteers” could be used; regimented the norms for their rations, material provisions and merit recognition;

³⁵ HIA. Dallin A. Box 6. File 6–24

³⁶ Ehrenburg, Ilya, *Memoirs 1921–1941*, Cleveland, OH, 1963

³⁷ In the *Ordnung Hilfspolizei* (Auxiliary police of order), *Ordnungsdienst* (Odi) (Service of order), *Schutzmannschaft* (Schuma) (Protective units), *Gemeindepolizei* (GemPo) (Municipal police), and the so-called *Vertrauensleute* (V-Leute) (Trusted men.)

³⁸ *Hilfswillige* (Hiwi.)

and instituted the “ceremonial” swearing of allegiance to Führer Hitler. The rank of “General of Volunteer Formations” was created under the Supreme High Command. This general was answerable for such formations’ creation, military and ideological education, reformation, and consequent inspection. When deployed, the units answered directly to the army command unit.³⁹

At this time, the general term “Eastern troops” (Osttruppen) increasingly began to appear in German documents. This encompassed all military units of local populations and POWsPOWs in occupied Soviet territories. In parallel, the narrower term “Eastern legions” was used to refer to formations of people of non-Russian ethnicity.⁴⁰

In early 1943, Nazi propaganda attached the catchphrase “Russian Liberation Army” (RLA) to many of the assisting units with a Russian contingent. Following the Germans, this is how they began to be referred to in Soviet military and partisan dispatches.⁴¹ It is important to understand that no “divisions” or “battalions” of the RLA existed in the German army before the end of 1944. In the terminology of the Wehrmacht, these were all “Eastern troops,” “Eastern legions,” “Eastern battalions,” and “Eastern squadrons.” Their ethnic composition was not uniform, the Germans were always shuffling them around, and individuals of Russian ethnicity were far from the majority. Some “Russian units” were in fact semi-experimental units of the German intelligence agencies, the Wehrmacht, or the SS, and had no relation whatsoever to the RLA.⁴²

In this way, the Germans paved the way long before Vlasov appeared and created corresponding structures for the mobilization of prisoners and local populations. They well understood that it was necessary to give these people an idea for which they would be willing to fight their countrymen under the Nazi flag. Propaganda therefore played a crucial role. Millions of

³⁹ TsAMO, F. 500. Op. 12462. D. 689

⁴⁰ Ostlegionen. By the end of the war this term was applied in German documents to Slavic units as well.

⁴¹ RGASPI F. 69 (The central headquarters of the partisan movement.)

⁴² E.G. Kaminsky brigade was under control of the 2nd German tank army’s headquarters, the so-called Russian National People’s Army (RPLA) was an Abwehr unit, while the Gil-Rodionov brigade was an SD-SS pilot project.

copies of agitprop anti-Soviet fliers and posters were printed; in occupied Soviet territories, more than 200 different newspapers and magazines were published in Russian alone. Special propaganda films were shot and shown at local theaters.

As a result of the USSR's heavy defeats in 1941 and 1942, dozens of Red Army generals wound up in prison camps. The majority of them refused to cooperate with the Nazis. A characteristic example is former Army commander Lieutenant General M. F. Lukin, who under interrogation cursed the Bolsheviks and communist policies, especially Stalinist collectivization,⁴³ but categorically refused to cooperate with the Germans.⁴⁴ Some, however, did agree to it. The Chief of Staff of the 19th Army, V. F. Malyskin, and the deputy Chief of Staff of the headquarters of the North-Western Front, F. I. Trukhin, wrote several notes suggesting ideological and subversive (including sabotage) work in the Soviet rear area, first in October–November 1941 and then in the spring of 1942.⁴⁵ But neither of the Major Generals was well enough known to head a German propaganda campaign to break apart the Soviet troops.

And then Vlasov appeared.

From the transcripts of the first German interrogations at the 18th Army headquarters, it is clear that Vlasov hid nothing and answered all questions put to him.⁴⁶ Sensing that the general was reaching out, the Germans structured their work with the captive in a psychologically effective way. They spoke to him with emphatic politeness, treated him as a respected person, and assigned to him educated officers with a good knowledge of the Russian language. Although at the end of the war the general complained that in the camp for high command prisoners in

⁴³ For General M.F. Lukin's interrogation see: Politarchiv des Auswärtigen Amtes. XIII. T. 2. R 105178.

⁴⁴ BA-MA. RH/2/2558. Bl. 66–70.

⁴⁵ TsA FSB. № N-18766. T. 8. LL. 4-5, 7-9, 10-14.

⁴⁶ TsA FSB. № N-18766. T. 7. L. 22–30.

Vinnitsa he had had to wash his own clothes, in comparison to millions of his countrymen, he was well provided-for. Almost immediately, the Germans began to put the idea to Vlasov that there was no way back, that he was capable of much, and that if he desired, he could participate in the newly created “Russian government.” For some time, the general wavered, but early in August 1942, he agreed.⁴⁷ And so, on 10 September, he wrote his first missive to the commanders of the Red Army and the Soviet intelligentsia, calling on them to fight against the Soviet government.⁴⁸

A year later, in October 1943, speaking at a conference in Poznani before the Reichsleiter and Gauleiter of the Reich, Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler cynically and openly explained to his fellow party members who Vlasov was, where he had come from, and how the Germans really felt about him. “... Our Brigadeführer SS Parteigenosse Fegelein captured one Russian general,” announced Himmler, thus admitting that Vlasov, who was officially listed under the command of the propaganda unit of the High Command of the German Infantry, had in fact been under the close watch of Nazi special forces from the first days of his captivity.

... The Russian that we captured was the commander of a Shock Army. Then dear Fegelein told his people jokingly, “We will act and behave toward him as if he were a real general.” When he was around, they made formations stand at attention, addressed him as General this, General that. Anyone would accept such a thing. It is the same the world over. And it worked. After all, he had received the Order of Lenin number 770, which he later presented to Brigadeführer SS Fegelein. Fegelein allowed him, when the Führer pinned his oak leaves on him, to present the Order of Lenin to the Führer himself. Then the Führer had it packed into a silver case and returned it to Fegelein (incidentally). That is, we treated the general correctly, with unbelievable politeness and kindness. Considering how these Slavs are, they willingly speak and listen to one another, and if someone tells them, “You know much better than I do,” and then politely listens to them, and maybe encourages them to have a bit of a discussion, then that guy will give up any of his divisions, any plan for operational

⁴⁷ TsA FSB. № N-18766. T. 7. L. 59–65

⁴⁸ TsA FSB. № 18766. T. 7. L. 66.

deployment, all that he was planning on doing and basically everything he knows.

What is the price for such betrayal? On the third day, we told the general something like this: "You know, of course, that now there is no turning back for you. But you are a very prominent man, and we guarantee you that when the war is over, you will receive the pension of a Russian Lieutenant General, and from now on and for the immediate future, liquor, cigarettes and women."⁴⁹

Vlasov was transferred from the camp in Vinnitsa to a camp run by the propaganda department of the German army in Berlin, where he met several of his future associates in the movement. The general recommended that the Germans transfer all Russian units to his command and unite them into an army. He was told that the formation of units was delayed due to the lack of a Russian political center. Therefore, if he wanted to have any success, he would have to create such a leadership center.

Together with the former Chief of Staff of the 19th Army, V. F. Malyshkin, a former member of the military council of the 32nd Army, G. N. Zhilenkov, and an officer in the propaganda department, M. A. Zykov (who had been a member of the editorial staff of the newspaper *Izvestiia*), Vlasov put together an address to the so-called Russian Committee. The text of the address was edited by the Germans several times and in the end was published on 27 December, 1942.⁵⁰ It was signed by Vlasov as the chair and Malyshkin as the secretary of the committee. Millions of copies of the address were distributed throughout the Eastern Front and in the rear territory.

The address announced that the Committee was taking upon itself the functions of the Russian government and stated that its goal was to overthrow Stalin, destroy Bolshevism, and achieve an "honorable peace with Germany." The address was purportedly signed in Smolensk; as such, this document is often referred to as the "Smolensk Proclamation" in the literature. In fact, Vlasov was

⁴⁹ See: Document 1919-PS: Speech by Himmler on the occasion of the SS Group leader meeting Posen, 4 October 1943 // Trial of the Major War Criminals before The International Military Tribunal. Nuremberg 14 November

⁵⁰ See: BA. R/6/35. Bl. 137–140. See also: TsAFSB. № N-18766. T. 7. L. 68–68 ob.; RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 165. L. 46–46 ob.

located in Berlin at the time, but the signers and their masters considered it politically disadvantageous to admit that the committee had been formed in the German capital.⁵¹

The “Address of the Russian Committee” did not lead to the creation of a real center of new Russian power, which would, of course, have been entirely unnecessary to the Nazi leadership. Vlasov overestimated the sincerity of the Germans’ offer. However, by signing another anti-Soviet proclamation, he allowed the Nazi propaganda machine to begin one of its most massive ideological campaigns for the break-up of the Red Army. As late as the end of the war, this campaign was referenced in German documents under the name “Aktion Wlassow,” or Project Vlasov.

In March 1943, the newspaper *Zarya for Russian POWs* (POWs, along with several other Russian-language newspapers, published a major letter from Vlasov entitled “Why I Set Off on the Path to Fight Against Bolshevism.”⁵² Concurrent with the publication of the letter, the Germans arranged for the general to make several trips to regions just behind the front line. As a result of these trips, he visited Mogilev, Pskov, Dno, Strugi Krasnye, Luga, and other occupied towns, where he spoke to local residents and units of “Eastern troops,” calling on them to mercilessly fight Bolshevism and cooperate with Germany. As stated in the German reports included in this collection, Vlasov always pointed to “the necessity of establishing close and friendly relations with the German government, who were doing everything possible to help the country.”

In spite of the fact that Vlasov followed the Germans’ orders and continuously published boilerplate texts of their propaganda, during these meetings with locals the general gradually began to draw attention to facts and events that his German masters would have preferred that he not speak about. In one case, for example, Vlasov announced that, “Russians don’t want to be slaves and will never become them,” “national socialism is impossible to imprint fully on the Russian people,” and “emigrants should not dream of

⁵¹ TsA FSB. F. N-18766. T. 2. L. 1-42.

⁵² TsAFSB. № N-18766. T. 7. L. 67.

returning to their previous lands and former properties.”⁵³ In another speech, he said that “the achievements of the Russian people and their Bolshevik leadership are quite significant, and the Germans will not soon be able to achieve victory through the force of arms alone.” To the faces of the German officers, Vlasov spoke “of the mistakes of Germany in its treatment of Russia,” contended that “the Russian people cannot be kept down,” and stated “the country cannot be seen as a colony.”

These statements by Vlasov contradicted the interests of the Third Reich and generated deep frustration within the German hierarchy. As has been noted, the Nazis understood that the expanse of space, the great losses, and the necessity of police control and intensive maintenance of the occupied territories demanded a massive engagement of the local population. In order to keep that population in check and protect it from Soviet counter-propaganda, they needed a leader like Vlasov. But his vision of Russian government—an independent Russian state allied with Germany—was diametrically opposed to the basic principles of national-socialism, which presupposed limitless exploitation of the subjugated countries and open colonialism.

The Nazis had, at first, envisioned the war against the Soviet Union as one of destruction, in which millions of people were to have been physically annihilated. There was no talk of any “partnership” or an independent Russia. In his diary entry of 16 July, 1941, M. Borman quoted the following demand made by Hitler: “We emphasize as if we were bringing freedom. In principle, as it turns out, we are talking about how to conveniently divide up a gigantic pie, as though we already owned it to begin with, and ruled it in the second place, and put it to our own uses in the third.”

The “Vlasov Project” and its goals became a topic of discussion by the Führer himself. At a briefing with Field Marshal General V. Keitel and his subordinates at Berghof, his residence in the Bavarian Alps, on 8 June, 1943, Hitler openly explained that he “did not need a Russian army that I will have to sew up entirely in German corset belts. If instead I get Russian workers, that will be beneficial to me.”

⁵³ BA-MA. RH/19 III/659. Bl. 94–101.

Later, he recalled the final days of the First World War, when on the word of General E. Ludendorff, who was well known to Hitler, the Germans – due to their own lack of personnel – decided to draft Poles into the German army on a massive scale. They created Polish legions that soon turned their weapons against the Germans in battle, thereby facilitating the establishment of an independent Poland. “We cannot slip back into the mess we had in 1916,” underscored Hitler. “This cannot be. We cannot allow it. We cannot hand over these formations to a third party, who, having them in hand, will say that today you are with us, but tomorrow you are not. One fine day we will be faced with a sort of uprising. It will spread throughout the front, and then they will organize themselves and begin their extortion.” In other words, the Russians could do just as the Poles had done, concluded the Führer. Therefore, let there be no Russian Liberation Army, and use Vlasov only for propaganda purposes to dissolve the enemy.⁵⁴

Between this briefing and the fall of 1944, Vlasov’s public speeches and his travels through the occupied territories were canceled. Vlasov was issued a property on the outskirts of the German capital, but the authorities hardly allowed him to leave. His activities were confined to the realm of propaganda.

At the end of February 1943, in the town of Dabendorf near Berlin, the Special Department for Eastern Propaganda – often referred to in the literature as the Dabendorf School of the Russian Liberation Army – was created. The School ran short courses that prepared propagandists, some of whom later became officers in the RLA, for the “Eastern formations” and military prison camps. The department put out a series of publications titled “The Library of the Propagandist,” a peculiar set of notes on the lectures given in Dabendorf. The main goal of the courses was to arm former Soviet POWs with anti-Soviet propaganda. Vlasov regularly visited the school, attended lectures, and spoke at marches and parades. His masters allowed him no further activity.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ See: BA. R/6/634. Bl. 21–26; The Journal of Modern History. Vol. XXIII. № 1 (March 1951). P. 58–71

⁵⁵ See: Andreev C. Op. cit.; Aleksandrov K. M. “*Russkie soldaty Vernakhta. Geroi ili predateli*” (Moscow, 2005. Pp. 143–145.) etc. See also the Volume 2 of this book,

Moscow took Vlasov's appearance on the side of fascist Germany with the utmost seriousness. The massive ideological indoctrination of populations in the occupied territories and the creation of pro-German units demanded decisive rebuttal. The Soviet leadership worked up a whole host of retaliatory measures. In the beginning of June 1943, a flyer put together by the Chief Political Administration of the Red Army and entitled "Who Vlasov Is," was distributed. The text of the flier was edited by Stalin himself,⁵⁶ who went so far as to order the physical liquidation of the traitor (the so-called "boar hunt"). The Central Headquarters for Partisan Movements and the state security agencies were given the main role in the operation. Special secret service groups were created to be sent to the front lines, where they searched among those surrounding the general for any kind of way to reach him. For a long time, Moscow was unaware that the Germans had ceased sending Vlasov on trips around the occupied territories. Later, they tried getting rid of Vlasov in Berlin by putting poison in his wine, but—as the documents in this collection show—they were unsuccessful.⁵⁷

In the sources and literature, various and sometimes diametrically opposed opinions can be found as to the battle-readiness of the "Eastern units." A significant portion of them were used in retaliatory operations against the partisans, to protect lines of communication including railways and other objects, and even as assistant personnel in German air-defense batteries and firefighting units. Their successful deployment in these spheres is often underscored by German dispatches. It is noted in several Soviet documents that individual units of *vlasovtsy* fought on the side of the Germans "with the despair of the doomed." As the head of the Political Administration of the 1st Belorussian Front, Major General S. T. Galadzhev, reported, in order to fool members of the Red Army, the *vlasovtsy* would undertake any kind of provocation.

interrogation protocols of I.A. Blagoveschensky and F.I. Trukhin (documents from subdivisions № 4 and № 5).

⁵⁶ RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 204. L. 46–47; TsAMO. F. 32. Op. 11309. D. 166. L. 71–73.

⁵⁷ NARB. F. 4p. Op. 33a. D. 609. L. 34–55. F. 4p. Op. 33a. D. 609. L. 34–55.

For example, during battle a Red Army soldier firing somewhere from a position of cover would suddenly hear Russian spoken in front of him. Usually, it was the words, “Don’t shoot!” or “What are you shooting at? Friendlies here!” But after the soldier ceased fire and came out from safety, the vlasovtsy would fire machine guns at him. All this only fed the hatred that the Red Army felt toward the vlasovtsy. Many soldiers said, “These traitors are worse than the Germans.” Therefore, Red Army soldiers usually did not take vlasovtsy prisoner during battle, but instead killed them on the spot.⁵⁸ Sculptor Ernst Neizvestnyi confirms such a view of the vlasovtsy. In his memoirs, he writes that toward Vlasov, “I felt only the deepest of hatred, as a traitor to the Motherland, and I considered it my duty upon encountering any vlasovets to kill him immediately, more so than the Germans.”⁵⁹

Nevertheless, there are many more documents about the low level of battle readiness displayed by volunteers, their lack of skill, lack of discipline, and desertion. Many of these are published in this collection. The “Eastern units,” an object of continuous counter-propaganda, were never seen as particularly reliable by the German high command.⁶⁰ Massive desertion of soldiers to the partisans or to the Red Army called their use in battle into doubt. It was also unpleasant for the Germans that, when running over to the Soviet side, the “volunteers” very often killed their “German brothers in arms.” This is exactly what happened when, in August 1943, several thousand fighters from the 1st Russian National Brigade of the SS, under the command of V. V. Gil’-Rodionov, crossed over to join the Belorussian partisans. On the order of their commander, the *rodionovtsy* killed the German officers and arrested the former commander of a rifle division, General Major P. V. Bogdanov, who was loyally serving under the Germans. As proof of their loyalty to the Soviet government, they destroyed a German garrison in Dokshitsy and attacked a railway station in Krulevshin. In September 1943, more than 500 people went over to the partisans

⁵⁸ TsAMO. F. 32. Op. 11289. D. 577. L. 105–106.

⁵⁹ Ernst Neizvestny *"Govorit Neizvestnyi"* (Frankfurt am Main, 1984. p. 84.)

⁶⁰ See: Zabelin A.E., Korotayev V.I., eds. *"Kollaboratsionizm v Sovetskom Soyuze, 1941-1945"* (Moscow, 2014, pp. 141-147)

from the brigade of former Oberbürgermeister of the Lokotskii district government B. V. Kaminsky

After the above case, massive numbers of participants in the RLA went over to the side of the Soviet partisans, prompting the German command to decide, in the fall of 1943, to transfer a large number of ethnic and eastern formations to the West, predominantly to France and Italy, where “volunteers” more successfully fought against the Allied forces and local partisans.

The ingress of the Red Army to the borders of the Soviet Union, together with the landing of Anglo-American soldiers in Normandy, clearly showed that the Germans were losing the war. The human capital of Nazi Germany was melting away. Under these conditions, the Germans “remembered” Vlasov, who, judging by a note in a report by the Hauptsturmführer SS, was in a depressed psychological state. The general complained that no one was interested in his opinion and that no one paid any attention to him, including in terms of provisions. “Did they value my actions?” asked Vlasov. “Not in the least. They treat me over and over again as someone less than human. For example, I, who am supposedly the commander of the so-called Russian Liberation Army, have only one set of underwear. My breeches are tied with a knot in the front because they have torn.” The general once again offered his services. “Let them give me something small, a division, for example, and I could show them what I am worth.”⁶¹

At last, Vlasov’s request was heard. Help, this time, came from a surprising place—from Himmler, whose power and authority had significantly increased after the unsuccessful attempt on the life of the Führer in June 1944. Until fairly recently, Himmler had, like Hitler, been an opponent of using Vlasov to command Russian units within the German army. But now the situation was different, and in order to save themselves, the Nazis were prepared to grasp at any straw, to accept any aid. In addition, the Reichsführer was the commander of the reserve forces of Germany, and new people were urgently needed to fill gaps on the front. And it was no

⁶¹ See: CM. BA-MA. RH/2/1517. Bl. 220–226

concern that the missing human capital was the Eastern people, these “subhumans” (*Untermenschen*).

Paradoxically, the very same “subhuman” brochure produced by Himmler, of which millions of copies had been distributed, was again being spread among the Germans. It stoked hatred toward the Slavs and unequivocally indicated to the eastern workers and Russian “helpers” their slave-like position in the Reich. The racial ideas of the brochure were the subject of massive offense and complaints from the vlasovtsy and other participants in the “Eastern formations.” And now these “subhumans” were being promised real units in the Russian Liberation Army and were issued weapons.⁶²

On 18 September, 1944, Himmler and Vlasov had their first meeting. Though the minutes of the conversation have not been preserved, in the pro-Vlasov literature it is described in epic terms.⁶³ Vlasov himself, in his testimony in Moscow, was more reserved. Himmler announced that the German armed forces’ propaganda department could not organize Russian POWs to fight against the Bolsheviks, and therefore he was to lead this work himself from now on. Himmler suggested uniting all the existing White Guards in German territory with the nationalist and other anti-Soviet organizations to create a single political center, with Vlasov at its head. In return, the general offered to create an agency called the “Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia” (CLPR) and to form an army consisting of ten divisions. Himmler agreed with the idea of creating CLPR, and he gave instructions to

⁶² See: Hass G. *Zum Rußlandbild der SS // Das Rußlandbild im Dritten Reich.* (Hg.) H.-E. Volkmann. Köln. 1994. S. 201-224.

⁶³ See: TsAMO F. 500. Op. 12493. D. 5. L. 43; HIA. Dallin A. Box 6. F. 6–25. See also: Aleksandrov K. M., Op. cit. pp. 275-276, 323. Aleksandrov hasn't seen Himmler's Work Diaries. The meeting took place on September 18, and not 16. It began at 2 pm and not at 10 am. It lasted exactly three hours (and not «more than four hours»): from 2 pm through 4 pm was joint lunch, followed by business discussion till 5 pm. According to Aleksandrov, SS Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger's presence «was not confirmed in German sources,» while Himmler's diary indicated that Berger was there during both lunch and discussion. Himmler invited Vlasov for the second time «for a cup of tea» on January 21, 1945. The meeting lasted from 5:30 pm through 7:30 pm. Berger and an interpreter were also present.

work up a manifesto for the committee and present it to him for approval. But he only agreed to the creation of five divisions. Later, and not without the influence of the Führer, that number was reduced to two.

The formation of the new political structure CLPR, however, faced serious opposition. The Ministry of Occupied Eastern Territories, through its head, Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg, spoke out against the idea. In several lengthy notes, including several addressed to the Führer himself, Rosenberg warned of the dangers connected with refusing the previous Eastern policies. The creation of a committee under the control of the Russian Vlasov – one that would unite all anti-Soviet and anti-Moscow nationalist groups – would be a return to Imperial Russia, wiping clean the many years of work the Germans had put into the formation of formally independent nationalist groupings in occupied Soviet territory. Only some of the ethnic groups would agree to join CLPR, Rosenberg predicted. And he turned out to be right. In spite of the support of the SS leadership, Vlasov could not manage to resolve this question. They were unable, in particular, to establish a dialogue with the Ukrainian nationalists. To the offer to coordinate their efforts, Stepan Bandera, recently released from house arrest by the Germans, answered Vlasov's emissary, G. H. Zhilenkov, in the following way: "Whatever Moscow might be like, Russians nevertheless remain the enemy of Ukrainians—they brought Bolshevism to Ukraine, so I don't want to have anything to do with the Muscovites."⁶⁴

By contrast with the disagreeable nationalists, many members of White emigrant organizations turned out to be amenable to joining CLPR. In order to force the chiefs of the Cossack movement to join the committee, the Nazis decided on an extraordinary measure: they fired a loyal ally, the head of the Main Administration for Cossack Armed Forces of the Imperial Ministry of the occupied eastern territories, the former ataman of the Don Troops, P. N. Krasnov, who refused to answer to Vlasov.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ See: HIA, Dallin, Box 6, F. 6–27; BA, NS/31/35, Bl. 35–36; там же R/6/72, Bl. 46–47, BA, NS 31/28, Bl. 19–22.

⁶⁵ See: GARF, F. 5761, Op. 1, D. 14, L. 361–361o6.; BA, NS/19/3120, Bl. 6, 6v, 7; BA–

The participation of White Guards and other emigrant groups in the Vlasov movement is a complex topic in its own right. In looking at it, it is essential to remember that, as opposed to the *vlasovtsy* who came from the Red Army, the emigrants had taken no military oaths, since they had never sworn loyalty to the Soviet government. What's more, in spite of the unpleasantness of Bolshevism, part of the Russian émigré population decidedly refused to cooperate with the Nazis, refused any support from Vlasov, and joined the ranks of the opposition.⁶⁶

The first meeting of CLPR was held under the control of the Nazis in the Prague fortress on 14 November, 1944. At this time, the manifesto that had been pre-approved by Himmler – which is often referred to as the “Prague Manifesto” in the literature – was published.⁶⁷ The committee was made up of around 60 members and candidates. Soviet investigators were very interested in one phrase in the manifesto: “some of the members of the committee have not signed the document due to the fact that they are located in the USSR.” Vlasov was emphatically asked to name these people. The general explained that the line was introduced by Zhilenkov to create the appearance that representatives of the committee operated on the territory of the Soviet Union. To Vlasov's objection that the Germans could demand the names of these people, Zhilenkov answered that they could get out of the uncomfortable situation very easily: “We will name several commanders known to us in the USSR and say that they are purportedly on our side.”⁶⁸

The CLPR only met three times before the end of the war. Since the Vlasov chancellery managed to destroy the archives of CLPR, the main sources of information about its work are the memoirs of witnesses and the Soviet investigative teams. All CLPR activity was financed by the Nazis. On 18 January, 1945, Vlasov

MA. MSg/2/17819, Bl. 10–14; Bl. 28–30.

⁶⁶ See, for example, memoirs of Laroche G. *On les nommait des étrangers: Les immigrés dans la Résistance*. Paris, 1945; or an in-depth study of Michel H. *Les courants de pensée de la Résistance*. Paris, 1963; and Shkarenkov, L. K. “*Agoniya Beloi emigratsii*” (Moscow, 1987)

⁶⁷ GARF. F. 7021. Op. 148. D. 139. L. 327–327 ob., 328–328 ob.; BA-MA. MSg/2/17817. Bl. 135.

⁶⁸ See: TsAFSB. № N-18766. T. 2. L. 93–134

signed an agreement according to which he received credit from the German government.⁶⁹ It was supposed that the credit would be returned after the “victory” of the new Russian government.

The visit with Himmler and the CLPR meeting opened the doors of many important offices in Berlin to Vlasov. In a short period of time, he met with many of the leaders of the Reich, including Hermann Göring, Joseph Goebbels, and Joachim von Ribbentrop. Only Hitler refused to see Vlasov and declined to give permission for him to be named the high commander of all Eastern units.

Himmler suggested that Vlasov organize two divisions of the RLA and use them to exemplify the battle-readiness of his troops. The first division (around 17,000 soldiers and officers), under the command of Colonel S. K. Bunyachenko, was created in February 1945 and sent to the Eastern Front, to the region south of Frankfurt-am-Orden, in March. The second division (around 12,000 persons) was led by former Red Army Colonel G. A. Zverev. Its formation was completed in mid-April 1945, and it did not see combat.

As paradoxical as it might seem, Hitler, Keitel, and other German military figures turned out to be right not to trust the Vlasov units. Upon receiving the order to move and encountering strong opposition from the Red Army, the commander of the 1st division, Bunyachenko, voluntarily ceased the operation. After meeting with senior officers, he ignored orders from the German command and, “not wanting any pointless losses,” ordered the division to retreat from the front.⁷⁰ On 15 April, the division moved toward Bohemia at a brisk march. They wound up near Prague at the moment of the uprising (5–8 May). Vlasov, who was with the division, entered into negotiations with the leadership of the Prague insurgents and allowed Bunyachenko to intervene in support of the Czech protest.⁷¹ The vlasovtsy left Prague only when they heard that Soviet troops were approaching.

⁶⁹ BA. R/2/271. Bl. 134–135.

⁷⁰ See: HIA. AuskySt. Box. 2; See also: Aleksandrov K. M., *Op. cit.* p. 223

⁷¹ See: TsAFSB. № N-18766. T. 8. L. 20–25, 50–54; *ibidem*. T. 15, in an envelope, T. 25, in an envelope.

Throughout the war, the Vlasov propaganda berated the “American plutocrats” and insisted that “England is the enemy of Russia.” But when it became clear that Germany was suffering defeat, the vlasovtsy decided that those very Americans and English should save them. However, they failed to take into account the Allies’ stance on Nazi collaborators.

As early as June 1941, when he received news of Germany’s attack on the USSR, Winston Churchill publicly stated: “The citizen of any country marching in the ranks of Hitler is our enemy. This regards not only existing countries, but also any kind of representative of the disgusting caste of quislings who have made themselves the agents and instruments of Nazism in the fight with their own countrymen and their own homeland. Immediately after victory is achieved, we will take them to court in our tribunals. That is our policy, and that is our declaration.”⁷² From 1943 on, in London, Washington and Moscow, there were discussions about the foreign nationals fighting in the ranks of the German army. Gradually, a consensus was reached that these people should be turned over to the judicial systems of the countries whose citizens they were just before the war began. The U.S. and Great Britain would not commit to anything else, nor would they make any other arrangements with the collaborationists. Consequently, the Soviet citizens were to be repatriated to the USSR.

In the literature, the possibility of Vlasov’s escape to another country is sometimes discussed. Switzerland, Spain, Serbia, Sweden, and even Poland are listed as options. In our view, all of these claims are just theoretical. There is no documentary evidence that these countries were willing to accept the general.⁷³

To date, no documents have been discovered in support of the claim that the general did not share the anti-Semitism of his Berlin hosts. In many of his speeches, especially in 1943, Vlasov openly accused the communist regime in Moscow of disdaining national interests and defending the interests of “world Jewry”; he appeared to have nothing against anti-Semitism. To be sure, apologists of the

⁷² Booker C. *A looking-glass tragedy*. London, 1997, p. 146.

⁷³ See: HIA. B. Nicolaevsky. Reel. 220

general point to the absence of any anti-Semitic utterances among the late propaganda materials of the vlasovtsy, including the Prague manifesto. But this can be explained by the flexibility of his German handlers—at the end of the war, there was no need to accentuate Judeophobia, particularly because the fascists hoped to the very end for a split among the Allies into anti-Hitler coalitions, and the vlasovtsy themselves harbored the hope that the English and the Americans would help them.

On 8 May, the 1st Division of the RLA was located in the region of Plzeň, where it intended to surrender to the American troops.⁷⁴ Having been denied an official capitulation by the Americans, individual convoys and groups decided to move in the direction of the border of southern Germany, then occupied by the Allies. This movement happened at the time when the Soviet command had declared its intention to take Vlasov at any cost. Captain M. I. Yakushev, the commander of a mechanized infantry battalion, overtook one such convoy and—on a tip from the vlasovtsy themselves—discovered the general in an automobile covered with a blanket. In the open letter “Why I Began the Fight with Bolshevism,” Vlasov had promised that he would put a bullet in his own head before he would be taken by the victorious Bolsheviks, but two years later, the general did not even remember this promise: under threat of a firing squad, he quietly obeyed the Soviet officer, and on 12 May issued an order for the immediate transfer of RLA troops to the Red Army. Vlasov further guaranteed everyone “life and return to the homeland with no repression.”⁷⁵ According to a dispatch by the commander of the 25th Tank Corps, Major General E. I. Fomin, Vlasov made an attempt to escape on the road, but he was detained.⁷⁶ The soldiers delivered the general to the 13th Army’s counterintelligence department, SMERSH. From there, he was transferred on May 15 to Moscow, where a long investigation began. Many of Vlasov’s followers and military personnel of the RLA were nevertheless able to make it to the American zone, where they did not hesitate to offer their services

⁷⁴ See: TsAFSB. № N-18766. TsAFSB. № N-18766. T. 7. L. 120–122; T. 8. L. 52–56.

⁷⁵ See: TsAMO. F. 236. Op. 2727. D. 30. L. 184.

⁷⁶ See: TsAMO. F. 236. Op. 2727. D. 30. L. 180–183.

to their new hosts, nor to continue their anti-Soviet activities. (It should be noted that this capitulation did not save many of them from being handed over to Soviet agencies for repatriation and subsequent investigation, trial, and capital punishment.)

The present collection includes the most important files from the interrogations of Vlasov and his circle. Many scholars are skeptical about the objectivity of investigations that were carried out after the war, since the prisoners had been subject to various forms of pressure, and a presumption of guilt was present in all investigative activities. However, in the case of Vlasov and his comrades-in-arms, we have a large number of cross-examinations, as well as the testimony of witnesses who describe events in roughly the same way. There is no convincing evidence that Vlasov and his people suffered any physical violence. As a rule, the facts determined by the investigation fairly completely and accurately reflect the course of events. Readers can see for themselves by comparing investigative materials with the other documents in the collection.

The investigation drew to a close in June 1946, and on 31 July there was a speedy trial. All twelve people under investigation, including Vlasov, were sentenced to death by hanging. The sentence was pre-approved by Stalin himself, and the Politburo confirmed the court's decision.

In 2001, riding the wave of a campaign to rehabilitate victims of political repression, the Russia-wide Political Social Movement "For Faith in the Fatherland," represented by Hieromonk Nikon (Belavenets), issued a request for the rehabilitation of Andrei Andreevich Vlasov and other persons. As part of a judicial review, on 22 June, 2001, the Attorney General's Office of the Russian Federation registered an appeal to the criminal case relating to the leaders of the RLA and CLPR who had been sentenced to the highest level of punishment. In the opinion of the Attorney General, the evidence gathered showed that the specified individuals had been convicted with foundation and the means of punishment corresponded to the seriousness of the offense. As such, the application for the rehabilitation of Vlasov and other members of his movement did not merit approval.

On 21 November, 2001, the appeal of the Attorney General's Office of the Russian Federation was reviewed at the session of the Military Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. The Military Chamber determined that Andrei Andreevich Vlasov, T. N. Zhilenkov, V. F. Malyshkin, F. I. Trukhin, I. L. Blagoveschensky, D. E. Zakutny, M. L. Meandrov, V. I. Mal'tsev, S. K. Bunyachenko, G. A. Zverev, V. D. Korbukov, and N. S. Shatov, being service members of the Red Army, had violated their military oath, betrayed the Motherland, and at various times crossed over to the side of fascist Germany – that is, to the enemy. On missions directed by the leadership of fascist Germany, they undertook actions that aimed at armed conflict against the Soviet Union. Their actions were of a concerted and cooperative nature; they were unified by a single intent and the achievement of a single result: subversion of the Soviet government with the help of fascist Germany and its armed forces, the elimination of the existing regime, and the installation on the territory of the Soviet Union of a pro-fascist government. Vlasov and the other members of his movement participated in an organization created to plan and carry out socially dangerous state crimes that gave rise to serious and irreversible consequences: the deliberate destruction of Soviet citizens and damage to the military strength of the USSR, its national independence, and territorial integrity. Therefore, they were justifiably convicted for the crimes pursuant to Article 1 of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from 19 April, 1943, "On the means of punishment for German-fascist villains guilty of murders and torture of the Soviet civilian population and POWs from the Red Army, for spies, traitors to the Motherland from among Soviet citizens and their co-conspirators," and also Articles 58-1b, 58-8, 58-9, and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, and they are not deserving of rehabilitation.⁷⁷ In this way, the judicial powers of the Russian Federation closed the chapter on the legal characterization of the activities of Vlasov and the vlasovtsy.

⁷⁷ See: TsAFSB. № N-18766. T. 10. L. 127–229, 215–229.

From time to time, fans of Vlasov nevertheless raise the question “of the innocent victims of the Stalinist government, the tragic fate and difficult choice which Vlasov and his followers were forced to make in the fight against communism in the service of Nazi Germany.”

In response, it is necessary to introduce clarity and to recall again the long-established truths of world historiography. Nazi Germany did not at all attack Poland and France, Denmark and Belgium, because there were communists in power there. The war against the Soviet Union was not undertaken to make the Russians and other peoples “free and happy.” The Nazis and their allies pursued plans of world domination and—in every concrete case—found a basis in propaganda to justify their criminal activities. The German command expended great effort to pass off their aggression in the East as “a liberating march against Bolshevism.” This “march” did, in fact, leave a strong imprint on the war with the USSR, which differed in its scale and severity from the war on the Western Front. Additionally, the Barbarossa plan was part of the general strategy of Hitlerism; calls to put an end to “kike-Bolshevism” served as a convenient cover and stimulus for Nazi terror. The Führer and his generals lent special significance to the so-called anti-partisan struggle into which the *glasovtsy* were actively recruited. Receiving regular reports of rebellion gaining traction in the occupied territories, they decided to use “anti-partisan struggle” to facilitate the mass killings of any opponents of the Reich and to “cleanse” the conquered territories of the “overabundant and subhuman” population. Consequently, the “war against the communist gangs” was not a sterile police operation to introduce order, but rather it was a form of armed conflict in pursuit of Nazi ends, the main victims of which were peaceful residents. Hundreds of trials, including those in the West, bear this truth out. Of course, the scale of the terror (behind which sometimes hid normal plunder) varied from place to place. But without the help of collaborators like the *glasovtsy*, legionnaires, Cossacks with swastikas, Ukrainians, and other nationalists, the Nazis would never have been able to kill so many people. The

vlasovtsy, like all collaborationists, were an important pivotal element in the Nazis' "new order."

Insofar as the war on the Eastern Front was set apart by its extreme cruelty and bloodshed, the decision of a given POW to swear loyalty to Hitler and put on a German uniform could not help but manifest itself in his subsequent fate. The highest leadership of the Reich understood these circumstances and tried to impart to Soviet POWs POWs' cooperation a form of "voluntarism." This effort was especially important in light of existing international agreements (the Hague and Geneva Conventions) which forbade the use of prisoners against their own country in time of war. Enlisting former POWs as "volunteers" allowed the German command to pretend that they were just "helping" the citizens of the USSR to join together in "the just and liberating war against Bolshevism."

It goes without saying that some of those who stood under the Nazi flag were volunteers without the inverted commas. However, their numbers do not compare to the overall number of POWs. When we speak of "voluntary desire," it is of critical importance to consider the conditions under which something was done. We do not know how many prisoners would have joined the police or the RLA if the Germans had simply fed them normally, to say nothing of providing sanitary conditions or medical services. Judging from many memoirs and testimonies, the reason for many prisoners' betrayal of the Soviet Union was either hunger or fear of punishment. Some prisoners, especially in the first year of the war, thought that the Red Army could not survive such huge losses, that the Germans would win, and that they needed to somehow find their place. It is likewise necessary to consider that the Germans did not bother to give some of the prisoners a choice. These individuals were chosen for being physically strong and healthy enough to be adjunct forces in corresponding formations of the Wehrmacht and the SS. Such forcible practices took place everywhere, right up to the final year of the war. The Germans also called these forced recruits "volunteers."

Every day during the Second World War, around 20,000 people died. Through their actions, Vlasov and his followers

lengthened the life of the Nazi regime, killing those same Russians who the general “cared for” so much. We are obliged to remember that we live and breathe freely today thanks to the victory of the Red Army, not the “works” of the vlasovtsy and other accomplices of Hitler.

List of Abbreviations

AF - The Air Force

BSRN (Боевой союз русских националистов БСРН)) - Combat Union of Russian Nationalist

СНПМ (Центральный штаб партизанского движения (ЦШПД)) - Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement

CLPR (Комитет освобождения народов России (КОНР)) - Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia

DAF (Deutsche Arbeitsfront) - German Labor Front

FP (Feldpost) - Feldpost

g. geh. (geheim) - Secret

g. Kdos (geheime Kommandosache) - Top Secret (TS) (Secret Command Matter)

g. Rs. (geheime Reichssache) - Top Secret (TS) (Secret Matter of National Importance)

GKO, GOKO (Государственный комитет обороны (ГКО, ГОКО)) - State Defense Committee (GKO)

GUKR SMERSH (Главное управление контрразведки “СМЕРШ” (ГУКР «СМЕРШ»)) - Main Directorate for Counterintelligence SMERSH

GULAG (Главное управление лагерей НКВД СССР (ГУЛАГ НКВД СССР)) - Main Administration of Camps of the NKVD

HCW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW)) - High Command of the Armed Forces

MGB USSR (Министерство государственной безопасности СССР (МГБ СССР)) - Ministry of State Security of USSR

NKVD USSR (Народный комиссариат внутренних дел СССР (НКВД СССР)) - The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs of USSR

NKGB USSR (Народный комиссариат государственной безопасности СССР (НКГБ СССР)) - The People’s Commissariat for State Security of USSR

NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) - The National Socialist German Workers Party

NSPR (Национал - социалистическая партия России (НСПР)) - The National-Socialist Party of Russia

NTS (Народно-трудовой союз (НТС)) - People's Labor Alliance
NTSNP (Народно-трудовой союз нового поколения (НТСНП))
- The National-Labor Alliance of the New Generation
OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres) - The High Command of the
German Army
OKR SMERSH (Отдел контрразведки «СМЕРШ») - Department
for Counterintelligence SMERSH
ОО (Особый отдел НКВД) - Special Department of the NKVD
ORVS (Объединение русских воинских союзов (ОРВС)) -
Association of Russian Military Unions
PCB (Политический Центра борьбы с большевизмом (ПЦБ)) -
Political Center of Anti-Bolshevik Struggle
POW - Prisoners of War
RLA (Русская освободительная армия (РОА)) - The Russian
Liberation Army
RNA (Русская народная армия (РНА)) - Russian People's Army
RNC (Русский национальный комитет (РНК)) - Russian
National Committee
RNNA (Русская народная национальная армия (РННА)) -
Russian National People's Army
RNSUV (Русский национальный союз участников войны
(РНСУВ)) - Russian national union of war veterans
ROVS (Российский общевойсковой союз (РОВС)) - The Russian
All-Military Union
RPLA (Русская освободительная народная армия (РОНА)) -
Russian People's Liberation Army
RLPP (Русская трудовая народная партия (РТНП)) - Russian
Labor People's Party
RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt) - The Reich Main Security
Office
SA (Sturmabteilungen) - CA - Storm Detachment, aka the
Brownshirts
SiPo (Sicherheitspolizei) - Security Police
SD (Sicherheitsdienst) - Security Service
SNK USSR (Совет народных комиссаров СССР (СНК СССР)) -
Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union
SS (Schutzstaffeln) - Protection Squadrons

UKR SMERSH (Управление контрразведки «СМЕРШ») -
Directorate for Counterintelligence SMERSH

VKP(b) (Всесоюзная коммунистическая партия (большевиков)
(ВКП(б)) - All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)

List of Photos

Photo 1. “Meeting between H. Himmler and Andrey Vlasov, 18 September 1944,” Central Archives, FSB, № N-18766. T. 8. L. 116.

Photo 2. General Vlasov (left) and General Shilenkov (center) of the Russian Liberation Army meeting with Joseph Goebbels. Circa February 1945, Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-H27774.

Photo 3. General Vlasov (third from left), Generalleutnant Georgii Nikolaevich Zhilenkov (second from left) and Generalmajor Fedor Ivanovich Trukhina (left) addressing officers of the RLA. 18 November 1944, Gosfilmofond of Russia, “Deutsche Wochenschau” № 742/44/2.

Photo 4. General Vlasov and Heinrich Himmler pictured in the Swedish edition of the popular *Signal Magazine*, 1943.

Photos 5 and 6. The blessing of the church to General Vlasov and his army of liberators, in Prague on November 1944.

Photos 1 and 2



По сообщению Германского информационного бюро от 29. 9. 1944, Рейхсфюрер СС Генрих Гиммлер принял в своей полевой штаб-квартире вонда Русского Освободительного Движения А. А. Власова и имел с ним продолжительную беседу, которая протекала в атмосфере полного взаимного понимания. Во время этой встречи обсуждались вопросы и мероприятия по привлечению всех антибольшевистских сил поработанных народов России к борьбе за освобождение их родины от большевизма.



Photos 3 and 4



Photos 5 and 6

Part I. The Nazi Project “Aktion Wlassow” 1942

Nº1. Special report from the headquarters of A. Hitler on the elimination of the Volkhov Pocket

28 June, 1942

Headquarters of the Führer, 28 June, 1942.

In February of this year, the Second Soviet Shock Army and units of the 52nd and 59th Soviet Armies,¹ having crossed the river Volkhov over the ice to the north of Lake Il'men', drove a deep wedge into the German defensive front. SS infantry and units (including Spanish, Dutch, and Flemish volunteer formations) under the command of Cavalry General Lindeman² with effective support from Air Force Colonel General Keller over the course of ferocious battles lasting months on end, under the most difficult weather and geographical conditions, initially cut off these enemy forces from their lines of supply, then applied more and more pressure to them, and today decidedly destroyed them.

In this way, a large attack force operation by the enemy failed, one which had as its goal to break through the Volkhov in order to end the blockade of Leningrad. The enemy suffered a serious defeat. The full weight of these ferocious battles was borne by the foot soldiers and combat engineers. Preliminary figures indicate that the losses of the enemy were as follows: 32,759 prisoners, 649 artillery, 171 tanks, 2,904 machine guns, mortars, and automatic rifles, and a large amount of other combat equipment. Enemy losses of living forces were several times the number of prisoners taken.

The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. F. 500. Op. 12462. D. 582. L. 73–74. Copy. Translation from German, contemporary to original.

Nº2. Possible dispatch of Sonderführer Poelchau to the Command Center of the 18th Army on the Capture of Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov

Not earlier than 13 July, 1942.

(XVIII/AK 34047/27)

(origin unknown; possible dispatch of Sonderführer (platoon leader) Poelchau)

Dispatch on the capture of Lieutenant General Vlasov³

On the night of 11–12 July, 1942, the military intelligence division received a telephone message from the local commandant's office in Yam-Tessovo that on the evening of 11 June in the area of Yam-Tessovo, in a battle with those who had broken through from the Volkhov Pocket, the commander of the Second Shock Army, Lieutenant General Vlasov, had been shot.

In the early morning of 12 July, Oberleutnant von Schwerdtner, along with Sonderführer Poelchau, Obergefreiter Hamann, and Obergefreiter Lipsky (acting as driver), departed from Yam-Tessovo by jeep in order to identify the body [of Vlasov] on the site. Along the way, in the village of Tukhovezhi, the jeep was stopped by local residents of the village, who announced with great excitement that on the evening of 11 June an outlaw had made his way into the village along with a woman and had asked for bread. The village elder had locked him in the bath house. The Belgian revolver that the elder had taken from the outlaw was given to Oberleutnant von Schwerdtner, who promised to interrogate both of them on the way back. In Yam-Tessovo, a wounded Red Army soldier who introduced himself as the driver for General Vlasov was immediately interrogated. Evidently, that Red Army soldier had been sent by General Vlasov to the village for food on the morning of 11 June and was wounded at that time. He could give no testimony regarding the evening battle.

Oberleutnant von Schwerdtner ordered that both corpses that had been found in the evening after the battle be located. The corpses were to be shown to the Red Army soldier. The wounded

soldier confidently identified one of the dead as General Vlasov. He claimed not to know the second dead man.

Then Oberleutnant von Schwerdtner asked two German military doctors who happened to be passing through the village to identify the body with the help of a photograph. As a result of this examination, both doctors reached the conclusion that one of the corpses could be said with confidence to indeed be General Vlasov.

After that, the Oberleutnant von Schwerdtner informed the General Headquarters that one of the bodies was positively identified as that of General Vlasov.

From Yam-Tessovo, they took with them a Russian agent who had parachuted in and immediately voluntarily surrendered. On the way back, they made a stop in the village of Tukhovezhi to interrogate the two outlaws captured there. Oberleutnant von Schwerdtner stood in front of the bath house with his automatic rifle at the ready as the village elder opened the bath house and ordered the male outlaw to come out with his hands up. The woman was to remain in the bath house for the time being. A tall, thin Russian soldier, dressed in a typical long tunic without any signs of rank or medals, appeared in the doorway. He wore a large pair of black horned glasses on his hawkish nose. In broken German, the soldier said: "Don't shoot. I'm General Vlasov."⁴ After this, he handed Oberleutnant von Schwerdtner a red identification card wrapped in leather bearing the facsimile signature of Marshal Timoshenko.⁵ General Vlasov and his companion were also seated in the four-seater jeep that already held seven people.

From Vol'naya Gorka, Oberleutnant von Schwerdtner reported by telephone to the head of the General Headquarters that the body that had been found was not in fact General Vlasov, since the general was alive and would be shortly delivered to Raglitsy. General Herzog and Colonel of Headquarters Siewert conducted a short interrogation on the premises of the commanding officers, and this showed that the body that had been found and identified as that of General Vlasov was actually that of his executive officer, Colonel Vinogradov.⁶

Since some doubt remained as to the identification of the dead body, agent Berg was dressed in the uniform of a Soviet sailor,

pinned with an Order of the Red Star, and placed (by the secretary of the Secret Military Police) in the room where General Vlasov was being held for interrogation by the Third Division of the Headquarters. General Vlasov's testimony regarding his presence in Leningrad did not match the timeline in the informer Berg's testimony.

At the same time, the pseudo-partisan (Germ. *Antipartisanin*) "Nina" struck up a conversation with General Vlasov's companion. From there it became clear that they had, without a doubt, found General Vlasov. In addition, Oberleutnant von Schwerdtner and Sonderführer Poelchau asked the general to sign one of his photographs. That signature was then compared with original copies of orders signed by him that had been captured. In this way, it was established without doubt that General Vlasov had been found.

On the morning of 13 July, Oberleutnant von Schwerdtner and Sonderführer Poelchau delivered General Vlasov to the encampment of the 8th Army, where he was immediately interrogated by Colonel General Lindemann.

Sonderführer (platoon leader)

HIA. Dallin A. Box 6. F. 6–24. Copy of xerox copy. Translation from the German. Originally published in "Net streliate, ia general Vlasov," ed. K. Aleksandrov, *Novgorodskii istoricheskii sbornik*, no. 13 (23): 2013, 388.

N°3. Minutes of the interrogation of Commander of the Second Shock Army Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov in the Headquarters of the 18th Army.

15 July, 1942

Translation from the German

Part I

CONTENTS: INTERROGATION of the commander of the Second Shock Army Lieutenant General VLASOV.

Brief biographical information and military service record

VLASOV was born on 1 September, 1901, in the Gorky province. His father was a peasant who owned 35–40 *morgs*⁷ (17–21 hectares) of land; from an old peasant family. High school education. In 1919, he studied for one year at the Nizhnyi-Novgorod University. In 1920, he joined the Red Army. At first VLASOV was not accepted into the Communist Party, as he was a former student of a monastery school. In 1920, he studied in a school for platoon leaders, and later became the platoon leader for the Vrangeli front. He remained in that army until the end of the war in 1920. Later, he was platoon leader and deputy company commander until 1926. In 1925, he studied in a school for middle-rank commanders. In 1928, he studied in a school for senior command staff. In 1928 – battalion commander. In 1930, he entered the Communist Party in order to move up in the ranks of the Red Army. In 1933, he taught tactics in the school for mid-level command staff in Leningrad. From 1933 he was Chief of Staff of the Leningrad military command region. In 1930 he became a regiment commander. In 1938, for a short time, he was Chief of Staff of the Kiev military command region.⁸ Immediately after this, he was a participant in the Soviet military commission in China. During that tour he was made a colonel. At the end of his tour in China in 1939, he became commander of the 99th division in Peremyshl'. For 13 months he was division commander. In 1941 he was commanding officer of the mechanized unit corps in Lvov. In the battles between Lvov and Kiev, his mechanized corps was destroyed. After that, he became commandant of the Kiev fortified sector. At the same time, he was ordered to put the 37th Army back together.⁹ He left the battle of Kiev with a small group. After this, he was temporarily assigned to the staff of General TIMOSHENKO, reforming the military supply forces for the South-Western front.¹⁰

A month later, he was transferred to Moscow to take command of the newly reformed 20th Army.¹¹ After that he participated in the defense of Moscow. Until 7 February, 1942, he was commander of the 20th Army. On 10 March, he was transferred to the headquarters of the Volkhov Front. Initially he was here as tactical advisor (consultant) to the Second Shock Army. After the dismissal of General KLYKOV as commander of the Second Shock Army, he [Vlasov] took the command on 15 April.

Details of the Volkhov Front¹² and the Second Shock Army

Constituents of the Volkhov Front in the middle of March: the 52nd, 59th, 2nd Strike Force, and 4th Armies.¹³

Commander of the Volkhov Front was General MERETSKOV.¹⁴

Commander of the 52nd Army was Lieutenant General YAKOVLEV.

Commander of the 59th Army was Major General KOROVNIKOV.

Commander of the 4th Army – unknown.

Evaluation of General MERETSKOV

Arrogant. A very nervous, absentminded individual. A calm discussion of business matters between the commander of the front and the commander of the various armies was almost impossible. Personal contradictions between MERETSKOV and VLASOV: MERETSKOV tried to have VLASOV removed. Vlasov was suffering from many inadequacies, unsatisfactory orders from headquarters of the front for the 2nd Shock Army.

Brief evaluation of YAKOVLEV. A good military worker, but dissatisfied with his own contribution. An individual of frequent changes. Known as a *drunk*.

In mid-March, the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army was in Opol'e.

Make-up of the 2nd Shock Army

Known brigades and divisions. It is worth mentioning that the units of the 52nd and 59th Armies that were in the Volkhov Pocket were not in the chain of command of the 2nd Shock Army. As early as

mid-March, the units of the 2nd Shock Army gave the impression of being the worse for wear. Large losses in hard-fought winter battles. Weapons on hand were in sufficient amounts, but there was a shortage of ammunition. In mid-March, there was difficulty with supplies, which worsened from day to day. There is little information about the condition of the enemy in mid-March. The reason: unsatisfactory means of intelligence, few prisoners. The 2nd Shock Army believed that in the middle of March they were opposed by approximately 6–8 German divisions. It was known that these divisions received reinforcements in mid-March.

In mid-March, the 2nd Shock Army was faced with a task: to take Lyuban and join forces with the 54th Army.¹⁵

Owing to the 2nd Shock Army being attached to the Volkhov Front, the 54th Army did not have unity of command in the advance on Lyuban. News of the true situation of the 54th Army reached the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army only sparsely, and even then much was known to be incorrect or overstated. MERETSKOV used this to drive the 2nd Shock Army especially quickly in the direction of Lyuban.

After the 2nd Shock Army joined forces with the 54th Army, the next mission was to destroy the German forces hemmed in around Chudovo-Lyuban. According to VLASOV, the overall mission of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts in the winter of 1942 was the military liberation of Leningrad from its blockade.

In mid-March, the 2nd Shock Army had the following plan to unite with the 54th Army.

The concentration of forces of the 2nd Shock Army to breach through Krasnaya Gorka to Lyuban, keeping the flanks in the area of Dubovik and Yegolino with the 13th Cavalry Corps; auxiliary attacks at Krivino and Novaya Derevnja. In the opinion of the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, this plan failed for the following reasons: too few forces for the breakthrough attack, the weariness of the soldiers, the lack of supplies.

They stuck to the plan to break through to Lyuban' until the end of April. In early May, Lieutenant General VLASOV was called to a meeting at the headquarters of the front in Malaya Vishera, which was led by Lieutenant General KHOZIN ¹⁶ from the

Leningrad Front.¹⁷ At the meeting, the 2nd Shock Army was given the order to pull out of the Volkhov Pocket. The 52nd and 54th Armies were to cover the retreat of the 2nd Shock Army. It was at this meeting of the commander of the 2nd Shock Army with the commanders and commissars of the divisions and brigades at the army headquarters on 9 May that the intention to retreat was first announced.

NOTE: According to defectors, the command of the 18th Army¹⁸ learned on 10 May of the replacement of the 87th Cavalry Division, and the rest of the news was received between 10 and 15 May.

From 15 to 20 May, orders were issued for the retreat of forces. From 20 to 25 May, the retreat was undertaken. The plan for the retreat from the Volkhov Pocket was as follows:

Retreat of rear forces; removal of heavy guns and artillery. Security for this operation by means of mortars. Then the retreat of the infantry to separate sites.

Site 1: Dubovik – Chervinskaya Luka.

Site 2: Finev Lug – Ol'khovka.

Site 3: site of Krest.

The retreat movements of the 2nd Shock Army were to be covered from the flanks of the 52nd and 59th Armies. As the last remaining units of the 52nd and 59th located in the Volkhov Pocket were to exit to the east from the Volkhov pocket.

Reasons for the failure of the retreat:

Extremely bad road conditions (flooding); very poor supply of food and ammunition. The lack of unity of command of the 2nd Strike Force, 52nd and 59th Armies from the side of the Volkhov Front. The 2nd Shock Army found out only two days later, on 30 May, that the siege had been broken and they had been surrounded by the Germans.

After receiving this news, Lieutenant General VLASOV demanded that the Volkhov Front open the German roadblocks using the 52nd and 59th Armies. In addition, VLASOV moved all forces of the 2nd Shock Army at his disposal to the area east of Krechno in order to open the German roadblock from the west.

Lieutenant General VLASOV could not at all understand why a single order was not issued from headquarters for all three armies to break the German roadblocks. Each army was more or less fighting independently.

On 23 June, the 2nd Shock Army undertook a last push to break through to the east. At the same time, units of the 52nd and 59th Army moved to cover the flanks. On 24 May, it was already impossible to lead the various units and sub-units of the 2nd Shock Army and it fell apart into separate groups.

Lieutenant General VLASOV stressed, in particular, the destructive action of the German air force and the very high losses caused by artillery barrages.

Lieutenant General VLASOV believes that while trying to break through, out of the whole Shock Army there were **approximately 3,500 wounded** and an insignificant part of separate units managed to make it through.

Lieutenant General VLASOV believes that **around 60,000 people** from the 2nd Shock Army were **either taken prisoner or killed**. He could not give any information about the numbers of the units from the 52nd and 54th Army located in the Volkhov Pocket.

Intentions of the Headquarters of the Volkhov Front

The Headquarters of the Volkhov Front planned to withdraw the 2nd Shock Army from the Volkhov Pocket in the area of Malaya Vishera and reinforce it there; simultaneously, the Volkhov bridgeheads were to be held. After reinforcements, it was supposed that the 2nd Shock Army would move to the north part of the Volkhov bridgehead so that the 2nd Shock Army could move from the south and the 54th and 4th Armies from the north to Chudovo. In light of developments, Lieutenant General Vlasov no longer believed in implementing this plan. According to Lieutenant General VLASOV, the plan to free Leningrad from the blockade would be adhered to. Implementing this plan depended heavily on the reinforcement of the divisions of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts and the introduction of new forces. VLASOV thinks that with the forces at hand the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts will not be capable of the large offensive employment at Leningrad. In his

opinion, the current forces will be enough to hold the Volkhov Front and the site between the town of Kirishi and Ladozhskoe Lake.

He evaluates the battle-readiness of the 52nd, 54th, and 4th Armies as generally low.

Lieutenant General VLASOV denies the necessity of commissars in the Red Army.¹⁹ In his opinion, the period after the Finnish-Russian war, when there were no commissars, was a better period from the point of view of military leadership.

PART 2: Addition

The oldest age of recruits known to him – born 1898.

The youngest – born 1923.

New unit formations

In February, March, and April, new platoons, divisions, and brigades were formed in large numbers. The main regions where the new formations were posted were to the south on the Volga. He knows little about the formations created inside the country.

Defense industry

In the Kuznetsk industrial region, in the southwest Urals, significant defense industry has appeared, which is now bolstered by evacuated industries from occupied regions. All major types of raw materials are available here: coal, ore, metals, however there is no oil. In Siberia, there are small, as yet little-used oil deposits.

Production is increasing due to reduction in the length of production processes. VLASOV is of the opinion that the industrial complex in Kuznetsk region will be sufficient to provide to a certain extent the Red Army's heavy arms needs, even with the loss of the Donetsk region.

Food situation

The food situation is comparatively stable. It will not be possible to get by entirely without Ukrainian grain, however Siberia has significant new land development.

Foreign supplies

The newspapers highly exaggerate supply shipments from England and America. According to the notifications in the papers, it is as though weapons, ammunition, tanks and planes, and even food provisions are arriving in great quantity. In his army, they had only telephones that were manufactured in America. He has yet to see foreign weaponry in his army.

On the creation of a second front in Europe, he heard the following. In Soviet Russia, there is a widespread opinion, one also reflected in the papers, that the English and Americans will create a second front in France this year. This was supposedly firmly promised to MOLOTOV.²⁰

Operational plans

According to STALIN's Order No. 130 from 1 May, the Germans should have been driven from Russia decisively this summer. The beginning of a large-scale Russian offensive was the offensive in Kharkov. For this reason, many divisions were sent to the south in the spring.²¹ The northern front has been left unattended. This may be why no new reserves have been sent even to the Volkhov Front.

TIMOSHENKO's offensive failed.

VLASOV, in spite of that, believes that it is possible that ZHUKOV²² will switch to a large-scale offensive on the central region of the front, from Moscow. He has enough reserves.

If TIMOSHENKO's new tactic of "elastic defenses" had been executed on the Volkhov, he would presumably have made it out with his army intact. VLASOV cannot say to what extent this new tactic can be employed in contrast to practical guidelines used previously.

TIMOSHENKO is, in any case, among the most capable leaders of the Red Army.

To the question of the meaning of our offensive on the Don, he stated that cutting off roads for the delivery of gasoline from the South Caucasus creates a critical problem for the Red Army, since a replacement for Caucasian oil can hardly be found in Siberia.

Gasoline consumption is already strictly limited within Russia.

VLASOV indicated that it is perhaps striking that he, as army commander, was not informed of the operational situation on a large scale, that it was kept such a secret that even army commanders did not know the intentions of the High Command even for neighboring territories.

Weapons

On the construction of ultraheavy 100-ton tanks he has heard nothing. The best tank, in his opinion, is the T-34; the KV-(60-T) is, in his opinion, cumbersome, because it has reinforced armor.

Families of deserters

Families of deserters, as a rule, are no longer being shot, with the exception of the families of deserting commanders.

Treatment of Russian POWs in Germany

They no longer believe that POWs are being shot in Germany. There are widespread rumors that treatment of Russian POWs has recently improved on orders from the Führer.

Leningrad

The evacuation of Leningrad continues day and night. For the sake of prestige, the city must be held at any cost.

Personnel

For approximately 3 months already, Colonel General VASILEVSKY has been the Chief of Defense of the Red Army.

Marshal SHAPOSHNIKOV has retired due to health issues.

Marshal KULIK is no longer in a command position. He has had his rank of marshal rescinded.

Marshal BUDYONNY, according to unconfirmed data, is tasked with forming new military formations in the rear for the Red Army.

VOROSHILOV is a member of the Supreme Military Council in Moscow. He is no longer in a position of command.²³

Certified by: MARTYNOV

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. N°N-18766. T. 7. L. 22–30. Authenticated copy.

N°4. Situation Report No. 16 of the Leningrad Partisan Movement Headquarters on the Exfiltration of Major General A. V. Afanasiev and information that General A. A. Vlasov and Chief of Staff of the Second Shock Army P. S. Vinogradov are alive.

Not earlier than 16 July, 1942

Top Secret

Central Headquarters for the Partisan Movement²⁴

At the Headquarters for the Supreme High Command

Comrade Ponomarenko P. K.²⁵

SITUATION REPORT N°16

Of the LENINGRAD PARTISAN MOVEMENT HEADQUARTERS

K 24.0016 JULY 1942

Map 100000

1. The partisan detachment of the First Secretary of the Luzhsky District Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, Comrade Dmitriev, broke free from being surrounded by the German scourge, but in so doing endured great losses. Communications are broken; the remaining units headed by Com[rad] Dmitriev joined the partisan unit of Comrade Sazonov operating on the territory of Oredezhsky region. Comrade

Dmitriev's unit has derailed an enemy train on the Luga-Leningrad line carrying ammunition, men, and vehicles; as a result of the crash, several hundred German soldiers and officers were killed and enemy vehicles destroyed.

2. Comrade Sazonov of the Oredezhsy partisan group, continuing intelligence efforts in the Luga area, reports: in the Luga garrison there are as many as 5 thousand German soldiers and officers.

At the airfield near Novosel'e (9266), there are 100 bombers and 50 fighter planes. The highway from Luga to Medved' in the Shimsky region is undergoing intensive repairs, and likewise fortifications are being built in the area of Tolmachevo station on the side toward Leningrad and in the direction of Oredezh station.

In Batesky, Utorgoshsky, and Soletsky regions, defense construction is under way.

3. Commander of the Oredezhsy partisan group Comrade Sazonov informs that his group was joined by Major General Afanas'ev²⁶ of communications for the 2nd Army upon exiting the encirclement. Commander Vlasov of the 2nd Army and Chief of Staff Vinogradov are alive. The Leningrad headquarters ordered Comrade Sazonov to refuse help and establish contact with them, informing the command of the Volkhov Front on the situation daily through Leningrad, with which they have radio contact.

4. In executing the plan of headquarters as confirmed by the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, on the night of 15–16 July, planes from the air force delivered a group of party organizers consisting of 6 people, led by Comrade Tikhonov, to the territory of Volosovsky region in Leningrad district.

The group was tasked with a mission: to conduct unceasing intelligence-gathering from the enemy along the Narva-Kingisepp-Krasnogvardeisk line. Create units and sabotage groups from local residents. Undertake political party work among the population. At [?] o'clock, a radiogram was received from the group in which the commander informed that they had landed safely and all was in order.

5. Such groups are also prepared for assignment in other occupied regions of the district.

CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE LENINGRAD PARTISAN
MOVEMENT Nikitin

CHIEF OPERATIONS OFFICER
OF HEADQUARTERS Alekseev

Signing statement: to first and second departments. In the report are indications of fortification of the Dmitriev detachment. 21.VII. V. Ser<...>;

It is not entirely clear where Vlasov and Vinogradov are located, what measures have been taken in the search for them and attempt to return them to the detachment. V. Ser<...>.

Note on the front page:

Leningrad front. Incl. Report, map, inventory. Make an inquiry regarding Comrades Vlasov and Vinogradov – as per signing statement 20.7.1942. Naumov.;

Placed in report 18.7 with the materials received from V. Ch.

The note on the last page: 18.7.1942. From conversations of V. Ch. with the headquarters of the P[artisan] M[ovement] of Lening[rad] front it has been established that Comrades Vlasov and Vinogradov are not with Sazonov's unit. From the rumors of someone (?) they set off in the direction of the Volkhov. 20.7.1942.

The Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) F. 69.
Op. 1. D. 463. L. 22–24. Original. Published in: M. Semiriaga,
*Kollaboratsionizm. Priroda, tipologiia i proiavleniia v gody Vtoroi mirovoi
voiny* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000), p. 822.

N°5. Directive of General Headquarters of the High Command No. 170518 to K. A. Meretskov, the commander of troops on the Volkhov Front, on retrieving the Commander, Chief of Staff, and communications officer of the 2nd Shock Army from behind the front lines.

17 July, 1942

According to your report, Vlasov, his Chief of Staff, and chief communications officer are located in the partisan unit of Comrade Sazonov.

Headquarters of the High Command²⁷ orders you to be personally responsible for undertaking all measures to ensure that no later than 19 July Vlasov and his people be delivered by airplane to the territory of the front.

Headquarters considers it the responsibility of your unit to complete this mission.

Headquarters orders you to task all aviation of the front to the execution of this mission.

Report on execution of the mission.

General Headquarters of High Command J. Stalin

A. Vasilievsky

Note: Reported to Comrade Stalin and confirmed by telephone at 18.30 on 17 July. Vasilievsky

The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. F. 148a. Op. 376. D. 126. L. 127. Original. Published in: *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi otechestvennoi voine*, vol. III, T. 2 (Moscow, n.p., 2003): pp. 52–53, doc. N°1014.

N°6. Briefings report of the head of the Leningrad Partisan Movement Headquarters M. N. Nikitin on activities to organize the search for and evacuation from behind enemy lines of the command staff of the Second Shock Army of the Volkhov Front.

No earlier than 24 July, 1942.

C[omrade] Pomomarenko

Top Secret

BRIEFINGS REPORT

ON ACTIVITIES TO ORGANIZE THE SEARCH FOR AND EVACUATION FROM BEHIND ENEMY LINES OF THE COMMAND STAFF OF THE SECOND SHOCK ARMY OF THE VOLKHOV FRONT

On receipt of a radiogram from commander of the partisan unit Comrade Sazanov informing that the communications general of the 2nd Army Comrade Afanasiev made it to him and that the commanding officer and executive officer, Comrades Vlasov and Vinogradov, are alive, the following measures have been taken:

- 1) Unit commander Comrade Sazanov was ordered by radiogram to hold Afanasiev at his location, take measures to search for Vlasov and Vinogradov, seek out a landing site for an airplane, report what he needs, and be in constant radio contact about all of this with headquarters;

- 2) The location of the commanding officers of the 2nd Army was reported to the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, the commanding officer of the Volkhov Front Comrade Meretskov, to the Central Headquarters for the Partisan Movement Comrade Ponomarenko;

- 3) Round the clock duty has been assigned to the best operators at the base radio station at headquarters to maintain radio contact with Comrade Sazanov's unit and to provide constant information from the command of the Volkhov Front on the situation in the region regarding finding Vlasov, Vinogradov, and Afanasiev.

Subsequently, as a result of the radiogram exchange with Sazanov where several details were cleared up about Vlasov, Vinogradov, and also the situation in the region, a number of decisions were made and implemented with the aim of fulfilling the mission handed down from the General Headquarters of the High Command and specifically the orders of Secretary of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party Comrade A. A. Zhdanov :

1. Two planes with provisions, ammunition, and 2 radio operators were flown from Malaya Vishera to Sazanov's unit.

2. In the area where Sazanov's unit was operating, a partisan unit from Kositsyn, consisting of 50 of the best partisan fighters fully armed with automatic weapons, was parachuted in. The unit was given a mission: complete the assignment of the General Headquarters of the High Command, find Vlasov and Vinogradov, and—in the event that they had been taken prisoner—break them away from the enemy and evacuate them from enemy territory.

3. At the command of the Military Council of the Volkhov Front, radio operator Stepanov was urgently transferred [to a new duty position] with call signs, timetables, and cipher to establish continual radio contact at the front with Sazanov and members of the 2nd Army in his unit.

4. The evacuation of Major General of Communications Afanasiev to Malaya Vishera was organized and implemented by means of the Volkhov Front with assistance from Sazanov's unit.

5. Three select, well-armed partisan units have been sent from partisan territory along the lines Luga—Strugi Krasnye—Pskov, and Porkhov—Pskov. The units were tasked with a mission: to prevent, in the event of the imprisonment of the commanding officers of the 2nd Army, their relocation to the German rear territory; to attack with automatic weapons; to take German officers prisoner [and seize German] documents; and to halt trains carrying prisoners and take them away from the enemy.

The progress of implementing all these activities can be judged by radiograms between the headquarters and Sazanov's unit and operations groups of the headquarters of the Military Council of the Volkhov and Northwest Fronts.²⁸ (see attachment) Work on the search for individuals of the command staff of the 2nd Shock Army continues.

CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE LENINGRAD PARTISAN
MOVEMENT NIKITIN

CHIEF OPERATIONS OFFICER OF HEADQUARTERS
ALEKSEEV

RGASPI. F. 69. p. 1. D. 467. L. 5. Authenticated. Published in: N.M. Koniaev, *Vlasov, Dva litsa generala* (Moscow: n.p., 2001), p. 9.

Nº7. Report of Major General A. V. Afanasiev to the Military Council of the Volkhov Front concerning the condition of the Second Shock Army and the fate of A. A. Vlasov after the army was surrounded.

26 July, 1942

TO THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE VOLKHOV FRONT

At the end of May 1942, a directive was issued for the withdrawal of the 2nd Shock Army from the line of Novaya Derevnnya, Ruchii, Korovii ruch'i, Krasnaya Gorka, Yelgino platform, Veretie, Ostrov Pashnino, Finev Lug, and Glukhaya Kerest' beyond the river Volkhov.

An operational plan was created by Colonel VINOGRADOV along the line for the withdrawal of the Second Shock Army, which then, on confirmation from the Front, became the main activity of the 2nd Shock Army.

The evaluation of the area at that time was especially dire, particularly after the spring mud season. All winter roads were flooded with water, impassable to animal-drawn vehicles and automobiles.

For the army, the supply of provisions and ammunition had become a difficult question, with the latter transported by staff on foot for a distance of 20–35 kilometers. Ammunition could only be delivered by airplane. During this season of mud and artillery and mortar fire from the enemy, communication and supply lines were completely closed off. Passage was possible only periodically and by single individuals.

The army suffered a depletion of personnel, which was reflected especially in the mobile execution of the operations plan

for the withdrawal of the first and successive intermediary lines of defense.

In spite of all the difficult conditions of the area, the exhaustion of the personnel, and the lack of reserves, thanks to the good political-moral condition of the army personnel, all the vehicles and equipment were successfully removed to Novaya Keresť by the strength of personnel alone. To achieve this, all units began to freely execute the orders issued to them.

Command control along all lines was established by having 2nd and 3rd command posts. Having well-developed, constant telephone and telegraph communications, the latter of which was a two-wire system, and having alternate communications along the front between rifle divisions and brigades ... allowed command to seamlessly direct forces throughout the period of the withdrawal to the river Polest'. For this, 52 radio operators were presented with state awards.

After thorough preparation of the units and confirming at the points of execution the directives for withdrawal to the lines indicated in the plan, there was easily enough time to destroy enemy forces, no matter the direction from which they approached (Korovii Ruchei, Krasnaya Gorka). And after that the enemy exited through Veretie and occupied Dubovnik. As a result of the combined forces of the 327th and 382nd Rifle Divisions, and the 59th and 25th Rifle Brigades, the enemy was entirely broken and destroyed. Units from the 59th and 25th Rifle Brigade from B. Elgino withdrew without casualties according to the plan. Wherever the enemy attacked from, they received robust resistance with great losses for them.

The same thing happened on the second temporary line, that is Ruchii – Radofinnikovo. The enemy's attempt to occupy Tigoda-Cherveno was unsuccessful.

On the third temporary line, the enemy encountered strenuous defenses from our units: the Bulyanov guys, the Antyufeyev guys, the 23rd Rifle brigade and 92nd Rifle Division. These units provided for the concentration of the strike force groups to the east—that is, the 22nd, 25th, 59th, and 57th Rifle Brigades, 46th and 382nd Rifle Divisions in the area of Glushitsa

River. Here the enemy was particularly active, but thanks to the good management of forces and communications with the front, as well as the coordination of the efforts of the Bulanovs, the Antyufeyevs, and the 23rd Rifle Brigade, the enemy suffered great casualties and was unsuccessful.

At that time, all the vehicles and equipment were concentrated near the Glushitsa River, preparing for evacuation according to the plan.

The eastern group began its movement to the east in coordination with the 59th Army. At that time, command organization was from two mobile command units, one two kilometers to the northwest of Novaya Kerest' and the command post, the other two kilometers to the east of Krechno. The response team was headed by Major General ALFERIEV and the command post by the command staff of the 2nd Shock Army.

It must be admitted that the personnel numbers of the army gradually decreased. At the third line of defense—Finev Lug, Ravan' River, Rogovka, Ol'khovka—there was not a continuous front line. The enemy forces were concentrated in the area of Ol'khovka, Finev Lug, and Glukhaya Kerest'. Command staff of the armies made the decision to strengthen forward units with special units—communications, artillery and others numbering about 1,500 persons. This broader unit was integrated into various other units, their battle-readiness not noticeably reflected in the overall defensive posture of the line.

The enemy increased pressure on stretches in the direction of Ol'khovka and Glukhaya Kerest'. Our units, with great losses for the enemy, left Ol'khovka, Finev Lug, and Glukhaya Kerest'. They moved to a previously-determined line along the edge of the Rogoviki forest to the south of Ol'khovka. [The line along the edge of the forest is the] swath of forest cut for high-voltage electric lines and a barn to the east of Finev Lug and Glukhaya Kerest'. The enemy continued to advance, suffering heavy casualties against the Bulanov guys and the Antyufeyevs. But having located gaps between the 305th Rifle Division and the Bulanov guys and between the 92nd Rifle Division and the 23rd Rifle Brigade, they intensified their action using small groups directed at the 23rd and Bulanovs.

As a result, these groups were removed with difficulty and withdrew under fire to beyond the Kerest' River.

The defenses at the Kerest' River did not hold for long: the enemy concentrated forces from all sides and there was air force activity against our vehicles, on the roads, in the clearings (to the east of Krechno) and on the command post.

Luckily for us, the command post held, command organization suffered no damage, and all damages to communications were quickly repaired and replaced by radio communications.

If my memory does not fail me, according to data from the division, the numbers of army troops at that time was not more than three thousand, the rear having an extremely insignificant number.

The strike group moved past the Glushitsa River and approached in a tight group, and in places crossed the Polist' River by 100 meters. They had no other movement. Other secondary echelons were prepared to advance the push at the Polist' River.

The enemy crossed the Kerest' River from the west and decisively led an attack between Bulanov and Antyufeyev on Krechno, and in this action posed a threat to our command post. But thanks to well-organized defenses at the command post, the enemy leaked into the interior only by avoiding our command post. As a result, on orders from the army commander, the entire command post was forced to concentrate in the area of the headquarters of the 57th Rifle Brigade, which is to say between the Glushitsa River and Polist', where they remained from 23 to 24 July.

The enemy stepped up air attacks here as well, but there were no losses. The majority of the headquarters staff remained intact. It was decided by the Military Council of the army that with the advance of the second echelons, the greater headquarters should be broken up into the headquarters of the brigades and divisions and move together with them to the east. All departments dispersed to take their places, and the command of the Military Council and the 120-person counterintelligence unit (Vlasov, Zuev, leader of the counterintelligence unit Vinogradov, Belishev, Afanasiev, and others)²⁹ followed the 46th Rifle Division (commanded by Colonel

CHERNIY). Everyone exited on the night of 24–25 July to the command post of the 46th Rifle Division, but at the moment of mobilization at 2 o'clock in the morning the entire group came under heavy artillery and mortar fire. Groups were lost in the smoke. One group, led by Zuev and the head of Counterintelligence, with a unit of 70 automatic riflemen from Counterintelligence, somehow managed to take cover towards the Polist' River in the direction of the mark 40.5 (according to Comrade Vinogradov), which is to say that they departed from us to the right, and we, together with the groups of Vlasov, Vinogradov, Beleshev, Afanasiev, and others, departed through the smoke from artillery and mortar fire to the left.

We organized a search for Zuev and Shapkov, but were unsuccessful. We could not advance, and we decided to go back to the command post of the 46th, to whence the command staff from the 46th also returned. We waited for a pause in the fighting, but alas, at that point the enemy broke through the front from the west and moved toward us through the breach in platoon formation, crying: "Russia, surrender." I was ordered to organize the defense of the command post and greet the Fritzes with well-organized return fire to drive them into the wooded area. I gathered 50 fighters, along with the commissar of the headquarters, Comrade Sviridonov, and we met the Fritzes with automatic rifle fire, dispersing them, but the enemy continued to press, increasing their force. Fire against the command post increased. It must be mentioned that Comrade Vlasov, in spite of the firefight, continued to stand in place, not lying on the ground. There was a sense of confusion or oblivion. When I warned him, "Take cover," he continued to stand in place. It was clear he was in shock. The decision was made immediately, and Vinogradov took it upon himself to implement the retreat into the rear territory of the enemy with an exit through the front back to our side.

It must be admitted that Comrade Vinogradov did not have in mind any specific invitation from the commanders of the headquarters. The whole affair was done conspiratorially. But in spite of these conditions, willingly or not, the group voluntarily merged into a unified group of 45 people. It was clear that this did

not suit him. But it was already too late to stop the flow. In addition to that, another group—that of Colonel Cherniy, which consisted of about 40 people—joined in. This resulted in a considerably large group. Comrade Vlasov was indifferent, and Vinogradov stepped up to offer his services as general commander. Comrade Vlasov offered me the position of commissar. We created a list of personnel. We divided it into three units: defenses, scouts, and fighters. I, as commissar, began to take an inventory of all party members and candidates, checking to see whether they had their party membership cards and warning them to keep their cards intact. We began to move along the route chosen by Vinogradov—that is, from the Glushitsa River to the large Mikhailovsky bog, the large Gredovsky bog. To cross the Kerest' River at marker 31.8. Scouting for fire from automatic weapons was conducted, and it was impossible to pass. We moved further to the north, where we met three groups from Larichev in the woods on the road near Bol'shoi Apolevsky bog. Cherniy and the command of the 259th Rifle Division separated from us and moved to the north. Everyone once again headed in different directions. We were crossing the Protnino swamp and we met up again with Cherniy and his unit, who had come upon a mine field; he had turned his unit to the northeast and our unit had headed to the south, to the barns to the south of the 31.8 marker, on the decision of Vinogradov. Here we organized a scout group of four commanders. No one went back; we continued on until morning and decided to move to the north, near the Ol'khovka farmstead, where we would cross the Kerest' River. The Germans figured out that units of the Red Army were moving through the deep rear territory. Anticipating this, they quickly organized picket lines along the Kerest' River with defenses and did not allow our units to pass into the forest of the deep rear enemy territory.

On approaching the Ol'khovka area, we organized scouts and found netting hung without supports. We used it, as there were no pickets in this location, and we freely crossed over to the west bank of the Kerest' River. Thereafter, we set off firmly in the direction of Vditsko. On approaching Vditsko, everyone was tired, exhausted. Cold, having eaten only grass without salt, we boiled up some

bland soup and mushrooms. The decision was made: the fighting unit would go along the road to Vditsko from the south and from the north attack an automobile carrying a load of provisions, take those provisions, and bring them to us in the woods. Fifteen people set out, and the entire group encountered an earth and timber bunker. A firefight ensued, resulting in the commissar of the headquarters, Comrade Sviridonov, being wounded by a bullet to the chest and one death. Their losses were about 12 persons. We were left without provisions. We decided to go to Schelkovka, to the old site of our previous command post. Spending the night there, we sent out people to search for provisions in Schelkovka; here we suffered the loss of another person, and 2 deserters were killed. They again returned with nothing. We decided to go to the west through the railroad at Poddubie. The date was 10-11 July, 1942. The rail line had already been changed to German gauge, and we discovered a defensive post but managed to avoid it. We went out on a wooden narrow-gauge line at a junction in the middle, about two kilometers to the east of Poddubie. There we made a long stop.

Comrade VINOGRADOV agreed with Comrade VLASOV that the larger group needed to be split into smaller ones that would choose their own routes and plan their own actions. He made a list and suggested that we move out. I personally objected to such a course and told my own plan, which was to move together to the Oredezh River. Catch fish together in Lake Chernoe and, if possible, in the river. And the remainder of the group led by me would go to search out the partisans, where we could find a radio station and be connected with our units to the east and could be offered help.

My proposal was not accepted. Then I offered that anyone who wanted could come with me, and one political officer wanted to come, a guy who was listed as being with Vlasov, and then Comrade Vlasov claimed that I had lured him over to my side, and the matter ended there. I told them of my decision, and the time came for me to move out. Together with 4 men, I headed out along the route I had indicated. Before leaving, I tried asking the groups who was going where, but no one had made a decision yet. I tried asking Vlasov and Vinogradov, and they told me that they had not

made a decision and they would set out last. I parted company with them on good terms and set off with my people.

I moved straight to the west in the direction of Ostrov. On approach to the trigonometric tower 54.5 to the south of the swamp Veretinsky Bog, there is a swath of woods with a road, and I decided to head along it to the south, thinking that it would be a good place for partisans. Passing 1.5 kilometers to the south of marker 64.5, I saw up ahead a citizen asleep on a stump with a rifle next to him. I crawled up to him, took his rifle, and arrested him. I asked him to show his documents. Rattled from the surprise, he pulled out his documents, which included a party membership card and other identification. He turned out to be a partisan sleeping at his post. I ordered him to take us to his unit. He was frightened and began to ask and to beg us, saying that they would punish him for this, to have mercy on him, etc. Arriving at the unit, I handed the rifle over to the unit leader, instructed them to limit his punishment to a public reprimand, and demanded that the watch commanders check their posts more often. After this, I began to get acquainted with the unit. It turned out to be the Luginsky partisan unit led by District Committee Secretary of the Communist Party Comrade DMITRIEV; we were warmly greeted and welcomed to the unit. I began to insistently demand the location of partisan units with radio equipment. Comrade DMITRIEV suggested that I find Sazonov's unit, which was none other than the District Committee of the Communist Party in Oredezh, that he was somewhere in the area. We organized a search and he turned out to be 4 kilometers to the west of Gorka. Together with a group of the Luga partisans headed by Comrade Dmitriev, we arrived there on 14 July, 1942.

We were warmly greeted and given more decent food. Until then, our rations had consisted only of grass, forest sorrel, and birch juice without salt or spices. Sometimes we boiled up hedgehog soup with reeds, or animal hide that we rinsed and scorched and then boiled, and that resulted in a kind of cartilaginous meat. Exhaustion grew and was reflected in our ability to work. We could only move 10–12 kilometers in a day. But the spirits, the mood of all the partisans and the leadership was unflagging, and quite the

opposite, after meeting with us was raised, and so we reached our goal. I familiarized myself with Sazonov's unit. The entire unit consisted of active party members led by the District Committee of the Communist Party. It consisted of 70 people, discipline and order were palpable, and they had 12 months of partisan experience. 15 August would be the anniversary of their founding, for which they were eagerly preparing, since they would then be sent a troop train with cargo and a host of operational missions. Comrade SAZONOV's unit had a radio station. I immediately sent a radiogram that I was with Sazonov, that Vlasov and Vinogradov were alive. I discussed with the leadership the condition of the units headed from the front into the forest, into the rear territory of the enemy, and in particular the location of Vlasov and Vinogradov.

An operational decision was made to organize a search and to detain all those coming from the Red Army and assign them to a particular region. The main mission of the unit was to find Vlasov and Vinogradov at any cost and to take them to Sazonov's unit under personal guard. The first unit of 22 people received the mission of heading to the north along the road Vydritsa – Lysina – Korpus – Tosno. They had the task of blowing up the bridge, preventing the movement of automobiles, and mining the roads. And, as a special mission, to search out Vlasov and Vinogradov and bring them to the unit. The second unit of 12 people received orders to head to the west, to the village of Ostrov and the Oredezh River, cutting through the forest, to see if Vlasov and Vinogradov could be found near the villages along the Oredezh River and to bring them to the unit. In addition, this unit was ordered to bring barley, wheat, and salt from the base, etc. All the above-mentioned units were equipped with weapons, ammunition, and provisions and set out on the morning of the 15th to complete their missions. That same day, we received orders via radio to take immediate measures to seek out Comrades Vlasov and Vinogradov. This order motivated the unit even more toward the completion of their assigned tasks. Vlasov's group consisted of Vlasov, Vinogradov, two political officers, two Red Army soldiers, and one female companion of Vlasov. The leader of the group and the one responsible for

choosing the route was Vinogradov. He kept his final plan secret and told no one of it.

I consider conspiracies to be unnecessary and inappropriate. Vlasov was indifferent to the matter and Vinogradov did not object. He fell under his influence. Vinogradov had told me earlier that he intended to head through the Luzhsky region to Staraya Russa or the Kalinin Front,³⁰ but I personally could not believe him, since they had neither the strength nor the spirit to travel such a distance. I imagine that their intentions were to head north to the 4th Army, where he was executive officer. He knew the routes of the partisans in that area. Therefore, my opinion is that they headed to the north. The search for them continues. I personally, awaiting orders from above, began to intensely acquaint myself with the partisan movement, their daily life, the conditions and situation, throwing myself wholeheartedly into this task. I came to the conclusion that the unit had accomplished much. In the eleven months of their existence, many hundreds of Fritzes [*translator's note: derogatory term for Germans*] and provocateurs had been killed at the hands of the partisans. Several trains that were carrying troops and ammunition had been derailed and exploded.

They destroyed several hit squads. In spite of the difficulties of living in the woods, the unit maintained excellent discipline; the people were prepared to throw themselves into battle at a moment's notice. The entire leadership staff and a large share of the partisan fighters have been awarded state medals. I personally added a number of organizational activities and suggestions that were taken up by them. And I am prepared to remain in contact with them. I was busy with my work and was ready to move on to operational tasks, but the leadership received a radiogram instructing us to protect Afanasiev and to provide an exit for him. It was suggested that I remain with the unit in place and not go anywhere, since my body was in a state of exhaustion. I made peace with this. I began to help on-site where I could, trying to get my strength back. At this time, I experienced swelling in my body that impeded me and prevented me from moving freely. The search for Vlasov and Vinogradov continued and the squads had still not returned. Eight days passed, and the squads were to have returned

but they still had not. SAZONOV's unit received a second order from ZHDANOV, repeating the orders of HEADQUARTERS to immediately increase the tempo of the search for Comrades VLASOV and VINOGRADOV and to radio with any results. That order stepped up the activity of the partisans in fulfilling the order from headquarters, since it followed that Comrade STALIN himself knew of the matter. For this honored assignment, the partisans voluntarily put together yet another final squad, leaving behind only an insignificant base unit. The rest headed off to fulfill the honored assignment from Comrade Stalin. What an honor, what praise, what an assignment Sazonov's unit was asked to complete. The mission was not easy. The entire district of Oredezh was put on alert, and I am sure that Vlasov and Vinogradov will not get away, that they will be found.

On 22 July, 1942, we received a telegram to find a landing strip at once and be prepared to send Comrade AFANASIEV off by plane. All the leadership and I went to search out a location for a landing strip. We passed by four kilometers from the stopping place, from the partisan camp to the trigonometric tower and marker 56.5. A hundred meters from us, a guard—a Russian deserter from a hit squad—stood in a tower, calling to the German commander that four partisans were approaching his position. We overheard this, set up observation, and saw at the edge of the forest a unit of deserters coming out and breaking up into a chain in our direction. We could not begin a firefight, since we were but four, and they thirty-five. We left into the forest: we organized a search for a landing strip in another location. The mission was completed. The landing strip was located and the coordinates relayed by radio. Evening fell on 23 to 24 July, 1942. The entire leadership of the unit and the partisan fighters accompanied me to the boarding area. We had grown used to one another and it was hard to part, but I assured them I would be in constant contact with them and help them, especially along the lines of the headquarters for the partisan unit. I would work there, taking it on as a supplemental duty.

The leadership gave me valuable materials, money, signatures for loans that had been gathered among the population in the rear of enemy territory, gold coins from tsarist times to pass on to the

district committee of the Communist Party for the defense fund, and letters from all the partisans to their relatives.

At 24:00 on 23 July, 1942, the airplane landed. I parted warmly with the partisans and gave the signal for takeoff, and the pilot, in spite of the roughness of the landing strip, handily guided the plane from the earth and we took flight.

As we flew over the enemy front lines, they opened fire. But the bullets and explosions were far off, and we were already in the clouds. Flying across the Volkhov River, I involuntarily cried out, "Hurrah! Long live our Great and Beloved friend and teacher, Comrade Stalin!" And as I clapped my hands, the pilot looked to see what was the matter and then guessed that I was happy to be flying into our territory.

I arrived at the landing site and was deeply touched to be greeted by Army General Comrade MERETSKOV and Army Commissar of First Rank Comrade ZAPOROZHETS.³¹ My legs were trembling—such respect, such an honor. After all this, I was deeply touched from all the attention, care and fanfare. They embraced me and we were so glad. I could not hold back my tears at such a greeting, which was altogether unexpected. They took me to their quarters for a brief reception. In spite of my weakness, I felt that I had come to life, become strong.

At four o'clock, Comrade General MERETSKOV called Comrade MALENKOV³² and reported that AFANASIEV arrived successfully. Comrade STALIN asked to be informed of this. I really cannot believe that Comrade STALIN knows of me and takes an interest in me. Comrade STALIN, even in such working conditions, manages to spend his valuable time on individuals and worry about them. After General Comrade MERETSKOV's conversation with MALENKOV, all my weakness passed from me. I was flooded with strength, energy and I was prepared to throw myself into my work immediately to more quickly crush the enemy, that fascist bastard.

Dear, respected leaders of the battles of the Volkhov Front!

General of the Army Comrade MERETSKOV and Army Commissar of First Rank Comrade ZAPOROZHETS! I am truly

touched by your hospitable greeting, your caring and thoughtful reception.

Dear Joseph Vissarionovich, I am deeply touched by your concern. It is too much and dear to me. Many thanks for life. This is the life of a small person, who pledges to pay with his own blood for every drop of blood, to destroy ten times more fascists. Death to the fascist executioners! And long live our own beloved leader, Comrade STALIN!

MAJOR GENERAL OF COMMUNICATIONS FORCES
AFANASIEV

26 July, 1942

RGASPI. F. 83. Op. 1. D. 18. L. 91–105. Original.

N°8. Address of the former commander of the Second Shock Army Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov and former commander of the 41st Rifle Division Colonel V. I. Boyarsky to the Supreme High Command of the German army on the organization of a center for the formation of a Russian army to fight against the Stalinist regime.

3 August, 1942

Translation from German. Original in Russian lost.

Bearing in mind the domestic situation of the Soviet Union, the growing opposition to the existing regime there, and also the international situation, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. Stalin's government, in connection with the extreme military defeats delivered by the German forces, and likewise due to his inability to organize military activity in the rear (for example, hunger throughout the country and disruption of agricultural activities), has lost popularity among the population and especially within the army. It is held together only by the previously-established and currently-supported system of the NKVD—a system of terror.

2. In army and popular leadership circles, there is an increasing awareness of the futility and uselessness of conducting the current war, which leads only to the annihilation of millions of lives and the destruction of material assets.

This group of people is faced with a dilemma—either die in vain in war or be killed in the underground crypts of the NKVD. Both on the front and in the rear, officers are being put to death, blamed for military failures. What's more, some of the commanders of these units are not at all responsible for the failures. The commanding officers are inhibited in conducting operations by the commissars. There are cases connected with this where high-ranked command staff has surrendered as prisoners.

3. The officer corps of the Soviet Army, especially the officers who have been taken prisoner and who are thus able to share their thoughts freely, are faced with the question of what can be done to topple the Stalin government and create a new Russia. All are united in their desire to overthrow Stalin's rule and change the form of government. The question remains: who to side with—with Germany, England, or the United States? The main task—the overthrow of the government—speaks to the fact that they should side with Germany, who announced a fight against the existing government and regime as the goal of the war. However, the question of the future of Russia remains unclear. This could lead to an alliance with the United States and England, should Germany fail to clarify the matter.

4. Stalin, making use of Russia's particular advantages (endless spaces, huge potential possibilities) and the patriotism of the people, upheld through terror, will never back down and will never make compromises. He will continue to wage war until all strength and possibilities are spent.

It is not worth counting on the possibility of an internal overthrow under current conditions.

5. Bearing in mind that there are millions of people in occupied districts and an enormous number of POWs, and considering their hostility to Stalin's government, it is possible to allow that these masses of people make up a nucleus of internal power that under the leadership of the German government will speed up the long-

ripening emergence of a new political order in Russia, which should happen in parallel with the ongoing creation by the Germans of a new Europe.

These forces are not currently being utilized.

From the above, we submit for your consideration the following stance:

Create a center for the formation of a Russian army and undertake its implementation.

Independent of its military characteristics, this Russian army will give the opposition movement a sense of lawfulness and in one blow will strike back a host of doubts and hesitations that currently exist among the occupied and unoccupied territories alike who are putting the brakes on the creation of a new order.

This undertaking legalizes intervention against Russia and drives away the thought of betrayal currently weighing on all the POWs and also on the people in the unoccupied districts.

We consider it our duty to our people and our Führer to voice the idea of the creation of a new Europe, to make the above known to the Supreme High Command, and, in so doing, make our contribution to the implementation of the above-mentioned idea.

Former commander of the 2nd Army

Lieutenant General Vlasov

Former commander of the 41st Rifle Division

Colonel Boyarsky³³

Vinnitsa

Translated by Captain Peterson

Authenticated: Al. Gumilev

This statement to the German Supreme High Command was given by myself and Boyarsky on August 1942 in Vinnitsa. The original of this document was signed by us and entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel von Ronn of the German army to give to the German Supreme High Command.

Vlasov

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. N°N-18766. T. 7. L. 59–65. Authenticated copy.

N°9. Memorandum report from member of the Military Council of the 32nd Army G. N. Zhilenkov and V. I. Boyarsky to the German command, with instruction on the need to organize a Committee for the Liberation of the Homeland and Russian Liberation Army for the fight against the Soviet regime.

27 October, 1942

Top Secret

MEMORANDUM REPORT

27 October, 1942

Led by the desire to end the war as quickly as possible and for victory over the Bolsheviks, and also to preserve the strength of the peoples of Great Germany and Russia, we must again submit a request to examine the following proposal that we have put forward.

Ending the war in the East and crushing Bolshevism demands broad use of internal forces and the political situation in Russia.

The colossal possibilities stemming from the difficult political situation are not being sufficiently taken advantage of by the German leadership.

Primitive slogans of the fight against Bolshevism cannot have serious success, since the Bolsheviks have long refused programmatic Bolshevik slogans. They wage war under the slogans “for the homeland,” “for honor,” “for freedom,” “for the Fatherland,” and “for saving the people from the deadly danger posed by the Germans.” The huge systems of Bolshevik propaganda and terror, functioning in parallel, force people to believe these slogans and continue the fight.

ON THE ONE HAND, THE PEOPLE OF RUSSIA DO NOT WANT TO DEFEND THE STALIN REGIME; ON THE OTHER,

THE GERMANS ARE PRESENTED TO THEM ONLY AS ENEMIES MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE BOLSHEVIKS.

The years of the reign of Stalin's regime have lowered the standard of living for the people of Russia to an almost subsistence-level existence. Collectivization, the physical annihilation of millions of peasants under the banner of "liquidating kulak elements," terror and repression, starvation, slavish labor laws for workers and service members, the obstruction of private initiative, tyranny and violence—all of this has strengthened popular hatred of Stalin's regime.

However, the main characteristic of the Russian people, which Stalin exploits, is that in times of threat from the outside, they are able to forget all of the deadly affronts against them.

According to Bolshevik propaganda, Germany wants to destroy everything Russian and, most importantly, the Russian government—to turn the Russian people into powerless slaves. To the Russian soldier, Germany is painted as an external enemy. To defend his Homeland from an external enemy, he will suffer the greatest deprivations, overcome military fatigue, and resist to the point of self-sacrifice.

He WILL STOP resisting immediately if he IS CONVINCED THAT GERMANY IS PREPARED TO PRESERVE RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT and include that government, on a new foundation, in the seven governments of New Europe.

The slogan "PEACE WITH GERMANY" WILL BECOME THE RUSSIANS' MOST POWERFUL SLOGAN BOTH AT THE FRONT AND IN THE REAR TERRITORIES. The thirst for peace will lead them to turn their weapons against Stalin.

Clearly understanding the potential for such developments, the Bolsheviks are, not unsuccessfully, using all new propaganda methods to instill in the minds of the people that Germany is fighting not against the Bolshevik system but against the Russian people, that the goal is to physically destroy the Russian people, to steal its riches and territory. Stalin, over the course of the most recent months of the war, has completely changed his domestic policies. He is taking extreme measures to eliminate the reasons for political dissatisfaction among the Russian people. The

demonstrative implementation of a number of measures has been used to try to show people that his regime cares deeply for the spiritual and material needs of the people. Examples of this include:

1) A new law for the protection of churches, their government-funded restoration, and full freedom of religion;

2) The dissolution of the institution of commissars in the army and navy;³⁴

3) The appointment of the powerful military specialist and former Tsarist officer Marshal Shaposhnikov to Supreme Commander;

4) The decisive expulsion of all Jews from leadership posts, both in the rear territories and on the front.

There is reason to claim that, in order to win the support of his people, Stalin will go even further: to conduct serious reforms of the collective farming system, to unleash private initiative not only in the village but in the city, to gradually weaken the limitation on private property.

ALL THIS IS DONE EXCLUSIVELY TO KNOCK FROM GERMANY'S HANDS ALL POLITICAL FACTORS THAT MIGHT HELP GERMANY ATTRACT THE PEOPLES OF RUSSIA TO ITS SIDE.

Unfortunately, the German leadership is doing nothing to counteract Stalin's activities in this regard, and their entire propaganda policy is based on tired, primitive, anti-Bolshevik, and antisemitic slogans. Stalin is gradually but decisively eliminating all those elements on which German propaganda in Russia is based.

Currently, what is most urgently needed, above all, in the interests of Germany and the peoples of Russia, is the dissemination of new political tactics that would guarantee a rapid end to the war and a victory for Germany.

The experience of 16 months of war in Russia, the organization of Soviet gangs in the rear territories, and the negative feelings of part of the local population toward the German regime in occupied territories convincingly prove the necessity of implementing a number of political and organizational activities that will lead to great success: they will save millions of lives and innumerable material assets, and will be entirely in keeping with German

interests. Under the current policies of the German government, which does not want to make full use of Russia's internal forces, Stalin has entirely sufficient capabilities not only for defense, but also for offensive operations. An example is the winter and summer actions of 1942, when the Bolsheviks not only maintained their position along three-fourths of the eastern front, but also undertook active military postures in several areas.

The territorial, personnel, and provisional reserves and resources of the Bolsheviks are fully sufficient to wage war for an extended period yet without the need for capitulation. For the Stalin regime, capitulation is out of the question. From the earliest days of the war, Stalin was reassuring those close to him that if they could preserve the population centers in the Urals, they would have all they needed to resist and eventually crush the Germans.

That was said in July 1941, when Stalin himself and, to an even greater degree, his followers were in a state of horrible panic.

Now, over the course of the war, the Stalin regime and the peoples of Russia have grown accustomed to the loss of cities and territory; now, there is no longer the previous panic and, in spite of Stalin's orders, people with the benefit of hindsight remember that from Moscow to the eastern border there are eleven thousand kilometers of rich and fruitful land.

Since the war has been of a protracted nature, the Bolsheviks have had time to roll out new manufacturing and industry in the Urals and the eastern parts of the country; they have managed to recommence a significant share of the activities evacuated from European Russia.

In the case of putting to use the resources and reserves of the Urals and Siberia, time is decisively favoring the Stalin regime. As time goes by, the main sectors of the war economy in Russia are being moved to the East.

Wheat, coal, oil, lumber, iron, copper, lead, etc. can all be produced in the eastern part of Russia in sufficient amounts—it is just a matter of time. As early as January 1942, 75% of industry relocated to the East was working at full power.³⁵

The German leadership is in possession of information that the entire industrial capacity of eastern Russia is being adapted to work exclusively on providing wartime needs.

At huge cost in terms of loss of life and popular deprivation, Stalin is taking measures to establish production units for wartime necessities in impregnable areas of the country. In 1943, under intensive mobilization of all forces, the eastern regions could provide 4.5 million *poods* (up to 73 million tons) of wheat, 25 million tons of oil, 15 million tons of iron, all necessary amounts of coal and lumber. Already the successes achieved in this respect are being reflected in the stability of the front.

This reinforces the hopes of the people and makes them believe that they have great wealth and vital space behind them.

By the spring of 1943, the Bolsheviks could be receiving active support from their allies. Portions of the Soviet armed forces will be rested up over the winter, will be brought into order and newly activated. Fear of a new advance by the Bolsheviks and active support from their allies will prompt a great increase in banditry, not only in the Russian districts, but also in Ukraine, Belorussia, and Poland.

All of the above points lead to the following conclusions:

1. The conquest of Russia by means of weaponry alone will take significant time and heavy losses; meanwhile, the situation requires a rapid end to the war in the East.
2. A quick end to the war and victory in Russia can be achieved through the full and correct utilization of internal Russian forces and the political situation.

CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR THE USE OF INTERNAL FORCES THAT CAN CONTRIBUTE TO VICTORY.

The Russian people, although not desirous of defending the Stalin regime, nevertheless steadfastly defend their Homeland. The Soviet government slogan “Defend the Homeland” remains critical both in the rear territories and at the front. The greater the danger to the Homeland, the more popular this slogan becomes.

It is necessary to paralyze this key slogan, which has given strength to their resistance, and take it away from the Stalin regime. This can be achieved in the following way:

1. The nation-wide proclamation of an official political Declaration of the Government of Germany to the Peoples of Russia.

This Declaration should include the critical statement:

a) that Germany has no intention of colonizing Russia, that the political independence of Russia is guaranteed, that with the destruction of Bolshevism a new Russian Government must be created in which truly free conditions of labor must be established for the workers, the peasants, and the intelligentsia;

b) that Germany considers Bolshevism defeated. With the goal of a rapid end to the war and establishment of peace between two great peoples—Germany and Russia—a “COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE HOMELAND” WITH THE RIGHT TO GOVERN RUSSIA will be created.

A PEOPLE’S ARMY WILL BE FORMED THAT WILL FIGHT ALONGSIDE THE ARMED FORCES OF GERMANY AS ALLIES IN THE RAPID DESTRUCTION OF THE REMAINING OUTPOSTS OF BOLSHEVISM.

It is not at all necessary in this document to raise the timely questions—for example, of borders, territorial divisions, etc. These questions can and should be decided after the achievement of complete victory.

WITHOUT SUCH A DECLARATION AND THE CLEAR DEFINITION OF GERMANY’S MILITARY GOALS IN THE EAST, THE USE OF RUSSIAN FORCES ON A LARGE SCALE IS NOT POSSIBLE. THE PARTICIPATION OF SMALL, FRAGMENTED DETACHMENTS CANNOT HAVE ANY IMPACT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR.

PRACTICAL MEASURES

2. It is impossible to convince the people by word alone. The first act in the implementation of the Declaration will be the creation of a “COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE HOMELAND” (New Government), whose mission it will be to prepare for the creation of a New Russian Government that is

indistinguishable in type from the other governments of Europe being developed under the leadership of the Führer of Great Germany. Simultaneously, it is necessary to create a RUSSIAN LIBERATION ARMY consisting of 50–80 thousand people. The desire of the Russian soldier to fight against Bolshevism has already been proven by the actions of smaller detachments of Russian forces.

One such detachment numbering 300 fighters and officers, operating from 19 to 26 May, 1942 in the area of Vyaz'ma, took prisoner more than 600 Soviet soldiers and made great trophies of weapons and military materials. Another detachment, consisting of two companies, operated in the Orlov portion of the front and in 10 days took prisoner more than 300 Soviet soldiers and officers, and also took some weapons and military materials as small trophies. The soldiers and officers of these Russian units were united by the idea of the liberation of their Homeland from the violence and oppression of the Jewish-Stalinist regime, the fight for a bright future as New Russia. These ideas are the high and noble goal of the creation of the Russian Liberation Army.

It is necessary to underscore that the indicated detachments had success on the front mainly BY SPREADING THEIR IDEAS AND ALMOST NOT USING WEAPONS AT ALL. Experience shows very convincingly the wisdom of the existence of such a Russian force. The huge military significance and usefulness of such an army, which would preserve distinct Russian characteristics, is completely obvious and proven in practice.

THESE SMALL ACTIVE DETACHMENTS HAVE ALREADY MET WITH SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS IN THEIR ACTIVITIES. IT MAY BE REASONABLY BELIEVED THAT THE CREATION OF A RUSSIAN ARMY AND ITS ACTIVITIES ALONGSIDE THE GERMAN ARMY, UNDER ITS LEADERSHIP, AS ALLIES, WILL PRODUCE HERETOFORE UNSEEN SUCCESSES.

THESE SUCCESSES WILL SAVE VALUABLE GERMAN AND RUSSIAN BLOOD AND WILL PROVIDE A SIGNIFICANT TIME ADVANTAGE FOR GERMANY TO ACHIEVE ITS FURTHER OBJECTIVES IN EUROPE.

BRIEF SCHEMATIC OF THE USE OF RUSSIAN FORCES

The Russian Liberation Army will take on the most critical portion of the front in the direction of Moscow.

Based on the Declaration of the Government of Great Germany, the leadership of the Russian People's Army and the "Committee for the Liberation of the Homeland" will, by means of propaganda, simultaneously prepare the Soviet armed forces to come over to the side of the Russian People's Army, WITH WEAPONS AND COMMAND STAFF, FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST THE STALIN REGIME, FOR THE HOMELAND, FOR NEW RUSSIA.

At the same time, a large network of intelligence and paratrooper units of the Russian People's Army will act in the rear territories of the Soviet forces to disrupt their command and sow panic and pandemonium along the front lines. Should parts of individual Soviet units refuse to voluntarily switch sides, the Russian People's Army will put down the resistance by force. Offensives by the units of the Russian People's Army will be coordinated with the actions of the German Army. Material provisions for the units of the Russian People's Army will initially be provided by Germany.

For the leadership and command of the actions of the Russian People's Army to be able to undertake such activities, a significant headquarters must be prepared in advance, one that will undertake the command of a large portion of the former Soviet units that defect to the side of the Russian People's Army.

The implementation of this action plan must be undertaken without delay in order to put an end to military action and achieve peace in the East by the beginning of summer of 1943.

What's more, the very organization of the activity indicated above will demand a large amount of time.

ANY DELAY BENEFITS GERMANY'S ENEMIES.

The proposals put forth in this report are free from any opportunistic intentions. They come from a deep desire for victory over Bolshevism, for the rapid end to the war, and are based on many years of experience of leadership in the army and among the people under the Soviet regime.

THESE PROPOSALS REFLECT THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE, MANY RESPONSIBLE AND LEADING RUSSIAN WORKERS, BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, LOCATED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE FRONT.

The historical necessity and wisdom of joining together with Great Germany will be understood by many millions of Russian people!

The genius Führer of Great-Germany Adolf Hitler and the Great German People in the historic crusade against Jewish-Bolshevism will find a true and sincere ally in the Russian People.

COLONEL BOYARSKY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ZHILENKOV³⁶

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. №N-18766. T. 7. L. 70–77. Authenticated copy.

№10. Proposal [by Minister of the Occupied Eastern Territories A. Rosenberg] to form a Russian National Committee under the control of the German government, prepare a declaration in the name of this committee, and form military units comprised of defectors.

Before 27 December, 1942

Peoples the predominant population of which are not subject to civilian government

A: Russians

1) The declaration of the position in relation to the Russian people carries decisive significance, since they currently occupy a dominant position that is attributable to their historic past and can scarcely be reduced to their numbers alone.

The exorbitant pressure on them from the ethnic-biological point of view, in which they currently see a danger and against which, in the end, there exist no effective means, may turn out to be convenient and useful under the future New Order—especially in

those cases when it can be successfully planted in the Russian consciousness as a national idea that their inclusion in the eastern problem is false, that (contrary to the imperialistic goals of the ruling circles) it has over the centuries turned out to be powerful in the subconscious of the broadest circles, as expressed, for example, in the colonization and absorption of Siberia.

If it be admitted that the lack of a positive political goal is the main barrier to internal liberation of the Russians from their current overlords, then the proclamation of a national goal becomes unavoidable, and with it, the creation of a firm foundation to provide European national order as a counterweight to Asian aspirations, by relying on the resilient strength of the Russians.

The Stalin regime is currently the only legal expression of the national idea, given the danger of losing their very statehood and in the future falling under a foreign leadership as a colony.

Therefore, it is worth opposing these fears with the Declaration, which would contain the principal admissions of the rights of Russians to their own statehood. It should take into consideration their most vital economic interests and it should end with a call to unite with the liberating forces of the German army, the goal of which is the creation of a New Russia through the absorption of the north-Asian territories and Russian indigenous spaces.

The Declaration should be forthcoming in the very near future. It is necessary that you agree to the following measures:

2) the formation of fighting units from Russian deserters.

In order to achieve the desired political effect, it is enough to form fighting units unconnected with one another but to give them a name that deeply stirs national feelings, something along the lines of "Russian People's Army."

3) the creation on Russian territory of a national organization along the lines of a military alliance, with a program that would answer to the long-term plans of the Germans.

The creation of such an organization would be in German interests for the following reasons:

a) the Russian national consciousness is a reality that the enemy takes into consideration to an increasingly great degree, and

which, as already has been demonstrated, they are using to their own ends. This national consciousness will try to express itself under all conditions. Whether it is put to use in the occupied Russian territories or in those Russian territories that have yet to be occupied, for the enemy it will mean the appearance of the most fertile soil for the organization and formation of illegal “national” party groupings, with all the accompanying serious negative moments for the occupying forces (for example, passive resistance, etc.) that this entails. This danger could be met by the kind of organization that would hold the national forces together and which would be supported and controlled by us.

b) A legal organization formed from Soviet Russians as an effective means of influence over the masses and control of the masses on this side of the front would allow the simultaneous emergence of illegal national groupings on that side of the front. As a result, the very real possibility of a civil war would again arise.

c) The “Military Union for the Liberation of Russia” or “National Unification for the Liberation of the Fatherland” could act as a single legal representative of Russian national interests – exclusively Russian. From this would follow a natural separation from all the non-Russians with any political weight, whose right to form similar structures should be recognized.

4. The creation of a Russian “National Committee for the Liberation of the Homeland,” with a governing role, which should be seen as the organization responsible for carrying out administrative activities throughout occupied Russia, and which in due time could possibly become the national Russian government.

A “National Union” or “Military Union” could become a starting-point for the implementation of this third practical measure in the course of (implementation of) the German declaration. A “National Committee” would not be left hanging in the air as a German puppet government, but its internal political legitimacy in the eyes of Soviet Russians would flow from the single national political organization. However, its political significance would be provided by the Germans.

The National Committee is envisioned not only as the highest executive office of the National Union, but simultaneously as its

highest leadership. In accordance with this, authorities of the government apparatus subordinate to it simultaneously serve as local leadership of the National Union.

The seat of this body should be one of the Russian cities in the occupied territory.

Consequently

Consequently, under the corresponding staff of the National Committee (in case of necessity, incorporating “consultants”) there is the ability to reliably regulate from our side without the necessity for a German to stand behind every Russian.

In this way, the question of controlling the activity of this organization and the question of the reliability of its leading membership would be, essentially, a technical problem for our supervisory bodies.

It would not be difficult to select several imprisoned Soviet generals and representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia circles, who as a part of the National Committee and leaders of a National Union might receive support from the population on both sides of the front.

With the help of the proposed measures, it would become possible to undermine all attempts by the Bolsheviks to portray their regime as responding to national interests.

The German Federal Archiv (BA). R/6/35. Bl. 137–140. Copy. Translation from the German.

N°11. Address of the Russian Committee, with a call to join the fight against Bolshevism on the side of Nazi Germany.

Smolensk, 27 December, 1942

ADDRESS OF THE RUSSIAN COMMITTEE
to the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army
to the entire Russian people and the other
ethnic groups of the Soviet Union

Friends and brothers!

BOLSHEVISM IS THE ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE. It has brought innumerable miseries on our Homeland and, at last, drawn the Russian people into a bloody war for the interests of others. This war has brought our Fatherland heretofore unseen suffering. Millions of Russian people have already paid with their lives for Stalin's criminal aspirations to rule the world, for the excessive profits of the Anglo-American capitalists. Millions of Russian people have been disabled and lost forever their ability to work. Women, the elderly, and children are dying from cold, hunger, and back-breaking toil. Hundreds of Russian cities and thousands of villages have been destroyed, exploded and burned on Stalin's orders.

The history of our Homeland knows no such defeats as have been the lot of the Red Army in this war. In spite of the selflessness of the soldiers and commanders, in spite of the bravery and sacrifice of the Russian people, battle after battle has been lost. The blame for this lies with the putrefaction of the Bolshevik system, the mediocrity of Stalin and his General Headquarters.

Now, even when Bolshevism has turned out to be incapable of organizing the defense of the country, Stalin and his gang continue to use terror and false propaganda to drive people to their deaths, wanting to stay in power at least a short time more at the cost of the blood of the Russian people.

STALIN'S ALLIES—THE ENGLISH AND AMERICAN CAPITALISTS—HAVE BETRAYED THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE. Intending to use Bolshevism to obtain the natural resource wealth of our Homeland, these plutocrats are not only saving their own hides at the cost of the lives of millions of Russians, but they have also sealed secret, exploitative deals with Stalin.

At the same time, Germany is not waging war against the Russian people and their Homeland, but only against Bolshevism. Germany will not infringe on the living space of the Russian people, nor on their national-political freedom. Adolf Hitler's National-Socialist Germany aims to organize a New Europe without

Bolsheviks or capitalists, in which each people is provided its own place of honor.

The place of the Russian people in the family of European peoples, their place in the New Europe, WILL DEPEND ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH THEY PARTICIPATE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST BOLSHEVISM, since the destruction of the bloody regime—of Stalin and his criminal gang—is PRIMARILY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES.

To unite the Russian people and the leaders of their fight against the hated regime, to cooperate with Germany in the war against Bolshevism to build a New Europe, we, sons of our people and patriots of our Fatherland, have created the RUSSIAN COMMITTEE.³⁷

THE RUSSIAN COMMITTEE has set for itself the following goals:

- a. The overthrow of Stalin and his gang; the destruction of Bolshevism
- b. The establishment of an honorable peace with Germany
- c. The creation, in cooperation with Germany and other peoples of Europe, of a New Russia without Bolsheviks or capitalists.

THE RUSSIAN COMMITTEE places the following main principles at the foundation of the building of New Russia:

1. The elimination of forced labor, the provision of real labor rights for the worker, and providing for his material prosperity;
2. The elimination of collective farms and the systematic transfer of land to peasants as private property;
3. The reinstatement of trade, craft, and domestic industry, and the opportunity for private initiative to participate in the economic life of the country;
4. The opportunity for the intelligentsia to create for the good of their people;
5. The provision of social justice and defense of the workers from great exploitation;

6. The introduction of real rights for workers to education, to vacation, and to security in the golden years;
7. The destruction of the regime of terror and violence; the introduction of real freedom of religion, conscience, self-expression, the press. The guarantee of the integrity of the person and housing;
8. The guarantee of national freedom;
9. The liberation from the political bonds of Bolshevism and the return from prisons and camps to the Homeland of all those who have suffered repression for fighting against Bolshevism;
10. The rebuilding of cities and villages destroyed during the war (paid for by the government);
11. The rebuilding of government-owned factories and plants that have been destroyed during the war;
12. The refusal to pay the exploitative contracts signed by Stalin with the Anglo-American capitalists;
13. The provision of a minimum standard of living payment for those disabled during the war and their families.

Truly believing that the happy future of the Russian people can and should be founded on principles, the Russian Committee calls on all Russian people located in liberated districts and all those in districts still occupied by the Bolshevik regime—all workers, peasants, intelligentsia, soldiers, commanders, and political workers—TO UNITE FOR THE FIGHT FOR THE HOMELAND AGAINST ITS MOST EVIL ENEMY: BOLSHEVISM.

The Russian Committee declares Stalin and his gang to be enemies of the people.

The Russian Committee declares all who voluntarily serve the punitive bodies of Bolshevism—the Special Divisions, the NKVD, the anti-retreat units³⁸—to be enemies of the people.

The Russian Committee declares all those who destroy valuables belonging to the Russian people to be enemies of the people.

The duty of every honest son of his people is to destroy these enemies of the people who propel our Homeland into new

adversities. The Russian Committee calls on all Russian people to fulfill their duty.

The Russian Committee calls on all soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, on all Russian people, to come over to the side of the Russian Liberation Army, which acts in alliance with Germany. All who come to the side of the fight against Bolshevism are guaranteed immunity and life, regardless of their previous activities or previous posts they have held.

The Russian Committee calls on all Russian people to join the fight against the hated Bolshevism, to create partisan liberation units, and to turn their weapons against the oppressors of the people – Stalin and his henchmen.

Russian people! Friends and brothers!

It is time to put an end to the spilling of Russian blood! To the creation of widows and orphans!

It is time to put an end to hunger, forced labor, and torture in the Bolshevik detention facilities! Join the fight for freedom!

To the fight for the holy cause of our Homeland! To the deadly fight for the happiness of the Russian people!

Long live honorable peace with Germany, initiating the eternal fellowship of the German and Russian peoples!

Long live the Russian people, an equal member of the family of peoples of New Europe!

Chairman of the Russian Committee,
Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov

Secretary of the Russian Committee
Major General V. F. Malyshev³⁹

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. № N-18766. T. 7. L. 66–68 ob.; RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 165. L. 46–46 ob. Typographic copy.

1943

N°12. Note on the 10 February, 1943 conversation in the Ministry of Occupied Eastern Territories on the Russian National Committee's calls to fight against the Stalin regime and the possibility of using the RNC and the RLA.

15 February, 1943

Note

Re[garding]: The Russian National Committee

At the meeting on 10 February, 1943, the minister was given the following report: Two leaflets were published by the Department of Military Propaganda of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht (HCW) ⁴⁰ in which a certain Russian National Committee called [Russians] to fight against Stalin and voiced for the first time [the call to] include Russians in the wider European whole. These leaflets should paralyze Stalin's increased national propaganda, which is not losing its influence. Distribution of these leaflets took place in early February. According to the data of the Military Propaganda Division of the HCW, they have already had a positive effect. The Military Propaganda Division of the HCW proposes swift movement to create this National Committee so that the propaganda they are deploying is not considered a propaganda trick and is not turned against us. It was therefore proposed that a Russian National Committee that would broaden its activity to all of the occupied Russian districts be created in the zone of operation of the army group "Center."⁴¹ The leadership of this committee should be put in place by the Reich Ministry of Occupied Eastern Territories,⁴² ideally by means of a delegated authority [of this Committee] in the chain of command of the army group "Center." The National Committee is tasked with supporting the propaganda campaign already underway and spreading the ideas that form the foundation of that campaign among Russians fighting in German Wehrmacht units. It is necessary to verify to what extent the National Committee can take on the function of advisor to the

military administration, in order to strengthen the effect of the propaganda through corresponding activities and make it easier for the population to come over to the side of Germany. The experience in Lokotskaya District⁴³ was pointed out.

In order to enhance the effect of the propaganda on the enemy, it was suggested that we add a military council to the National Committee. Recruitment was conducted by the Military Propaganda Division of the HCW with help from the Russian National Committee in Ukraine as well. However, in order to not only conduct propaganda work through the Russian National Committee, but to attach to it other large ethnic groups within the Soviet Union through their own [propaganda] bodies, National Committees will be created for Ukraine and Kazakhstan in the corresponding zones of military activity.

All Russians who fight in the ranks of the German Wehrmacht are united under the flag of the “Russian Liberation Army,” and Ukrainians involved in the German Wehrmacht under the “Ukrainian Liberation Army.” The number of their formations will necessarily be approved through the HCW and the commanding general of the eastern forces.⁴⁴ Units up to the size of battalion are still being considered. The “Russian Liberation Army” should receive a single [identifying] symbol.⁴⁵ Proposals on this point are being considered by the National Committee.

To attract supporters it is advisable to lay the foundations for the ideas reflected in the leaflets. If we were to turn away from these ideas, then the general spirit of the population of the occupied eastern districts and of volunteer supporters would unavoidably be lowered, and with it labor and other indicators of activity. They must be inculcated with the idea of participation in the liberation of their homeland. For that reason it is necessary to adhere to the principle that all peoples of the Soviet Union are equal partners in the community of European peoples. In this way, Russians will no longer be lifted above the other peoples of the Soviet Union, but [stand] next to them. Thus, it is necessary to oppose Russian imperialistic ambitions in a form acceptable to Russians themselves.

The minister is in agreement.

BA. R/6/35. Bl. 159–160. Original. Translation from the German.

N°13. Proposals of unidentified staff member of the Ministry of Occupied Eastern Territories concerning the temporary organizational structure of the Russian National Committee.

8 March, 1943

Secret!

Proposals concerning the temporary organizational structure Russian National Committee (RNC).

The leadership of the RNC should be concentrated in the hands of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories alone. It should be administered by the Authorized Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, who can simultaneously be the authority under the army group “Center.” It should coordinate its activity with the relevant military or other authorities.

Members of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories will be stationed at the Authorized Headquarters, and they will act as “advisors” to the working committees of the RNC that will be created.

In this way, together with the general leadership and supervision of the RNC, the Reich Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories should also provide leadership on concrete issues, and likewise exercise more detailed control over the offices of the RNC.

The RNC will be formed by the Reich Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories and include representatives from the HCW and Investigative Division.⁴⁶

Personnel of the RNC and its committees will be agreed upon by the HCW and the Investigative Division, as well as by the general of the eastern forces; they will be asked to submit corresponding proposals [about staffing, to be approved by the listed agencies].

The RNC, as reflected in previous propaganda campaigns of the Press and Propaganda Division of the HCW, includes:

- 1) Lieutenant General Vlasov – chair
- 2) Lieutenant General Zhilenkov – his deputy
- 3) Major General Malyshkin – secretary

It would be preferable to broaden it with representatives from various professional areas in coordination with the executive and consulting functions of the RNC, as well as to include informers in its working committees. The functions of the RNC should preliminarily be divided into

- a) executive and
- b) consulting.

A transition period from b) to a) must be overseen by the Reich Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories on the basis of acquired personal and service experience [on the part of the RNC] and in accordance with both political and military demands.

A. Executive functions can be grouped into four areas of competency, and they should correspond to the number of RNC committees, which (under the leadership of “advisors” from the Reich Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories) will function on the basis of cooperation with the institutions listed in Attachment 1 (drawing). (The labels on the circles and rectangles indicate not chain of command, per se, but functional spheres.)

1) Propaganda functions

The programmatic points of the “Military Union” listed in the attachment to memorandum I of the main department make up the ideological basis; these points may be developed by the National Committee with the approval of the Reich Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories.

Base: cooperation with the Propaganda Division of the HCW; additionally with the gen[eral] of the eastern forces and accordingly with the division of German military intelligence for foreign territories (in areas that concern the Military Union).

Areas of activity:

- a) Civilian population of the occupied districts.

The pacification of these districts by means of ideological and propaganda victory over the partisans. Not allowing the influence

of events on the front. Mobilizing all productive forces to the fight against Bolshevism for a New Russia.

Means: propaganda units among the troops, press, radio; possibly later propaganda infiltration of lower-ranking experienced offices of government.

b) Regular national military formations.

c) Volunteers

(United under the general name “Russian Liberation Army”)

In both cases, the ideological leadership should be approved by the general of the eastern forces. Ideological principles and means, if necessary, as above in point a).

d) Work to demoralize the enemy in enemy territory as well.

Through the HCW, cooperation with the most visible and influential representative of the local population (Promi); if necessary with the Abwehr Abroad Division⁴⁷ and the Investigative Division.

Means: by the approval of and when necessary from the above-named divisions. The Military Union

2) Military functions

Basis: cooperation with the general of the eastern forces, as well as with the Abwehr Abroad and Investigative Division.

a) Muster of deserters and POWs for the “Russian Liberation Army.”

Means: special committees (insertion of agent-informers).

b) study of such issues as: badges of rank and emblems, suggestions for service advancement and awards of merit

c) the uniform itself

3) Mercy and charity functions

Basis: cooperation with military forces (and, if necessary, with civilian authorities), as well as with the military police in the east.

a) provide help to the wounded

b) provide help to refugees

c) provide help to repatriated *Ostarbeiter* workers

Area of activity: occupied Russian territory (currently the army groups “Center” and “North”) ⁴⁸ and, if necessary, the German Reich.

Means: activity depending on what is necessary: camps to offer help, consultation, and offers of assistance from the military authorities to complete work and mobilize the workforce.

4) Predominantly political functions

Basis: cooperation with military authorities, SS, Investigative Division, and Abwehr. Here the participation of the Reich Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories is most important.

a) preparation of command support services

b) recruitment of productive national forces to the political-military alliance

To this end,

c) the solution of all personnel issues, with the exception of military (cf. Point 2).

This committee should create a certain counterweight to possible RNC claims (which currently have a primarily military focus) to a special role/special place.

By way of creating comradeship (...), the Military Alliance should form in the civilian sector a stronghold of national and activist elements that have not found a role for themselves in the liberation army. At the same time, it should become the most active force against the expected Bolshevik intrigues aimed at the disintegration of productive forces through secret organizations, masking them as national ones.

In cooperation with the Abwehr and Investigative Division, these forces should be used for direct influence behind enemy lines. (cf. Point of memorandum)

B. Consulting functions

Cooperation through the Reich Ministry of Occupied Eastern Territories with military authorities, and also with the Economic Headquarters “East”

Preparatory planning on issues of

5) government

6) culture

7) economics

8) rights

Conduct planning over an extended period (6–12 months).

Propaganda studies planning to begin immediately.

Means: growing inclusion of specialists in the committees, when necessary creating subcommittees.

[Attachment]

Attachment on personnel composition

of the Russian National Committee,

according to the preliminary org. chart

Chair: Lieutenant General Vlasov. Counter to all doubts expressed up to this point, I consider it necessary to the strength of propaganda efficacy to preserve Vlasov in this capacity – at least for the time being.

I.

Executive functions:

[Responsible] For propaganda functions:

- 1) General Blagoveschensky.⁴⁹ As publisher of the newspapers “Zarya” [“Dawn”] and “Dobrovolets” [“Volunteer”],⁵⁰ he has experience and success in this area and makes a more trustworthy impression than the previous editor of “Izvestiya” (Starov?), who could be left in this section in a lower rank.
- 2) General Lukin—former prisoner of Wustrau.⁵¹ Seriously wounded (prosthetic leg). Formerly the commandant of Moscow. In the opinion of all leaders [in the field of] training, he makes quite a dependable impression in the political sense.
- 3) Volunteer Turkevich, Russian student-medic. Lieutenant Colonel Erksleben—field number 05211—recommended him as an agent.

II.

[Responsible] For military functions:

- 1) General Vlasov
- 2) General Malyshkin—of all the current members of the committee created by the Military Propaganda Division of

the HCW, he makes the impression of a person most deserving of trust. He has less effective self-control, it seems, than Vlasov, and he is not as cunning as Zhilenkov.

- 3) General Lukin
- 4) General Trukhin⁵² – former prisoner of the Wustrau camp, later head of training at Wustrau. Most recently transferred to head of training at Dabendorf.

III.

[Responsible] For charity and mercy functions:

- 1) Engin. Kaminsky⁵³ – currently leader of the self-governing region of Lokot'. The best reviews from the appropriate German bodies. He has sufficient contacts to attract others from trustworthy circles of the Soviet civilian population.
- 2) Med. Doc. Krupovich – former prisoner at Wustrau camp, later head of training and camp doctor. Holds a responsible post; works in Berlin hospitals. Gives the impression of being politically reliable; has organizational abilities. Speaks German.
- 3) Med. Doc. Aleksandrov – former prisoner at Wustrau camp, currently declared for recruitment [willing to work in recruitment]. Very good behavior in the Wustrau camp. [General] impression: reliable, educated, active.
- 4) Lieutenant Babinsky – former prisoner at Wustrau camp; currently head of training at Wustrau.
- 5) Viktorov – former prisoner at Wustrau camp; currently head of training at Wustrau.

IV.

[Responsible] For primarily political functions:

a) Training of auxiliary service of administration.

- 1) Kaminsky
- 2) Prof. Ivanov (Stalino)
- 3) Bogomolov – artist – prisoner at Wustrau, training associate at Wustrau, currently at camp Dabendorf.
- 4) Flegontov – prisoner at Wustrau – chemical engineer – training associate.
- 5) Prof. Minaev – prisoner at Wustrau – professor of mathematics – currently librarian.

- 6) Zaitsev – former prisoner, most recently transferred to Dabendorf as a training associate.

b) Selection of staff for political-military alliance:

c) Personnel issues:

- 1) Kaminsky
- 2) Flegontov
- 3) Bogomolov
- 4) Captain Khokhlov – currently under Investigative Division, organizer of the Political Division, creating the military alliance there.
- 5) Colonel Gil', currently under Investigative Division, organizer of the Military Division, creating the military alliance there.
- 6) Ivan Ivanov – artist-deserter – currently under Investigative Division, with very good reviews on his political views and character, but rather strong-willed.

Those names marked with a cross are proposed as members of the committee; the remaining names are recommended for summary appointment.

To Mr. Drop and Mr. Mend <...> with the request to express their opinions and if necessary inform Mr. Dr. <...> on Monday 29, March

Kun<...>. 27 March.

Note: Wie mündlich vereinbart mit vorläufigen Vorschlägen einverstanden. M[ende]. 4.4.[1943].

BA. R/6/72. Bl. 18-21, 23-25. Original. Translation from the German.

N°14. Letter from the Chief of Staff of the Belorussian Partisan Movement P. Z. Kalinin to J. V. Stalin on the visit of A. A. Vlasov to the units of the RNA in Borisov.

7 April, 1943

TO THE SUPREME HIGH COMMANDER
MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
COMRADE STALIN J. V.

By means of partisan intelligence it has been established that the traitor, the former commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General Vlasov, has taken command of the so-called Russian People's Army.

In the last days of March, Vlasov visited RPA units in the town of Borisov.

On 21 March, his article "Why I Joined the Fight Against Bolshevism" appeared in fascist newspapers published in Belorussia.

We have been ordered to keep Vlasov in our field of view and organize his elimination.

SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF BELORUSSIA –
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE BELORUSSIAN
PARTISAN MOVEMENT P. KALININ

The Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. F. 3. Op. 50.
D. 458. L. 26. Original.

N°15. Special report of the Chief of Staff of the Kalinin Partisan Movement S. S. Bel'chenko to the head of the Bureau for Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks G. F. Aleksandrov about the makeup and activities of the Russian National Committee, the holding of a joint conference of the Russian Committee and representatives of the German government, and the decision about the Russian Liberation Army.

7 April, 1943

SPECIAL REPORT

ON THE ACTIVITY OF THE “RUSSIAN COMMITTEE”
TO THE CHIEF OF THE AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA
DEPARTMENT

OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
COMRADE ALEKSANDROV⁵⁴

In Comrade Sokolov's partisan brigade operating in the area to the north-west of Smolensk there is a deserter from the “Russian Liberation Army,” former Major of the Red Army A. Rudenko. In 1942, Rudenko served as the Chief of Staff of an artillery regiment of the 346th division. In August, in the midst of a battle, he was, in his words, concussed and taken prisoner. In October 1942, he was transferred from the camp for military prisoners of to a camp where volunteer units of the German army were being formed, where he was made commander of an artillery division. On 23 February, 1943, Rudenko and a group of volunteers—about 125 persons with weapons—disabled the artillery division before going over to the side of the partisans.

Rudenko testified that he found out from one of the commanders who was present at the reception at the chair of the “Russian Committee,” Lieutenant General of the Red Army, the traitor Vlasov A. A., that on 18–19 January of that year there had been a general meeting of the “Russian Committee” with the participation of members of the German government in which the following questions were discussed:

- 7) The staff of the “Russian Committee” Forging diplomatic relations between the committee and the governments of other countries
- 8) Offering the committee independence in forming institutions, etc.

At that general meeting, the following decisions were made:

- 6) The creation of the “Russian Volunteer Army”
- 7) The formation of propaganda battalions, the organization of courses for propagandists, and the issuing of the newspaper *Volunteer*

- 8) Conducting recruitment of persons subject to conscription for military service on the territory of occupied districts.

Rudenko, due to the impossibility of crossing the front lines at the current time, is located in the partisan brigade. This information was received from the brigade by radio.

In occupied areas, Germans are circulating leaflets explaining the goals and missions of the “Russian Committee.”

I am attaching two such leaflets.

CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE KALININ PARTISAN MOVEMENT
MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL FRONT A.S.
Bel’chenko⁵⁵

Instructions: Secr. Archive. On the orders of Comrade Aleksandrov two pages are attached. Directed to Comrade V. M. Molotov and Comrade A. S. Scherbakov. 13 April, 1943.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 165. L. 44. Original.

N°16. Report of the Eastern propaganda division from Einsatzstab Reichsleiter A. Rosenberg on the visit of A. A. Vlasov to the town of Mogilev and his speech before the public on 13 March, 1943.

16 April, 1943

[Translation from the German]

Secret

CONTENTS

on General Vlasov’s visit to Mogilev⁵⁶

On 13 March, Russian General Vlasov, the “savior of Moscow” and popular regiment commander, gave a speech in the Russian cinema on the formation of the “Russian Committee” and its mission. He stated that the majority of Russian commanders and officers do not

sympathize with the Bolsheviks in their souls, and that it is more evident to him than to others, since as a senior officer he moved in these circles and had learned their mood well. They welcome joint work with Germany and think that due to cooperation, only together could the two peoples win the fight against Bolshevism. Now there are many such people who support this opinion, both in the territories occupied by us and in Stalin's army.

The goal of the "Russian Committee" is the organization of honest cooperation between the two peoples and the uniting of these forces for the fight against Bolshevism. The reinstatement of the old tsarist regime is out of the question, though some emigrants may think it possible. Capitalism is ruled out, as is Bolshevism. The Russian people must voluntarily take their place under the new flag and create a new form of government. The Russian people live and will continue to live, and it will be impossible to lower them to the condition of a colonial people.

The audience reacted to General Vlasov's speech very reservedly. All of his conclusions were accepted indifferently. There was a feeling that there was something forced about Vlasov's performance.

The general made his most interesting statements in a small circle. In that small circle of Germans, General Vlasov expressed himself very frankly. He stated that he was convinced that Germany would lose the war against Russia if a large army was not introduced in the near future to fight against Stalin and if Germany did not radically change its policy regarding treatment of the population of occupied areas. Due to Stalin's offensive tactics, not only were the German units losing military might, but behind the front lines the danger of the partisan movement was increasing.

The partisan movement authorized by Stalin has, thanks to unceasing Bolshevik propaganda, taken the form of a patriotic movement of heroes.

The reason for the growth of the partisan movement is, first of all, the Germans' unsuccessful policy concerning treatment of the population of occupied regions. The population has become convinced that their lives have not only not improved under the Germans, but quite the opposite, that they have fallen under the

yoke of bloody overlords. Vlasov criticizes the Germans' old, traditional policy of forced mobilization of workers to Germany and they call the treatment of peoples ignoble. Cases where theaters were blown up during performances and all who were capable of working were forcibly shipped off to Germany without even the possibility of saying goodbye to their loved ones cause horror and indignation and lead to bad consequences. Such cases provide the best material for propaganda against Germany, and for the Russian population of occupied regions they are an unbearable enslavement. Vlasov claims that without cooperation with and the support of the civilian population and without the systematic suppression of the Russian front, Germany will lose the war within a year due to lack of people and raw materials. Stalin has the possibility of recruiting into his army, in addition to the Russian population, millions more of the Asian peoples.

The reestablishment of industrial plants that Russians removed to the east has already been completed. Bases for raw materials have not suffered damage or reduced output capacity (the Urals, Siberia, the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, the region of Emba, Turkestan; additional resources from Mongolia and China, aid from America). Russia will not feel the lack of food supplies.

If Germany did not have any slave-colonizer intentions, then that would be expressed in some official statement or seen in the activities of Germans in the occupied territories.

The long silence of the German government, its unsuccessful treatment of the population, the disappointment with local self-government that has turned the population into a puppet fulfilling statutes to the letter without consideration for their interests—all this, together, has destroyed the hope and faith of the population in the good and honest intentions of the German government. Heavy taxes on the poverty-stricken population, taxes on the churches built with the pennies of the poor, etc., push the population into the arms of enemy propaganda.

There is a significant number of people here with anti-Bolshevik leanings, and we need to attract them to our side and urge them into action. Vlasov takes on this mission himself. But for this, he states, it is absolutely necessary to shine light on the goals

of the Germans. It is precisely the best of the Russians, those with national pride, who want to know what role they will play. It is precisely these people who are worthy of building a “New Russia,” but they will always fight against the enslavement and colonization of Russia and the Russian people. On the other hand, they will not go over to the Bolsheviks, and what’s more, in the case of the defeat of Germany, not one of them will stop before committing suicide.

Vlasov himself stated that in such a case he would also put a bullet in his head. The uncertainty of the situation surrounding the silence of the German government calls forth doubt in the “Russian Committee” among the people. If the German government’s policy does not change soon, then the population will see Vlasov and his followers as traitors selling out the interests of the people. Signs of mistrust are already evident. Vlasov warns not to publish the true intentions of the Germans. He says that soon the time will come when the local Russian population will come to its end, and those remaining will cross over into Stalin’s army. This is not the way to achieve the destruction of Stalin’s army, which will only become more resolved in the fight against—and victory over—Germany.

Vlasov indicates that the popular anti-German movement will take on threatening shapes in the coming months, and he would not be surprised if thuggery became a common occurrence.

Vlasov calls the local Russian self-government sell-outs. Not one self-respecting Russian would join this government, and the only people that could be attracted to it are characterless opportunists. The people know the value of the local self-government and place the responsibility for this on the Germans.

Vlasov believes that with his popularity in the army and among the Russian population, he will be able to create from the large numbers of anti-Bolshevik-leaning deserters that he expects an army of two million people, battle-ready and morally fixed in the fight for the liberation of Russia from Bolshevism, but at the foundation of this liberation should lie the slogan of “satisfying the national interests of the Russians.”

Vlasov speaks of the fact that many of the officers, in spite of their anti-Bolshevik views, have still not decided to join the liberation movement, simply because the Russians’ situation under

German policies is not clear at this time. Under existing conditions, they consider it dishonest to fight against their brothers in blood, to call them over to our side, since they cannot give them a satisfactory promise and guarantee of safety. Vlasov describes the people he is talking about as honest, brave people prepared to lay down their lives for the liberation of Russia from the Bolsheviks, but they do not want German enslavement. They are prepared to cooperate with Germany as representatives of a people not devoid of pride and honor.

Vlasov points to the fact that the gentlemen in Berlin understand the essence of the Russian question less than the Army in the East. Here the demands and particularities of the Russian people are better understood, and they recognize the national pride of the Russians. Vlasov is searching for a resolution of the Russian question by the Führer, of whom he speaks with great respect as the most talented potentate and military leader. He hopes that the Führer will restore Russia and the Russian national spirit and pride. New Russia will fight together with Germany for the destruction of Bolshevism.

TRANSLATED BY: Member of the 2nd div. UKR SMERSH⁵⁷
2nd Lt. Alekseeva

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. F. 40. Op. 17. D. 55. L. 176, 176 ob., 177–178. Original. Translation from the German, contemporary to original.

N°17. Dispatch of the command staff of army group “North” to the Main Command and General Headquarters of the HCW [Oberkommando des Heeres] on the visit of A. A. Vlasov to Pskov from 29 April to 1 May, 1943.

4 May, 1943

Draft letter
Secret

Command staff of the army group “North” Gen. Hq. 4 May, 1943
O. Qu. /VII 6015–43 geh.

HCW/General Army headquarters/General Quartermaster
Re[garding]: the visit of Lieutenant General Vlasov to Pskov
During his trip (prepared by the propaganda services) through the occupied [by us] territories, Lieutenant General Vlasov stopped from 29 April to 1 May, 1943 in Pskov, where he was given the opportunity to share his ideas with representatives of the Wehrmacht and the Russian administration, give a speech on 1 May before a large crowd, and visit a number of productive enterprises. For information on how he spent his visit in Pskov, the main idea of Vlasov’s statements, and a general assessment of Vlasov’s disposition during his visit [to Pskov], see the report of the garrison commandant Major General Meyer, which I have attached.

I have still not received the Russian general myself, and therefore I cannot confirm these impressions with my own observances. Nevertheless, I find worthy of attention two details about which I heard from others. Vlasov was saying in close circles that Stalin often called him a “climber.” I think that Stalin did indeed use this formulation to characterize Vlasov, who was close to him. In another conversation, Vlasov clothed the thesis of the necessity of immediately determining political goals in the following words: “Russia is not a nation of a million and a half people; being a people of a hundred million with a great historical past, Russia deserves to know why they have to suffer and die!” This point of view, quite cocksure in expressing what is almost an ultimatum, also seems characteristic of Vlasov to me.

Does Vlasov really have the support he talks about among the Russian people and, most of all, among the officer corps of the Red Army? In any case, it can already be said today that Vlasov might become highly significant for further developments in the East. In the broadest circles of the Russian population, in the ranks of volunteers and national formations, the personality of Vlasov and his program are currently at the center of discussion. Further delay in making the decision Vlasov is seeking, or disappointment in that decision, could have both military and economic consequences

which cannot currently be foreseen. The lack of any direction from the center, or at the very least official statements of intention that are sought by the Vlasov movement, would negatively influence political developments, the tone of which was given by the offices of propaganda.

Signature

Sent 7 May, 1943

Dispatch

On the visit of Lieutenant General Vlasov
to Pskov from 29 April to 1 May, 1943

I. Chronology of events

Arrival on 29 April, 1943, approx. 17:00.

Short coffee break with information on coming activities.

Dinner in the officers' mess of the garrison headquarters, where the only invited guest was the head of the military administration for the army group "North," section leader (K. V. Abt.) Dr. Jung.⁵⁸

After dinner, time was spent together in the officers' mess. At the wishes of Lieutenant General Vlasov, who did not want to spend the evening in vain and not do some work, and since the German accompanying him did not have any objections to Lieutenant General Vlasov freely associating with his Russian compatriots—and, on the contrary, announced that this was desirable—the following Russians were brought in: the mayor of Pskov, the head of the Pskov district, the man in charge of finances for the town and district of Pskov, the chief of police of the Pskov district and the medical doctor Dr. Sergeev, head of the women's clinic in Pskov.

The entire evening's exchange of opinions was uninterrupted and even encouraged from the German side, Lieutenant General Vlasov eye to eye with the above-listed members of the local administration in Vlasov's room within the garrison headquarters.

On 30 April, 1943, at 10.00, celebration of the May holiday in the soldiers' theater in Pskov. The program is attached. There was a wired broadcasting of the celebration out to the market square, where a May tree had been erected and on that day the market was open for business.

At a general lunch, a thick soup was served. Participants: Lieutenant General Vlasov with his escort, the garrison commandant with colleagues from the garrison and local headquarters offices, the head of the Propaganda Division from Riga, the head of the propaganda unit in Pskov, representatives of the Greek-Orthodox mission, and representatives of local offices of the town and district.

After eating, an hour-long conversation in the officers' mess of the town garrison headquarters among a very close circle including Lt. Gen. Vlasov and the people accompanying him, section leader (K. V. Abt.) Dr. Jung, Colonel Eger from Stalag No. 372,⁵⁹ and three colleagues from the garrison headquarters.

After lunch, a familiarization tour of the power station, the "Metallist" factory, and the fur factory, a visit to the propaganda division, and a presentation by the initiative group.

Lieutenant General Vlasov's participation in a rally at the fur factory conducted there under the auspices of the May holiday, with a speech from the Chief Purser of army group "North" Colonel Bekker.

At 19.30, dinner with invited guests at the officers' mess of the garrison headquarters.

After dinner – voluntary conversations in the officers' mess of the garrison headquarters. Among other discussions, Lt. Gen. Vlasov spoke with the representatives of the Greek-Orthodox mission in Pskov.

On 1 May 1943, in the first half of the day, departure of Lieutenant General Vlasov for Strugi Krasnye.

II. Main ideas of the statements and formulations of Lieutenant General Vlasov

1) The most significance is given to the meeting of Lt. Gen. Vlasov on the first night of his stay with the above-mentioned 6

representatives of the local town and district administration of Pskov. He immediately had the impression, and himself remarked on it gladly, that the local administration of the Pskov district had good cooperation with German institutions, which is in the interests of the fight against Bolshevism. Considering this fact, the German side had nothing against Lt. Gen. Vlasov making use of the opportunity, in the course of the evening, to talk alone in his quarters with representatives of the leadership of the local administration. And Lt. Gen. Vlasov viewed this encouraged [from the German side] and uncontrolled [by them] meeting in the evening alone with his guests as proof of the solidity of the German position within the jurisdiction of the garrison commandant. Thus we ensured that from our side, in the course of further exchanges of opinion, he expressed himself completely frankly, honestly, and without looking back

2) During the scheduled May holiday, at 10 in the morning of 30 April, 1943 in the ceremoniously decorated soldiers' theater of Pskov, Lt. Gen. Vlasov took the floor after the garrison commandant, under the thundering applause of those gathered, announced that Lt. Gen. Vlasov was in the theater and would speak before them.

The sense of the speech, delivered energetically but calmly and confidently and making an impression, was in short thus: He is not an agent of Stalin, as they were saying, nor is he in the service of the Germans, as others were saying; he is Russian.

His goal is a new Russia in which there are neither Bolsheviks nor capitalism.

In its day, the Russian army helped Germany to be rid of Napoleonic rule. Today, the Germans are helping the Russian people to throw off the yoke of Bolshevism.

The Russians would return the favor to the German people in the area of the economy.

Germany and Russia are united. Russia will not be a German colony, but will live freely and with plenty, closely connected with Germany, who is claiming the independently-won leading role in history and not belittling the Russian people in doing so. In connection with this, Lt. Gen. Vlasov made reference to Germany

after the Treaty of Versailles:⁶⁰ they suffered debasement and now play a leading role in Europe.

The problem of national borders is not of primary concern. The decisive factor is the cooperation of the peoples. First, it is necessary to defeat Bolshevism.

Therefore, the duty of the Russian person is not to scatter his strength, but to gather it, in order to make his contribution to the victory over Bolshevism.

This is a fight of worldviews. It is fought not for colonies or for territory, but under the leadership of Germany, against Bolshevism.

The reason that the Red Army continues to fight is that Stalin, that wolf, has pulled a sheepskin over himself and now speaks of “national war,” gives freedom to the church, while instilling in the minds of the people the idea that the Germans want to turn Russia into a colony. But in fact Stalin does not think this, and this is just a Jewish-Bolshevik means of achieving Bolshevik goals, the goals he has in reality never rejected.

But if there nevertheless arises an independent, true liberation movement among the Russian people in the territories freed by the Germans, then on the other side of the front it will find more friends than can possibly be imagined today. [It] will expose the Bolshevik method and tear apart Bolshevism from the inside.

The liberation movement led by him will significantly strengthen the fight against Bolshevism. The movement allows for freedom of religious expression. By the example of the Germans, it will teach the Russian person discipline and preparedness for work and fighting. It seeks genuine friendship with the German people and thirsts for a New Russia in the ranks of the peoples of Europe, without Bolshevism or capitalism.

3) In the course of his conversations, Lieutenant General Vlasov said, in addition to the above, the following: Neither Russian nor German should hold a grudge against one another. It is necessary to relate to one another openly, with directness and honesty. The majority of Russians are inclined favorably toward the Germans, since the Russian people have no animosity toward the German people. Always, whenever the two peoples have united, they have achieved prosperity.

Russians have likewise always understood that the liberation from Bolshevism is possible only with help from a foreign power (Germany). This liberation is now approaching, and the Russian liberation movement is playing a decisive role in it. It is the counterweight to Stalin's widely-touted and propagandized 'national war' against Germany".

He allows himself to hope that in the very near future there can be expected a statement from the Führer in which he will say directly that the Russian people will not be lowered to a colonial people, and in his sincerity he [Vlasov] believes irrefutably—for after all he is the Führer. This word will direct the liberation movement, as an organization that the Russian Liberation Army belongs to, one with a completely new national idea for Russia, so as to overcome Bolshevism in the shortest time possible, both through use of military force and with the help of propaganda. Of the German position on the other side of the front, there is a widespread opinion that such a Liberation Army already exists. But that has not happened yet. So when the Liberation army has been created and begins to fight, and when that fact is spread at lightning speed through propaganda to the other side of the front, not only can we expect the dissolution of the Soviet army due to the fact that [its soldiers and officers] will cross over to our side, but also that Bolshevism will be torn apart from the inside.

Lt. Gen. Vlasov is a well-known figure in the enemy camp. Many senior and high-ranking officers who are on friendly terms with him would, on reflection, cross over to the side of Lieutenant General Vlasov as leader of the Russian Liberation Movement. If he shows at the front that he is on the side of the Germans, then, according to him, not one Russian will take a shot at him. Russia's gratitude to Germany for the liberation from Bolshevism will be expressed in the supply of goods.

The question of borders is not a burning one.

The idea is to create a new Europe from the point of view of geopolitics. The integrity of Russia would play a role in this, primarily because the participants in the liberation movement would see it as a fatherland movement (single, holy Rus') in view of the Russians' fight against Bolshevism.

On the question of emigrants, Lt. Gen. Vlasov stated that it is not important where the liberation movement comes from; it is only important, keeping in mind this great new goal for which we are aiming, to attract all forces to the fight against Bolshevism in the name of Russia, bound in close ties of friendship with Germany.

Both Lt. Gen. Vlasov and, independently, his adjutant Captain Antonov expressed their joy that the military administration recognized trustworthy local Russian residents within the area of responsibility of the garrison headquarters, and has united them in a special initiative committee through the local administration and the propaganda division. Attracting those qualified forces from among the local population to leadership work in the administration may to a significant degree explain the necessity of restoring positive interaction between the local population and the German military authorities. With particular satisfaction on the very first day of his stay in Pskov, he heard from colleagues of the local administration, with whom he was able to speak extensively and without hindrance, that there is no friction, but there was absolutely complete trust in regard to the German military administration. In all instances he found confirmation of this during his visit to Pskov, even from the side of church officials. During the entirety of his travels through the freed Russian territories, nowhere did he find such positive interactions of the German military authorities with the local administration as in Pskov. The success [of such interaction] did not fail to affect both the mood and the work accomplished.

III. Opinion of the population regarding Vlasov's visit

The very fact that Lt. Gen. Vlasov appeared at all made a very strong impression on the population.

Especially recently, the name of Vlasov has deeply occupied the Russian community. Various rumors have been circulating, one contradicting the next—for example, that Lt. Gen. Vlasov ran back to Stalin, that he is not even alive anymore, that the Germans are not allowing him to appear in public.

The fact that V. could appear before the Russian people, [making it] obvious to everyone that he was cooperating with the

German military authorities, and was given the possibility to speak with them gave rise to diverse opinions connected, naturally, with how the general behaved and with what he said. It could not go without notice that, in spite of the goodwill of the German authorities during the Pskov visit, he nevertheless felt constrained in certain concrete goals and ways to reach them, and that other questions of German-Russian relations had not been fully worked out or cleared up. This lack of clarity and sense of things left unsaid somewhat spoiled the general impression from Vlasov's visit to Pskov concerning attracting the masses. Vlasov's answer to the question of the organization of the liberation army and its base of operations was likewise unconvincing as to where this Russian Liberation Army was that the Germans talked about in their Russian-language propaganda newspapers as though it already existed.

On the other hand, V.'s words that he desires to be brothers-in-arms with Germany against Bolshevism; that new Russia, a friend of Germany, would in the future at least be able to achieve self-governance and not be turned into a colony of the Reich; and that V. believes in the sincerity of German friendship toward the Russian people were met with satisfaction.

The courteous and clearly friendly manner of the representatives of the German military authorities with Lt. Gen. Vlasov allowed for a strengthening of the Russian population's faith in the Germans' sincerity regarding the Russian people, meaning the acceptance of help in the fight against Bolshevism that had not only been offered but on many occasions already put in action.

IV. Evaluation of the affairs and personality of Lieutenant General Vlasov based on his visit to Pskov

It was V.'s manner to behave with the highest degree of confidence, relaxed, natural, reserved, friendly, and in a socially tactful way. He in no way looked frightened and acknowledged his goal.

The impression should have been given that he is an individual who soberly, realistically looks at things and knows his

own worth, as he knows how important is the matter that he is presenting is for the outcome of the fight against Bolshevism.

To answer the question of whether there is any objective basis for this, it is first necessary to have a full and clear understanding of V.'s persona.

According to his own testimony, he surrendered to the Germans because he was afraid that sooner or later he would suffer the same fate, thanks to Stalin, as Tukhachevsky and Blyukher.⁶¹ That is, he chose a German prison camp out of fear of Stalin and fear for his own life and did not make use of the airplanes that, as V. himself described in one of his conversations, Stalin sent for him so that he could avoid falling prisoner. There is no reason to doubt the truthfulness of this. Even if V. had to date, by his own admission, seen only good from Stalin, it is entirely possible that when he was taken captive, some inborn instinct of the peasant's son spoke to him, sensing that the high position he had achieved was rather a threat to his very life. To what degree V., a member of the party since 1930, recipient of high awards, a well-known and famous person in the Soviet camp, who counts many high-ranking officers among his friends, is troubled by the question of whether it was necessary for him to surrender, only in order to save his life, can be deduced from the fact that in his speech in the soldiers' theater in Pskov he said, trying to expose the Bolshevik method of preserving this regime, that only in Bolshevik Russia is it possible to exterminate high-ranking officers without any trial simply because, in Stalin's opinion, they had accrued too much power.

It must be admitted that as an opponent of Bolshevism alone, V. would not have crossed over to our side. It is possible that not long before doing so he had the thought that he could play a much more noticeable role on our side than that which he had in the Soviet Union, and above which he could not rise. It is possible that this realization came to him only once captured, after his views of Bolshevism underwent certain changes. V., who has gone all the way from son of a peasant to "savior of Moscow" at the head of an army, is ambitious enough now to offer us his popularity as an individual who undoubtedly has a place in the Soviet camp, to offer himself as suitable to be a regimental leader, and his influence in

general. It is possible that it is not so much out of conviction [of the necessity] of the destruction of Bolshevism as a danger to the people as it is to call check against Stalin, his personal enemy, in a key position which he believes that he has and about which is written below. It would be unfair to the persona of V. not to admit that some patriotic motives nevertheless play a role in his actions and that he, a smart and practical person, could betray his own beliefs and truly change dramatically due to the influence of what he saw in Germany.

In any case, V's condition cannot at all be considered unfavorable after the German side gave him the possibility to become the great leader of the liberation movement for his people in the territories freed from Bolshevism, and likewise to act in the capacity of leader of the soon-to-be-launched Russian Liberation Army. Among the Russian people in the territories freed from Bolshevism, it has not yet been possible under the current conditions to grow a liberation movement. The movement that is now led by V. was created by him with German assistance thanks to the opportunity he was offered to issue a call and speak before his people.

The main thrust of this meeting lies in the pursuit of their own Russian government without Bolshevism and without capitalism. It is V. who stated before his people that Russia could never be lowered to the status of a German colony. He said these inspired words to the Russian population of the territories freed from Bolshevism and they inflamed the Russian hearts.

Even if V. could not yet name concrete goals of a political nature and did not answer many questions, the so-called liberation movement nevertheless continues to grow more solid.

This is clear to V., and it would not be a mistake to draw the following conclusions about his views on the current political situation in the East, views that were formed on the basis of what he heard, and from which it is possible to easily draw conclusions that he has, however, never stated as such:

If V. is not given the possibility to act as the commander of the Russian Liberation Army and the herald of New Russia legitimized by the Führer, the creation of which he has made his goal, then

perhaps we will conquer other parts of Russia, but Bolshevism will not be defeated and destroyed.

The population on this side of the front will be disappointed and will move to passive objection, which will weaken the military might of the German army, since without the Russian workforce the fight cannot be won.

[Translator's note: the following two paragraphs have nearly identical content with somewhat different phrasing.]

V. is thus connected as an individual, fully justified, with the preservation of voluntary Russian forces in the occupied districts, since they look to him as the leader of the liberation movement, and likewise to an easier time in the war against Bolshevism, since under his appearance as commander of the army, a consequence of that authority that he exercises, the Soviet army will fall apart, and through this Bolshevism itself, with help from smart propaganda, will collapse from within. V. occupies a key position. He can be patient. He is absolutely sure of success. He sees himself as the key figure. He only agrees to the role of army commander if the Germans agree to the creation of a national Russia while simultaneously promising to fulfill all other requests for the implementation of his ideas. He will visit already freed regions in the future as well, since this is favorable to his ideas and strengthens his position as an individual exercising popularity in Russia, which he notes every chance he has, pointing out that if he is refused in his requests, then the Russian people in the occupied territories will also refuse us.

In this way, the person of V. is the [real] key to support from the volunteer workers in occupied districts, since they see him as the leader of the liberation movement, and likewise to an easier victory over Bolshevism, because since he appeared as the commander of the army as a result of such popularity as he still has in the Soviet camp, the Soviet army will fall apart, and Bolshevism—as a result of this, and also due to smartly used propaganda—will fall from within. V. occupies a key position. He can be patient. He is absolutely assured success. He himself thinks that he plays a decisive role. He only agrees to the role of army commander if he will be given the agreement of the German side to

create a national Russia while promising to fulfill other requests for the implementation of his ideas. He will visit already freed territories in the future, since that advances his ideas and strengthens his position as a person popular in Russia, which he refers to in all appropriate circumstances, showing that if he is refused in his requests, the Russian people in the occupied territory will in the same way refuse us.

Bearing in mind the already well-known opinion of V. given above, it is necessary to point out the following:

The wheel of the so-called liberation movement, with V. at its head, is turning. To throw a stick in the spokes to stop it is more than dangerous. But his movement can be directed.

There exist only two possibilities: if we need to put an end to Bolshevism, it is necessary to recognize a national Russia. Its image and structure are in our power to determine.

Not to put the person of V. to action in the future for the sake of victory would be a mistake, given that he has already managed to speak out on the side of the Germans.

While gaining living space and the necessity to provide our people with food supplies should not at the current moment be noted as goals of the fight against Bolshevism, it goes without saying that we need to keep these things in mind. It will be hard to defeat Bolshevism by means of weapons alone. It must be destroyed with the help of the people who helped to create it.

Garrison Commandant
Major General

Program of the May Celebration in the Soldiers' Theater of Pskov
30 April, 1943 at 10:00

- 5) Musical play performed by the Russian orchestra
- 6) Presentation of bouquet of flowers to Lieutenant General Vlasov by three Russian women
- 7) Greetings on behalf of the garrison commandant
- 8) Musical play with choir singing

- 9) Speech by Russian volunteer Bozhenko
- 10) Musical play
- 11) Speech of Lieutenant General Vlasov
- 12) Musical play with choral accompaniment

The Military Archives Division of the German Federal Archives (BA-MA). RH/19 III/659.BI. 68181. Original. Translation from the German.

N°18. Brief dispatch from an unidentified person about the trip of Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov to Pskov, Strugi, and Luga from 30 April, to 3 May, 1943.

7 May, 1943

Headquarters 7.5.1943

Secret

Brief dispatch
on the trip of General Vlasov to Pskov, Strugi, and Luga

(30 April–3 May, 1943)

On 30 April at 10 in the morning in the soldiers' theater of Pskov there was a rally in the form of May Celebration, during which General Vlasov gave a speech before the gathered representatives of the town and the Pskov district. Concerning this celebration, it is worth noting that half of those in attendance were representatives of the Wehrmacht and other German organizations, who, due to a lack of knowledge of the Russian language, were unable to follow the speech given by Vlasov. It would have been better if more places had been reserved for the Russian population. In his speech, General Vlasov remained within the framework of the well-known goals already stated on the leaflets of the so-called Vlasov movement. Nothing sharply divergent was noted. On the whole,

the Russian audience was reserved and did not show any spontaneous excitement, which could be ascribed in part to the nature of the Russian soul and in part to the fact that good preparations for the appearance of General Vlasov had not been made. This was also felt during his visits to various enterprises of Pskov after lunch that day. Only during the visit to the gas-generating plant, which was set in motion by the Commercial Division of the army group "North," did the workers in one of the workshops greet General Vlasov with applause. He asked some of the workers questions about their personal lives, working conditions, and food. The workers offered him no complaints. On the whole, the visit to this enterprise left a positive impression.

After this, there was a trip to the fur and felt factory, and the impression there was rather less positive. Especially unpleasant was the fact that in several of the workshops – for example the shop for repair of felt boots and the workshop for cleaning clothes – most of the workers were children ages 12–14. Later, in conversation, General Vlasov said that that plant made a negative impression on him, but that he nevertheless understood the necessity to include teens in some of the lighter work. There were no complaints on the part of the workers here either. On the contrary, in answer to questions put to them, the workers stated that the German side often gave them supplies over and above the norm and even extra food products.

During the visit to the felt factory, one thing jumped out, namely that a large portion of the personnel did not know who this general who was visiting the enterprise was. Thus, one female worker of whom General Vlasov asked several questions later said to a woman sitting next to her, "That German general speaks Russian very well." And to the question of whether they knew who was speaking with them, many workers answered that they did not.

After the end of work at the fur factory, there was a May celebration in which General Vlasov participated and which was broadcast by radio.

General Vlasov was particularly impressed with the opportunity on 29 and 30 April to speak openly with

representatives of the Russian administration. On 30 April in the garrison mess hall there was a dinner attended by both representatives of the German military authorities and the Russian population from the jurisdictional garrison of the region, during which General Vlasov, in an unforced conversation, answered questions and expounded on his ideas. The visit to the initiative group of the propaganda division (Russian informants), during which General Vlasov shared his thoughts in a tight circle in the course of a two-sided discussion, was just as successful.

Later that evening there was a supper in the garrison commander's offices with the participation of invited guests and representatives of the German Wehrmacht. Here, as on each subsequent occasion, General Vlasov again underscored how well-rounded the German officer corps was in comparison to the Russians and how pleasant it was for him to associate with German officers.

Strugi

On 1 May at 8:15 we set onward to Strugi, where after a greeting from the field commandant in the soldiers' theater there was a rally which was skillfully led by Staffelführer of the Luga propaganda division First Lieutenant Kaehlbrandt, and at which General Vlasov gave a speech before representatives of the Russian population. The impression he made on the population turned out to be greater than in Pskov. When General Vlasov began speaking about, among other things, the creation of a national Russian army for the fight against Bolshevism, thunderous applause sounded.

After dinner in the [field] [commissar's offices], we visited the regional administration, where General Vlasov listened to a detailed report by the leader of the region on the social and administrative institutions there, in particular the police, medical services, school affairs, the fight against epidemics, etc. After that, he greeted a group of long-time residents gathered there, and he was immediately able to establish a rapport with these people. Several times, he indicated to them the necessity of close and friendly cooperation with the German authorities, who were making every effort to help in local areas. In conclusion, General

Vlasov gave short speeches at two more rallies. All these meetings left a deep impression on the Russian population.

After dinner, we set off for Luga.

Luga

On the morning of 2 May, we visited the sawmill in Tolmachevo, some 17 kilometers to the northwest of Luga. This is a Wehrmacht enterprise, and approx. 400 people were working in it. We had the most positive impression of the order and cleanliness of the living quarters of the volunteers, the general kitchen, the new and well-equipped sauna, the medical station, and especially the kindergarten, in which several Russian teachers cared for more than 100 children while their parents were working. In his speech to the workers, as in subsequent speeches before volunteers and *ostreitors* and likewise before representatives of the regional authorities, General Vlasov again and again underscored that he was extremely surprised at how much the German military administration was doing for the Russian population in social and economic terms in spite of the ongoing war.

Upon returning from Tolmachevo, General Vlasov spoke at the organized division of propaganda of Luga and at another very successful rally in the soldiers' cinema with volunteers and *ostreitors*, who were listening to him with interest and at the end of his speech gave out a loud "hurrah!"

After dinner there was a large people's rally in the hall near the church, where the population listened with attention and excitement to the speech of General Vlasov. In conclusion, General Vlasov spoke before representatives of the regional authorities.

In the evening, General Vlasov warmly thanked the representative of the command staff, Captain Dr. Trost, for the courtesy extended to him and added that, to date, in none of the districts that he had visited did he have such a positive impression of the activity of the German military administration in the social sphere, the sphere of organization of government, and the economic sphere, as in the zone of activity for army group North.

General Vlasov's trip made an unforgettable impression on the Russian population and put an end to many rumors. And though the first rally in Pskov was not as good as it might have been

from the point of view of propaganda, the effect of the impressive rallies in Strugi and Luga was great, and it remains to be hoped that thanks to the skillful propaganda work the people's mood will continue to improve. The expectations of the Russian population are very great, and the promulgation of clear political goals and necessary directives is mandatory, or else there exists a great danger that the positive impression will be smeared and the friendly attitude toward the Germans will turn into a contrary one. Saf. (Z)

Abt. VIII. Hg. A.

BA-MA. RH/19 III/659. Bl. 90-91. Original. Translation from the German.

N°19. Message from the Chief Staff of the Leningrad Partisan Movement M. N. Nikitin to the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement on efforts to scout and capture A. A. Vlasov.

Leningrad, 25 May, 1943

Top Secret

TO THE CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE PARTISAN
MOVEMENT

Comrade BEL'CHENKO

I report that through the Leningrad Headquarters of the Partisan Movement the following measures have been undertaken to neutralize the treasonous activities of the traitor Lieutenant General VLASOV.

On 25 April, 1943 the order was given from a representative of the Leningrad Headquarters of the Partisan Movement under the Northwest Front to Gordin to send 3-5 people with the mission to take Vlasov dead or alive, and through the brigades and companies organize scouting to track down Vlasov.

On 30 April, 1943 the order was given to the commanders of the 3rd and 5th brigades, Comrade German and Comrade Koritsky, as well as regiment commanders Comrade Stepanov and Comrade Khudiakov: "All forces and means, all people including command staff, are to be directed toward finding General Vlasov and Shpeiman. Take them dead or alive."

On 10 May, 1943 the order was again given to Comrade German and Comrade Stepanov and leader of the partisan group Comrade Porutsenko to establish unceasing search for Vlasov, to assign combat groups and organize ambushes on routes Vlasov's movement might be using in order to kill him or take him prisoner.

On 14 May, 1943 the command staff of the 3rd partisan brigade and the 1st regiment was given the instruction to find hunters – national heroes from among the partisans, collective farmers, and intelligentsia who were prepared to die to kill the traitor Vlasov.

Over the course of May, 8 different leaflets, for a total of 75 thousand, were published and dropped behind enemy lines along with 5 thousand copies of an issue of the newspaper "For the Soviet Homeland," exposing the true face of the traitor Vlasov and the reasons compelling the German fascists to agree to the creation of the so-called Russian Committee and the "volunteer army" led by Vlasov.

In addition, underground partisan organizations and political apparatuses of partisan brigades and companies are undertaking serious work in clarification among the population by means of written and oral agitprop.

Recently, Vlasov has been traveling through the regional centers of Leningrad district with the goal of attracting the population to the "volunteer army." On 4 May he was at a rally in the village Volosovo, on the 6th in the town of Porkhov, on the 7th in the village of Pozherevitsa and on the 10th in the village of Dedovichi. Earlier he spoke in Pskov, in Krasnogvardeisk, and in Luga. Speaking in Volosovo, he announced that he would create an army of five million and would take Leningrad in 5 days.

Vlasov's agitprop has no effect on the local population, and they see him as an outright traitor to the Homeland and to the Russian people. After the rally in the village of Dedovichi the

citizens stated: “May that traitor and his army of volunteers be cursed.”

The people are not going to join Vlasov’s army. To wit, of the 100 men called up by the draft committee of Zapliusskaya volost’ in Pliussky region, not a single volunteer was to be found. The same situation [has unfolded] in other regions of the district. “The population is declining in mobilization,” reports the leader of the partisan group Comrade Porutsenko, “and is leaving into the forest, and a great number of them are joining the partisans. We imagine they will manage to mobilize by force only a few individuals.”

From among the local population Vlasov is able to recruit into his army as volunteers only an insignificant group of people, those clearly opposed to the Soviet authorities. The main contingent of his few units are made up of prisoners from the Red Army.

Chief of Staff of the Leningrad
Partisan Movement M. NIKITIN

Instructions: to T. Formashev. Please touch base. Bel’[chenko]. 31.5.43

RGASPI. F. 69. Op. 9. D. 9. L. 53–53 ob. Original.

**N°20. Excerpt from the interrogation transcript of A. E. Ulyanov
on the courses for RLA propagandists in Dabendorf.**

25 May, 1943

EXCERPT

From the interrogation transcript of the arrested ULYANOV
Aleksei Efimovich from 25 May, 1943

ULYANOV A. E. 1914 year of birth, native of village Annenkovo in Kuznetsky district, Kuibyshev region, Russian, teacher by profession, former candidate for membership in the All-Union Communist Party from 1940. In the Red Army since 1936, from

March 1942 commander of division 823 regiment 301 rifle division 21 army. Rank – 1st lieutenant. Taken prisoner by the enemy in July 1942. Served in the German army, company commander of training-reserve battalion of the 16th army.

QUESTION: In which camps were you a prisoner of the Germans?

ANSWER: After our capture, KOTLYAR, IVANOV, and I were sent to the camp for military prisoners in the city of Belgorod. In a 24-hour period I was transferred as a member of a 100-person group of commanders from the Red Army to the officers' camp "Stalag-353" in the city of Vladimir-Volynsky (Western Ukraine). I was in that camp until September 1942.

In September 1942, a group of 50 military commanders were chosen in Stalag-365, and the administrators of the camp explained that we had been selected to be sent to work in Germany. However, the selected military prisoners were not sent to work, but were taken to a so-called "camp of propagandists" located near Wuhlheide, about 50 kilometers from Berlin.

QUESTION: What was the meaning of "camp of propagandists"?

ANSWER: On the second day after arrival at the camp, the German commandant of the camp announced that all military personnel would take a two-month course of study, after which they would be sent as propagandists to Russian camps of military POWs to conduct special work according to the instruction of the German command. What exact work we would have to fulfill was not indicated at the time...

QUESTION: Can you describe the "propaganda camp" in detail?

ANSWER: In the camp were gathered 800 POWs of mid- and junior command rank, and also troops with higher education. The entire group of those studying was split into groups of 50 persons each, headed by prisoners who had already completed their course of study in that very camp...

During the time I was at that camp, the themes taught included: Teachings on Russia, How the People See Themselves, Government, Jews and Marxism, Cult of the Leader and

Democratization, Marxism and Liberalism, Pacifism and Armament...

On 20 December, all students were gathered in one of the large barracks where they usually showed films and there appeared former generals of the Red Army BLAGOVESCHENSKY and MALYSHKIN, and also ZYKOV,⁶² who called himself a “doctor of economics.” I don’t know ZYKOV’s military rank in the Red Army. From other prisoners I heard that ZYKOV was supposedly the commissar of a division and worked at the newspaper *Izvestiya* at the time that it was edited by BUKHARIN.⁶³ After spending some time in the prison camp, ZYKOV was sent by the Germans to Berlin, where the Ministry of Propaganda of Germany used him for various assignments, and then was named the editor of the newspaper *Volunteer*, which was given out among the commanders and soldiers of the so-called Russian Liberation Army.

Speaking at a meeting, ZYKOV reported that on 17 December, 1942 in the city of Smolensk the Russian Committee was created, and put before itself the task of, with the help of the German army, organizing the fight against Bolshevism, overthrowing the Soviet authorities, and building a New Russia without either Bolsheviks or capitalists. ZYKOV introduced himself, MALYSHKIN, and BLAGOVESCHENSKY as members of this committee. He did not name other members of the committee, explaining this by saying that there was some reason this was not allowed; supposedly the members of the Russian Committee were located not only in territory controlled by the German army, but also in the Soviet rear territory.

In conclusion, ZYKOV announced that we would take an additional course of preparation, after which we would be sent to POW camps to recruit volunteers for the then-being-formed Russian Committee and Russian Liberation Army.

Over the course of the following 10 days, MALYSHKIN, BLAGOVESCHENSKY, and ZYKOV gave lectures to the students at the camp on the themes Bolsheviks are the Cause of the War, Bolshevism is the Enemy of the Russian People, Germany Fights Not Against the Soviet Union but Against Bolsheviks, The Historical Alliance of the German and Russian Peoples, England as

the Historical Enemy of Russia, The Condition of POWs in Germany, and Tasks the Russian Committee Has Taken On.

At the end of December or the beginning of January it was announced that in the coming days we would be sent with special assignments to camps of Russian POWs.

QUESTION: Where were you sent and what were your assignments?

ANSWER: In the first days of January, I was sent with a group who had finished their course of study at the propaganda camp to a transit point located in the city of Hohnstein (southern Saxony), from which the “propagandists” were divided among the camps of prisoners.

I was sent to the camp in the city of Pirna, where there were about 200 people who worked at the artificial silk factory KITNER. I had the task of conducting propaganda about the mission of the Russian Liberation Army among the prisoners and recruiting them into that army...

... After two months, in March 1943, they transferred me from that camp for repeat training in the courses for propagandists.

QUESTION: Where were these courses for propagandists?

ANSWER: The courses for propagandists were in Dabendorf, about 30 kilometers from Berlin, on the site of some former camp that was located there. The students were housed in 5 large living barracks.

QUESTION: To what end were these courses organized?

ANSWER: These courses were organized for the preparation of propagandists intended for work among the personnel of the so-called Russian Liberation Army. Initially those sent to these courses were those more tested in the area of traitorous work—commanders and soldiers of the volunteer units created by the Germans—and then they began to be supplemented from among the commanders and soldiers of the Red Army who were being kept in camps by the Germans.

QUESTION: Name the leadership staffing these courses.

ANSWER: The head of the propaganda courses was former Major General of the Red Army BLAGOVESCHENSKY, member of the Russian Committee, which he stated himself.

I first saw BLAGOVESCHENSKY in the camp at Wuhlheide, where he led the so-called “group of adolescents” for some time; he was then called to Berlin and then traveled to the camp as a representative of the Russian Committee.

The head of the academic unit of the propaganda courses was former Major General of the Red Army TRUKHIN, also a member of the Russian Committee. TRUKHIN, in his own words, studied in the propaganda courses in the city of Kielce (Poland) and from there was sent to Dabendorf.

QUESTION: What was taught in these courses?

ANSWER: The course of study was analogous to the program taught in the camp Wuhlheide. Several changes were made in order to tailor them to the goals of the Russian Liberation Army. The length of these courses was 20 days. All students in the courses received a field ration.

In the 5th company there was a platoon of “journalists.” In this platoon were prisoners who used to work in newspaper editorial offices or as correspondents; it also included those with higher education.

After their studies, the cadets of the platoon of journalists were sent to work in editorial offices, publishing newspapers in the occupied territories.

The cadets of this platoon were given lectures with a broader scope and they were taken to Berlin to meet various émigré figures. For instance, in Berlin they had a conversation with General KRASNOV⁶⁴ and with BELEN’KY, the editor of some “Cossack newspaper.”⁶⁵

In addition to the lectures, the cadets were sent in groups on tours of various factories in Berlin and other nearby cities, as well as German peasant households.

During my time in the course for propagandists, from 20 May to 25 April, there was a graduation of those cadets chosen within the volunteer units.

After that, there arrived those chosen in camps for military prisoners, the former commanders and troops of the Red Army with higher education.

Under the guise of rehabilitation and acquisition of military knowledge, in order to test the military knowledge of the cadets, they formed an examination board with TRUKHIN as chair, which included Colonel BUSHMANOV⁶⁶ and company commanders. The board tested the knowledge of the cadets and determined to what extent those who called themselves commanders or soldiers of certain kinds of weapons actually had training in this area of specialization.

At the end of the course, all students were either moved into a special battalion from which they were sent out or back to the volunteer units they had been selected from, or else made available to the headquarters of German formations to conduct propaganda work among the Russian POWs and residents of occupied regions.

The main task that was set before those finishing the course for “propagandists” was the recruitment of commanders and soldiers for the Russian Liberation Army.

QUESTION: Who among the members of the Russian Committee attended the courses for propagandists?

ANSWER: The former General MALYSHKIN, being the secretary of the Russian Committee and the editor of the newspaper *Zarya* [Dawn], which was distributed among the POWs, often came to the courses from Berlin. I first saw MALYSHKIN in the camp at Wuhlheide ... Later, he, together with ZYKOV, was sent to Berlin, worked for some time there on assignment from the Ministry of Propaganda of Germany, and towards the end of my time in Wuhlheide appeared there as a representative of the Russian Committee. MALYSHKIN spends most of his time in Berlin, in the offices of the *Zarya* newspaper, which are located on one of the streets not far from the Potsdam Square metro station. He lives with former general of the Red Army VLASOV in the suburbs of Berlin. From the words of ROZHANOVSKY, a former company commander of the propaganda courses, I know that MALYSHKIN and VLASOV not infrequently spend time at the house of the female typist of the *Zarya* offices, though I do not know the address; she is a White Russian émigré who lives permanently in Berlin. This typist leads a loose lifestyle, and there are often orgies at her place.

When he came to the propaganda courses, MALYSHKIN spent most of his time with BLAGOVESHCHENSKY and rarely conversed with individual cadets.

During my time in the courses for propagandists, the chair of the Russian Committee, former general of the Red Army VLASOV, came there two times. The first time, he arrived at the end of March or the beginning of April for the cadets' oath-taking. I do not remember the text of the oath fully, but it ended with the words: "I pledge to obey without question the supreme commander Adolf Hitler." That text was read before Colonel BUSHMANOV, and then each of the cadets signed in acceptance of the oath. VLASOV, who was present for the taking of the oath, congratulated the cadets, and then they were led into one of the barracks, where VLASOV gave a speech. In his speech, VLASOV talked about the Russian Committee's program and ways to achieve it.

VLASOV stated, "The Russian Committee places as its task the overthrow of Soviet authorities with the help of German troops, the signing of an honorable peace with Germany, the building of a New Russia without landlords, capitalists, or Bolsheviks, the restoration of private land use, private trade and handicrafts, the restoration of heavy industry, which will be in the hands of the government, and light industry, in the hands of private entrepreneurs. To accomplish these tasks, real forces are needed, which are thought to be in the organization of a Russian Liberation Army from POWs and residents of the occupied parts of the USSR controlled by the Germans.

This army, according to VLASOV, should be the nucleus of the future army of New Russia.

In closing, VLASOV called on the cadets to conduct active work to recruit officers and soldiers who were POWs to join the RLA.

The second time, VLASOV came to the propaganda courses around about 20 April of this year. He did not give a speech, but walked among the platoons in the company of his adjutant, asked the cadets how their studies were going, and answered individual questions.

In the evening of that day, in one of the rooms where the courses were held, a banquet was organized for the members of the *Zarya* newspaper at which were present: VLASOV, MALYSHKIN, TRUKHIN, BLAGOVESCHENSKY, former Lt. Colonel VLASOV, and some colleagues of the editorial offices of the paper from Berlin unfamiliar to me.

In both cases, VLASOV came to the propaganda courses with MALYSHKIN.

QUESTION: What traitorous work did you undertake after this?

ANSWER: On 25 April of this year I was sent with a group that had finished the propaganda courses to be at the disposal of “General-Ost” (I know neither the name of the general nor the location of his headquarters).

This general was responsible for units made up of Russians, Ukrainians, Latvians, and persons of other nationalities of the Soviet Union located in the ranks of the German units.

I was given travel papers to go to the city of Pskov, where I was to present myself at unit 1-Ts of the 16th German army.⁶⁷

On arrival in Pskov I presented myself at the headquarters of the 16th army and lived in town until I received my assignment.

On 1 May in the building of the offices of the commandant of the town a meeting was called at which the mayor was present, along with responsible colleagues from the departments of city government, priests, ranking police officers, and elders and leaders from towns and villages located near the city. VLASOV, who had arrived in town, spoke at this meeting.

I do not know the contents of VLASOV’s speech, but, according to the words of the residents, his speech was broadcast by radio.

On the next day, 2 May, I and some other propagandists who had come with me awaiting assignment (ROZHANOVSKY, ANDREEV, and SIDORENKO) were called to the town commandant’s offices for a reception with VLASOV.

VLASOV was staying in the building of the commandant’s offices (I do not know the name of the street and the house number),

not far from the cinema, in the center of town. In this building the Executive Committee used to be housed (not sure).

When receiving our group, VLASOV was accompanied by his adjutant and a German officer with the rank of captain. There were armed German soldiers in the hall leading to the room where the reception took place.

The 15-minute conversation VLASOV had with us was of an instructive nature. Having told us that the Russian Liberation Army he was forming would be made up of POWs who were soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, and of local civilian population and deserters, VLASOV stated that RLA regiments and divisions already existed, but he did not indicate where. After that, he tried to convince us that the well-being of the workers of Pskov had improved under the Germans, and he argued this point with the fact that the population had been issued foodstuffs and vodka.

In conclusion, VLASOV called on us to do fruitful work in recruiting new cadres for the RLA.

... QUESTION: What do you know about the members of the Russian Committee and other traitors serving under the Germans and their activities?

ANSWER: I am aware of the following individuals serving under the Germans:

VLASOV, Andrei Andreevich, former general of the Red Army, taken prisoner somewhere near Leningrad. After imprisonment, he was in the Vinnitsa camp for military POWs, and then he was located in Berlin. I first saw him in March 1943 at a meeting for cadets of the propaganda courses in Dabendorf, where he gave a speech.

He is the chairman of the Russian Committee.

In the leaflet "VLASOV's Letter," which was intended for distribution among the units of the Red Army, and which I read, it is indicated that VLASOV was located in Smolensk. In my opinion, that is a German propaganda device to hide VLASOV's true location.

When VLASOV was located in Pskov, he was constantly escorted by a personal adjutant and a German officer of the rank of captain (who was a representative of the Ministry of Propaganda, I

was told by ROZHANOVSKY) and a guard of several German soldiers.

MALYSHKIN—former general of the Red Army. I do not know how he was taken prisoner.

He is the secretary of the Russian Committee and the editor of the *Zarya* [Dawn] newspaper. In 1942, during my studies in the propaganda camp in Wuhlheide, MALYSHKIN was there as well and lived separately with the other prisoner-generals.

At that time I did not see any anti-Soviet activity on his part. In October or November, MALYSHKIN was taken to the camp in Berlin, where, according to rumor, he was working on assignments from the Ministry of Propaganda.

On 20 December, 1942, he unexpectedly, in the company of BLAGOVESCHENSKY and ZYKOV, arrived at the camp and was presented at a meeting as a member of the Russian Committee, and following that he gave a lecture.

In 1943 MALYSHKIN often came to the propaganda courses in Dabendorf, and he accompanied VLASOV during the latter's trips to the courses.

MALYSHKIN lives in the same household as VLASOV in the suburbs of Berlin.

A large part of his time is spent in the editing offices of the *Zarya* [Dawn] newspaper, located on one of the streets (I don't know the name) not far from the Potsdam Square metro station. The editorial office of the newspaper *Volunteer* is in the same building.

BLAGOVESCHENSKY—former general of the Red Army, is a member of the Russian Committee, which he himself announced to the cadets.

In 1942 he was in the camp in Wuhlheide, where he led a group of about 200 adolescents. In this group were youths aged 15–18 brought by the Germans from the occupied territories of the USSR.

BLAGOVESCHENSKY taught them discipline, how to behave politely with the Germans. After their training, they were sent to work at industrial sites in Germany.

In October or November of last year, BLAGOVESCHENSKY was taken by the Germans to Berlin, and from there he returned to

the camp already a member of the Russian Committee and gave anti-Soviet lectures to the cadets.

In 1943 BLAGOVESCHENSKY at first edited the *Zarya* [Dawn] newspaper, and then he was appointed the head of the propaganda courses in Dabendorf.

TRUKHIN – former Major General of the Red Army, member of the Russian Committee, which I know from the words of cadets who studied with me in Dabendorf.

He is the head of the academic unit of propaganda courses in Dabendorf. He arrived at Dabendorf from Kel'tsy (Poland), where he took propaganda courses.

He is always wearing civilian clothing, and lives with BLAGOVESCHENSKY on the territory where the courses are taught.

The transcript of the interrogation from my words has been recorded correctly and read by me. Ulyanov

INTERROGATED: HEAD OF 4 DIVISION MAIN DIRECTORATE OF SMERSH

Major General TIMOFEEV

Reference: The original transcript of the interrogation is located in the investigative file of the accused ULYANOV A.E.

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. №N-18766. T. 5. L. 14-23. Authenticated copy.

№21. Memorandum of A. Rosenberg to A. Hitler on the RLA and national formations of the Eastern peoples.

Berlin, 26 May, 1943

Memorandum for the Führer

Regarding: the so-called Russian Liberation Army and national bodies of other eastern peoples.

On 8 February I reported to the Führer on how the unification of the Russians and other ethnic groups is progressing, in the sense that in case of continuing one-sided support only from the Russian side, the danger could arise of a concentration of Great Russians in the future. The Führer decisively agreed with this position, and therefore I forbade any feeble impulse towards the formation of a Great Russian organization from their collective of Russian volunteers (Russian Liberation Army). I did not object to propaganda activity beyond the front lines and in the operational zones of army groups A and B, but I forbade the announcement of activity of the leadership of Russian volunteers in the Ukrainian or German press in the east. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to report to the Führer on the results in full. In a note from 22 February, 1943. I presented the Führer a report on the situation, but I did not receive a response. Up to the present time, a large number of messages on the impact of Russian Liberation Army propaganda have been received, in which the action [propaganda] in the Soviet Union and the question of deserters are evaluated positively.

I refused numerous pressing solicitations to recognize the Russian National Army by way of the Russian National Committee, possibly in combination with other national committees, keeping in mind the still-unclear general situation and the consequences which such a step would naturally call up. As an answer to this, on 19 April, 1943 I received from the HCW a copy of the telegram of Field Marshal General Keitel.⁶⁸ From this telegram I could likewise not make out a positive answer from the Führer, and therefore I did not agree to further activity in this direction. First of all, I indicated to the representatives of the Propaganda Division of the HCW and HCGA that the leadership of the Russian Liberation Army was, naturally, Russian, and Russians would not easily come to terms with the thought that they are not the dominant ethnic group but rather one among many others in the East, all of whom have a common goal—to use all their forces to drive out Bolshevism. A new European order is being born, and each ethnic group will find its own fate within it. This line of thought, obviously, was used by

representatives of the HCW over a period of time to drive home the idea to Vlasov and his followers. Not long before my departure for the headquarters of the Führer, on 18 May, I received from the Division of Military Propaganda of the HCW a copy of General Vlasov's statement, which I attach as Attachment 3. Here, it seems, for the first time the position of a Russian leader is presented and signed, stating that although Russian centrism had been justified, today—in the context of the emergence of a greater European idea—there is no longer room for it. In light of entering the European family of peoples and considering the common large European economy, the Russian people could reject Ukraine and the Caucasus [in favor of a greater Europe].

The HCW has long since asked the Reich Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories to hold a meeting in order to clear up this question as a whole. In hopes that I will soon be able to make a report to the Führer, I postponed this meeting so as to have the possibility of presenting a clear position after the Führer makes a decision. Insofar as I had the opportunity to lay out this problem for the Führer during my report on 19 May in the Führer's headquarters, my representative has set off for the HCW in order to again obtain documents necessary to evaluate the general state of affairs. He was instructed in the following manner:

Not to impede the Russian Liberation Army in rallying volunteers, the order for which was given by the Führer, in its propaganda activities, and in uniting all necessary forces in the rear. As far as its reconfiguration into the National Committee is concerned, at the very top this is seen with skepticism. And therefore the Reich Minister of the Eastern Territories is not prepared to give voice to his final opinion. The representative of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories was charged with listening to all positive proposals and considerations and then reporting them to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories for the final decision of the Führer. No instructive decisions can be made on the basis of this discussion.

Overall, I will allow myself to state my opinion that the action, which under certain conditions could have political and propaganda success in the sense of lightening the military situation

and weakening the military opponent (provided that it is led by a tested individual), could create danger if it is delayed or in the absence of constructive and real results. It should be pointed out that propaganda conducted without concrete political reasons for the future will be seen by our enemies exclusively as a propaganda trick and will be turned back against us. To demand of hundreds of thousands of volunteers long and successful participation in the fight is possible only when we can offer them some kind of political platform (even if it is not realized in the future). The commitment to the fight against Bolshevism and the political idea are working together here. The way the Galician division was formed, as ordered by the Führer, has likewise shown this.⁶⁹

As far as the other ethnic groups are concerned, representatives of the Caucasian peoples, Turkestanis, and Kazakhs are gathered together without any strictly assigned form so that we might direct the legions that are created from them according to political needs and foster in them an anti-Bolshevik spirit through specially selected representatives. This includes the Muslim clergy, which will be prepared and used in this sense.

As I see it, it is necessary to decide the pressing issue concerning whether or not to use political and propaganda means to support the military fight in the east in one form or another by using forces that are yet to be chosen, including by the means just approved by the Führer of the declaration of the restoration of individual property rights among the peasantry, or whether it is necessary to refrain from such joint work. Since the question here is one of the highest importance, I ask the Führer for the possibility to make a report in person on this problem.

signature

A. Rosenberg⁷⁰

BA. R/6/634. Bl. 21-26. Copy. Translation from the German.

N°22. Plan for the formation and training of a guard strike brigade of the RLA, which will insert terrorists in Moscow and other cities of the USSR to carry out terrorist acts against the leaders of the party and the government.

26 May, 1943

Translation from the German

Top Secret

PLAN FOR THE FORMATION AND TRAINING OF THE GUARD
STRIKE BRIGADE OF THE RLA

I. Subdivision and personnel numbers of the brigade

1. The guard strike brigade will include:

- a) Special operations regiment
- b) Rifle regiment

(Numerical composition is attached.)

2. The officer and enlisted personnel of the guard strike brigade is made up of people recognized and tested in the fight against Bolshevism, who are ready at any minute to lay down their lives for the idea of the destruction of the Stalin regime and building a New Russia in true brotherhood in arms and cooperation with the German people.

3. The success of the actions of the guard strike brigade is based on the determination of the human resources uncovered and their political education. It is worth mentioning that the recruitment of officers and enlisted staff to the ranks of the guard strike brigade is conducted exclusively by the highest leadership, that is, by the general and brigade commanders under the constant influence of the general, representative VLASOV, and the Russian Liberation Movement.

II. Special operations regiment

1. The special operations regiment is prepared by the main staff for the organization of military actions in the rear of the Soviet front.

Its missions are based on national-revolution work, specifically:

a) The organization in the Soviet rear of military units of the Russian Liberation Army directed against the activities of Stalin's dictatorship.

b) Agitation and propaganda in the Red Army for the Russian Liberation Army with the final goal of desertion.

c) Terrorist and sabotage actions against particularly prominent figures of the Stalin regime and his highest military leaders.

2. Before undertaking military activity, each soldier and officer in the special operations regiment will undergo strict military-political organizational preparation for a period of one to two months for each unit.

3. Keeping in mind the present situation in the Soviet Union and the mood at the front and in the rear, the following centers are being organized to conduct the national-revolutionary work of the RLA: Moscow, Kuibyshev, Sverdlovsk, Gorky, Ivanovo, Yaroslavl, and Leningrad.

Groups from the special operations regiment should be inserted into these centers according to strictly covert principles. Groups of 3–8 people will conduct their work independently from one another.

According to this plan, for example, in Moscow over the next two months up to 75 groups will be inserted, with the estimation that in each part of town there will be no fewer than 3 groups. These groups will conduct organizational-political work according to the instructions of the leadership of the guard strike division. One of the main missions of these groups is to recruit opponents of the Stalin regime for active secret cells of the RLA.

4. Other groups are being prepared to conduct undermining missions among the ranks of the Red Army. Their field of operations is the long- and near-range stages of the Soviet front, where they will pose as deserters, wounded, etc. to agitate for crossing over into the Russian Liberation Army. For the success of this work, they must penetrate previously-determined Soviet military units.

In order to conduct terrorist assignments, as for example in Moscow, particularly dedicated, specially trained nationalist-

revolutionary guardsmen of the Russian Liberation Army must be selected.

Their sphere of activity includes the attempted assassination of Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Beria,⁷¹ Zhukov, Vasilievsky, etc.

5. The future sphere of activity for the special operations regiment includes the mission of inserting groups near concentration camps in order to eliminate the guards and revolutionize the prisoners in the fight against the Jewish oppressors.

Similar actions are likewise planned for the German camps of military prisoners.

6. Work in various groups is conducted in part in conjunction with inserted leaders and in part with opponents of the Stalin regime already known to us and who are friends of the Russian liberation idea.

Leadership is directed exclusively through us by radio and other means.

III. Rifle regiment

According to a specially prepared plan, the rifle division of the guard strike brigade will act at the front and behind enemy lines. The rifle regiment is primarily reserve for the special operations regiment. In times of military action, its mission includes the attainment of documents and the arrest of individuals and whole units of Reds.

IV. Joint actions of the special operations regiment and the rifle regiment

The special operations regiment and the rifle regiment work hand in hand. The special operations regiment organizes the defection of units of the Red Army to the German side and the rifle regiment provides security and support for the operation.

V. Leadership of the guard strike brigade

Leadership of all the work of the guard strike brigade is directed by the commander of the guard strike brigade in close contact with the German command leadership.

Deployment 26 May, 1943.

Signed: Lieutenant General ZHILENKOV and IVANOV

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. N°N-18766. T. 7. L. 88-94. Authenticated copy.

N°23. Dispatch of Colonel Pol'sky of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement on the arrival in the Bryansk forests from Orel of three divisions of the RLA numbering up to 40,000 people and the implementation of an offensive operation by them against the partisans.

26 May, 1943

Transaction by High Frequency

TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS
OF THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT

Lieutenant General Comrade Ponomarenko P. K.

On 25 May, 1943 by high-frequency telephone you received a report on the blockade of partisan brigade groups of the west and south units of Orlov district.

On 25 May of this year the enemy, conducting intensified scouting using units of regular forces and RLA forces, pushed up their activity in the forward areas of SMELIZH and KRASNAYA SLOBODA.

By 15 May the enemy had established a blockade of the Bryansk forests, cutting partisan brigades into pieces. The following enemy units are taking action against the partisan brigades:

In the north – the 102nd Magyar [Hungarian] infantry division, which includes regiments: 42nd, 43rd, 44th and 51st. The division was given a group of tanks from the 18th tank division, RLA regiment Desna.

In the south, the 459th separate German regiment is acting, along with the 82nd RLA battalion, the 508th infantry regiment, the 292nd German infantry division, the 930th infantry regiment, 291st German infantry division, and 137th (German), which includes the regiments: 447th, 448th, 449th.

Eight battalions of the RLA are acting simultaneously, the numbers of which have not been established, but the total number of troops may be as high as 40 thousand.

On 16 May the enemy undertook an offensive against the brigade "Death to the German Occupiers" and the Schors brigade with a force of up to a division with an accompanying 40 tanks. The brigades were completely blockaded, the circle of defenses narrowing with each passing hour. The partisans are moving to the south through enemy fire, together with a population of up to five thousand people, and they have no provisions.

On 18 May the enemy, with a force that included units of the 137th German infantry division, 292nd Magyar infantry division, and up to 4 battalions of troops from the RLA with an attached 5 tanks, 4 armored vehicles, division artillery and several batteries of heavy mortars, led an offensive in the direction of NEGINO, MAISKY, SUZEMKA, NEDOL'SK, PODGORNAYA SLOBODA, and the collective farm Put'. As a result of having superior forces, by the end of 23 May the enemy was able to take control of SUZEMKA and come out to the border of GAVRILOVA GUTA, the crossing NERUSSA, and the village NERUSSA, breaking through defenses in the area of KOKAREVKA, taking control of STEKLIANNY, and having success in KOLOMINO. The enemy intensified offensive actions in the locations of the brigade named for Stalin, on the border of OSTRAYA LUKA, and BORODENKA. The enemy is attempting to restore the rail line UNECHA-vil.MIKHAILOVSKY at great speed.

On 24 May at CHERN' the enemy inserted up to a regiment of infantry, simultaneously firing from 70 large guns. The partisans pushed back six furious enemy attacks. In this battle alone, over 300 soldiers and officers were killed and two tanks destroyed. In just one day, on 24 May, 600 fascists were annihilated.

In the region of KOLOMINO the enemy is moving through passages in the woods, shooting everyone they encounter. Two battalions of the 292nd Magyar infantry division of the enemy tried to come out in the rear of the partisans through NERUSSA, bypassing DENISOVKA and KRASNAYA SLOBODA, but the latter group were beat back using counterattacks that pushed them back across the NERUSSA river.

In the area of DENISOVKA, a group of ten tanks and supporting infantry coming from SUZENKA tried to overtake the partisan airfield.

By 18:00 on 25 May the enemy units of the 492nd German infantry, the 137th German infantry, and battalions of the RLA had taken KOLOMINO, STEKLIANNY, TEREBUGHKA, CHERN', and DENISOVKA, and were attempting to get a stranglehold on the high road from SUZEMKA – TRUBCHEVSK, simultaneously tightening the ring. Prisoner Gefreiter RIDIGER of the 492nd infantry division testified: the division arrived with the assignment to wage a fight with the partisans of the Bryansk forests. The personnel of the division was seventy percent Nazis, and they were on orders to kill all partisans, not to burn population centers or shoot local residents, and not to kill any partisans who surrendered.

From operational documents and maps taken from the killed German Lieutenant WACHS it is evident: the 507th and 508th regiments are in the 492nd division. The division has the mission to take the defenses along the left bank of the river NERUSSA. TRUBACHEVSK has a large assemblage of troops and vehicles of the enemy.

Provisions are lacking both among the partisans and the local population, which numbers up to 25 thousand people. The enemy is intensifying activity against the partisans.

I ask your operation for help for the partisans in sending provisions and ammunition, and most importantly in bombing from the sky SUZEMKA, KOKAREVKA, ALTUKHOVO, GLINNOE, and TRUBCHEVSK. Ammunition can be delivered to the airfield CHUKHRAI (5 km west of Smelizh).

Deputy Chief of Staff
Colonel POL'SKY

Instructions: to Comrade Khrapkov. Summary. Be[l'chenko]. 26.5.43
Note: Use in RS No. 23.27.5. P.

RGASPI. F. 69. Op. 1. D. 913. L. 34–35. Copy.

**N°24. Introductory note to the report of the General Headquarters
“The Course and Status of Military Propaganda from the fall of
1942” (“Vlasov project”) by the representative of the Reich
Ministry for Foreign Affairs under the OKH von Etzdorf to the
Ambassador for Special Missions von Rintelen.**

6 June, 1943

Representative of the Reich Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Under the High Command of the Infantry
Matter of National Importance
O. U., 6 June, 1943
Nr. 22/43 g. Kommandosache
To Ambassador for Special Missions von Rintelen.⁷²

Dear Mr. von Rintelen, With the conversation taking place between the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs and the head of the General Headquarters [of infantry forces] undoubtedly in your mind, the attached report of the General Headquarters on “The Course and Status of Military Propaganda in the East from the fall of 1942 (“Project Vlasov”) will be of interest to you.

I would appreciate you returning [the report] to me when possible.

With friendly greetings

Heil Hitler

Exceedingly loyally yours

H. Etzdorf

P. S. The report was presented by Junior Secretary of State Henke.

[Attachment]

The Course and Status of Military Propaganda in the East from the fall of 1941 (“Project Vlasov”).

I. The goal of German military propaganda against the enemy is the disruption of the unity of enemy forces to the point of challenging the ability of the enemy soldiers to resist, achieving a large number of deserters, and thereby protecting German blood and not deploying German troops more than necessary.

II. Course of military propaganda from the fall of 1942

1) Background Commander of the Russian army Lieutenant General Vlasov was taken prisoner in the summer of 1942 during the battles of the Volkhov pocket. After his imprisonment, he gave himself to the fight against Bolshevism.

In connection with this, the first Vlasov leaflets appeared in September 1942, and they turned out to be so successful that the HCW, with the approval of the Chief of Staff of the HCW, made the decision to include a propaganda plan for the winter of 1942/1943 in a larger-scale operation “from one Russian to another.”

2) Previous course of the “Vlasov campaign” and its effect

a) Course of the operation

At the root of the campaign was Vlasov’s proclamation, in which the so-called Russian Committee called on people to fight against Bolshevism on the side of Germany. Propaganda alliances of national formations were necessary to propel those who loved their homeland and had anti-Bolshevik leanings to come over to the side of Germany and to cooperate [with us]. At the same time, the Russians’ will to fight had to be broken down by the conviction (which needed to be encouraged) that the place for those who loved their homeland was on the side of Germany.

This operation was only approved by the Reich Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories in mid-January 1943, after the most favorable time for conducting the operation had already passed, and from that point on the operation has been continually in process. In spite of this [delay], it has had great success.

In order not to cast doubt on the credibility of German propaganda, it was necessary to support the propaganda with practical undertakings. From here arose the thought of the creation of a committee that would be given advisory functions in the

economic and social spheres. Along with significantly strengthening trust in German propaganda, the creation of such a committee could serve to significantly weaken Russian propaganda, primarily in the regions overrun by bandits, and in so doing have a positive effect on our situation vis-à-vis these gangs.

b) Impact

The impact of German military propaganda can be seen largely from the reports of soldiers and the statements of POWs that are attached. The impact can be summarized as follows:

aa) Impact on Russian participants of combat.

The large number of attached reports from all parts of the front show that Vlasov's proclamation [made] a deep impression on the Russian soldiers, and provide evidence that Vlasov's proclamation, to a significant degree, had the effect of breaking down Russian opposition, weakening the enemy, and strengthening the desire to cross [the front line] to our side.

The enemy's activities in counteracting this [trend] confirm this impression.

However, due to promises that have to date gone unfulfilled, the number of voices expressing doubt in the honesty of the German propaganda is growing of late. An official German position could release some tension, if possible an edict from the Führer – one that drives away existing doubts and enacts operations as a decisive military factor.

bb) Impact within occupied eastern territories.

Vlasov's proclamation spread most rapidly among the civilian population of the occupied eastern territories, though its publication has still not been officially permitted. It has had a conciliatory effect everywhere, positively influencing the situation with gangs and giving new hope for honest cooperation with Germany.

The fact that the enemy knows that the distribution of this proclamation has been forbidden in the occupied eastern territories has a negative influence and is seen by the Russians on the whole as proof that the entire operation is a propaganda trick.

cc) Impact in national formations

Vlasov's proclamation, after it was voiced, gave the national formations especially strong momentum, since the Russians fighting on our side for the first time saw in it an attempt by the German side to tell them not only what they were fighting against, but what they should fight for.

All the more reason that the decisive influence lies in the doubts as to the honesty of the German propaganda, as in any answer [to that propaganda].

dd) Impact on POWs

In camps for military POWs, the consequence of the "Vlasov Campaign" was a splitting of what might otherwise have been a single front of enemies of Germany. The number of requests for admission to national formations is growing. On many occasions, we have seen confirmation of increased readiness to work on the part of the work groups in the POW camps. (As a result of these successes, the air force and Todt⁷³ requested that propaganda action be extended also among the volunteer helpers of the Luftwaffe⁷⁴ and POWs used in Todt.)

ee) Impact abroad

In April and May, the Vlasov Project had great resonance in allied, neutral and enemy countries, and the opinion was that everywhere under Germany's future cooperative and skillful leadership, this action could become a decisive turning-point in the war in favor of Germany.

In case of the failure of the Vlasov campaign, enemy propaganda will be presented with unlimited possibilities. Nor should we underestimate the potential loss of trust in the German leadership on the part of neutral and allied countries.

III. Current state of affairs

From the beginning of May, the "campaign" has been conducted on an ongoing basis and has become more intensive thanks to the additional propaganda campaign "Silver Belt" [*Serebryanaya poloska*]⁷⁵. Nonetheless, growing mistrust on that side concerning the honesty of German intentions and German propaganda is making conducting the operation more and more difficult with every passing day. There are already no remaining slogans or key phrases that we could use to hold out until an edict

from the Führer is issued, lest the enemy feel ever more under the pressure of the German campaign and that the uncertainty of German intentions is being hidden from him for as long as possible.

We should not expect that we can continue this way successfully for long.

IV. List of pressing measures and consequences of the possible refusal of them.

1) Having begun as a propaganda trap, Project Vlasov has called forth a movement which, from the enemy point of view, is making the danger of civil war very real due to its threatening nature.

From this point on the situation demands firm leadership and furtherance of the movement in order that German military propaganda avoid return fire.

General Vlasov is therefore especially suited to be the representative of this movement, since his position on national politics and emigration coincides with the German point of view.

Vlasov is convinced that ultimate success can be found exclusively in honest cooperation with Germany. Continual observation of him indicates that he is a reliable person. He knows that a return to Stalin no longer exists for him. (Among other things, Vlasov cites the actions of the Japanese in China and the territories occupied by them.)

The culminating point of the potential influence of propaganda on the basis of officially approved theses has been passed; each additional day that he [the Führer] does not pronounce a decision will necessarily influence our propaganda in a negative way. The dangers of further delay, from the military point of view and particularly in response to the Vlasov Campaign, are obvious if we take into account that approximately 800 thousand Russians are already listed in the eastern formations, the “Silver Belt” propaganda action for deserters has to a significant degree been built on Vlasov’s proclamation, and the situation with gangs⁷⁶ depends to a decisive degree on the fulfillment of German promises.

2) Therefore it is urgently necessary to take the following measures to create the possibility of further use of German military propaganda in the east:

a) to act quickly, because further delay is intolerable from the military perspective;

b) [the need for] an official German position in relation to the Vlasov Campaign, possibly in the form of an edict from the Führer. If it is impossible to obtain an edict from the Führer, then the German position should find documented confirmation of official inclusion of national committees (currently the function of the committees is of an advisory nature, and even so in few districts, especially in questions of providing national formations, propaganda among the population, etc. If it makes sense, broaden the sphere of its activity on the basis of economic propaganda.);

c) General Vlasov should become the chair of the Russian Committee. He should be supported in all possible ways, both propaganda and material, since, considering his authority among Russians, he represents the singular person who guarantees an accord between German demands and Russian wishes that will coordinate the success of all actions in a decisive way.

3) What it is necessary [to do] in the event of the rejection of [these] urgent measures and the consequence of that rejection.

In case of a possible rejection of the above-mentioned urgent measures, it will be impossible to continue German military propaganda in the east based on previously existing principles.

In order to minimize these losses, it is necessary:

a) to prepare for an end to the Vlasov Campaign, and likewise to the propaganda action Silver Belt, which is aimed at deserters;

b) to prepare a propaganda campaign to mask the measures from the German side against the increased counter-propaganda of the enemy which can be expected to soon follow;

c) to prepare the gradual dissolution of national formations and transfer then to another type of activity;

d) to strengthen current and form new German security forces which, firstly, should instantly replace the 800-thousand-person national auxiliary force in use today and, additionally, should

increasingly be used in the fight against enemy gangs, which will undoubtedly immediately increase their activities.

In spite of these countermeasures, the following consequences, among others, are unavoidable:

a) full loss of trust in all German propaganda, which will long be doomed to inaction both in Russia and throughout the rest of the world;

b) loss of position in light of the most important point of enemy propaganda (“The goal of Germany is to split and enslave the Russian people; as a result the unification on the side of Soviet Russia,” etc.)

c) indirect but decisive strengthening of the enemy opposition, since after such actions on the part of Germany all Russians will see the masked Bolshevik system as the lesser evil in comparison with German rule as it concerns the relationship with national groups, and will wholeheartedly take pains to preserve it; the gang movement will grow in the direction of a movement of national uprising, encompassing all layers of society if German security forces do not have enough might.

Published in: *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945. Serie E. Bd. VI: 1. Mai 1943 bis 30 September, 1943* (Göttingen, 1979), pp. 145–149. Doc. 85. Translation from the German.

N°25. Summary statement of the telephone conversation on the Vlasov movement between Ambassador Hewel and Ambassador von Rintelen for the Reich Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Berghoff, 9 June, 1943

Second copy for Ambassador Ritter

Ambassador Hewel

Summary statement for the Reich Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Regarding: On the participation of eastern peoples

Confirmation of my telephone conversation from 9 June with Mr. Ambassador von Rintelen

Yesterday evening there was another lengthy conversation between the Führer, Field Marshal General Keitel, and the Headquarters Chief of Staff Zeitzler⁷⁷ on the question of using eastern peoples on the front and behind enemy lines and the politics of that, during which various points of view were sometimes heatedly discussed.

The heart of it was various reports from the front, especially the dispatch from the Northern Army,⁷⁸ which alone used 47 thousand volunteers from among the eastern peoples. The commander of the Northern Army thinks that the use of volunteers is a clear success, since in his territory there is not one partisan left and all directions are protected and controlled exclusively by Russian volunteers. There have been absolutely no more incidences of sabotage. For all of this he must thank the slogans of General Vlasov, which have resulted in increasing numbers crossing over from the side of the Bolsheviks. But where the organization of these formations reached a known culmination, a critical moment was reached. Though Vlasov recruited volunteers and made their use possible in various ways, he is still not receiving any support from the German side. For the first time questions have appeared among the ranks of volunteers and their commanders that cast certain doubts on Vlasov's promises. The army is afraid of the threat that may arise from the disappointment of the eastern national formations, which, if they knew that Vlasov was conducting his propaganda without the support of the facts on the part of the Germans, would mean the sudden transformation of 47 thousand volunteers into 47 thousand partisans and saboteurs. At this critical moment, it would be necessary to make a policy decision.

According to what General Zeitzler said to me in a private conversation at the end of a meeting with the Führer, the Führer maintains his previous opinion: he said that history has proven that such national movements have always turned against the occupying force in times of crisis⁷⁹. Therefore, the Führer ordered that Vlasov no longer continue stirring up particular efforts on the

German side and that he not give any more speeches. The volunteer formations should continue to remain within narrow limits, numbering not more than a battalion, but they should be encouraged to service more through material advantages, for example good quarters, good rations and entertainment, than because of some ideological political propaganda. As for the enemy on the other side, we need to continue using Vlasov's slogans and national Russian propaganda there.

For the publication of such necessary fixed rules of interaction [with the eastern population] for the commanders at the front, the Führer has tasked Reich Minister Lammers⁸⁰ to work them up. In this way, definitive instructions can be presented only after Lammers' proposals. Therefore, this proposal for the time being is informational and does not constitute final instructions and decisions.

Signature
Hewell

The Political Archive of the German Foreign Service (Berlin), Handakten. Ritter. B. III. Bl. 368759–368762. Copy. Translation from the German. Published in *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945*. Serie E. Band VI: 1. Mai 1943 bis 30 September, 1943 (Göttingen, 1979), pp. 157–158. doc. 92.

N°26. Special dispatch No. 001102 of the head of the Political Administration of the Leningrad Front K. Kulik to the Headquarters of the Political Administration of the Red Army on the necessity of organizing counter-propaganda against the propaganda "Project Vlasov."

16 June, 1943

Top Secret

TO THE HEAD OF THE MAIN POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION
OF THE RED ARMY,

Lieutenant General Comrade SCHERBAKOV⁸¹

SPECIAL DISPATCH

of the Political Administration of the Leningrad Front

ON THE NECESSITY OF OFFICIAL DENUNCIATION OF THE
TRAITOR OF THE HOMELAND, FORMER COMMANDER OF
THE SECOND SHOCK ARMY, LIEUTENANT GENERAL
VLASOV

On 7 June, 1943, I reported to the Main Political Administration of the Red Army that recently the Germans on the Leningrad front have been dropping many leaflets both in battle areas and in the rear, which come for the most part from the so-called Russian Committee and the Russian Liberation Army, supposedly led by the former commander of the Second Shock Army, Lieutenant General VLASOV.

In spite of the measures taken to rapidly collect and destroy these leaflets, some of the soldiers and commanders read them and know about the Germans' supposed creation of the Russian Committee and Russian Liberation Army. In individual and group conversations with Red Army soldiers, our propagandists are asked the questions, "What is this Russian Committee and Russian Liberation Army? And who is Vlasov?"

I request permission to denounce VLASOV and other traitors of the Homeland to the Red Army soldiers and their commanders and mobilize personnel in the fight against these scoundrels.

Head of the Political Administration of the Leningrad Front,
MAJOR GENERAL K. KULIK

Instructions: Give reply to Comrade Kuznetsov.⁸² A Scher[bakov]. 21.6

The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. F. 32. Op. 11309. D. 196. L. 141. Original.

N°27. Dispatch of the head of special unit of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement in Minsk S. I. Kazantsev to P. K. Ponomarenko (Director of the Headquarters of the Partisan Movement) on the measures being taken to organize intelligence work and implant partisans in military formations.

Minsk, 19 June, 1943

From transaction account – 88 Comrade PONOMARENKO

Activities regarding VLASOV are strictly taking effect even with his absence and that of his “household” in Minsk.

Work under way:

1. Sending a person to Glubokoe with the goal of studying the “household” there and recruiting people.
2. One of VLASOV’s recruiters in Minsk, candidates available for both situations.
3. Sending our own into VLASOV’s units as agents.
4. I have leads on learning the agents of VLASOV working in the Soviet rear territory.

Ref. N°49, 17 June, 1943

Starosta

*Instructions: T. FORMASHEV – Very important, need a reply.
Ponomarenko*

Verified: Captain Karpov

RGASPI. F. 69. Op. 9. D. 9. L. 7. Copy.

N°28. Assignment from the Western Headquarters of the Partisan Movement to the intelligence group “Avrov” to determine the location and secure the capture of A. A. Vlasov.

23 June, 1943

Top Secret

SEEN AND APPROVED

HEAD OF THE WESTERN HEADQUARTERS for the senior group

OF THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT and his deputy
MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE WESTERN
FRONT
[D. Popov]

23 June, 1943

ASSIGNMENT
FOR INTELLIGENCE GROUP AVROV, SENT TO THE
SMOLENSK REGION

Your group is tasked with infiltrating the German-occupied territories of the Smolensk region to conduct special intelligence to determine the location of and apprehend Vlasov, former general of the Red Army, caught by the Germans during the war, and now carrying out traitorous work.

The intel group will be taken behind the front lines by airplane and lowered by parachute to a selected area to the west of the city of SMOLENSK.

After landing, the entire group will gather at a predetermined location not far from the landing site, inform the Western Headquarters of the Partisan Movement by radio of arrival in the rear territory, and after this head to the area of activity – GUSINO, LELEKVINSKAYA, and SMOLENSK—and set to completing the task.

From the moment of landing in occupied territory, the whole group will operate under the radar, relying on relatives, close acquaintances, and documents.

The main task of the intel group should be finding Vlasov, who calls himself the chair of the Russian Committee in SMOLENSK, and his subsequent extraction to the Western Headquarters of the Partisan Movement. If Vlasov is not in Smolensk, the whole group will watch for his arrival in town and conduct intelligence in the garrisons of Smolensk and the areas nearby, from the west side to the region of GUSINO-RUDNYA and the area surrounding SMOLENSK, thus providing a collection of

information for the Western Headquarters of the Partisan Division the moment VLASOV arrives in town.

To complete this mission, one group of agents, specifically SIMKOV, GAKOV and GASOV, should infiltrate the city of SMOLENSK and settle there to live. For these purposes, the indicated comrades will use their connections in SMOLENSK, find their relatives and acquaintances, and through their means settle in, at first illegally and then for legal residence in the city. They will seek out work for themselves in town that will provide them with a living and freedom of movement around town and beyond the city limits. All three agents will live in SMOLENSK with different people and meet with one another in an agreed-upon location in secret.

Agents Gakov, Simkov, and Gasov, while located in SMOLENSK, will establish the existence in town of the so-called Russian Committee and the leadership of the Russian National People's Army. They will determine all the leaders of these fascist organizations. They will have, in addition to this, the main goal of discovering whether Vlasov is located among them in SMOLENSK, and likewise where he works, where he lives, who guards him and how. Having gathered this information, the indicated agents should report on this to their superior, who after this will discuss with them a plan to capture and extract from the city _____ and, if this is impossible, to kill him.

The three agents will undertake all actions in the capture of VLASOV and/or his killing only with the approval and knowledge of the senior person in the group (in the event he is still alive), making note of the time, location, and plan for the attack and capture.

The second part of the intel group headed by group leader Avrov – agent Dor, communications agent Irov, and radio operator Pin – are settling in western SMOLENSK in the triangle of SMOLENSK-GUSINO-LELEKVINSKA, where contact is being established with the agents located in the city of SMOLENSK Western Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (by mobile radio) and with leaders of Petin's second intel group operating in the areas around Smolensk.

The agents Avrov, Dor and Irov, located in the regions of GUSINO and LELEKVINSKAYA, are not to involve themselves in any sort of organization or institution created by the Germans in these regions. They must use familial contacts and acquaintances or relatives among those serving under the Germans and close acquaintances to procure documents on the subject of free passage through this territory and a route through to the city of SMOLENSK for contacting the agents and on help completing the mission of finding and bringing out VLASOV from SMOLENSK.

In addition, units of the intel groups will conduct surveillance of the enemy in the given regions for the whole group, in order to, like the other units of the group, gather information on Vlasov that will allow for the successful completion of the mission given to the whole group.

In order to determine VLASOV's place of arrival and stay in SMOLENSK, if he is not in town, the entire intel group will collect information on the so-called Russian Committee and the Russian National People's Army⁸³ by asking acquaintances about the activity of these fascist organizations in SMOLENSK, familiarizing themselves with the newspapers or separate addresses issued by the Russian Committee and learning through co-workers and acquaintances of the people who are part of the so-called "Volunteer Army" or the headquarters of that army in command posts. Together with this, they will simultaneously find information about the town garrison and the inhabited centers near it, and likewise information about the economic and political condition of the city and the region and the mood of the remaining residents.

In their assignments, they are not to inform anyone of the whole state of affairs and should take action exclusively through their own means.

The capture of Vlasov in SMOLENSK from his place of work, from his residence, or on the road must be implemented and agreed upon by the entire staff of the group, which should be arranged on site ahead of time after the completion of intelligence-gathering activities.

After capture, Vlasov must be transported to our Soviet rear territory or the Western Headquarters of the Partisan Movement. For this, the necessary preparations need to be made, working with Petin's group, to airlift him out, to search for a landing-place for the plane, and to inform the headquarters of this or deliver him to the nearest partisan unit. Should it prove impossible to take Vlasov alive, it is necessary to kill him, delivering ____ in order to confirm.

Avrov, located in the region of GUSINO-LELEKVINSKAYA, should prepare ahead of time a place to hide Vlasov after his capture.

Avrov will make contact with headquarters by mobile radio, for which purpose a radio operator will arrange this in illegal conditions. Dispatches should be sent to the headquarters every 3–5 days. Vlasov is to be called "*sedoi*" [gray-haired] in dispatches. Dispatches on enemy troops should be sent on receiving the information.

Contact with the Petin group will be established through radio technician Irov and the communications man of the Petin group, Alik, at a previously agreed-upon location, using a password for meeting around their area of activity.

Petin's group will come to help on receiving a signal of the need for it, for which purpose an additional password is established: "*Svat s nami*" [the matchmaker is with us].

In addition to conducting special intelligence, conduct observation of the strength of the enemy, determining locations of headquarters, large groups of soldiers and technical equipment, the appearance on the airfield of any significant number of planes, the possession of chemical stockpiles with poisonous substances and chemical units, defensive borders and fortifications; determine where units of the RNA are being used, where their headquarters are, and also the area of activity of large death squads. This information on the enemy should not be collected at the expense of the main mission.

Use every possibility to obtain documents on the subject of free movement through the occupied territories and successfully complete the mission.

After 2–3 weeks deployed, report a suitable location for a drop of additional provisions for radio and food. When you inform on the location of this drop, indicate the signal for the plane, so that they will know where to drop the supplies and ammunition in order to implement the operation.

The intel group will remain behind enemy lines until a final result is achieved, after which they will exit the territory together with Vlasov, or they will withdraw as per the instructions of the Central Headquarters for the Partisan Movement.

SENIOR DIVISION CHIEF

WESTERN HEADQUARTERS FOR THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT
MAJOR OF STATE SECURITY ANUROV

31 May, 1943

RGASPI. F. 69. Op. 1. D. 933. L. 1–2 (reverse side of the page) Copy.

N°29. Report of Field Marshal General V. Keitel, the head of the General Headquarters of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, on the further formation of RLA units and use of A. A. Vlasov only for propaganda purposes.

1 July, 1943

1. The head of the Propaganda Division for the Armed Forces reported to me in Berlin on the trip he took on my orders to the front (Eastern).

According to his report, the Vlasov Propaganda and parallel roll-out of the Liberation Army have been conducted to the extent foreseen by the Führer and deployed in the direction desired by the Führer.

2. The Minister for Eastern Affairs rejected using Vlasov. The Führer agreed with the proposal from von Wedel that I reported to him on his use in the goals of propaganda; the possibility of implementing his national ideas will not be given to him for the time being.

3. Today I spoke with the Führer regarding both proposals sent to him through Colonel von Vedel. The Führer agrees with such separation and with the corresponding elimination of Vlasov's Great Russian idea.

4. The head of the Division for Propaganda of the Armed Forces has been informed by me.

Keitel

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. N°N-18766. T. 7. L. 20–21. Authenticated copy. Published in: *Rodina*. 1992. N°8–9, p. 89; *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi otechestvennoi voine*, vol. IV, T. 2 (Moscow, n.p., 2008), pp. 685–686. Doc. 203.

N°30. Leaflet of the Chief Political Administration of the Red Army “Who Vlasov Is.”

Before 3 July, 1943

Former Soviet General Vlasov Turns Out to be a Toady and a German Spy

The fascist German scoundrels shout to the world that General Vlasov, the man who supposedly created a Russian army on German-occupied territory, is working for them.

Who is Vlasov?

Vlasov is a miscreant and a traitor who sold out to the Germans. In 1937–38, Vlasov participated in the Trotsky plot and, together with other enemies of the people, tried to bring our homeland down. Vlasov was an active participant in the counterrevolutionary Trotskyite organization, which held secret talks with the Germans and the Japanese about selling Soviet land to them – the Soviet Far East and Siberia to the Japanese, and Soviet Ukraine and Belorussia to the Germans. When the Soviet authorities discovered Vlasov's plotting, he was held to account. By that time, the

counterrevolutionary gang of Trotskyites had been beaten down and destroyed. Held accountable, Vlasov pretended to be remorseful and begged for forgiveness. The Soviet judiciary forgave Vlasov for his crimes and gave him the possibility to make amends by working in the ranks of the Red Army against the German invaders.

In the summer of 1941, the trickster Vlasov broke his military oath, surrendered to the Germans near Kiev, began to serve under the German fascists, and recruited others to be spies and provocateurs.

This was Vlasov's second most grave crime against his fatherland. His repentance proved to be false. The double-dealing Vlasov fooled the Soviet people. Vlasov was and remains a loathsome traitor.

Returning from a German intelligence assignment outside Kiev, the spy Vlasov claimed that he had broken through a siege. He was again given the possibility to prove his innocence in the fight against the Germans on the Western Front. Fearing that he would be found out as an oath breaker and a traitor, the treasonous Vlasov for some time hesitated to conduct his criminal activity as a provocateur and spy. When he later ended up on the Volkhov front, Hitler's spy Vlasov, on the instructions of the Germans, led units of our Second Shock Army into a German siege, killed many Soviet people, and himself ran over to his masters, the Germans. From this moment on, Vlasov has revealed himself to be a spy for Hitler, a traitor, and a murderer of the Soviet people.

The scoundrel Vlasov sold out everything – his homeland and his honor.

The Germans are killing Soviet people by the thousands and thousands, and that Judas Vlasov tried to pass off the fascist German invaders as benefactors.

The Germans take away thousands and thousands of our brothers and sisters to Hitler's work camps, into German slavery, and the traitor Vlasov calls the Germans liberators.

The Germans spill the blood of and try to eternally enslave Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Russian lands; they destroy the culture of our peoples, enslave the

Soviet population, and the reprobate Vlasov considers the Germans to be friends.

That is why the Germans are raising Vlasov as a shield and helping him scrape together units of the same kind of scoundrels as he is himself, in order to throw them in front of the Red Army! That is why the Germans are helping the traitor Vlasov with such force, using trickery to fill his units with citizens of the Soviet areas occupied by the fascists and a few POWs, none of whom will fight against their brothers and will at the first opportunity cross over to the side of the Red Army!

However much the Hitler-followers shout about their toady Vlasov, however much the German spy Vlasov twists and turns, he has no army now and will never have one. And the Vlasov gangs put together with the help of the Germans will fall to pieces at the first confrontation with our troops.

Scoundrel and traitor of the worst kind, a betrayer through and through, a German spy – that's who Vlasov is.

Death to the loathsome traitor Vlasov, despicable spy and agent of the cannibal Hitler.

Main Political Administration of the Red Army

Note: Published on 6.7.1943 in the newspaper "Son of the Homeland" [Syn rodiny] No. 159.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 204. L. 46–47. Original; The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. F. 32. Op. 11309. D. 166. L. 71–73. Draft.

N°31. Memorandum from the head of the Western Headquarters of the Partisan Movement S. Popov and the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters for Intelligence of the Western Partisan Movement F. Krylov to the Department Chief of Intelligence for the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement Kuteinikov "On the work to eradicate anti-Soviet formations created by the Fascist German invaders."

Not before 13 July, 1943

CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT
TO THE HEAD OF THE SPECIAL INFORMATION DIVISION
COLONEL Comrade KUTEINIKOV

ON THE WORK TO ERADICATE ANTI-SOVIET FORMATIONS
CREATED BY THE FASCIST GERMAN INVADERS

The command staff of the German army throughout the occupied territories of Orel and Smolensk districts is combining police into companies, battalions. They are conducting recruitment of all men aged 16 to 50, enrolling them in the Russian Liberation Army, and sending them to the front to fight against the partisans.

As a rule, the formations are distinguished by ethnic group. There are battalions that have personnel of various ethnic groups. But the Germans try to give even these mixed battalions a veneer of nationalism.

Thus in the Ukrainian legion, which is located in the village STAR' of the Orel District and ROSLAVL' of the Smolensk district, there are Russians. But their family names have been changed to make them look Ukrainian. Among the legionnaires who crossed over to the partisan brigade of Comrade KORBUT, Vasiliev bore the name Vasilenko, Ivanov bore the name Ivanenko, etc.

The Germans' cooperation with the soldiers and commanders of the Russian Liberation Army is characterized as mistrust for one another, even as far as Germans showing open disgust towards the legionnaires.

The agent "Arkady" reports the following facts: during one troop movement, the Germans ordered lunch for themselves in a

village, but the “Cossacks” traveling with them were left hungry. During a pause in the fighting, the “Cossacks” settled themselves in a thick stand of fir trees to warm themselves; the Germans drove them out and took their place, and then forced the “Cossacks” to stand guard for them. The Germans do not trust the legionnaires and post them together with their own soldiers.

Comrade EREMEEV, Secretary of the Ponizov District Committee of the Communist Party, reported the following: the fascist German command sent a group of death squads out against the brigade of Comrade Sokolov, a squad consisting in the majority of RLA, or, as the partisans are calling them, the “populists” [*narodniki*]. These death squads were weak in their opposition to the partisans, did not show particular activity, and a significant number of them came over to the side of the partisans during the operation. The fascist provocateurs were forced to call back the “populists” and send others in their place, and some of those called back were cruelly punished. In May the personnel making up the punitive units fighting against SOKOLOV’s brigade were almost exclusively Germans.

The moral-political condition of the people in various anti-Soviet formations is at a low level: instability, displays of hesitation – not isolated cases.

The low morale of the legionnaires is characterized in a number of documents:

Commander of eastern battalion No. 604 SCHELOKOV in order No. 24 from 11 March, 1943 writes, “In spite of my order No. 3 from 20 November, 1942 ‘On looting and theft by soldiers against the peaceful population,’ today there are still ongoing cases of theft of the civilian population. For looting, systematic drunkenness, and lack of discipline, soldiers from the 2nd company Sergei KSENOFONTOV, Aleksei TIMOFEEV, Mikhail SUCHKOV; company headquarters: Vasily Vasiliev, Petr Petrov ; 3rd Company: non-commissioned officer Sergei KOMALOV, private Ivan SIMONOV are being sent to camps for POWs.

For drunkenness, debauchery, threatening an officer with a weapon – non-commissioned officers of the 2nd company were

handed over to a military tribunal: Sergei Pomerantsev and Nikolai Pereletov.”

Further in the order it is noted that soldiers are not maintaining the established daily schedule, are not fulfilling military training exercises, wander through the streets of the village during the day, look unkempt, and fail to salute officer staff.

In the next order, from 16 March, it is established that the arrested pair Pomerantsev and Pereletov have escaped.

A similar order exists for the 13th battalion “People’s Watch” in the town of Pochep, Orel District.

There are quite a few examples of police, legionnaires, soldiers, and commanders of the RLA crossing over to the side of the partisans. [So far] in 1943, around 1,700 people have crossed over into the SOKOLOV brigade. Between 1 and 10 March, 65 police officers crossed over into the unit “For the Homeland” of the PANASENKO brigade. On 6 April three companies of “volunteers” of the “Barricade” battalion crossed over from MGLINO—120 people, who brought with them 2 standing machine guns, 8 hand-held machine guns, and 3 mortars. Seventy people crossed over from the Armenian battalion into DANCHENKO’s brigade, and many crossed over into the regiments of GRISHIN and SADCHIKOV. Especially high levels of defection were noted during periods of Red Army offensives.

The process of dissolution of anti-Soviet formations can be sped up by better organization of Agitprop work among these units—increasing the number of leaflets and, mainly, improving the activities of our agents and underground conspirators. There are a number of cases of failure of the activities of patriotic organizations within these anti-Soviet military units.

In DUBROV, an uprising was being prepared. The preparation was discovered not long before the designated time. Eighty-five people were arrested. There was another such failure in KLETNYA in the Armenian legion, in the village STAR’, and in a number of other towns. The main reason for the failure is poor clandestine security. Conversations about their intentions and plans are held in the presence of outsiders. Agitation work—conversations, reading from newspapers, leaflets, and then discussions—is done openly at

large meetings. The list of participants of such meetings is not checked.

The German command often changes the location of its units in order to avoid allowing various national units to make or strengthen contacts with the partisans. This unarguably makes our efforts to dissolve the “volunteer” units a degree more difficult.

CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE WESTERN HEADQUARTERS OF THE
PARTISAN

MOVEMENT—MEMBER OF MILITARY COUNCIL OF
WESTERN FRONT⁸⁴

D. POPOV

SPECIAL INFORMATION DIVISION CHIEF KRYLOV

*Instructions: to Comrade Kleimenov, 1. Type 1 copy for Comrade Malin
2. To plans regarding RLA. 13.7.43*

Note: Completed. 15.7.43

RGASPI. F. 69. Op. 1. D. 1092. L. 84–87. Original.

N°32. Report from Representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs under the German High Command H. von Etsdorf on the conversation of V. Keitel with A. Rosenberg regarding the prohibition of A. A. Vlasov's presence in the occupied territories and allowing him any independent activity.

22 July, 1943

Copy

- 1) It is forbidden to use the National Committee to recruit volunteers.
- 2) From here on, Vlasov is forbidden from appearing in the occupied territories

3) As far as the continuation of the propaganda campaign Project Vlasov is concerned, the Führer has not given his agreement for a single point of the Vlasov program to be realized without the special permission of the Führer. Not one single German institution should take seriously the promises that make up the 13 points of Vlasov's program.

Reich Minister Lammers has been tasked with working up solutions to this issue.

Note: <...>. Keitel/Rosenberg.

BA-MA. RH/2/2558. Bl. 150. Original. And RH/2/2263. Bl. 30. Authenticated copy. Translation from the German. Republished in O. V. Vishlev, *Nakanune 22ogo iunia 1941 g.* (Moscow, 2001): p. 216.

N°33. Cipher message from Starosta No. 1240 to the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement on the recruitment of Vlasov follower "Dedushka."

14 August, 1943

Rs 88 – Comrade Ponomarenko 1240

14 August N°111 STAROSTA

In Minsk an inside agent called "Dedushka" [Grandfather] has been recruited from among a number of VLASOV's trusted people—a figure of some weight with broad connections among the Vlasov followers in Orsha, Bobruisk, and other towns who have connections to VLASOV's main apartment in Berlin. Dedushka reported: VLASOV is in Berlin, the "masters" don't trust him, there have been arrests among powerful Vlasov followers in connection with which some people have appeared dissatisfied. There are some concrete people from among Vlasov's deputies, generals, that in the evaluation of Dedushka cannot be swayed over to our work. I intend, through Dedushka, to start up a connection with these

people with the goal of attracting them to our work. In case of success, I suggest sending a letter in whose name we are contacting them and what we want, the text of which I ask you to dictate. I request instruction on the ways in which they may be used beyond my own mission. I am placing agents in Orsha, Bobruisk, Minsk, and other towns in the sphere of possibility for Dedushka, insiders for the role of fixed-post spies against Vlasov, and I am searching for other channels to expand this work.

Instructions: Comrade Bel'chenko

To Comrade Anisimov, Comrade Formashev. Request they speak with me. Bel'chenko. 18.8.43.

RGASPI. F. 69. Op. 6. D. 55. L. 34–35. Authenticated copy.

N°34. Memorandum of the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) of the USSR No. 1767/M to the State Defense Committee of the USSR with the proposal to liquidate A. A. Vlasov.

27 August, 1943

The Russian Committee that was created by the Germans is, as is known, headed by the traitor to the Homeland former Lieutenant General of the Red Army A. A. Vlasov (henceforth named *Voron* [Raven]).

Raven, who is living permanently in the region of Berlin, periodically visits the cities of Pskov, Smolensk, Minsk, Borisov, Vitebsk, Zhitomir, and others where the Germans have organized divisions of the Russian Committee and units of the Russian Liberation Army.

With the goal of the liquidation of Raven, the NKGB of the USSR⁸⁵ is conducting the following activities:

I. In the city of Pskov

a) The editor of the Russian Committee's newspaper "Volunteer," published in Pskov, is G. N. Zhilenko, who says that he is a "Lt. General of the Red Army." The leader of the operational

group of the NKGB of the USSR functioning behind enemy lines, Comrade Rabtsevich, reported that Zhilenkov was a member of the Military Council of the 32nd Army in the Red Army.

It has been confirmed that G. N. Zhilenkov, born 1910, by profession a technician, former secretary of the Rostokino District Committee of the Moscow Regional Organization of the All-Union Communist Party, was in fact a member of the Military Council of the 32nd Army with the rank of brigade commissar and from October 1941 was considered missing in action.

In February–March of that year the Germans circulated a leaflet on several parts of the front with a photograph of members of the Russian Committee headed by Raven. One of the faces in this photograph was recognized by the above-mentioned Zhilenkov.

To study the possibility of establishing contact with Zhilenkov in hopes of his eventual recruitment and possible inclusion in our efforts to liquidate Raven, we have inserted into the region of Pskov-Porkhov an operational group of the NKGB of the USSR under the leadership of the head of the division, Major of State Security Korchagin, equipped with a letter from Zhilenkov's wife, who is living in Moscow and who believes, in spite of the fact that she is receiving a pension for having a husband who is "missing," that he is alive and is located in a partisan unit.

The letter from the wife should, in our estimation:

1. Remind Zhilenkov of his family in order to make him more inclined to accept our proposals to participate in the liquidation of Raven.
2. Convince Zhilenkov that his family has not suffered repression yet, and that their fate depends on his further behavior.
3. To prove that the person making contact with Zhilenkov in our name did in fact arrive from Moscow and that this is not a set-up from the Gestapo.

If Zhilenkov agrees and takes part in the liquidation of Raven, he will be promised the possibility to return to our side and forgiveness for his betrayal.

b) Should Zhilenkov refuse to participate in the liquidation of Raven, the NKGB of the USSR has prepared a group of Spaniards

numbering 5 people, former commanders and soldiers of the Spanish Republican Army, already tested by us in military work.

The group is headed by Comrade Guillon.⁸⁶

Francisco Guillon, 22 years of age, Captain of the Red Army, twice sent behind enemy lines with special assignments, awarded the Order of Lenin. As a boy, he served in the ranks of the Spanish Republican Army and made a name for himself in the fight against fascism.

Guillon's group will be given to Comrade Korchagin in the event that Raven appears in the area of Pskov and used for his liquidation in the following way:

The "Blue Division" is deployed in one base on the Leningrad Front, a unit which often operates in the area of Pskov. The appearance in Pskov of our operational group of Spaniards dressed in the uniforms of the Blue Division,⁸⁷ knowing Spanish, and provided with the corresponding documents, will not draw particular attention on the part of the local administration.

The Spaniards are given the following mission: use a plausible pretext to get close to Raven and liquidate him.

In conjunction with this, the operational group of Comrade Korchagin is tasked with finding his location and other possibilities for the completion of the overall mission.

II. In the city of Smolensk

a) For the preparation of necessary activities and conducting operations in Smolensk we have inserted behind enemy lines senior special agent of the NKGB of the USSR, 1st Lt. of State Security Volkov.

Volkov's operational group is given the mission to make contact with the group of resident agents inserted by us in Smolensk in October–November 1942, who have the necessary connections at their disposal.

Two agents who know German will be provided by us with the uniforms of German officers, and in the event of Raven's arrival in Smolensk, they should make their way to him posing as German officers.

Comrade Volkov has also been given an operational group from the NKGB numbering 22 people under the leadership of First

Lieutenant Pogodin, who was sent by us to the region of Nevel', where, according to the information we possess, Raven has a headquarters, in case he arrives in Nevel'.

b) Command of the NKGB in the Smolensk region has inserted an operational group of 5 people to conduct preparatory work for the liquidation of Raven in the area of Roslavl.

The leader of the group, Aleksandr Andreevich Skobelev, born 1916, member of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, originally from Tula District, former worker in the railway militia of Smolensk District, was in 1942 located in Smolensk District territory occupied by the enemy and proved his worth.

c) The agent "Maksimov" has been inserted, with a portable radio set and radio operator, in the Rudniansky region of the Smolensk District.

"Maksimov" has been tasked with establishing communications with resident agent "Dubrovsky" and using him for the work concerning Raven. This agent was inserted behind enemy lines in June 1942 by the Command of the NKGB of Smolensk District and has settled in the city of Smolensk.

III. In the city of Minsk

a) The NKGB of the Belorussian SSR has inserted in the region of Minsk an operational group of responsible workers and tested agents of the NKGB of the Belorussian SSR headed by Lt. Colonel of State Security S. V. Yurin. In order to complete the assigned mission in Minsk, the group has some necessary conditions in place.

Comrade Yurin was given the assignment of making contact with seven resident agents and using them to participate in the operation against Raven created by the NKGB of the Belorussian SSR.

Comrade Yurin's operational group also includes the agent "Uchitel'" [Teacher], who has been in Minsk on assignment from the NKGB of the Belorussian SSR.

In addition, Comrade Yurin was given four operational groups of the NKGB of the Belorussian SSR to provide preparations for the liquidation of Raven, totaling 37 people, acting in the area of Minsk and with experience in military work behind enemy lines.

b) The NKGB of the Belorussian SSR has inserted in the region of the cities of Smolensk and Borisov an operational group of five people headed by Lt. Colonel of State Security Sotikov.

For the execution of the established mission on Raven, Comrade Sotikov has been offered the use of:

1. Operational group of the NKGB of the USSR with 8 people, headed by Lieutenant Solyanik F. A., created from the resident agents in the Borisovsky and Minsk regions of Belorussia. Comrade Solyanik's group has already conducted a number of acts of sabotage behind enemy lines and has battle experience.

2. Operational group operating in the Orsha region of Belorussia from the NKGB of the USSR consisting of 47 people, headed by Rudin D. N., performing well behind enemy lines in the fight against the German invaders.

IV. In the city of Vitebsk

In the area of Polotsk – Vitebsk there is an operational group of the NKGB of the USSR under the leadership of Major Morozov, consisting of up to 1,900 troops and commanders.

Comrade Morozov's group undertakes active explosive work behind enemy lines.

In April of this year, deserters from the Military Alliance of Russian Nationalists⁸⁸ joined the op group:

1. Fyodor Vasilievich Vedernikov, born 1911, former battery commander of the 23rd Rifle Division 11th Army, was wounded and taken prisoner by the Germans near Velikie Luki in August 1941.

2. Dmitry Petrovich Leonov, born 1912, former radio technician of the 599th anti-tank regiment, former POW.

3. Petr Afanasievich Nagornov, born 1922, former soldier in the anti-tank unit No. 1638, former POW.

The above-listed personnel are providing communication among the troops and commanders of the Russian Liberation Army units created by the Germans; they have given valuable testimony on the intelligence work conducted by the Germans by means of participants of these units and expressed a desire to take active part in the fight against the Germans.

Vedernikov, Leonov, and Nagornov named a number of individuals in the RLA who are of a patriotic bent and intend to desert to our side.

Comrade Morozov was given the assignment to make contact with the above-named Vedernikov, Leonov, and Nagornov, to prohibit them from coming over to our side and to use them for the preparation and realization of necessary activities in relation to Raven.

V. In the areas around Kalinin District.

The command of the NKGB of Kalinin District formed an operational group of 20 people, headed by 1st Lt. of State Security Nazarov, who was inserted into occupied territory of Kalinin District with the mission of conducting work on Raven in the regions of Nevel', Novo-Sokol'nichesky, Idritsa, and Pustoshkinsky, using our resident agents in these regions.

VI.

Assignments on the preparation of necessary activities for the liquidation of Raven were also given by us to the following operational groups of the NKGB of the USSR, operating behind enemy lines:

1. Operational group of Comrade Lopatin, located in the region of the city of Borisov.
2. Operational group of Comrade Maliugin, located in the region of the cities of Zhlobin-Mogilev in the Belorussian SSR.
3. Operational group of Comrade Nekliudov, located in the region of Vil'no-Molodechno, Belorussian SSR.
4. Operational group of Comrade Rabtsevich, located in the region of Bobruisk-Salinkovichi, Belorussian SSR.
5. Operational group of Comrade Medvedev, located in the region of the city of Rovno, Ukrainian SSR.
6. Operational group of Comrade Karasev, located in the region of Ovruch-Kiev.

The leaders of the listed operational groups were instructed to study the living conditions and daily life of Raven and the condition of his guard, and promptly report to the NKGB of the USSR information on the location and travel routes followed by Raven.

VII.

On 3 July, 1943 at the base of the operational group of the NKGB of the USSR in the region of Borisov, led by Captain of State Security Lopatin, there arrived a deserter from a German prison camp, Major of the Red Army Fedenko F. A., born 1904, member of the Communist Party, who in the Red Army held the post of Chief of the Personnel Office of the Separate Coastal Army.⁸⁹

Fedorov and Fedenko related that in the beginning of 1943 they attended the economics courses organized by the Germans in Borisov for senior officers from among the Soviet POWs and that the Chief of Staff of these courses was a brigade commander whom the Germans called Major General, Bogdanov Mikhail Vasilievich,⁹⁰ who was inclined against the Germans but was hiding his feelings.

It has been confirmed that Bogdanov Mikhail Vasilievich, born 1907, not a party member, with a higher education, in the Red Army since 1918, at first in the war he held the post of leader of the artillery for the 8th Rifle Corps, has been considered missing in action since 1941. There is no compromising information available on him. His family, consisting of a wife and daughter, lives in Baku.

As a result of the activities of the op group, contact was made with Bogdanov, and he was recruited on 11 July.

According to a message from the head of the op group Comrade Lopatin, Bogdanov “very happily became our agent in order to wipe away the stain of imprisonment and service under the Germans.”

Bogdanov was given the assignment to get into Raven’s headquarters, earn his trust, and, with our help, organize his liquidation.

At the last contact with Bogdanov on 16 August, Bogdanov reported that he was able to get Raven to agree to his working in the headquarters and that 19 August he is leaving for Berlin for a personal meeting with Raven.

In addition to the above-reported information, the NKGB of the USSR is working up a number of other activities with a view to the liquidation of Raven, which will be reported separately.

People’s Commissar for State Security of the USSR Merkulov⁹¹

Published in: *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine. Collected documents. Vol. 4, Book 2.* (Moscow, 2008): 288–293. Doc. N°1583.

N°35. From the dispatch of P. Z. Kalinin to P. K. Ponomarenko on the creation, structure, and activity of the Military Alliance of Russian Nationalists, the Russian SS National regiment and the RLA, and work toward the dissolution of the RLA formation under the command of Rodionov-Gil’.

September 1943

TO THE HEAD OF THE CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE
PARTISAN MOVEMENT under the SUPREME HIGH
COMMAND Lt. General Comrade P.K. PONOMARENKO

MILITARY DISPATCH

on the work toward the dissolution of the RLA formation under the
leadership

of Lt. Colonel Gil’ (Rodionov).

[...]

5. Organization by the Germans of the 1st Russian National
Regiment of the SS

The German command, having been convinced by its experience with the Russian National People’s Army of the latter’s unreliable nature and inability to achieve goals set for it, set on the road to the creation of “volunteer” formations of “select” contingents of POWs who had completed the Gestapo school and proven their loyalty to the occupiers during their time in the camp. One such select formation was the First Russian National Regiment.

The formation of the First Russian SS National Regiment began in mid-1942, from Russian POWs, mainly individuals with secondary and higher education, military specialists and battle commanders of the Red Army who had been selected and sent to various small

towns and cities in Germany and Poland, specifically to the small town of Oswitz near the city of Wroclaw, the city of Waimerg, Lublin, and others.

The Russian National Regiment was mainly formed from:

The city of Wroclaw – the first retinue, under the command of Lt. Colonel Gil' (Rodionov)⁹² – former Chief of Staff of rifle division; graduated from the Academy named for Frunze.⁹³ While imprisoned, he completed the special Gestapo school in Berlin. It was there a political school was formed which became the future foundation of the regiment.

The city of Lublin – the second retinue, under the command of Captain Blazhevich.

Osintorf in Orsha District – formed separate units of the regiment.

In June 1942, Gil' (Rodionov) formed a unit, which was at first called a retinue, for the fight against the partisans. With this unit, he went to Smolensk, where he conducted several operations against the partisans. In October 1942, the unit of Gil' (Rodionov) arrived in the city of Mogilev with the mission of fighting against the partisans deployed in the Klichevsky region (Usakinky forest). He arrived in the area of operations of the partisan units in November 1942. The command staff from the unit was united into a single company, which was called the officers' company.

The unit rolled out operations against the partisans with only representatives of the German command, German officers, and a group of German soldiers from local garrisons present, which was proof of the German command's mistrust even of the select "volunteer" formations. However, these activities by the German command did not shield the unit of Gil' (Rodionov) from the influence of the partisan units trying to dissolve it. Already by the end of December 1942, the unit that had arrived was already falling apart to a significant degree, and sometime after 20 December the officers' company, which had been created from "select" people, left as a group (70 people) for the partisan units of the Klichevsky grouping and brought with them part of the personnel of other companies.

On 11 December, 1942, in the village of Rogi in the Klichevsky region, 39 soldiers from the Russian National Army crossed over to the partisans with their weapons, bringing with them 12 horses and carts. After death squad expeditions conducted against the partisans of the Klichevsky group of units, the unit of Gil' (Rodionov) transferred to the district of Slutsk, where it conducted a number of operations against the partisans, and in the spring of 1943, about the month of March, they arrived in the small town of Luzhki, Plisa district, Vileika region.

On 15 March, 1943, the second retinue of the Russian National Forces under the command of Captain Blazhevich, which numbered from 300–350 people and consisted of two companies, arrived in that same place.

On 26 March 1943 arrived a SS special unit consisting of two companies numbering 216 people, made up exclusively of former command staff of the Red Army who had gone through the Gestapo preparatory school in the small German town of Oswitz (today Osobowice, Poland) and the Gestapo school in the small town of Yablon', the castle of Count Zamoisky (Poland) and in Wohlau (Germany). The battalion was commanded by Rubansky; the Chief of Staff of the battalion was Colonel Yermeev.

Upon arrival of the above-listed formation in the town of Luzhki, they were all brought into the First Russian SS National Regiment under the command of Lt. Colonel Gil' (Rodionov). A special SS unit under the command of Rubansky remained a separately operating unit.

The regiment was organized in the following way:

The regiment command: commander—Lt. Colonel Gil' (Rodionov), Chief of Staff of the regiment (he managed the affairs of the Gestapo)—Captain Blazhevich, head of the counterintelligence regiment—former Major General of the Red Army Bogdanov Pavel Vasilievich,⁹⁴ former commander of the 48th Rifle Division of the Baltic Special Military District⁹⁵ and the North-West Front. The headquarters also included Major Kuznetsov.

The make-up of the regiment: three rifle battalions of three companies in each battalion; a motorized bicycle squadron with two platoons of 36 motorcycles and a bicycle platoon with 18–20

bicycles; an artillery division with 2 cannons, one 70mm and the other 120mm; a communications company with 3–4 mobile radio units and regimental medical unit.

In each battalion there was a communications platoon (2 portable radio stations) and a machine gun platoon. Under the regiment a school was created for non-commissioned officers and warrant officers. The regiment consisted of 1,200 people, of whom 150 were officers. In addition to the above-indicated artillery unit, the regiment had as armaments: 45 fixed machine gun systems “Maksim;” 60 Czech hand-held machine guns; 2 anti-tank cannons; 18 mortars, of which 6 were battalion level; more than 200 automatic rifles, for the most part Czech; and 30 vehicles.

Connected to the facts of dissolution within the “Russian National Regiment” and the facts of the crossing over of “volunteers” to the partisans, the Germans intensified the work of the Gestapo and gave the leadership of the latter within the unit to the former Major General of the Red Army Pavel Vasilievich Bogdanov. Systematic observation of the commanders and enlisted personnel was established within the regiment, and a far-reaching network of secret agents was planted there as well.

The Russian National Regiment, in addition to its main purpose of armed and political fight against partisans, had the mission of winning over the population to the side of the occupiers under the flag of the creation of New Russia.

In the region of the town of Luzhki, the regiment was allotted a 100-kilometer rectangle. Here, from north to south, from Polotsk, and to the south and west, where the towns of Drissa and Diona were, they were charged with the liquidation of the partisan movement, to create the conditions for change in the relationship between the population and the Germans toward pacifying the population and organizing local self-government.

They tried to treat the civilian population politely, wholeheartedly supported the Orthodox and Catholic churches, organized the distribution of land to the peasants, and created a local police force under their own leadership, all of which created the impression of popular self-government.

The First Russian SS National Regiment was meant to serve as a pillar of support for the Russian National Government created in Wroclaw.

In the beginning of 1943, the formation of Gil' (Rodionov) was visited by Generals Zhilenkov and Ivanov with orders from General Vlasov to coordinate the entrance of the latter into the RLA, after which the First Russian National Regiment began to be called the RLA.

In mid-May 1943, the regiment numbered 1,500 people, including 126 officers and 146 non-commissioned officers. The regiment had in service an Investigative Department, a field provost corps, a department of observation of political order, police, and Gestapo.

6. Fight of the First Regiment of the SS-RLA with the partisans of the Begoml'sky region

The first regiment of the SS-RLA, located in the town of Luzhki (30 km NW of the city of Glubokoe), on 25 March, 1943 headed in the direction of Dokshitsa, Begoml', and Lepel', with the mission to liquidate the centers of the partisan movement in these regions.

The regiment began a firefight against the partisans of the Begomlsky zone on 2 May, 1943, with a force of 45 thousand regular select German units participating in a death squad expedition in May and June of that year in that zone.

The partisan brigade named for Zheleznyak (brigade commander Comrade Titkov,⁹⁶ commissar Comrade Mankovich), coordinating its activity with the neighboring brigades of Comrade Dubrovsky, Lopatin, and Voronyansky, using all methods of partisan fighting, made an organized entrance to the fight with an enemy that had superior numbers of soldiers and technical equipment. As a result of the fierce battles over almost two months, the partisans of the Begomlsky zone delivered the enemy a great loss of life and technical equipment, themselves suffering insignificant losses.

During the battles with the enemy, the partisan units and brigades managed to destroy: soldiers—1,968, officers—100, tanks—15, whippets—7, armored vehicles—2, large guns of

various caliber—4, cargo trucks—63, automobiles—10, planes shot down—2, pushed back 43 echelons of the enemy. One railway bridge was demolished. Trophies taken: mortars—2, machine guns—4, rifles—29, automatic rifles—10, shells—1000, horses—1,514, herds of cattle and smaller animals—267 head.

Partisan losses: killed 88, wounded 57 partisans, missing in action—14 persons; anti-tank—3, machine gun—1, mortar—1, rifles—69.

The Germans, having suffered defeat in their attempt to destroy the partisans and having met with the firm and organized opposition of the latter, began to punish the local civilian population by killing people from the towns and cities and other animal-like behavior against the population. During the period of death squad expeditions, the Germans killed and burned 4,007 people from the peaceful population, drove 3,051 people to work camps in Germany, raped 16 women, and destroyed 4,007 houses.

The outcome of the death squad expeditions and the organized push from the partisans against an enemy force outnumbering them five to one strengthened the efforts of individual soldiers and officers of the Gil' (Rodionov) regiment to cross over to the side of the partisans.

7. Dissolution of the Gil' (Rodionov) formation and the activities of the partisans

Separate instances of dissolution, expressing themselves in group and individual defections of the "volunteers" of the Russian National Formation took place before 1943. In 1942, an entire officers' company of the Gil' unit crossed over to the side of the Klichevsky partisans, along with a large number of command staff and soldiers of other companies.

At the end of March 1943, during the first operation against the partisans in the region of Ushachi, there crossed over to the side of the partisans 10 soldiers of the First Regiment of the SS-RLA, who reported that the morale of the regiment was unsteady and that the majority of the personnel were against the Germans. The regiment command had the company commander shot for the fact that soldiers crossed over to the partisans, in spite of the fact that,

on returning from the operation, 14 students who were preparing to become officers also left to cross over to the partisans.

As a result of the work done by the partisan unit of Comrade Tyabut with a view to the dissolution of the First SS-RLA Regiment and the SS special unit of the SS, by 1 May 1943, 52 people had crossed over to the partisans.

During one of the operations against the partisans in April, one sub-unit of the SS special unit crossed over to the partisans. As a countermeasure of repression, the Germans disarmed the first squad of the special unit and the commander of the first company, who were then sent to Wroclaw to a prison camp.

Sometime after 20 April, in a battle with the partisans for the town of Dokshitsa, a company of the SS special unit crossed over to the partisans. Eighty people with machine guns followed the company to the partisans from Glubokoe.

In connection with these mass desertions of “volunteers” from their units, the remnants of the SS special battalion were disarmed by the Germans and some of the personnel were arrested. SS battalion commander Rubansky and Chief of Staff Yeremeev also deserted to the partisans. As a result of this situation, the Germans increased measures for spying on their own personnel. Soldiers and commanders were isolated from the outside world. The number of arrests among the “volunteers” increased, and those arrested were sent to special camps for the RLA in Vitebsk.

During death squad expeditions of the enemy against the partisans of the Begoml'sky zone, 27 people from among the RLA “volunteers” crossed over to the partisans; for the month of July, 13 people crossed over into the Zheleznyak partisan brigade.

In connection with the temporary withdrawal of the partisan brigade named for Zheleznyak from the territory of the Begoml'sky region due to death squad expeditions, the First Russian National Regiment, reorganized into a brigade of the RLA at the end of June 1943, was redeployed to the village of Otrubok (24km north of Begoml'), and in June Lt. Col. Gil' (Rodionov) began forming a division, for which the Germans began in the region of Dokshitsa (57 km west of Lepel') and the village of Veresyaevka (37 km s-west

of Lepel') a concentration of the contingents of "volunteers" recruited in the western districts of Belorussia.

In the first days of August, the combined unit of Gil' (Rodionov) was redeployed to the villages of Beresnevka (6 km north of Begoml'), Pustoselie, Glinnoe (15-18 km north of Begoml'), and the small town of Dokshitsa.

According to the data of Zheleznyak brigade commander Comrade Titkov, on 10 August, 1943, battalions of the RLA located in these places numbered about 1,700 people, of whom 15 percent were military POWs, 45 percent were recruited in the western districts, 55 percent were police, 5 percent were German officers and police, and those who had gone through special training in schools – 93 percent.

The Zheleznyak brigade, conducting an armed fight with formations of the RLA, simultaneously on the basis of instructions from the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement and instructions of the Belorussian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, correctly combined combat operations with covert agent and agit-prop activities to the dissolution of these formations: inserting agents and distributing slogans, leaflets, and posters prepared by the same brigade.

III. Negotiations between the command staff of the Zheleznyak partisan brigade and representatives of the RLA

After the failure of the German advance in the summer in the region of Orel and Belgorod and the crossing of the Soviet soldiers in an advance on these parts of the front, after the blow dealt by the partisans of the Begoml'sky zone against the death squad expeditions of May and June, and the following blows from the Zheleznyak partisan brigade destroying major garrisons of the RLA in Yanovo and Yukhnovka, during which the latter suffered serious losses in lives and weaponry, and likewise as a result of the covert agent and agit-prop work done by the Zheleznyak and Tyabut brigades, the process of dissolution from within the RLA developed rapidly.

In mid-June 1943 on the initiative and proposal of the officer staff of the RLA, negotiations began between the command staff of

the Zheleznyak brigade and representatives of the RLA of the conditions for the defection of the RLA to the side of the partisans. From the reports of Comrades Titkov and Mankovich from 15 July, 1943 it was clear that the mood of the majority of "volunteers" was anti-German and that the idea of a New National Socialist Russia had not taken root, but the dissolution of the RLA was hindered by two main points:

- 1) The deep-seated conviction due to agitation that sooner or later they would all be shot, if not in the ranks of the partisans, then with the coming of the Red Army.
- 2) Observation from all sides and secret spying in the sub-units, conducted by POWs who had sold out to the Germans and knew the command staff well. Therefore the soldiers and officers of the RLA asked for an authorized statement of their further fate on the approach of the Red Army.

The Central and Belorussian Headquarters for the Partisan Movement gave the command of the Zheleznyak brigade the corresponding instructions and authority to continue the negotiations with representatives of the RLA.

Representatives of the Gestapo in the RLA, sensing the growing internal dissolution of the core staff of the formation threatening its very existence, clearly decided to take control of the negotiations by breaking them off, and to conduct the negotiations with the command staff of the Zheleznyak brigade there arrived a leader of the Gestapo brigade of the RLA, former Major General of the Red Army Bogdanov, who suggested compromises that were clearly unacceptable and nearly led to the breakdown of negotiations.

On 5 August 1943, Comrades Titkov and Mankevich reported that Bogdanov tried to get the partisans to agree not to interfere with the gathering of the harvest, not to impede recruitment into the RLA, and not to block the roads. The suggestion that the partisans move was rejected. Because the conditions put forth by Bogdanov were clearly unacceptable, the negotiations ceased.

The Belorussian Headquarters for the Partisan Movement gave the order to Comrades Titkov and Mankevich to continue and intensify work on the dissolution of the RLA and organizing group

defections to the partisans, and to take measures to save a thread of possibility to conduct future negotiations for the RLA to cross over to the side of the partisans.

9. Crossing over of the RLA to the side of the partisans

On 17 August, 1943 Comrade Titkov reported that on 16 August he held negotiations directly with Rodionov. All the “populists” of the garrisons of Beresnevka, Dokshitsa, Glubokoe and others under the command of Rodionov crossed over to the partisans. On orders from the command staff of the combined unit, they arrested and handed over to the partisans the head of the Gestapo of the RLA, former Major General of the Red Army Bogdanov, as well as the Germans located in the RLA and the émigré officers.

He further reports that Rodionov left the Bogoml’sky district and transferred part of his equipment and stores of ammunition to the partisans. Under the control and with the cooperation of the Zheleznyak brigade, the unification of the RLA has launched military operations against Krulevschina and Glubokoe. The brigade was named the First Anti-Fascist Brigade.

A similar report was received on 18 August, 1943 with the signatures of Titkov and Rodionov, in which the latter asked that the brigade be given battle assignments.

On 18 August, 1943, Comrade Titkov reported that on 17 August the Rodionov brigade (former RLA) had, with the assistance of the Zheleznyak brigade, destroyed the garrisons at Dokshitsa and Paraf’yanovo. There are ongoing battles for the Krulevschizna station and the city of Glubokoe. Instruments and stores are being taken to Berezino. Many police, Germans, and officers have been taken prisoner.

In a battle report from 18 August, 1943, Titkov and Rodionov (Gil’) reported that on 16 and 17 August the First Anti-Fascist Brigade under the command of Gil’ (Rodionov) defeated Dokshitsa, Uzlovaya, and Krulevschizna station. Destroyed: stationary installation, pumping station, rail yard, barracks, offices, four railway bridges, four steam engines, 18 rail cars with ammunition and various military property, 10 automobiles, 18 motorcycles, one stockpile of fuel, one cannon, 6 mortars, 30 machine guns. There

were 580 soldiers and 15 officers killed. There were 40 soldiers taken prisoner.

Trophies taken: automobiles—11, motorcycles—16, cannons—2, machine guns—20, automatic rifles—30, rifles—170, portable radio in vehicle—2, supply of fuel—2, supply of ammunition—2, various other property and provisions—5.

Brigade losses: soldiers killed—5, commanders—2; wounded: soldiers—27, commanders—3.

Chief of Staff of the Belorussian

Partisan Movement P. Kalinin⁹⁷

RGASPI. F. 69. Op. 9. D. 5. L. 114-120 (s ob.) Copy.

N°36. Report from P. K. Ponomarenko to members of the State Defense Committee on the crossing of RLA soldiers to the side of the partisans and sending untrustworthy RLA soldiers to camps.

11 October, 1943

N°3429 cc

REPORT

As a result of the successful offensive by Red Army units and intense activity of underground party organizations and partisans, the process of dissolving the traitorous and police formations has been significantly increased.

In order to prevent the defection of soldiers of the RLA and police to the side of the partisans, the German command has been forced in a number of places to disarm garrisons of traitors and send them to camps. The clandestine affairs division of the Belorussian partisans in the city of MOGILEV has intercepted an order from the Supreme High Command of the German Army No. 100 from 20 September, 1943 on the disarmament of the 7th division troops of the RLA and sending the personnel of this division to concentration camps.

According to partial information received by the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement from 25 September through 8 October, 1943, more than 700 soldiers of the RLA and police forces have crossed over to the partisans.

On 27 September, soldiers of the Eastern Battalions from the garrisons of Chernevo, Sorokino, and Bezovets (25–30 km southwest of Gdov) killed up to 30 German soldiers and officers, destroyed 2 automobiles and 30 bicycles, and left into the woods. Eighty-nine people with rifles and three with machine guns, along with a cart containing ammunition, crossed over to the partisans. The Germans sent those traitors who remained in the garrisons to POLNA.

From the garrisons at Karamyshevo, Kuzova, and Talitsa, 135 RLA soldiers walked off with their weapons into the forests to unite with the partisans. Many deserters – police and legionnaires – are hiding in the forests of Nikandrova hermitage (to the northwest of PORKHOV). From the garrison at GRIDINO, 85 Cossacks crossed over to the partisans with weapons and horses. Before leaving the garrison, the Cossacks killed the Germans and destroyed 8 vehicles.

Due to the mass desertion from the traitorous and police formations and the crossing of these formations over to the side of the partisans, the German command has been removing soldiers of Russian ethnicity from the guard of the rail lines throughout Leningrad District and replacing them with Germans.

According to information from 28 September, 38 soldiers from the cavalry guard of the 281st security division crossed over to the partisans from the garrison at Mishnevo (22 km southwest of Opochka).

From 19 to 25 September, up to 50 Russians from the 283rd Latvian battalion guarding the Latvian border crossed into the partisan brigade of Comrade Zakharov in the region to the north of Polotsk.

Groups of up to 400 traitors from the units of the RLA and police crossed over into the partisan brigade of Comrade Lavrentiev in the region east of Vitebsk. The deserters belonged to the 624th Cossack battalion, the 638th Cossack brigade, and the 508th supply battalion of the 6th Army. When crossing over to the

partisans, they brought with them 20 machine guns, 4 mortars, and 330 rifles.

On 26 September, five soldiers from the auxiliary company of the 20th crossed over to the partisans. The deserters stated: “There was nothing else for us to do. Either surrender to the prison camps or cross over to the partisans – we are afraid of being shot.”

On 15 September, 30 Cossacks from the garrison at Shepetovka crossed over to the partisans.

In the beginning of October, 7 Cossacks from the outpost at the rail yard south of Luzhinets crossed over to the partisans.

From the Kaminsky brigade, which was redeployed from the region of LOKOT', Orel District, to the region of LEPEL', Vitebsk District, desertion is ongoing, along with cases of crossing over to the partisans. According to the data from 4 October, the supply base of the Lepel' zone is allocating Kaminsky provisions for only 3,665 people. That is likely all that is left of his brigade, which in August numbered some 12 thousand.

According to data from the Crimean partisans, the Germans are beginning to send traitorous formations from Crimea to Northern France and Italy.⁹⁸ Analogous data has been received from the Leningrad partisans. In all likelihood, the German command has been forced to go down this road as a result of the increased dissolution of traitorous formations and the impossibility of using them in the fight against units of the Red Army and the partisans.

Ponomarenko

RGASPI. F. 69. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 126, 126 ob., 127. Original.

N°37. Cipher message No. 3649 from the head of the Intelligence Department of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement S. I. Kazantsev to the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement on the return of agent “Dedushka” to Minsk and the results of agent recruitment among RLA officers.

20 December, 1943

Top Secret 649

RS88 Comrade PONOMARENKO

Dedushka [Grandfather] is in Minsk. He completed his assignment in Berlin. He left agents there. He chose people from among RLA units located in Italy and France. Within days he should come out to me. He has valuable data for the report to Central. On 25 December, a new agent is going to Berlin with instructions and a bow. The bow is for the liquidation of organizers of the Russian Movement. Nothing new on Shakal. We are working with all our strength. Matters regarding the nat[ional]dem[ocrat]s are going well. Recently lost one colleague from the commissariat and nine of the best agents. Work has become more complicated. We have no explosives; ration packages have run out. There is no help from anywhere. Prepare the ground for work in the Vileika region.

No. 173 KAZANTSEV

Instructions: Comrade Ganenko. P[onomarenko].

Op[erational] division. Need help. Ganenko. 23.12.1943

Note: There are some 12 airfields prepared. I. Sizov. 24.12.1943.

RGASPI. F. 69. Op. 6. D. 67. L. 143. Authenticated copy.

N°38. Message from S. I. Kazantsev to P. K. Ponomarenko on sending RLA units to the Western Front.

25 December, 1943

Comrade Ponomarenko No. 3748

Kaban [the boar] is in Berlin. He is not involved with the RLA. His plans to build a New Russia after an “honorable peace” treaty with the Germans “collapsed,” and the Germans have turned the RLA – which was created for this purpose – into their own auxiliary units. And now, in spite of the wishes of Kaban, they are being sent to the

Balkans, Italy, and France, in light of their instability on the Eastern Front as a result of the work of “Stalin’s agents.”

The RLA will not fight on the side of the Germans in the West. They are infected with hopelessness, dissolved by the work of our people and the German policies of terror, mass disarmament, arrests, and firing squads. To us, the Russian Committee and the RLA have lost political significance. This whole movement has fallen apart. In the near future, the Red Army with its successes will deal the final blow.

25 December 1943. No. 175. Kazantsev

Authenticated Karpov

3 January, 1944

RGASPI. F. 69. Op. 9. D. 1. L. 221. Authenticated copy.

N°39. Cipher message No. 3772 to the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement on the recruitment of active RLA participants by agent “Dedushka” and of preparations to liquidate A. A. Vlasov.

26 December, 1943

Top Secret

RS88 Comrade PONOMARENKO

N°176 Kazantsev

A roving agent arranged to work with Major General TRUKHIN, Colonels BAEVSKY and SPIRIDONOV, and Major PSHENICHNY.⁹⁹ He set the mission: to break up the RLA and organize sabotage work. To organize a network of dissolution agents in many of the RLA units in the West. To create battle groups from the Russian workers and POWs with the missions: sabotage German industry, prepare these groups for internal presentations,

prepare small stores of weapons, and have meetings with German Communists and representatives of English intelligence. Tried twice to liquidate Kaban, so far without success. On 23 December sent 1st Lt. Stepan NIKOLAENKO to Berlin with my instructions and poison. Poison for the liquidation of Kaban and member of the Russian Committee ZYKOV, former regimental commissar, one of the more fervent organizers of the *kabanchiki* [little boars, i.e. followers of Vlasov].

Instructions: To Comrade Anisimov. This case and that of Kazantsev need to be given to Comrade Sudoplatov.¹⁰⁰ P[onomarenko]

Note: Formashev

RGASPI. F. 69. Op. 6. D. 67. L. 143. Authenticated copy.

N°40. From the report of Special Group Commander for the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement Major Kazantsev to P. K. Ponomarenko on the activities of the special group of the CHPM in searching for and attempting to liquidate A. A. Vlasov.

Rudniansky forest, Minsk District, 20 January, 1944

TO THE HEAD OF THE CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS FOR THE
PARTISAN MOVEMENT

Lt. General Comrade PONOMARENKO P. K.

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 1

On the case of former General of the Red Army VLASOV A. A.
On 5 June, 1943, we received your order: to use all possible means to search for and liquidate the deserter of the Red Army and traitor to the Homeland, General Vlasov A. A.

No specifics were reported on this.

On the basis of the order, in which the exclusive importance of this matter was emphasized, we undertook several covert activities

to collect information on Vlasov, to determine his location and activities, and to study the possibilities of access to him.

Of this eight-month intensive work and its results, I report the following:

I. Immediately, through the existing agent base in Minsk, steps were taken to collect information that might present an opportunity to find some trace of this traitor.

After some time, we were able to find out from our agents and other official sources that Vlasov is located in Berlin, and that he has put together some kind of “committee” and is forming a “Russian Liberation Army” in the western regions of our country that have been taken by the Germans.

Furthermore, we were able to discover that units and members of the RLA are present in Minsk, Orsha, Borisov, Glubokoe, Bobruisk, and other cities of Belorussia.

Of all these population centers, our area of operations included only Minsk. In the other regions, we were unable to work due to a number of conditions.

Accordingly, an intensified search for Vlasov’s people was conducted in Minsk in order to select informants from among their number, from whom we could receive first-hand data for direct work on the Vlasov affair.

The search was long and difficult. It was especially difficult for the newly organized, young agent base, who were still directed towards other objects (Kube), to find any trace of the few Vlasov supporters located in Minsk.

Many of our agents were able to strike up individual and significant contact with these Vlasov supporters, but they could not catch hold of the necessary people.

And only after much searching were they able to determine that only a few are located in Minsk, specifically:

1. Lt. Colonel Sobolenko—leader of the propaganda group of the RLA. From reserves. Before the war, faculty chair of military preparation at the Gomel Institute. Rather cowardly; inclined against us.
2. Captain Walter Kraubner—propagandist. From the ranks of the Red Army. Has relatives in Moscow.

3. 1st Lt. Muraviev – propagandist. From the reserves. Anti-Soviet leanings.
4. Military engineer second class Demianovich Andrei – propagandist. Resident of Minsk, has a family, hates the Germans. But a notorious talker and anti-Soviet. Was in prison before the war.
5. Lt. Obidnov – propagandist. Coward, no initiative.
6. Sergeant Gatsuk – propagandist. Just like Obidnov.
7. Sergeant Belichko – propaganda. Was studied.
8. Private Malashenko – propagandist. Born in the city of Borisov. Has family there. Former Komsomol member, from the workers. Was studied.
9. Sergeant Major Tomilin – propagandist. Former pilot. Was shot down near Königsberg. Left on an assignment to Smolevichi and from there left to join the partisans.

All these people are under the command of Lt. Col. Sobolenko, working among the POWs in various parts of town – camp No. 352 (Masiukovschina), Pushkinskie barracks, and Krasnoe tract – and had the following missions:

1. To promote the propaganda and clarify the “ideas” of the Russian Liberation Movement.
2. To regulate questions of interrelations between military POWs held in camps and the German command-run camps. To show concern for improving the day-to-day conditions of the POWs.
3. Select and recruit suitable people to the RLA from among the POWs.

Among the propagandists who had direct relation to Vlasov’s “Committee,” we were able, through the selfless work of agent “Sokolok” and resident agent “Maksim,” to recruit Captain Walter Kraubner, pseudonym “Dedushka.”

The circumstance of his recruitment is thus.

In June 1943, our Minsk agent Sokolok, working under the leadership of resident agent Maksim, on assignment from the latter through his acquaintance Andrei Osipov, who worked in the council, made the acquaintance of the engineer Vera Demianovich, with whom Captain of the RLA Kraubner Walter was good friends.

One day Sokolok, together with Osipov, met Kraubner at Demianovich's apartment, invited him to drink, and, during a friendly drinking session, studied his mood in detail. Determining that Kraubner was very positively inclined, Sokolok when Osipov was away, agreed with him [Kraubner] on work and later put him in contact with resident agent Maksim, through whom we have maintained further contact.

As a consequence, we were able to attract the following to supplemental work in this direction:

1. Military technical engineer Andrei Demianovich, brother of the engineer Vera. Demianovich
2. POW and former assistant regiment commander of the clerical unit Stepan Stepanovich Bakhmutov, pseudonym "Semyon Semyonovich."
3. Elena, Kozlovskaya pseudonym "Galya." Teacher in the village of Masiukovschina, wife of a Red Army commander, her sister Vera was in an intimate relationship with Sobolenko.

In addition, through the Minsk agent "Drug" [Friend], we were able to recruit Glubokoe resident Nadezhda, Kolontai pseudonym "Dasha," who first worked in the headquarters of the RLA located in Glubokoe and later in the German court, giving her significant contacts among RLA officers. Dasha, with the exception of [providing] some information on Vlasov and his people, did not do any work in particular, since we lacked any well-established regular contact with her.

Nevertheless, from her we received the following information:

In April 1943, Vlasov made an inspection visit to an RLA unit located in Glubokoe, and during his time there he spent the night at Dasha's apartment, where a private party had been arranged, with several officers and women present. Parenthetically I will say that Vlasov was absolutely licentious in his personal life and there is nothing surprising in the fact that he is getting drunk with women.

Vlasov appeared in Glubokoe because just at that time—the end of April-May, the beginning of June 1943—he was making his "agitational" trip through the "liberated districts." His route went

through Glubokoe. The lackey “Russian” press trumpeted about this, specially publishing the filthy newspaper “For the Homeland”¹⁰¹ in Riga.

Through Dasha, we intended to make the necessary contacts with RLA officers in Glubokoe to keep watch over Vlasov there. But this unit soon left; our work therefore ceased and our contact with the agent was cut off.

Through the group of agents we recruited from the official “Russian” press, from deserters, and from other sources (Dedushka, Dasha, Maksim, Galya, and others), we were able to gather fairly detailed data on Vlasov, the Russian Committee, and the Russian Liberation Army. I will report on this below.

Now I will continue to report on the further work of our agents on the heart of the matter.

At the end of July 1943, Maksim and Dedushka conducted a successful operation working up and bringing out to us Lt. Col. Ivan Ilych Astolypin-Asmolov, who was working as a tactics and topography instructor in the German school “Bal’ga” (tentative name), which was preparing agents to be sent into the rear territory of the Red Army and the USSR on intelligence and sabotage assignments. The Bal’ga school is located 3 km from the Gross-Hotzenburg station in eastern Prussia, 35 km to the west of Königsberg. It was under a special intelligence institution of the German High Command conspiratorially named “Walli Headquarters.”¹⁰²

Walli Headquarters was located in a specially constructed camp in the forest to the north of Königsberg.

This intelligence agent institution had, in addition to the Bal’ga school, several other schools in which agents were likewise being prepared from among our POWs.

All detailed material on the leadership of the Bal’ga school and Walli Headquarters, their activity, and lists of agents sent to our rear territories were sent, together with Astolypin, to your location but were lost in an airplane crash. I have no remaining copies of the documents, in light of the difficulties of storage.

Recreating from memory part of these materials, I want to briefly report on the work methods of this “institution.”

The leadership of Walli Headquarters and the schools, along with the instructors, periodically travel to the camps of military prisoners and use various methods of trickery to recruit members of our armed forces. Those recruited are taken to the schools, where they are taught intelligence and sabotage work for between 3 and 6 months, under the leadership of our own instructors: army specialists, workers of the NKVD, and military engineers.

After their training, the contingent of students were sent to Walli Headquarters, where they formed them into single and group agent units; provided them with documents, portable radios, and money; and suitably equipped, armed, and issued assignments to them before inserting them into the rear territories of the USSR or sending them to be made use of at the front or with other army commands.

The Bal'ga school, organized at the end of 1941, had, by August 1942, prepared and inserted up to 300 agents with various assignments into our rear territories, drawing exclusively from among Soviet POWs.

People were inserted in Moscow, the Urals, the Caucasus, on the Volga, and in Baku, and likewise in the rear units of the Red Army and in the area of the pre-front supply stations.

In order to have an idea of the nature of preparation of the spy staff, I will list some brief information on the instructors of the Bal'ga school.

- 1) Boris Stepanovich Rudaev, colonel, around 47 years old, head of the academic unit.
- 2) Vasily Pavlovich Schelgunov, 45 years old, lieutenant colonel.
- 3) Avilov, around 40 years old, major of state security, teaches work methods of the NKVD, intelligence and counterintelligence.
- 4) Mikhail Pushkarev, 30 years old, engineer of the third rank, teaches the subject "Industry of the USSR and Methods of Sabotage."
- 5) Asman Asmanov, 50 years old, colonel, teaches the subject "Organization of the Logistical Forces of the Red Army."

- 6) Georgi Sergeev, 36 years old. Engineer of the third rank, teaches “Industry of the USSR and Methods of Sabotage.”
- 7) Natalya Aleksandrovna, last name unknown. In the past, Kiev engineer-steam engine technician.
- 8) Pavlov, 34 years old – military technician of the 3rd rank. Teaches about radio matters.

Ivan Ilych Asmolov, born 1903. Lieutenant colonel, taught special tactics and topography. The similarity of the Bal’ga school and Walli Headquarters to our own special schools, in terms of the selection of instructors, academic program themes, and work methods, comes involuntarily to mind. The Germans are learning this kind of work from us.

On assignment from the Walli Headquarters, Asmolov, escorted by a German officer, arrived in Minsk in mid-July 1943 at the Stalag No. 352 (Masiukovschina) in order to recruit troops for the Bal’ga school. In Masiukovschina, he was met by our agent Dedushka and became acquainted with him, and in a short period of time our agent won him over.

Considering the level of information Astolypin had in the matter of the preparation and insertion of German spies, Dedushka and resident agent Maksim organized Asmolov’s flight to me on 2 March, 1943, in order to immediately transport him to the rear territory where he could be of great use in recognizing and exposing those German agents operating in the rear of the USSR. Asmolov knew by name and by face around 300 German agents. The plane crash, Asmolov’s untimely death, and the related loss of our documents has ruined the whole affair.

On 20 August, 1943, Dedushka was called to Berlin regarding the case of Colonel Bushmanov, on which there is more below.

Before leaving for Berlin, Dedushka asked me for instructions, which were sent to him by special courier. The contents of the instructions are as follows:

Take measures toward the liquidation of Vlasov.

Make contact with generals positively inclined to our side – members of the Russian Committee.

Select your own people from among the officers of the RLA in various units and institutions.

Give all recruited individuals the task of dissolving the ranks of the RLA; organizing the defection to the side of the partisans, the Red Army, and patriots; refusing to fight; sabotaging the activities of the Germans in organizing their own sabotage measures, etc.

Upon receiving these instructions, Dedushka left for Berlin, leaving a person in Minsk through whom we were to maintain written contact using a particular code.

This person was Stepan Stepanovich Bakhmutov, pseudonym Semyon Semyonovich, who lived in a camp for military prisoners in the area of the Pushkinskie barracks and who was on free work duty and twice a week had the right to leave the camp freely.

In this same camp he had a close German acquaintance whose address was used to correspond with Dedushka.

For the period that Dedushka was in Berlin, one letter was received from him and several were sent to him, with confirmation of previous instructions and other orders. A couple of months after Dedushka's departure, contact with him ceased due to his arrest in Berlin. We found out about this somewhat later through Andrei Demianovich, with whom we set up contact to work in this area, and through Sobolenko, to whom Dedushka wrote a personal letter.

Up until then, we had made great efforts to reestablish contact with Dedushka and determine his fate and the results of his work. The circumstances were not in our favor. Demianovich Andrei was arrested by the Gestapo soon after we set up contact with him because he maintained contact with many people and many units. We decided not to recruit Sobolenko, since we had some negative information on him. There were no other suitable candidates. Only after a search for a suitable alternative candidate to make contact with Dedushka, we decided to send letters, money, and poison to Dedushka with our agent Phoenix, who happened to be traveling to Berlin, along with letters for several generals in the Russian Committee who had previously recommended to us very positively by Dedushka. The courier Viktorov, who carried all of this along with one mine, was killed on the road to Minsk under the following circumstances:

In the region of Malinovka and walking to the city, Viktorov noticed on the road a German patrol approaching him with a search dog. Knowing that they would search him, he stopped in the bushes to take care of natural needs [go to the toilet] and at that moment threw the mine (the letters were sewn into his coat). Upon completing his business, Viktorov came out from the bushes and calmly started to approach the Germans. They stopped him, checked his documents, and since everything was in order, let him go. Viktorov continued on, and the Germans, having reached the place where he had taken care of his natural needs, searched the area with the dog and found the mine. On finding the mine, the patrol rushed to catch up to Viktorov, releasing the dog from his leash. The dog followed the scent, caught up to him, and began to tear at him. Viktorov fought the dog for a long time, but at that moment the Germans caught up to them and shot him. The Germans did not touch Viktorov's family, since he was not carrying his own papers for work. As a result, Phoenix's trip to Berlin fell through.

After this, we did not have contact with Dedushka for a long time. He returned to Minsk only on 27 November, 1943 and was with great difficulty brought out of the city to us, since it was impossible for him to remain.

During his exit from the city of Minsk, he accidentally ended up in the headquarters of the "Stormers" brigade, whose people led him out of town. Here he was interrogated and searched by Captain Slutsky from the Special Division of the Minsk Zone and the authorized representative of the OO brigade, but in so doing they did not make an inventory of documents taken from him. After his temporary assignment to me, Dedushka stated that some documents very important to me and to the matter at hand had been lost, including response letters from generals of the Russian Committee. On investigation it became clear that several of the documents had been taken by Captain Slutsky; one of them, written on blank paper with nice ink, he used to wrap sausage. At my request to return the documents, Comrade Slutsky replied that he had not taken them.

Upon arriving with us, Dedushka reported the following on his work in the matter of the liquidation of Vlasov:

Twice he made an attempt to take out Vlasov, but unsuccessfully. His report went like this.

“In November 1943 (either 18th or 14th), a ‘dish’ mixed with a dose of poison was prepared in order to kill Vlasov.

This was done by a young woman named Vera who worked in our kitchen (I can’t remember her last name exactly, something like Nesterova, Nesterenko, Nesterovich). Vera is one of the eastern workers, from Ukraine, from the city of Dnepropetrovsk, 20 years old, finished the 9th grade, smart. I met her in March 1943, when she was in the camp for eastern workers in Marienfeld (Berlin). This camp was at a railway station along the line from Dabendorf (the RLA school) to Berlin, and many of those in the RLA school traveled to meet with young women. I went from time to time and met Vera. I used to go to her; she would come to the RLA school (many young Russian women come there). She was jolly and sensible, which made me want to befriend her to break things up and cut through the boredom. Vlasov’s adjutant, a young man named Captain Antonov, also knew her. Arriving in Berlin at the end of August 1943, I met with her again. In October I went to Berlin again, wanting to meet up with Vera, and I went to Marienfeld, where the young women there told me that she now worked at Vlasov’s apartment (in the kitchen). I wrote her a note, in which I told her that I wanted to meet up with her in Dabendorf, and passed it to her through the officers’ guard. She came. At the second meeting after my arrival, on 2 or 3 November, I started up a conversation with her about Vlasov and told her that we needed to take him out, that he was doing harm to the Homeland and that she could and should do this. At first, Vera was afraid; she said that they would shoot her, etc. I assured her that after the deed was done she would be immediately taken to safety. Through Liudmila Khomenko there was a place ready for her in the Eastern camp. This meeting was at the Dabendorf station. I assured her and she agreed. On 8 November, also in Dabendorf, I met her and gave her an ampule of poison that I had obtained from a Russian emigrant named Petr Saksonenko back in September. I told her that she should pour

about $\frac{3}{4}$ of this poison into prepared food or wine. And as soon as she gave it to Vlasov, she should leave the house right away and go to Liudmila Khomenko's apartment.

Around 15–16 November, a young woman arrived from Marienfeld and told me that Vera was waiting for me. On meeting with Vera, she reported to me that on 13 November before dinner, she knew that Vlasov would be drinking and that she was to prepare a cold dish to accompany the drink. She mixed the dose of poison ($\frac{3}{4}$ of the ampule) into a salad of pickled tomatoes and cucumbers. Right before dinner, when all was prepared, a car came for Vlasov from the Ministry of Propaganda, and he left without eating to go to the Ministry and returned in the evening. Vera said that as soon as Vlasov left, she threw out that salad, and they yelled at her for doing so, but she said there was no way she could leave it because someone else could have eaten it and all would have been discovered. She said that she overheard a conversation that in a few days Vlasov would be getting some wine from the RLA school. I took the remaining $\frac{1}{3}$ dose of poison and decided to investigate and do it myself.

On 19 November, his adjutant, Captain Antonov,¹⁰³ came to the RLA school for wine and food, along with 2 privates. Antonov went to General Trukhin and gave the wine to the others. That wine was left for several minutes (while the other two went to see their friends) in the room where the teachers lived and I went in to see them. But at that time no one was there (it was during the hours of lessons). I made use of this and poured the remaining dose into one of the bottles of bulk wine (there were only three bottles in total, and two of them were vodka). As I learned from Vera, on the evening of 19 November Vlasov, together with Malyshkin and others, drank that wine, but the poison did not have any effect.

I do not know why. Vera no longer works for Vlasov and is located in the camp for eastern workers in Berlin. Shteglitz."

To continue, we sent money, valuables, and poison to Berlin in order to implement the operation not only against Vlasov, but also against his colleagues Captain Zykov and General Malyshkin, the main figures of the "white" movement. These materials were taken on assignment from us by 1st Lt. of the RLA Nikolaenko, who

was to give them to resident agent Demianovich, Captain senior teacher at the RLA school in Dabendorf near Berlin, who was left to work as the organizer in Dedushka's place.

On other questions he gave a detailed written report, which I am attaching below and declare to be the original. All information from Dedushka corresponds to other material gathered on the matter by our agents and from official sources.

I. The Vlasov Case

1. Former Lieutenant General Andrei Andreevich Vlasov, chair of the so-called Russian Committee, who recently commanded the 2nd Shock Army of the Red Army in the Volkhov area of the front, voluntarily surrendered to the Germans in 1943, betraying his Homeland and his people. After taking Vlasov prisoner, the Germans portrayed him as a coward in the German and Russian newspapers "For the Homeland," "Battle Cry," and "New Word,"¹⁰⁴ and they claimed "that's what the Soviet generals are like—they don't want to fight for the Bolshevik regime." The Germans put in the papers the words Vlasov said before surrendering: "Don't shoot. I'm Lieutenant General Vlasov." According to the judgment of a number of individuals from among the RLA officers, Vlasov had been turned before the war and worked to their advantage. Many think that he was recruited by the Germans during his stay in China in 1937-1938 as an advisor to Chiang Kai-shek. On surrender, Vlasov was placed by the Germans not in the common camp for POWs, where the other captive generals were held, but separately from the others, where the necessary and best conditions were provided to him.

In the period before Vlasov's arrival, the Germans had already begun to organize a number of organizations and parties intended to help the Germans in the fight against Russia. But although these programs were to the advantage of the Germans, the Germans nonetheless sought one [a program] more practical and useful for their purposes. On surrender, Vlasov was offered, and it was essentially spelled out for him, a new program under which the Germans thought that Vlasov, as a visible figure in Russia whom everyone knew, could do them, the Germans, a great deal of good,

and they thought the Russian people would follow Vlasov. Therefore, when proposing and dictating the program of the so-called Russian Committee to Vlasov, the Germans were sure that the Russian people would go for it. The leading Germans from the Ministry of Propaganda, alongside Vlasov, “organized” a “Russian Committee” staffed by necessary and useful individuals (on this see below).

How Vlasov sees himself. Vlasov in the hands of the Germans is a figure who could be repositioned wherever and however they wanted and in whose name anything could be written. For this reason, the Germans considered that he would be useful for them and authoritative for the Russians.

Vlasov himself is a short-sighted person with a limited worldview, rude, foul-mouthed, often exhibits tactlessness. Having lost all confidence, especially lately, in the power of the idea of the Russian Committee and the RLA, and not hoping for recognition, it can be concluded that he thinks “the day is ours” [something like seize the day, *carpe diem*].

2. Vlasov is satisfied that the Germans have provided him with a decent apartment where he lives with his retinue. Due to the wine that is meant for rations for the RLA school, Vlasov is often drunk. In his personal life he is unstable, found himself a woman (a half-Polish woman or all Polish). Observing Vlasov’s behavior with her, one forms an impression of disgust toward Vlasov as a general. Before this, Vlasov was acquainted, through his adjutant, Captain Antonov, with a number of young women from among the eastern workers and emigrants. In private conversations, Vlasov tries to show himself to be a supreme leader. In Dabendorf, where the RLA school is located, Vlasov ordered his portrait painted and hung on display. In the club there was a German swastika and portrait of Hitler on the right side, and the emblem of the RLA on the left, and to the left of the emblem a portrait of Suvorov and to the left of that a large portrait of Vlasov himself. It can be concluded that he wants to create a sense of his own authority. His outward appearance is repellent, charmless. Lieutenant General Zhilenkov and Major General Malyshkin live in the same apartment as Vlasov.

Vlasov's adjutant is a young captain, some 27 years old, one Antonov, and he is his personal interpreter. There are also staff who live in the house: cooks, people supplying food, cleaners. They are all privates or young commanders. Among the supply people are a Sergeant Dobryakov and a Private Mikhailov. The people around him [Vlasov] say that he likes to drink and when there is no vodka, he curses his adjutant. Two other colonels live with Vlasov, the names of whom are unknown. They work along the lines of agent-based intelligence, apparently in the general headquarters, and carry out some kind of assignments for Vlasov. Additionally, there are 2 officers and 2 young commanders from the permanent staff of officers of the RLA school who are posted as guard on the house where Vlasov lives, rotating daily. They are posted at the house and after their shifts they rest in the guard area, which is located in the same house. Vlasov often goes into the guard area. The house where Vlasov lives is located on the outskirts of Berlin. This region is often subjected to bombing, and in August 1943 the house next to Vlasov's was destroyed. According to information I have not verified, Vlasov's house was supposedly damaged during a bombing raid in November 1943, and Vlasov was forced to move to a different apartment. The address for letters in Vlasov's name:

His home address disappeared along with other papers on being searched.

3. What are the service activities of Vlasov, what kind of ideas and views does he have, and what is his mood? Vlasov's service activity is very limited. Vlasov himself has said more than once, "I am striving to achieve and will achieve in the near future equal rights for our Eastern workers, the same as the rest of the foreign workers have. I will achieve the removal of the 'OST' patches from their chests." He said, "We will achieve improvement of conditions for military POWs." "Officers of the RLA should be and will be on the same level as German officers." "Our RLA will function only in the East, on its own land." And so on, and so on. These are often his practical goals. But he has been unable to achieve any of the above-listed things, because the Germans do not think much of Vlasov as a person, especially lately. This can be judged by the fact that in light of the circumstances (deserting to the side of the Red Army,

running away, refusing to fight, the effects of our Soviet propaganda, more on this below), the Germans were forced to relocate units of the RLA from the eastern front to the southwest front. Vlasov made a public statement about this: "I did not know and the German command did not ask me if it was necessary to relocate units of the RLA to other parts of the front; they themselves issued the order to transfer them, and I only found out about it later, when the units were already being moved to the west."

When in September, in a close circle of officers at his apartment, Vlasov was asked the question, "Tell us, what are you doing these days, what are you working on?" Vlasov answered, "I have a lot of work. Just days ago I received a letter from the eastern workers of one of the factories of Berlin, and they write that they are being fed poorly, beaten, made to work 14-16 hours a day. So making use of the fact that the Germans gave me slips with the stamp 'Chancellery of Lt. General Vlasov,' I wrote a letter on one of those slips to the owner of the factory. The owner, receiving my letter and perhaps not understanding who wrote it, who this lieutenant general was, just sent me an answer." And that is evidently all the work that Vlasov could manage. In addition to this, Vlasov said that he has to write and look over leaflets, communicate with the other side, and do some other work. But in general, very few of the RLA officers have any idea what Vlasov does. He is a toy of the Germans, he signs leaflets composed by them and needed for their purposes, he helps the Germans insert their agents into the Soviet Union, and he recruits "volunteers" for the Germans (under the guise of the RLA).

His apartment is also a service office. Vlasov is often called from his apartment to the Ministry of Propaganda. He is accompanied on these trips by representatives of the Ministry: Cavalry Captain Dielenhaus, von Deropp, Zellmeister, and others. Vlasov almost never goes out alone or only with Russian officers. Vlasov visits the RLA only rarely, especially in recent months (one time in two to three months). The main ideas of Vlasov on which the "program" of the "Russian Committee" is based are:

- 1) Signing an honorable peace agreement with Germany

- 2) Building, in alliance with Germany, a new Russia without Bolsheviks or capitalists
- 3) The liquidation of the Bolshevik regime in the USSR.

The main core of the whole Vlasov movement is the false and treacherous slogan: “The Fight for the Homeland. For Russia. For the Russian People.” They are hiding behind this. But this is just for show. When Vlasov and other figures were asked the question, “What will the borders of the new Russia be after the war? Will the Germans not demand territorial compensation from New Russia after the war? After all, Hitler wrote in *Mein Kampf* of his intentions for the East and conquering Russian lands. Will the Germans not trick us?” etc.

To all this, Vlasov, Zykov, and others answered, “It is early to talk about the borders, we will talk about that later. The Germans will not trick us, since we are openly heading into the fight alongside the Germans without anything up our sleeves.” Beginning in January 1943, Vlasov reassured listeners in all of his speeches that “the matter of recognizing the Russian Committee and the RLA is a matter of the coming months.” In August, he stated, “They have to recognize us and they will recognize us, and this will happen in the coming days.”

In his most recent speech, in December 1943, Vlasov stated, “They do not want to recognize us as a force. And if they do not accept us, then the Germans are only doing themselves harm.” In this same speech on the Germans’ relationship to the Russian Liberation Movement, Vlasov stated, “All Germans can be separated into three categories: 1) normal Germans—they understand us and stand for the recognition of us as a force; it is easy to work with them, 2) harmless and helpless ones who see that we are a force, but do not want to recognize it; for them it is all the same, and 3) harmful and stupid—they do not want to accept and understand us, and we need to keep away from them; they are harming our movement.”

In his latest speeches and conversations in close circles, there is a sense that Vlasov has lost confidence, become pessimistic—that he, as I understand, knows that they will not accept the Russian Committee or the RLA but that he has no other choice. He agreed

to become the lackey of the Germans and wants to remain so forever. Vlasov is not in the mood for fighting: he stated, “Here I am a general, but I do not wear the shoulder boards because I do not have an army. Many Russians consider me to be the commander of the RLA, but I am not in command, the Germans are in command.

Speaking of the long-term prospects of the war, Vlasov concludes that the war between Germany and the Soviet Union will last until 1946, and in support of this he cites the fact that both the Soviet Union and Germany have reserves. Others, including Lieutenant General Zhilenkov, Colonel Boersky, Major General Trukhin, and others, do not agree with this opinion. They think that the war has reached its culmination.

4. If in January 1943, after the address of the Russian Committee was issued and 38 million copies of it spread through the other side of the front, many thought that that spreading all this—the creation of the Russian Committee, its address, its program—would have great political importance. To that end, the Germans openly announced that this would call forth the creation on the other side of the front, the Soviet side, of large units of those sympathizing with the RLA; they supposed and openly stated that the time was near when, under the influence of the ideas of the Russian Liberation Movement, there would be an unavoidable internal explosion in the Soviet Union.

And then, in speeches, Malyshkin, Zykov, and others said, “There, we have distributed 38 million leaflets on the other side of the front. That will draw the sympathies of the mass of people of the Soviet Union to our movement and we will soon be recognized, since our ideas will be life-giving for that side; the Germans will see this, and other European countries will see it.”

But now, when the Russian Committee and its masters, the Germans, see that not much will come of this enterprise, the weight and the authority of the so-called Russian Liberation Movement have fallen significantly. The Germans have not written anything about Vlasov for months, and he has lost authority, does not have weight. And the Germans hold him up as the figure that led all this,

since the Germans need people, whether they get them by truth, untruth, or trickery – and to get them, they used Vlasov.

5. Now Vlasov's relationship with his masters, the Germans, is tense and has seriously deteriorated. The relationship has been especially affected by people from the RLA leaving and crossing over to the Red Army and the partisans, in large and small groups and individually. The Germans have seen this and know that the RLA includes people who are supporters of the Soviet regime – that there is opposition. In July 1943, Vlasov had a conversation with Rosenberg, Field Marshal General Keitel, Gross Admiral Dönitz,¹⁰⁵ and other members of the leadership. The question remained as to whether to recognize the RLA as an allied army. I know from Colonel Baevsky-Boyarsky that when it reached Hitler, he said, "We cannot trust anyone right now. We can only partially trust the Cossacks." As we know, Hitler did not even receive Vlasov for a conversation.

Among the German high command and leading individuals, by July or August 1943 two factions had formed, according to their views on the Russian liberation movement.

One group said that the RLA represented a force in the hands of the Germans, that it was an important agit-prop factor for the dissolution of Red Army units, because when Red Army units encountered the RLA and saw that their brothers were here, it would affect their moral dissolution and battle-readiness. They therefore thought that the RLA should be recognized and given initiative and independence in battle.

The other faction, the more authoritative one, was against recognizing the independence of the RLA. They based this on the fact that the mass of former POWs, on joining the RLA, intend to break through the barbed wire and go over to their own. To this end, they listed facts: "Have a look, there a battalion left, there a company, a group, a single soldier." These Germans believed that "we should use the Russians, but in German units, as small sub-units and groups, mixed together. Independence is impossible. They need to be controlled."

Vlasov and others, in all their speeches, stated that the RLA would take action only on the Eastern front, on its own soil, and no

redeployments of the RLA would occur. Now, when the Germans were forced to redeploy the RLA, that also severely shook Vlasov's relationship with the Germans. Vlasov's authority plummeted.

Supporters

6. One of Vlasov's chief supporters and a man of like mind was a certain Zykov. This is a person not well known among the RLA and in general among the people. Zykov was a former commissar of a division (the 100th or 99th), before the war worked in party and economic positions, worked in Udmurtia. At one time he supposedly worked with Bukharin on the editorial staff of the newspaper *Izvestia*. He is 40 years old. Literate. In the Red Army he held the rank of regimental commissar; his current rank in the RLA is captain.

Zykov is an authoritative and influential personage for the Germans. He was responsible for all anti-Soviet literature and propaganda. They discussed everything with him. He was given a separate apartment, and he married an émigré. He works in the Ministry of Propaganda (eastern propaganda). Vlasov's second serious supporter and like-minded thinker was his personal friend Major General Malyshkin (former instructor at the Academy of the General Headquarters of the Red Army, went to prison). This person has little authority among the RLA, all his speeches are monotonous, he bows to every German, a real boot-licker. He also works for the Ministry of Propaganda and along with Zykov writes leaflets, edits leaflets, edits anti-Soviet books, newspapers, etc. Malyshkin is something like the roving representative. He traveled to France, gave speeches to Russian emigrants in many towns of France, was in Brussels, in the Balkans.

According to information I have received, Malyshkin is in charge of questions of contacting the other side, of issues of agent-based intelligence work for the Germans, and supposedly he has a direct relationship to special intelligence agent schools to send spies and sabotage groups to the Soviet Union.

These two people are the most influential personages in the so-called Liberation Movement and the Russian Committee. They run everything. They are figures no less important than Vlasov. On Vlasov's other supporters I will report below.

7. Among the individuals near the Russian Committee and Vlasov, there were and are opposition groups. There is a significant group of individuals from among the officers of the RLA who think that the whole Liberation Movement and Russian Committee are a scam, necessary only to the Germans, that it is all a lie. People in the opposition groups believe that Vlasov sold out to the Germans, and, using his rank of Russian lieutenant general to trick the Russian people, is betraying Russians, forcing them into a fratricidal war. Playing on national feelings, on feelings of love for the Homeland, fooling the unstable elements, gathering around him a group of lawless, criminal, and vengeful people. Vlasov does what the Germans order him to do, and many understand very well that the fictitious Russian Committee announced in the leaflets is none other than a bunch of ringleaders who had begun to serve the Germans fully and completely. People understand that the RLA is a group of units fighting under German command and the Germans send the RLA wherever they want. There can be no recognition of the Russian Committee and the RLA.

Therefore, a significant number of individuals, especially from among the officers of the RLA, have come to the conclusion that our people – that is, people who would help their own true Homeland, their Red Army, in the rapid destruction of the occupiers – must be everywhere.

Some people came to that conclusion on their own and naturally, without being led, and began acting without connections to work for the dissolution of the ranks of the RLA.

Many had to be urged into this; it was necessary to explain to them, make the connections, establish the leadership, give assignments, and task them with useful work.

In so doing, we always said, “Whether you have a star or a badge on your coat, whether you are dressed in the uniform of the Red Army or a German one, if you believe that you have your own Homeland, your people, your native Red Army, you must do everything to help your true Homeland, your Red Army. Our people must be everywhere. We cannot let our enemies fully run the show in the RLA, Germans to the traitors. We need to do all we can so that our people from the Red Army are there in the RLA, but

let them wear the German uniform for now. The uniform cannot change the person or the content of his work.” That is what we taught our supporters. On the people in the opposition groups, on their work and the assignments they received, and on the results of their work I will report below (see section II, III).

8. Vlasov, as the head and organizer of the so-called Russian Liberation Movement, as a sold-out enemy, must be taken out. Along with him, first in line we must take out Malyshkin and Zykov. These people, having betrayed their Homeland, are a danger and will do great damage to our Russian people and the Red Army.

Three attempts have already been made on Vlasov’s life—twice during his trips to the northern districts (May–June) and attempts to kill him in Berlin—but all without success. The details of the attempts to kill him in the northern districts are unknown, and it is all hushed over and is held in total secret; even those close to Vlasov know nothing of it.¹⁰⁶ And who did it we do not know. What we do know is from a secret order of the German command, which landed in the front lines headquarters and of which we learned from people working in the headquarters (RLA officers). In this order it was mentioned that all this was the work of Stalin’s agents and that it was necessary to expose them.

During the attempt at his liquidation in Berlin, everything was done in such a way that he should have been killed. The plate from which he usually ate was laced with a prepared poison, and it was done by a young woman who worked in the kitchen there, on my orders. But unexpectedly, just before dinner, Vlasov was called to the Ministry of Propaganda, where he remained until the evening. He dined at the ministry. The food with the substance intended for Vlasov remained untouched and had to be thrown away.

On the second attempt, the remaining dose of the poison was mixed with wine that was received by Vlasov from the RLA school. Vlasov drank this wine with Malyshkin, his adjutant, and other individuals living with him. But the poison did not have any effect. It is unknown why (either a low concentration or inefficacy of it with the alcohol).

Located in Berlin, I myself had the opportunity to kill Vlasov through my people. But the main difficulty with this is the lack of poison or alternative means (time-delayed mines, etc.) other than weapons. I was, with great difficulty, able to buy the above-indicated low dose of poison (one small ampule) from a Russian émigré, Petr Samsonenko, who lives in Berlin.

In December 1943, the ampule of poison I received was sent to Berlin through 1st Lt. Nikolaenkov. The variations that exist for approaching Vlasov with the goal of killing him:

a) Though service personnel, from the ranks and junior staff of leadership living in the same house as Vlasov.

b) Through officers from the permanent staff of the RLA school and young commanders who daily receive the assignment to guard Vlasov's house. The 24-hour guard is changed daily; the same people repeat every 10–15 days. The guard is appointed from the RLA school, in the chancellery. We have a man, Lieutenant Sedchenko, who works in the chancellery.

c) Through individuals who may be admitted to Vlasov for negotiations and discussions. Anyone who is going to Vlasov has to pass through the head guard, who notifies his adjutant, who in turn reports to Vlasov. But that variant is more complicated.

d) During Vlasov's visit and travel to the Ministry of Propaganda, to the RLA school, or to the theater. For this we need time-delayed mines that can be instantly and skillfully installed in the car or location where he is going.

e) During Vlasov's trips to the units of the RLA (but Vlasov is now not very likely to make such trips).

Who could complete this assignment.

a) The organizer of all of this could be Captain ... Dmitry (military engineer) – senior instructor of the RLA school, has a large circle of acquaintances, competent in all things. Smart, understands the danger and hopelessness of the Vlasov Movement. He does many useful things for the Homeland. He is aware of everything. On leaving, I made him my main deputy.

His address: Berlin, Dabendorf-Südkreis Teltow
Ausbildungslager (school of the RLA)

b) Lieutenant ... – works in the chancellery of the RLA, young, energetic guy. He is in the anti-Vlasov faction of the RLA school. Colonel Bushmanov has put a lot of work on his shoulders. Cautious, but brave. He sometimes personally meets with Vlasov.

His address is the same as above.

c) ... – sergeant. Works in Vlasov's apartment. Works on procuring supplies, stokes the woodstove, etc. 26 years old. According to all information he is Jewish, but hides it. He is rather cowardly, cunning. He has great potential. He is often at the RLA school.

d) ... – Nikolai – private, 25 years old, works at the Ministry of Propaganda, carries papers and documents from one office to another for signatures. Often meets with Vlasov, is sometimes at his apartment. Daily sees Malyshkin and Zykov at the ministry. Lives at the RLA school.

e) ... – 24 years old, young Ukrainian woman, from Dnepropetrovsk. Works for the rail road as a draughtswoman. Has a German passport. Is acquainted with Vlasov. Smart, practical. Worked in the same group as Colonel Bushmanov.¹⁰⁷ I do not know her, she lives:

Other apartment.

f) ... – captain, earlier served in the 2nd Caucasus Corps, 26 years old, now works near Berlin, in the city of Luckenwald, is in Berlin daily, in the RLA school.

g) Through other individuals working for Vlasov, it is possible to organize Captain ...

On 23 December 1943, through 1st Lt. Stepan Nikolaenkov, who was headed from Orsha to Berlin, and then on to France and Italy, I passed one ampule of poison to kill Vlasov and his companions. The results of the work and the actions are unknown. We know that he arrived in Berlin. I passed letters and money through him, and he was ordered to make contact with Captain Podunov. Details on this assignment in the second section.

The likelihood of completing the assignment to kill Vlasov is possible.

I repeat, the difficulties are due to materials, since they are too difficult and practically impossible to obtain in Berlin.

It would make sense to send to Berlin by any means the material necessary to conduct the work.

Captain Podunov and Lieutenant Sedchenko can organize everything on-site, as they know our people very well and know what they can assign to people and what who is capable of doing what.

IV. "RUSSIAN COMMITTEE"

1. In 1943, the Germans used trickery and false promises in an attempt to attract Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and other peoples of Russia to their side and use them for their own purposes ("like living meat"), making it possible for some individuals to write various programs and declarations, to create parties, alliances, and committees. Yet all the time the Germans worked toward a single goal – to attract and force Russians to fight against their own, against their Homeland. That is, they recruited them into a fratricidal war, hoping that in so doing they would shake the moral strength of the Red Army and cause a split in the ranks of the fighters. But the various programs were not acceptable enough to the Germans.

After Vlasov voluntarily surrendered to the Germans, they created the best conditions for him, placing him separately from the other imprisoned generals. The Germans essentially dictated and proposed to Vlasov the program of the so-called Russian Committee, which they hoped would be the most suitable for them and which they considered that the Russian people would follow – that they would follow Vlasov. They thought that Vlasov was a visible and authoritative figure in the Soviet Union.

The leading Germans from the Ministry of Propaganda organized, with Vlasov, the so-called Russian Committee, to which they brought the individuals that would be necessary and useful for them.

Makeup of the Russian Committee

1. Lieutenant General Andrei Andreevich Vlasov – chair of the Russian Committee, description given above.
2. Major General Malyshkin – secretary of the Russian Committee.
3. Regimental Commissar (now captain) Zykov – member. Their descriptions given above.

Lieutenant General Zhilenkov – member of the Russian Committee. Former party worker. Now manages questions of recruitment for the RLA, in the summer often traveled to RLA units. Many RLA officers have suggested that if the Russian Committee is recognized, then Zhilenkov will become “Military Minister.” He rarely states his opinions. He sometimes disagrees with Vlasov and even at Vlasov’s public speeches, he shakes his head negatively. He is more of a long-term thinker than Vlasov. Zhilenkov received an anonymous letter in September from an individual from an “authorized center,” in which it was suggested that he “return to the ranks of the Red Army, and in doing so wash clean his shameful stain.” In exchange, he was guaranteed life, immunity, and full secrecy in his work. The answer to this letter was brought to me by a person I did not know at all dressed in civilian clothes, aged approximately 30 years old. A meeting was set for me at the train station Dabendorf. He approached and said, “Are you waiting for an answer from someone?” I answered, “What do you want?” He said to me, “Here is a box with the answers to the anonymous letters. Pass on word of this directly to the individual responsible in Moscow, or better yet, pass it just as it is to Moscow. You do not have the right to open it.” I tried to discover who he was and who sent him, but he did not say anything. I never met him again. That box was the size and shape of a notebook (6x10 cm) and I did not open it. On being searched in the headquarters of Lunin’s brigade, all documents were taken from me, and I warned of the value to me of each piece, but after they returned my things and began checking my documents, that box was not among the others.

The anonymous letters had roughly the same contents as what was written to Major General Trukhin and Major General Blagoveschensky. Trukhin, as far as I know, received his, but

Blagoveschensky did not, as he was in the Baltics and not in Berlin at that time. A letter with different contents, also anonymous, was written to Zykov, as I came to learn through the émigré Samsonenko, and Zykov read it, laughed, said, “What fools,” and burned it. Nothing more is known.

So I do not know whose answers were in that box, but what was written there, I suppose, was Zhilenkov’s, possibly Trukhin’s, and possibly those of other individuals.

Major General of Shore Service Blagoveschensky – member of the committee, former head of the RLA school in Dabendorf, before the war was head of the Naval Academy near Leningrad. As far as I know, he has anti-German leanings. He walked around lost in thought, dissatisfied. Very strict. After the arrest of Bushmanov and others from the RLA school, the German command supposedly offered Blagoveschensky a “vacation” for medical treatment and a trip to see his brother. He was sent to the Baltics, where his brother supposedly lived. From July to November, Blagoveschensky was not in Berlin. Such an “extended vacation” is doubtful for some officers. Some think that Blagoveschensky was removed from his position.

6. Major General Trukhin – before the war, he was head of the operations division for the headquarters of the troops of the Baltic region. After Blagoveschensky, considered to be acting head of the RLA school. Exceedingly simple, loves to talk to everyone. At a time when the Germans were putting individual officers in prison, sending them to punitive camps for POWs, Trukhin defended them. I had a conversation with Trukhin on several occasions. In August, when I arrived in Berlin from Minsk, Trukhin was very interested in the situation in Belorussia, and I described to him the situation exactly as it was. I told him of the mass firing squads, hangings, expulsions from villages, burning of villages together with the residents. He listened attentively and then said, “Civilized people do not do things like that.” And, “Yes, it is bad for us.” He stated to me directly that “there is no RLA, only Russian-German units, and we are without rights.” He said in conversation, “I myself asked to be sent to the camp, but they will not take me.”

Trukhin is not a party member. He is not crazy about the Germans, but he greatly fears the Bolsheviks. For him, the word Bolshevik is equivalent to barbarian or a thug. And Trukhin's main thought is always of "those Bolshevik oppressors." He can keep what he is told to himself. He can be spoken to openly.

These individuals are officially announced and known. Of others who are members of the Russian Committee nothing is known, even whether they exist or not. In their speeches, Vlasov, Malyshkin, and others often indicate that "on the other side of the front, in the Soviet Union, we also have people, members of our Committee. We are not alone." But who? Where? All this is held in full secret and all efforts we have made to discover it have been fruitless.

2. What are the goals, missions, and programs of the "committee"

[...] 7. The "Russian Committee" is causing great harm with its agent-based subversive work on the territory of the USSR.

First of all, Vlasov, Malyshkin, and others have said more than once that the members of the "committee" (more accurately their agents) are working on the territory of the USSR.

We know members of the RLA, both officers and soldiers, are prepared in advance in their front and army headquarters or in special intelligence training schools, and are inserted into the territory of the USSR. And they give them assignments: intelligence, sabotage, acts of terror, psychological warfare, anti-Soviet propaganda. Groups are equipped with portable radios.

During the German withdrawal from the Bryansk forests, there was an RLA group of up to 100 persons left in the forests, dressed in the uniform of the partisans, with the mission of conducting sabotage in the rear territories of the Soviet Union. I was informed of this in November by Captain Shamov, who had been at the front in the Bryansk area. Another such group (up to 60 people) was left in the region of Bakhmach-Konotop.

These groups were tasked with penetrating further into the Soviet rear territories. There, they were to conduct sabotage, and the Germans would cry out in the papers that "the partisans are taking action in the Soviet Union, too."

Another such group was prepared in the Pskov region, but it is unknown whether they were sent or not. I was informed of this by Lieutenant Dmitriev, who was at the front in the Pskov area.

In addition, the Germans are creating from among the personnel of the RLA, police, and other units some so-called anti-partisan units. They usually wear the uniform of the partisans, go into the forests, make contact with small and sometimes even large partisan units and groups, and kill them. They make note of the location and number of partisan units. They inform the Germans about this. In an effort coordinated with the Germans, they are fighting against the partisans.

But they have one main mission: to discredit the role and essence of the partisan movement. Therefore, these anti-partisan units come into villages, rob the residents, loot houses, shoot people, beat the elderly, and burn villages whole. And they do all this dressed as partisans. And then the Germans, in their newspapers, leaflets, and on the radio, announce that, well, "these are not partisans, but thugs. They steal, shoot, and hang." For a month or even less these anti-partisan units have been in the forest, taking action, and then they change their clothes and return to their German unit bases, to the city, on vacation. These units are extremely mobile, often changing their base location.

We know that a large anti-partisan unit (up to 400 people) was operating in the area of Pskov – Dno (until November 1943).

An anti-partisan unit of up to 100 people was operating in the region of Bobruisk – Slutsk.

In the region of Orel, a unit of up to 500 people was operating. Now its status is unknown.

In the area of Rakov, a small anti-partisan unit made up of Polish legionnaires and a small group of Belorussians is operating,

8. The "Russian Committee" promotes the propaganda of its ideas by means of

a) the RLA school (also called the school for propagandists) – on which I will report below;

b) publishing a large amount of anti-Soviet books and brochures, for example, "The Impending Crash of the Soviet Economy," which was authored by N. Moskvich (which is Zykov),

“In the Detention Facilities of the State Political Administration,” “The RLA is the Army of the People,” “What is the RLA?” and several books by I. Solonevich, a book by Albrecht, etc. All of these are filled with anti-Soviet propaganda;

c) publishing the newspapers “Zarya” [Dawn] and “Volunteer,”¹⁰⁸ which are directly controlled by the Russian Committee. The paper “Volunteer,” which is the paper of the “Forces of the Liberation Movement,” is under the editorial control of Zhilenkov. The newspaper *Zarya* has long been edited by Malyshkin.

In addition to this, they publish the “Officers’ Bulletin,” which comes out 3 times a month, edited by Colonel Boevsky-Boyarsky. The daily paper “For the Homeland,” which is currently published in Riga, is also fully supported by the positions of the “Vlasov Liberation Movement.”

In addition, they publish newspapers and bulletins for the front.

d) The “Committee” also publishes in its name a large number of leaflets, addresses, and proclamations with calls to the Red Army, partisans, and the Russian people.

9. How popular are the ideas of the “movement”? As I indicated above, the Germans and Vlasov were sure that the Russian people would follow the program of the committee—would follow Vlasov. They considered and hoped that the ideas of the Russian Liberation Movement would inevitably call forth an explosion, an uprising in the Soviet Union.

At first, when the “Address of the Russian Committee” was released along with the first “Open Letter from Vlasov,” some less stable, personally offended, lawless, and criminal elements to some degree believed these false and mendacious ideas. There were cases of individual unstable elements voluntarily crossing over to the side of the Germans. The Germans, together with Vlasov, issued order No. 13 “On Voluntary Deserters.”¹⁰⁹ According to this law, the deserters were guaranteed that, should they cross over to the Germans in the following 7 days, that they could choose whether they wanted to join the RLA, work in German units, or work according to their specialty. They were promised that they would

be without escort and that they would be issued full German rations. This order was accompanied by a number of addresses in the name of the “Main Command of the RLA” (which does not exist). Some believed this as well. There were deserters, but the Germans placed them in a common camp for military POWs and offered some of them certain privileges.

So even the unstable, personally offended elements understood that this whole “movement” is but lies and trickery. And the very “ideas” of the Russian Liberation Movement are against the people and aimed at a fratricidal war. In its essence, the Russian Committee is nothing but a group of sell-outs without any ideas or principles who are the servants of the Germans.

And now, when the Germans have been forced to remove the RLA from the eastern front, (did Vlasov not say more than once that the RLA would only be operating in the east, on their own soil?), the “ideas” of the “liberation movement” have lost all weight and authority.

But the Vlasov propaganda and the work of agent-saboteurs inside the Soviet Union bring harm and loss to our people, to our Homeland, and to the Red Army.

V. “THE RUSSIAN LIBERATION ARMY”

1. As Vlasov had stated and Trukhin had indicated in his personal conversations, the Russian Liberation Army essentially does not exist; rather, there are units and legions under German command. In the minds of the Germans, the RLA exists. As early as March 1943, Vlasov said of the RLA that “this army will be often our people’s army. In its ranks will be not only Russians, but also other peoples inhabiting Russia. Its commanders, from the individual unit commanders all the way to the High Command of the RLA, will be our people. But we will answer to the German High Command.” That is what Vlasov proposed and considered. This is again trickery, since the Germans could never give independence to the Russians. In essence, there were never and are not currently any units of the RLA fully under Russian command. Only a few (up to regiment and battalion) were sent into battle, as experiments. All units and sub-units of the RLA were directly under German control.

Fully staffed units of the RLA were sucked in and mixed with German units by sub-unit.

Thus, for example, the platoon commander was a Russian lieutenant, but the German boss over the platoon was a non-commissioned officer or sergeant major, in a company; the company commander or first lieutenant was a Russian, but the German boss was a sergeant major or lieutenant. Usually sub-units of the RLA (almost always not larger than a battalion) were assigned to a German unit (regiment).

The main headquarters of the RLA as such did not exist. Vlasov said several times, “Here I am a general, but I do not wear shoulder boards and rank insignia because I do not have an army.” But for the purposes of propaganda, the Germans and the “committee” advertise that the RLA exists.

2. In practice, the Germans are using Vlasov, Zhilenkov, Malyshkin, and others to recruit into the RLA—to acquire people. Vlasov, during his trip to the northern districts, inspected and conducted examinations of sub-units of the RLA, but alongside the Germans. Zhilenkov directly deals with staffing the RLA: in the summer he was in Vileika for some time, was in Pskov, went to Paris. In November he left for France and northern Italy for recruitment. The Germans entrust much to Zhilenkov to control himself.

3. Sub-units of the RLA up to battalion size are organized and built on the principle of German sub-units, with the difference that the RLA units are not as well-armed as their German equivalent. Sub-units of the RLA, under German control, are usually attached to German sub-units and units. A platoon of the RLA in a German company, a company in a battalion or even half. In the RLA units fighting against the partisans or the death squads, usually there were fewer Germans.

4. The numbers of the RLA and the Russian Committee are significantly exaggerated by the Germans. They believe that the RLA is more than a million people. That was even announced in a leaflet (“letter to Molotov”).¹¹⁰ From a number of sources (RLA officers placed near the leadership), we know that the RLA consists of 250–300 thousand people.

The RLA is 95% made up of POWs. Even so, the means of recruitment vary widely. In January-February 1943, people from the POW camps with secondary and higher education were selected and were told that they would be sent to Germany: they would see what life in Germany was like, there would be tours, and then they would serve in their specialty and would be freed from the camps. A group of more than 300 people arrived in Berlin; they were taken on tours, read lectures on the National Socialist Party and its program, and then they were included them in the ranks of the RLA, which transferred them to the RLA school in Dabendorf that had opened in March 1943.

Another method. In the POW camps, they would select specialists: in artillery, anti-aircraft gunners, de-mining experts, they would select Cossacks and then send them to be included in German units.

3) Around POW camps, they conduct enrollment and announcements are made of those desiring to join the RLA; they select them and send them to recruitment training. But they do not always take those who want to go. Thus, in the Minsk district they did not take prisoners from Stalag 352 directly into the RLA units even though there were those who wanted to go.

4) Many were taken into the RLA from among the deserters (voluntarily crossing over). That method has been used since May 1943.

5) Part, but still a good share of the RLA, was taken from local residents and from émigrés living abroad.

6) Since 1941, the Germans have included in their own units and sub-units some of the people who voluntarily surrendered to the Germans or were taken prisoner, and they have been used as an auxiliary force (in supply trains, in kitchens, in cleaning, and even as specialists). These people were largely included in the RLA. The Germans also offered many from Ukrainian units the opportunity to join, or rather to cross over to the RLA.

And even the German soldiers and officers working in RLA units wore the insignia of the RLA on their sleeve.

5. The arms in the RLA were mostly Russian, trophies, some small part German. Automatic weapons fewer than the Germans

had. They were mainly armed with rifles, machine guns, and mortars. In artillery units, the soldiers of the RLA are usually second and third number.

Units of the RLA are armed at about 60–75% what the Germans have for armaments. In various units and sub-units, the situation was different, but everywhere they were more poorly armed than the Germans.

The uniforms of the soldiers of the RLA were more worn out, more ragged, than those of the Germans. In some units, food was the same as for the Germans, but where there were large groups of the RLA, they would arrange separate kitchens. In the majority of cases, the Germans would cut the rations of the RLA soldiers.

The same goes for monetary remuneration. Russians are not equal to the Germans.

In some units the Russians are given tobacco, and the Germans get cigarettes. For those at the front lines, these differences in supply, treatment, etc., are somewhat less than in the rear, where the differences are more stark. This is all starkly reflected in the morale of the RLA.

6. As I indicated above, RLA units from the eastern front have now been redeployed to Italy, France, the Balkans, Denmark, Belgium and Holland.

The main forces are based in the south-east of France and in northern Italy. Cossack units and part of the RLA forces are located in the Balkans (in Serbia, Yugoslavia),¹¹¹ and at the so-called Atlantic Wall¹¹² there are mainly specialists—artillery, anti-aircraft gunners, de-mining specialists—all with the mission of preventing a possible amphibious landing by the English. The Germans specially relocated part of the force to the Atlantic Wall, knowing in so doing that there would be nowhere for them to leave or cross over.

In the Balkans, the RLA, together with the Cossacks and Germans, have the goal of fighting against the partisans.

In northern Italy, the fight is against the remaining forces of Badoglio there. The RLA will also be used at the front in Italy, in battles with Anglo-American troops.

Unfortunately, I do not have all information on the makeup, deployment, and missions of all the RLA forces on the western and southwestern fronts. (That material was taken from me during a search and, as was later discovered, Captain Slutsky wrapped a sausage in those papers.)

We know that in northern Italy and southeastern France there should be 15 RLA divisions together. The units and sub-units that make up these divisions will be given to German units and will operate mixed with German units.

There are soldiers from the RLA in anti-aircraft units in Germany, in various cities, and in other countries.

In addition to this, on parts of the eastern front there remain individual RLA units with special assignments: to be inserted in the Soviet rear territory, as anti-partisan units under the headquarters of the German armies, divisions, special groups of “screamers.” There are individual sub-units to fight against the partisans, but very few.

Almost nothing was known about the activity of the RLA on the southwestern fronts until December, since those units had just been formed and – with the exception of the Balkans – had not seen battle.

But we know that in the Balkans (in Serbia and Yugoslavia), the Cossack units and RLA units, by fighting against the partisans and mistreating the population, have made the population rise up against them. The people have an exclusively bad opinion of the Cossacks and the RLA. In addition, even before the arrival in the Balkans of the Cossacks and the RLA, a so-called “cadet corps” made up of émigrés was already operating in Serbia. This corps guarded the railroad, fought against the partisans, and cracked down on the local population. The Serbian people, who had until then maintained exclusively genial relationships with the Russian émigrés, now hate them as traitors. They have an even worse relationship to the Cossacks and RLA.¹¹³ In France, Denmark, Belgium, and Holland, the relationship between the local population and the arriving units of the RLA is likewise atrocious. The majority of the population looks at the RLA as traitors and betrayers of their Homeland.

9. All these tensions between the Germans and the RLA – inequality, difference in supplies, equipment, monetary compensation – influenced and were reflected in the political condition and morale of the RLA. What's more, the "big shots" of the RLA were constantly promising that the RLA would be recognized as an allied army, that the Russian Committee would be recognized. But the Germans recognize neither the Russian Committee nor the RLA, and they do not want to recognize them, and many within the RLA believe that they never will.

The political condition and morale has fallen sharply since the relocation of the RLA from the east to the southwest and west. In connection with the relocation of the RLA and many cases of disarmament of RLA units and sentencing them to punitive camps for POWs, the mass arrests, sentencing to prison, trials, and firing lines – all this has also been reflected in the worsening morale.

The offensives and successes of the Red Army have also strongly affected people. The beastly atrocities of the Germans against our people have also affected individuals, though some of the RLA have themselves taken part in these atrocities and punitive measures.

Our people working toward the dissolution of the RLA are doing great work. Even Vlasov, in his last "open letter"¹¹⁴ and in a speech, admitted that "Stalin's agents (as he calls them) are having an effect on our ranks." Many officers and soldiers of the RLA have now lost all confidence in whatever strength and ability the RLA may have had. The majority are firmly convinced that the Red Army will win.

I would think it would be a good idea to drop leaflets to the RLA in the Balkans and in Italy with a call to cross over. By the way, in his speech on 1 December 1943 and in a letter, Vlasov warned, "The Bolsheviks will not back away from spreading propaganda through their allies and their agents, and they are trying to break up the RLA on new parts of the front as well."

Vlasov and the Germans are afraid of this.

10. The main institution that deals with questions relating to the RLA is the Ministry of Propaganda, and under it the Eastern Division. The address is: Berlin No. 35, Viktoriastrasse, House 10.

This ministry building was destroyed and burned during the bombing raid of 23 November. The ministry has temporarily moved to the base of the RLA school in Dabendorf.

This Eastern Division (Ostpropaganda) manages all anti-Soviet propaganda. The main role is played by Malyshkin and Zykov, as consultants and public figures.

Along with the Russian Committee, there exist a number of other national committees: the Azerbaijani Committee, the Georgian Committee, the Armenian Committee, the Turkestan Committee,¹¹⁵ the Tatar Committee, the Cossack Committee, the Russian Émigré Committee, and others. A significant number of émigrés make up these committees. Each of these committees issues its own newspaper and has its own "ideas." These "committees" unleash one people against another and sow nationalist discord. In large part in this very way, though they do not intend to do so, they are breaking apart the RLA and people of other ethnicities.

The RLA has its "own" school. In May-June 1942, on the outskirts of Berlin, in Wuhlheide, a school for propagandists was created (in a camp for POWs). Various programs were born in this school. Malyshkin, Blagoveschensky, Zykov, and others taught at this school before they were freed from imprisonment. All the academics were led by a Baltic German who had moved to Germany and still did not have the rights of a "citizen of Germany," Sonderführer (not lieutenant) von der Ropp, who has excellent Russian language skills.

Blagoveschensky and Malyshkin nearly died of starvation in this camp from poor nutrition. Malyshkin made cigarette cases and traded them with the German soldiers for pants. They were called "skinny goners." As a result of this treatment, Blagoveschensky ended up in the hospital, where imprisoned French and English officers helped to save his life.

At the end of 1942, better conditions were created for Malyshkin, Blagoveschensky, and others.

This camp-school turned out propagandists for camps of military prisoners. They selected individual people from the school and sent them to special intelligence agent training schools. Thus, in January 1943, from among the graduated there was a group of

mostly old, tsarist servants who were sent to the front for preparation, and then, as I learned, some of them were put on the front lines themselves.

In March 1943, the school was moved from Wuhlheide to the southern part of Berlin, at Dabendorf–south station (one station before Zossen). From that time on, the school came more under the control of Vlasov's people, though it remained in the hands of the Germans.

The school has the name "School of the RLA" or school (sometimes the courses) of propagandists say that the Germans call it *Ausbildungslager Ostpropaganda*—a special educational camp. It is under the purview of *Ostpropaganda Abt LBD*.

The leadership of the school (camp):

- 1) Commandant—German, captain (knows Russian well).
- 2) Deputy commandant (from the Gestapo)—1st Lt., German. Speaks Russian.
- 3) Academic inspector—Lieutenant von der Ropp, German.
- 4) *Zahlmeister* (supply, provisions)—German.
- 5) Chancellery (it is called exactly that, "German chancellery")
- 6) All the inventory, payroll, uniforms, receipt of food supplies, the kitchen, the guard at the gates—all managed by Germans.

But alongside the German leadership, there is also a Russian leadership.

- 1) Head of the school (or courses)—now acting in this role is General Trukhin (before him it was Blagoveschensky)
- 2) Head of the academic division—Colonel Spiridonov (before him it was Colonel Bushmanov, who was arrested).
- 3) Head of the battle division; he is considered during the training to be battalion commander—Lt. Col. Vlasov.
- 4) Assistant to the head of school for maintenance—Captain Putilin.
- 5) The "Russian chancellery" has the head of the chancellery, Captain Strel'nikov, his assistant Lieutenant ..., and translator Lieutenant Romashkin, who is also Trukhin's adjutant.

Of the permanent staff of the instructors (company commander or company executive officer):

- 1) Captain ...
- 2) Lieutenant (senior) Smolyakov
- 3) Senior Lieutenant Stefanov
- 4) Lieutenant Zuev
- 5) Senior Lieutenant Zaitsev
- 6) Major Pshenichny
- 7) Major Vnukov
- 9) Major Khitrov¹¹⁶
- 10) Major Kuskov
- 11) Major Zagorodny
- 12) Colonel Antonov¹¹⁷
- 13) Major Fedorov
- 14) Senior Lieutenant Kuznetsov
- 15) Major Nechaev
- 16) Lt. Colonel Ershov (was leader of the propaganda group in Cossack units, now an instructor)¹¹⁸
- 17) Major Gavrilov (edits manuals)
- 18) Lt. Colonel Karbukov¹¹⁹
- 19) Lt. Colonel Ryl' (has now left for a formation in Italy)¹²⁰

Training in the school lasts 2.5–3 months. Class size up to 250 people.

Graduates are used:

- 1) On the front, in command or propaganda roles
- 2) For work in camps for military POWs
- 3) Of those selected for the front, after undergoing additional preparation in the army headquarters they are sent as agents into the Soviet rear territories. After graduation, some individuals are selected and suddenly taken away. This is done with strict secrecy, but it is known that they are sent to special schools.

Programs of study:

- 1) National Socialist worldview (themes: race, nation, cult of the leader, socialism, national socialism and Marxism, the Jews, labor, idealism and materialism, and others)
- 2) The history of Russia

- 3) Tours of factories, plants, agricultural museums
- 4) Drill practice
- 5) Learning the drill manual
- 6) Lectures on separate political themes, for example, “Reasons for the War in 1942,” “On the Preparation of the USSR for War in 1941,” “Bolshevism is the Enemy of the Russian People,” “Idealism and Materialism,” and so on. The training program is created in the Ministry of Propaganda. Control of the program is in the hands of the Germans.

Address of the school: Dabendorf-Südkreuzung Teltow Ausbildungslager bei Berlin, or Feldpost No. 28264.

From the railway station Dabendorf along the road in the direction of Glinnik, it is 2.5 km.

Lately, for secrecy, the address of the school has been referred to no longer as Dabendorf but as Glienick (it is 3 km from the school to Glienick), but the school is located in the previous place. From April 1943, a preparatory school for the Dabendorf school was created near Berlin, in the south, in Luckenwalde. First, they arrive at the preparatory school from camps for military POWs; there a selection is done. They complete preparatory training, learn the program, practice drilling. Selected individuals are sent to Dabendorf. Training is one or even as long as two months. Training in the preparatory school in Luckenwalde is led by Lt. Colonel Pozdnyakov¹²¹ (former aristocrat, commander of the Red Army, it is rare that anyone is pleased with him).

The other school which prepares soldiers, mainly for the front but also for intelligence agent work, is located in Lötzen, Eastern Prussia.¹²² This school is largely led by the Germans. After graduation, the graduates are considered members of the RLA.

There is a special school in Wilno [now Vilnius].

In Berlin, on Fridrichstrasse [sic], there is a special intelligence agent school, and Germans who know Russian[s] study there along with a group specially selected from among émigré Russians. The contingent is approximately 80 people. We know that they study radio communications intensely.

On the work for the dissolution of the RLA, its status, progress, and results, and on the agents working on this dissolution I explain in section II and III.

According to the report of Senior Lieutenant Vinokurov, in October–November 1943 to the south of Berlin in the region of Luckenwalde – Wittenberg, a division was formed from the RLA, Ukrainian, Caucasus, Central Asian and other national units that supposedly have special designation by unit and group to be inserted into the rear territories of the Soviet Union. These groups and units are formed on the principle of ethnicity. In this so-called division, as Vinokurov informed me, there are as many as 4 thousand people. Of these, 100 are Germans who speak Russian very well. A German Major General (name unknown) commands and manages the training of this division. This division is also called a special forces group.

I have no further data on this.

Our further activities in the Vlasov matter will include establishing normal communications with agents inserted in Berlin, attracting generals Trukhin, Zhilenkov, and others to our work, trying to pull someone out to us, killing Vlasov, Zykov, and Malyshkin, and dissolving the RLA.

For this goal we are working through Minsk with Lt. Colonel Sobolenko, Sergeant Velichko, and other individuals, through whom we plan to establish improved communication with Berlin.

If the possibility presents itself, I will try to arrange communication with our people in the intelligence school Balga. [...]

SPECIAL GROUP COMMANDER
CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS FOR THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT
Major KAZANTSEV

The National Archives of the Republic of Belarus (NARB). F. 4p. Op. 33a. D. 609. L. 34–55 (s ob.). Original.

1944

N°41. From the report of the Intelligence Division of the Central Headquarters for the Partisan Movement for the period of work from May 1943 through January 1944.

5 February, 1944 SEEN AND APPROVED

Head of the Central Headquarters
for the Partisan Movement under the Headquarters
of the High Command,
Lieutenant General P. Ponamarenko
“... ” February 1944

REPORT

on the work of the Intelligence Division of the Central Headquarters for the Partisan Movement
for the period of May 1943–January 1944

The Intelligence Division of the Central Headquarters for the Partisan Movement began to be staffed with personnel in May 1943 and was fully staffed by the end of July. During this period, all the work of the ID of CHPM was directed at completion of Order No. 00189 from the People’s Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade Stalin, dated 5 September 1942.¹²³

The main directions of work of the ID of CHPM are:

- 1) Leadership of intelligence activity in the republic and district headquarters for the partisan movement and separate partisan brigades and units.
- 2) Informational intelligence activity.
- 3) Intelligence agent work.

[...]

13. Traitorous formations

All the partisans’ means of intelligence-gathering have been used to discover the German command’s formation of various traitorous units with the goal of using them in the war against the USSR. They

have used all means of coercion to attract to these units citizens of the USSR who for various reasons found themselves in occupied territory (POWs, local populations, those who succumbed to the fascist agitation, and other anti-Soviet elements).

The formation of traitorous units was conducted under various democratic slogans, such as "liberation from Bolshevism," and directed toward the creation of the so-called "Russian Liberation Army," "Russian People's Liberation Army," "volunteer eastern battalions," Azerbaijani, Northern Caucasus and other national legions, and Cossack units.

It has been established that these activities of the Germans have failed; their attempt to use the population of the occupied territories in the war against the USSR has suffered defeat.

The "Russian Liberation Army"

In the beginning of 1943, the German press conducted intensive propaganda in the occupied territories around the creation of the "Russian Committee" and the "Russian Liberation Army." "Volunteer" recruitment was organized in camps for military POWs, and in support of this the conditions in the camps were made intolerable. In the region of Pskov, special camps were created for the formation of RLA units. The first RLA units were noticed in the beginning of April in the region of Staraya Russa. At the end of April, the traitorous units arrived in the region of Nevel' to fight against the partisans. In April-May, the traitor Vlasov traveled in the rear areas of the North Group Army and Central Group Army, and there was an announcement to sign up to become a volunteer, and then mobilization of the RLA, but the results were insignificant. The slogans of the "Russian Committee" and the "RLA" did not find support from among the Soviet people. On 27 May, Vlasov stated at a press conference in Dvinsk that his army consisted of 200 thousand people. This number was obviously exaggerated. Neither at that time nor later did the RLA have that amount.

In the period of May-August 1943, partisan intelligence established the existence of RLA units:

- a) in the rear areas of the North Army Group (Leningrad District) – RLA regiments – 1; RLA battalions – 4

- b) in the strip of the Kalinin Front—RLA regiments—2; RLA battalions—2;
- c) in the strip of the Western and Bryansk fronts—RLA divisions—1; RLA regiments—2; RLA battalions—1
- d) on the territory of Belorussia—RLA regiments—4; RLA battalions—7
- e) on the territory of Ukraine—RLA regiments—2; RLA battalions—2.

In consequence of the German defeats on the Soviet-German front and the partisans' work to dissolve the RLA units, German attempts to use these formations on the front, in the fight against the partisans, and for the defense of their rear areas have not produced results. In September-October, the German command began to disarm them and send some of them to Western Europe (France, Yugoslavia, Italy).

The formation of these units has ceased, Vlasov has been removed from the leadership of the RLA, and his army has ceased to exist as a military unit.

One of the largest units of the RPLA in the occupied territories of the USSR remains the Kaminsky Brigade, deployed in the region of Lepel' and numbering some 4–6 thousand people. The brigade was formed in the Lokotsk region of Orel District and, in connection with the withdrawal of the German troops, has been relocated to Belorussia, where it was reinforced and took part in the fight against the partisans. The Germans gave Kaminsky the rank of general, and his brigade is called the RPLA (for the deployment of units of the RLA, see addendum No. 5).

Eastern formations

Comparatively larger in numbers than units of the RLA are the eastern formations in the German army under German field and rear units. They were formed from POWs and included into the composition of German units as "volunteers" who were named the "eastern battalions" and the "Cossack regiments" (from the Ukrainians).

In May–December 1943, partisan intelligence established that there are:

- a) in the rear areas of the North Army Group (Leningrad District) – eastern battalions – 10
- b) in the strip of the Kalinin Front – Cossack brigade – 1
Cossack battalions – 1
Eastern battalions – 6
Caucasus battalions in the guard division – 2
- c) in the strip of the Western and Bryansk fronts – Cossack regiment – 1
Eastern regiment – 1
Eastern battalions – 30
- d) on the territory of Belorussia – Cossack regiments – 5
Eastern regiment – 1
Eastern battalions – 22
- f) in Ukraine – Cossack regiments – 2
Cossack battalions – 3
- g) In the Crimea – Eastern battalions – 18

The mission of these formations was the rear security of the division, corps, and army. Using them in the fight against the partisans and on the front proved the low battle-readiness of these units; the German command was forced to partially disarm them, and maintained great mistrust in the rest. In the beginning of January 1944 in the territory of Leningrad District, the eastern formations (serving under the guard/security divisions, the rear commandant, and field units) were noted only in the area of Pskov, where they numbered up to two regiments.

In the rear areas of the Central Army Group, the eastern battalions, were almost unseen as solitary units independently completing security missions in the rear by the beginning of 1944. They remained in the field units as supply battalions, auto-transport columns, and other logistics units, and were likewise used as personnel for death squads.

Eight battalions of traitors remained in Crimea at the beginning of 1944 (for the Deployment of Eastern Battalions, see Attachment No. 6).

Nationalist formations

The traitorous units created by the Germans from other ethnic groups were formed at the end of 1942. In July 1943, there was a battalion of Azerbaijanis guarding the railway at Bryansk – Roslavl' that was formed in December 1942 in Częstochowa (Poland). Formed by forced recruitment of military POWs or by mobilization in the occupied regions, these traitorous formations for the most part turned out to be, like the others, poorly prepared for battle.¹²⁴

In May–December 1943, nationalist formations were established:

- a) Latvian – Latvian Legion of the SS – 1
 Latvian brigade of the SS – 1
 Latvian Division of the SS – 1
 Latvian Police Battalions – 10
 Latvian combat battalions – 3
 Latvian de-mining battalions – 1

In 1941–1942, they began to create police battalions in Latvia on the basis of self-defense units that performed a policing function. Around 20–25 battalions were formed, numbering from 200 to 600 persons each. In February 1943, the Germans began to form the Latvian SS Legion. The basis of its formation was the 16th, 19th, 21st, and 22nd Police Battalions, which had already demonstrated their loyalty to the Germans by participating in battles with the Red Army on the Leningrad Front. The legion was later renamed the 15th Latvian SS Division.

- b) Estonian – Estonian SS brigade – 1¹²⁵
 Estonian police battalions – 6
- c) Lithuanian – Lithuanian police battalions – 6
 Lithuanian battle battalions – 8

German attempts to create a Lithuanian SS legion did not meet with success and the Germans began to create “units of local self-defense” in Lithuania.

- d) Units from ethnic groups of the Caucasus¹²⁶
 - Battalions of North Caucasus peoples – 2
 - Armenian regiment – 1
 - Armenian battalions – 3
 - Georgian battalions – 1
 - Azerbaijani battalions – 4

- Turkestani legion – 1
- Turkestani battalions – 3

In the Crimea, a division of peoples from the North Caucasus (Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and others.) [sic]

Of all the nationalist formations on the front and in the fight with the partisans, the Latvian units are set apart by their level of activity. The rest, especially from the North Caucasus, have low levels of battle-readiness.

At the end of November, Lithuanian nationalists led by General Counsel Kubiliūnas began to speak to the Lithuanian people on the question of forming a “Lithuanian army” with the goal of “fighting Bolshevism.” The army would be put together by mobilizing and uniting all the existing guard/security battalions.¹²⁷

On 20–21 December, 1943 in Minsk, the Germans created the “Belorussian Central Council”¹²⁸ with Prof. Ostrovsky confirmed as president. The BCC had the task of “mobilizing all forces of Belorussians in the war with Bolshevism.” They intended to conduct forced recruitment of men aged 18 to 56. In a number of regions of Baranovich District, attempts had already been made to, following Ostrovsky’s instructions, to conduct forced recruitment of men into the “Belorussian army.” A “Belorussian division”¹²⁹ is supposedly being formed in Volozhin. (On the deployment of national formations, see addendum No. 7).

[...]

The dissolution of traitorous formations

The formations that had been assembled from POWs by means of starvation and coercion in no way exhibited high morale. The successful advance of the Red Army ultimately tore apart the moral spirit of the traitors. The work of the partisans for the dissolution of these units allowed the traitors to, *en masse*, cross over to the side of the partisans and desert, as a result of which the German command was forced to disarm them or send them deep into the rear territory.

According to partial data, for the time period from June through December 1943, more than 10 thousand traitors crossed

over to the side of the partisans with weapons in their hands. What's more, this crossover was accompanied by the killing of German officers, soldiers, and traitors in the garrisons or within their units. Crossing over to the partisans took place not only by group and sub-unit, but by whole larger units, for example the RLA SS regiment under the command of Rodionov, the 427th battalion of the RLA, three battalions of the Kaminsky brigade, and others.

In September, more than one thousand traitors crossed over to the side of the Leningrad partisans and more than two thousand were disarmed by the Germans.

In October–November, the Germans disarmed the 653rd, 668th, and 669th eastern battalions in the area of Dno and partially disarmed the 198th Armenian division, the 8th Turkestanian battalion, the 5th company of the 700th regiment, and others.

Aside from direct crossing-over to the side of the partisans by traitorous and police formations, massive desertion was noted. According to the indications of one deserter, from November to December 50 people deserted from the 315th Eastern Battalion, deployed in Dvinsk, some 70 people from the 314th, and some 150 people from the 283rd.

The partisans captured an order from the command of the Eastern Forces of the HCW under the 9th Army, issued on instruction of the Central Army Group and the Supreme Command of Infantry Forces from 29 September, 1943, on the transfer of volunteer formations from the eastern front to other theaters of military activity. The order motivates this activity with the desire of volunteers “not to shoot their compatriots, but to settle accounts directly with the English and Americans.” Undoubtedly, the real reason for this activity was the dissolution of “volunteer” units.

[...]

Head of the Intelligence Division
Central Headquarters for the Partisan Movement
Colonel S. Anisimov

[...]

Attachment No. 5DEPLOYMENT OF UNITS OF THE RLA

determined by partisan intelligence from 1 May through 31 December 1943

N° P	Unit number	Date established	Region of deployment	Number of personnel
1	2	3	4	5
1	3 rd Division of the RLA	14 June	Dyat'kovo	–
2	Kaminsky Brigade	7 July	Lokot' Region	12000
		December	Lepel' Region	4000
3	273 rd Regiment of the RLA	15 May	OPOCHKA	–
4	1 st SS Regiment of the RLA	17 May	Luzhki	1500
5	RLA Regiment Desna	15 May	Navlya, Altukhovo	–
6	198 th Regiment of the RLA	10 June	OPOCHKA	3000
7	1 st Reserve Regiment of the RLA	21 August	Bobruisk	2000
8	193 rd Regiment of the RLA	26 June	Bobruisk	–
9	125 th Regiment of the RLA	18 August	S. Bryansk	2000
10	700 th Gunnery Unit of the RLA	26 August	Minsk Region	–
11	82 nd battalion of the RLA	15 May	S. Bryansk	–

12	623 rd and 723 rd battalions of the RLA	25 May	Gorodok	–
13	16 th Reserve Battalion of the RLA	17 June	Dedovichi region	600
14	2 nd and 4 th Battalions of the RLA	23 June	Cherven’	800
15	Marching Guard Battalion of the RLA	29 June	Ostrov	650
16	624 th and 634 th Battalions of the RLA	10 July	Polotsk region	–
17	432 nd Battalion of the RLA	13 July	Osipovich region	180
18	603 rd Battalion of the RLA	1 June	Polotsk region	–
19	533 rd Battalion of the RLA	18 August	Polotsk region	–
20	6 th Battalion of the RLA	24 August	Novorzhev region	–
21	322 nd Battalion of the RLA	19 August	Pliussa region	–
22	46 th , 47 th , and 48 th Battalions of the RLA	6 September	Minsk region	–
23	115 th Battalion of the RLA	6 September	Kiev	–
24	118 th Battalion of the RLA	6 September	Chernigov	–
25	45 th Security Regiment of the RLA	20 October	Chikhaevo	–

26	427 th Battalion of the RLA	17 September	Vitebsk	180
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[...]

RGASPI. F. 69. Op. 1. D. 721. L. 1, 34–38, 53, 82–85. Original, copies.

N°42. Attachment to the report of an unidentified individual addressed to the High Command of Infantry Forces on the propagandist-volunteers from among Soviet POWs.

22 February, 1944

Copy

Addendum 3 к II/1534/geh.

High Command of Infantry Forces

General Headquarters of Infantry Forces, Main HQ, 22 February, 1944

Division of “Foreign Armies of the East” (lib/Prop)

Nr. 1222/44

Re[garding]: propaganda among Soviet POWs.

To: OKW/WFSt/WPr (IV05) Az. 2 f 24. 10. from 18 January, 1944

The excerpts below, taken from reports to authorities at the Administration for Propaganda of the Wehrmacht in camps for military POWs, illustrate the successes of voluntary Russian propagandists when used in a practical way and when they are suited for it.

Military POW Camp No. 2 Luftwaffe

As in other camps, all the positions in this Russian camp administration have been grabbed by a clique of well-masked Bolsheviks. They have enjoyed the full trust of the camp leadership,

which, in spite of all warnings from the intelligence officer, allowed them to fool themselves thanks to the “irreproachable” behavior of the Reds. Only in the most recent days has it been possible to make a breach and remove some of the Bolsheviks from the camp. The damage done by them is great. It can be offset only with time.

Stalag 182

Thanks to the active participation of Russian propagandist-volunteers, it has been possible to prevent many from running away and to destroy plans to run. Many instigators and disturbers of the peace in the camp have been uncovered. Readiness to work and productivity of work have significantly increased. All this is the work of Russian propagandist-volunteers.

Dulag 375

Rumors stemming from the current state of affairs and which have dealt a blow to propaganda have been repudiated thanks to the participation of Russian propagandist-volunteers. In work teams where there were propagandist-volunteers, it was possible to achieve growth in enthusiasm for and productivity of labor.

Stalag IV C

In one work team, the labor productivity of the prisoners working on the railroad increased on average from 60% to 100% over 5 months. The POWs observe excellent discipline and display interest. It has even been possible to strengthen the feelings of comradeship and solidarity in work teams. This has been a big relief for the team leaders. Each individual POW encourages his team comrades to work.

Stalag IV D

Prisoners’ labor productivity has significantly increased since the propagandist-volunteers have managed, in many cases, to convince the POWs that honest and conscientious work is equivalent to their active use at the front. Many who have problems have taken a liking to the propagandist-volunteers and often call on them for private conversations.

Stalag XII A

In one of the work teams, the attitude of the prisoners was very poor. This was caused by the guards’ treatment of the POWs. After a considerable altercation between one of the propagandist-

volunteers and the guards, the relationship fundamentally changed. Aside from all the rest, there was noted growth in labor productivity.

Stalag 3 There is noted growth in productivity everywhere. The thought that work achievements are an aspect of the fight against Bolshevism is increasingly accepted.

Stalag I B Violations in the garrison headquarters have come to light, exclusively thanks to the interference of a propagandist-volunteer. They will be dealt with immediately. The authority of the German leadership has been strengthened.

Stalag II E

Continual disruption in one of the auxiliary camps is the result of the communists' political terror. They managed to get hold of key positions. Among them are 4 Jew-doctors and 7 other doctors. The kitchen staff is almost exclusively communists. Communists have even infiltrated the camp police. The prisoners' anti-Bolshevik attitudes have been announced to be "harmful." With the cooperation of the propagandist-volunteers, 81 communists have been arrested. The campaign has had a positive influence.

Stalag VIII B

1. Decrease in the number of escapes as a result of explanatory activity of the propagandist-volunteers.
2. Successful fight against false information of Polish and Czech civilian workers.

Stalag VIII C

1. Improvement in the material condition of POWs, as a result of which the prisoners have been more open to propaganda.
2. Successful opposition of those Bolshevik elements that it has not, to date, been possible to expose as instigators and unmask.

Stalag IX A:

The opinion of the company: the participation of propagandist-volunteers is having an influence on the majority of POWs. They are becoming more calm and follow orders better in the company. The deficient ones are liquidated and corrected. Mistrust in the Bolshevik system is growing.

Stalag 350

With the help of one of the propagandist-volunteers in one work team, it was possible to unmask a large plunder of foodstuffs.

Stalag 366

A propagandist-volunteer, on uncovering harmful elements, nipped new unrest among the prisoners in the bud.

Transmission: according to instructions

By order of Dep.

Signature

Confirmed from the original

The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. F. 500. Op. 12466. D. 56. L. 232–234. Authenticated copy. Translation from the German.

N°43. Excerpt from the transcript of the interrogation of V. F. Sorokin on his service in the RLA and training in the German intelligence school.

21 May, 1944

EXCERPT FROM THE TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION
of the accused Vasiliy Fedorovich SOROKIN
from 21 May, 1944

V. F. SOROKIN, born 1914, born in Voronezh region, Schuchensky District, village Staroe-Barshevo, Russian, in the past he was a member of the Communist Party from 1939 through 1941, his education level reached 7th grade, he was a former commander of a platoon connected to the 2nd division, 388th artillery regiment, 172nd rifle division. He was captured by the Germans in September 1941.

... QUESTION: When and under what circumstances did you enter into the service of the counterrevolutionary so-called “Russian Liberation Army”?

ANSWER: I entered the service of the so-called “Russian Liberation Army” on 5 May, 1943 while at the camp for military

POWs in the town of Peremyshl' under the following circumstances:

On the dates of 10–12 April, 1943, a German army major and a translator, whose names I do not know, came to the Peremyshl' camp. These two gathered all the POWs together and announced that they had come to the camp to collect those desirous of serving in the Russian Liberation Army. Right away, without explaining the mission of this army, they began to put together a list, asking each person who expressed desire to serve for their first and last names.

At that time, I also expressed desire to serve in the RLA, and informed the major and his translator of my real first and last names... The major selected those who were physically in better health, who lived in a separate barracks, and in 12–15 days they took us to the town of Luckenwalde (Germany) and put us in a camp for military POWs, but in a separate barracks.

QUESTION: What did you do in this camp?

ANSWER: In this camp all those of us chosen for service in the RLA went through a quarantine and did not do anything.

Around 4 May, 1943, a colonel from the RLA came to us and, gathering the whole group together, announced that we had been selected for service in the army created by the Germans intended to fight against Bolshevism and the Soviet army. That same colonel announced that we would all enroll in the RLA school located in Dabendorf, near Berlin.

QUESTION: When did you arrive in Dabendorf?

ANSWER: I and the other POWs who expressed desire to serve in the RLA arrived in Dabendorf on 7 May, 1943 and were enrolled in the school, and on 12 May began our studies.

QUESTION: What kind of school is this that you were enrolled in?

ANSWER: This school was called the school for propagandists of the RLA, in which they prepared propagandists and battle unit officers for service in the RLA.

QUESTION: How did enrollment in the school happen?

ANSWER: On 9 May, which was two days after we arrived at the school for propagandists in Dabendorf, I was called for a

conversation with former Major General of the Red Army TRUKHIN, who held the leading position in the RLA and the school. The conversation took place in the club, and here they filled in a questionnaire from my words.

After filling out the questionnaire, TRUKHIN announced that I was enrolled in the school and that on graduation I would be sent to camps for POWs or work camps for agitation and propaganda work. This was the end of the conversation, and I was enrolled in the 3rd platoon of the 2nd company...

QUESTION: What questions did TRUKHIN discuss with you?

ANSWER: In the course of our conversation, TRUKHIN only asked me whether I agreed to fight against Bolshevism, to which I answered in the affirmative and stated that I was prepared to complete any task given to me.

QUESTION: When did you begin studies at the RLA school?

ANSWER: I began studies in the school together with the rest on 12 May, 1943. I was in the 3rd platoon, 2nd company. In all, there were 4 platoons in the school.

QUESTION: What was included in the course of study?

ANSWER: The program of study included the following disciplines:

1. German History
2. Study of the Condition of the German People
3. Bolshevism as the Enemy of the Russian People
4. Drilling exercises

Here, lectures were read 16 days of the month, and 14 days a month the staff of the school went out in platoons to German towns on excursions.

In the lectures on the themes of "The Condition of the German People" and "German History," the instructors praised fascism and its leaders in all ways. Due to their pro-fascist position, in their lectures on "Bolshevism as the Enemy of the Russian People," the instructors cursed the Soviet system and the Bolshevik party...

QUESTION: When did you complete this school?

ANSWER: On 9-10 July, 1943, it was announced to us that training in the school had been completed. Then all the students took an oath and were allowed to wear shoulder boards with rank

insignia indicating the rank that each had in the Red Army (before imprisonment). I wore the shoulder boards of a sub-lieutenant of the RLA.

QUESTION: When and to where were you sent after completion of this school?

ANSWER: On 16 July, 1943, I received the assignment of propagandist in Stalag No. 13 A, located in the town of Sulzbach-Rosenburg, where I was sent on 18 July of that year.

QUESTION: What exactly is Stalag No. 13 A?

ANSWER: Stalag No. 13 A is in charge of a group of camps for military POWs and work teams; it manages the assignment of prisoners to work at factories and in agriculture.

The Stalag is headed by a German army major whose last name I do not know. Sonderführer KRÜGER is in charge of propaganda among the prisoners, and under him the senior propagandist Nikolai Konstantinovich ANTONOVSKY, a former senior lieutenant of the Red Army, who finished the Dabendorf school together with me and had the rank of lieutenant of the RLA. I do not know anything more of the activities of the Stalag.

QUESTION: What designation did you receive in the Stalag?

ANSWER: On arriving in Sulzbach-Rosenburg, I ended up in the chain of command of Sonderführer KRÜGER, who announced that I would conduct propaganda work among the POWs who worked in German factories, and he named the following camps on the spot: camp No. 313 in the city of Schwandorf, camp No. 1004 in the city of Maksiutoheindhof, camp No. 303, and also camp No. 1018 near Regensburg.

On 18–19 July, having received from Sonderführer KRÜGER copies of the fascist newspapers *Zarya* and *Novaya Doba* in Russian and Ukrainian, published in Berlin and then in Dabendorf, I left for the work team in Maksiutoheindhof. Thus, until the end of August I traveled to the camps assigned to me and distributed literature with fascist content.

QUESTION: What did you do after the last days of August 1943?

ANSWER: At the end of August 1943 I was sent from the Stalag back to Dabendorf, where I remained until about 18

September of that year in anticipation of some kind of special assignment. Due to illness, however, I did not get the assignment and I was put in the hospital in the city of Lichtenrade, where I remained until the second half of November 1943.

Upon my recovery I arrived again in Dabendorf, where I was enlisted into the reserve officer staff to await being sent to the front. I should say that by that time the school for propagandists was no longer functioning, and the buildings were occupied by RLA soldiers and officers who had returned from the front.

QUESTION: How long were you in the reserves and what did you do there?

ANSWER: I was in the reserves from the second half of November through 20 December, 1943. On 25–28 August, 1943 I was sent to Berlin, where for a 24-hour period I stood guard at the home of former Lieutenant General VLASOV. On returning to Berlin, I returned to my studies, and on 20 December 1943 I departed, in a group of officers and soldiers, for the city of Mlava to enlist in the acting Cossack units created by the Germans from imprisoned Cossacks.

Seeing as I am Russian by ethnicity, they did not enlist me in the Cossack units and sent me back to the reserves—not to Dabendorf, but rather to Lötzen, an RLA special forces camp, where I was located until March 1944, that is, until the moment when I was recruited for cooperation with German intelligence...

QUESTION: Under what circumstances were you recruited for spy work for the Germans?

ANSWER: In the beginning of March 1944, a German intelligence officer, one Captain MENSHIKOV, arrived at the special operations camp of the so-called Russian Liberation Army in which I was living, located in the city of Lötzen. Not long after MENSHIKOV's arrival, that very day, most likely on his orders, the entire personnel of the camp was lined up in formation.

MENSHIKOV, addressing the formation that I was in, asked, "Who fears nothing and is ready to go through fire and water?" All without giving any explanation.

Since MENSHIKOV gave no explanation of his question, no one from the officers and soldiers of the RLA standing in formation

answered. That time no one recognized why MENSNIKOV had come and where he meant to select people for...

A week and a half to two weeks later, MENSNIKOV came to the special operations camp for a second time and again put everyone in formation by company. This time MENSNIKOV announced that he was selecting people who wanted to cooperate with German intelligence and work side by side with Red Army units to gather information.

After that announcement, I, SOROKIN, expressed a desire to conduct spy work to the advantage of the Germans...

QUESTION: When did you depart from the special operations camp?

ANSWER: Two days after Captain MENSNIKOV made a selection from among those who expressed a desire to work for German intelligence, he returned to the camp and sent us all to the city of Lykk, to the Neuendorf intelligence school, where I studied in a group of intelligence specialists...

... The majority of those who had signed up for training in the intelligence school were RLA officers who had graduated from military schools somewhere in France and were in the reserves at the special operations camp, waiting to be sent to the front...

QUESTION: How was your cooperation with German intelligence formalized?

ANSWER: When MENSNIKOV announced that he was selecting people for cooperation with German intelligence, other than compiling a list with last names, no other documents were produced. Documentation of my cooperation was produced somewhat later, on arrival at the Neuendorf school of German intelligence, around the last days of March of this year. I was called to the headquarters of the school, to the Sonderführer, whose name I do not know; he took my service record book, which I had with me, and asked me whether I agreed to cooperate with German intelligence and whether I knew that I had come to a school.

On receiving an affirmative answer, the Sonderführer had me sign a statement of commitment in which it was indicated that I was obligated to keep my cooperation with German intelligence secret

and not to divulge any secret information that I might learn in the process of undergoing training at the school.

In a short time, in April, I was photographed in a German uniform, which I wore every day. With this, my documentation as an agent was complete...

QUESTION: Were classes held in the Neuendorf school from the moment of your arrival from Lötzen?

ANSWER: When I, as part of the group of RLA officers recruited in the Lötzen special operations camp, arrived at the Neuendorf school, there were as many as 20 radio operators undergoing training. Those of us who had just arrived made up one academic group and underwent studies until 17 April, 1944.

QUESTION: During your stay in the school, did any other recruited RLA officers arrive there?

ANSWER: During the period of approximately 22 March through 1 April, 1944, two groups of officers numbering 40 people arrived from Lötzen, having been recruited by MENSNIKOV.

In the same period, a group of 20 people supposedly recruited in German units arrived at the camp. Where they really served after imprisonment and who personally recruited them I do not know.

QUESTION: What identity documents were you given at the school?

ANSWER: No documents were given to me nor to other individuals studying at the school. When they found themselves outside the bounds of the school, each agent was given an identification in German *Ausweis*. In this identification it was indicated that such and such legionnaire, located for service at military unit No. 03598, was released on leave until a certain hour.

QUESTION: What identification code did the school have and what was its mailing address?

ANSWER: The school command, on receiving reinforcements, gave the instruction that agents, in interactions with local residents, not divulge that an intelligence school was located there and suggested that questions be answered by saying that it was a "Russian legion" that had come for leave.

QUESTION: From which contingents was the Neuendorf German intelligence school made up?

ANSWER: As far as I know from personal interactions, there were 80 people studying with me who had been recruited from the traitors to the Homeland who crossed over into service under the Germans, either directly in their army or in the so-called Russian Liberation Army, and the officers of the RLA trained in a separate group from the soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the RLA. I do not know the makeup of the group of radio operators.

QUESTION: When did you finish training in the school?

ANSWER: Classes in the school ceased on 15–16 April of this year, and immediately afterward the completion of the school was announced...

QUESTION: When and where were you sent after finishing the school?

ANSWER: On the second day after graduation—around 17 April—our whole group, numbering 20 people including me, departed by train from the Lykk station to the city of Minsk and took up residence in the building of some intelligence office at Abutnova St., 34...

QUESTION: How long were you in the Minsk intelligence office?

ANSWER: I was at the Minsk intelligence office at 34 Abutnova St. through 9 May, 1944 and did not have any job...

QUESTION: When were you sent to the Soviet rear territory to complete an assignment?

ANSWER: On 9 May, 1944 at approximately 20.00, KOSITSKY – “SHABASOV” and I flew out on a two-engine plane from the Orshansk aerodrome to the Soviet rear territory and, after two hours of flight, were dropped with parachutes into Soviet territory, not far from the city of Nevel’...

This transcript was recorded from my words and read by me personally, and I hereby sign off on it.

INTERROGATED BY: HEAD OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
“SMERSH” OF THE 1ST BALTIC FRONT,
Major General KHANNIKOV

Authenticated: MOROZOV

Background: The original transcript of the interrogation is located in the archival investigative case against the accused SOROKIN V. F.

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. №N-18766. T. 5. L. 289–297. Authenticated copy.

№44. Excerpt from the battle report of the Russian volunteer battalion on the actions of the battalion against Allied Forces in Normandy.

Not earlier than 6 June, 1944

Copy of a copy

Infantry versus massive technical equipment

From the battle report of the Russian volunteer battalion

The location of the battalion was moved to the center of resistance. Here, not far from the ammunition bunker, are gathered the units of the battalion that are being used on this site. They have heavy battles under their belts, successes they can be proud of, and a difficult time. Some comrades that helped to beat back the first attack of the enemy are no longer with us. But the battle spirit of the people is not broken. Now, armed only with infantry weapons, they are still successfully opposing an enemy armed to a greater degree with tanks, artillery, and other heavy weapons. Fewer than 48 hours ago, they destroyed an enemy group of paratroopers that numbered more than four hundred fighters to the last man, and then they held the enemy for days at their field positions, surprising two Sherman tanks with their Faustpatrone. And using only basic weapons, they forced the landing of five enemy planes. One of these planes was shot from the carbine of a German lieutenant and Russian lance-corporal, another fell after machine-gun fire from a Russian non-commissioned officer, and the other three thanks to joint fire from German and Russian troops in the battalion.

Now the troops that the battalion commander gathered around him are clinging to their command post. Even before this battle, the number of enemy dead was several times our own losses thanks to this battle group. Now that number is growing from minute to minute. But the superiority of the enemy in this position is too great. Pinned down on all sides, under fire from enemy artillery and attacks from fighter planes, in the thunder of shots from RPGs, the condition of the surrounded unit is becoming increasingly threatening. The commander has decided on a breakthrough operation. But first the ammunition bunker must be destroyed; nothing should fall into enemy hands. Lieutenant M. takes responsibility for this. It works. With a deafening roar, chunks of cement and metal shrapnel and shells go flying around the enemy and force them to drop to the ground for a time. In the explosion, Lieutenant M. meets a soldier's death. But his death gives his comrades a chance. They use it. Before the booming of the explosion died down and the enemy raised their heads from taking cover, they got ahead of them, and rifle butts, bayonets, pistols, and hand grenades once again brought in a rich harvest. When the breakthrough operation succeeded, it was without our own losses.

One kilometer to the west of the old position there stretches a new line of defense. Units of the volunteer battalion that occupy a position at Vire are supported by the 1st German infantry platoon, the 1st propelled grenade detachment, and the 1st infantry gun platoon. Both bridges, one of them a railway, can be burned or demolished when the time is right. The participation of Russian Offiz. S. is greatly important to the demolition of both bridges. The enemy is using superior resources to try to achieve the crossing. They are using a battle-ready battalion, artillery, and tanks. Again and again their attacks break up at the defensive line. It is holding. The American tanks have to restock again. The bushes that the defenders have dug in behind are torn away by enemy fire, the earth churning under the constant hail of blows from the large guns, but every time the enemy infantry begins a charge, they are met with continuous barrage fire and fall back. Now only 25 men defend the passage. The battle has been going on for 18 hours. Then the enemy manages to break through. A short, all-out, close-

quarters battle. Our unit is fighting desperately, but the enemy's superiority is too great. The defenders of the blocking position are forced to fall back.

The next day they are in battle again. They were reinforced by units of the battalion that had been broken away, and they again demonstrate their significant fighting power. The enemy advanced and is holding the high position they took, which has great significance for the continuation of the operation. The volunteer battalion is being used to strike back. The first attack chokes under the insane barrage fire from the Americans. The second also fails to reach its goal. The company commander, Lieutenant M., and some Russian commanders of the unit died. Lieutenant K. takes command. Under his leadership, the third counter-attack is successful. People burst through to the position of the Americans and kill them. All the enemy's counter-attacks—which are delivered with the usual Western-style massive use of live forces and technical assistance—are met with fierce opposition from the German and Russian infantry.

Together with the battle unit that they now belong to and the two German battalions, they violently rebuff all the attacks of the next day. However, the soul of the opposition is the commander of the battle unit, Major B., who has been announced as killed in action several times already, who broke through enemy positions alone with his automatic rifle, who gathered 18 people and led them in a successful counter strike, who was always at the front, an example, and through his unconditional personal participation inspires his people and embodies the kind of German infantryman that the enemy so fears.

And today B.'s battle unit, under the leadership of their experienced commander, is again used in the center of the current battles so often mentioned in military reports. Alongside the Russian volunteers, who, serving in the first Russian battalion formed under the German Wehrmacht, proudly wear the symbol of the skull on their caps, there are German units the names of which are well known and call forth fear not only from our Anglo-American enemy. And when the fire of the enemy's 38-millimeter guns temporarily falls quiet, when there is a pause in the grenade

launchers and all other caliber of weapons, when the roar of bombing raids falls quiet along the line, and the American infantryman gets up from his foxhole in order to take control without risking a territory that seems completely pummeled, then from half-caved-in foxholes, from pits, and from the remnants of cover smoke appear the infantrymen in defense, who fight as though possessed, a possession that again and again fills the enemy with confusion and fear. These infantrymen have passed through an endless trial, a trial such that they do not speak of it, one that can be measured only by one who lived it, but they stand against the current material superiority of the enemy and fight with dogged stubbornness based on the fact that this is now about the most important thing.¹³⁰

Woe to the defeated!

Signature Erik Jakobson, Standartenführer

copy is authenticated

signature

Captain

The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. F. 500k. Op. 12466. D. 56. L. 144–145. Authenticated copy. Translation from the German.

N°45. Memorandum from SA Hauptsturmführer S. Fröhlich to the German High Command on the mood of General Vlasov.

Glienick, 16 June, 1944

Volunteer Unit of Propaganda Special Forces. Glienick, 16 June, 1944

Copy

To the High Command of Army Forces/ General Headquarters of the Army.

To the general of vol[unteer] form[at]ions]

Re[garding]: memorandum of SA Hauptsturmführer S. Fröhlich¹³¹

The memorandum given below is the notes of SA Hauptsturmführer S. Fröhlich, who was attached to Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov. The conversations on which the notes are based are of an absolutely personal nature and reflect the mood of Lt. Gen. Vlasov. They happened in the last weeks not long before the offensive.

With original authenticated Signature

Ober-[eutnant] Cavalry Captain and Deputy Chief of Staff

[Attachment]

Copy

SA Hauptsturmführer S. Frelich

Memorandum

Recently I have been able to observe principal changes in several of A. A.'s views. I was already able to notice these new views 2-3 months ago, but at that time I considered them accidental utterings. These utterings have been repeated with increasing frequency. The beginning of the offensive was, in all likelihood, the psychological trigger that strengthened A. A. in his new attitudes.

Here, I am conveying (the sense of) A.A.'s utterings in the order in which they were made.

1. You Germans are nevertheless strange people. You do not want to work with decent people. You only want to work with paid mercenaries, but even then you try to economize on the pay. You would like to buy people for 5 pfennigs. For these 5 pfennigs, we are supposed to stand at attention and reply "exactly so" and "yes, sir."

2. In China, they not only fulfilled all my wishes, but Chiang Kai-shek took every opportunity to, in one way or another, pay attention to me, in friendship and respect. For example, when I first left on leave to Russia, I had still not been paid my salary. Ch. gave the instruction (without any request on my part, on his own initiative) to pay me an advance of \$2,000. In addition, he gave me an additional \$3,000 as a gift.

3. In Vinnitsa, where I spent the first part of my imprisonment, I had to wash my own clothes. I did not have a towel. To wipe myself off, I used one of my foot wraps. Of course, I was a prisoner, but nevertheless I was a prisoner who was a general. But to the Germans I was a sub-human for whom foot wraps were good enough.

4. After I won my first major battle for Chiang Kai-shek, I was awarded the highest Chinese award, the Golden Order. It was awarded to me in the presence of all the highest-ranked military officers and Ch. and his wife personally. It is worth remembering that at that time I was only a young division general. Believe me, I felt happy then. I felt that Ch. highly valued me, trusted me, and saw in me a strong and reliable cohort and friend.

5. I came to you, Germans, to fight. It is my craft, one that I have been working on for more than 25 years already. I still consider myself to be a good and experienced general and military leader. I was even the Deputy [People's] Commissar for Defense. I was in command of three fronts. Here in Germany, I am not needed. They refused the services I offered. They did not even speak with me. Here, with you, I have grown close to one person with whom I can discuss things, with whom I can share my opinions, but he is just a young captain. Higher-ranking officers, evidently, do not have any interest in me. I am a sub-human, after all. I also cannot understand you just on a practical level. One way or another, I know Stalin personally, I am acquainted with his ploys; in certain cases I could even predict his actions. I also know all the higher military leadership of the Soviet Union, and I can say for certain who among them is capable of what. But you Germans, you think you know everything so much better. My opinion does not interest anyone. As a result, I sit in my little house in Dahlem, tan myself in the garden, and play cards, all while there are battles going on at the front.

6. A powerful propaganda campaign was conducted in my name, and it is still being conducted now. I helped you get troops. And even today I am doing everything in my power to prevent this army from falling apart. Do they value this activity of mine? Not at all. They continue to treat me, again and again, as a sub-human. For

example, I, supposedly the commanding officer of the so-called Russian Liberation Army, have only one set of underwear. The long underwear I wear are tied in a knot because they are torn at the end.

7. I am sure that Marshal Paulus was interrogated after being taken prisoner – if not by Stalin himself, then at the very least by his closest colleagues – and that they continued to consult him often on various issues. Certainly he never lacks for anything.

8. Whether the Russians and the Germans want it or not, whether they like it or not, they are connected to one another. The two peoples have a common path. This can be seen geographically, politically, and ethnographically. And when the hour comes – and that it will come I truly believe – when our peoples will stand shoulder to shoulder, then the rest of the world will be left to kneel before us. I have long understood that Germany does not share this point of view. Nevertheless, I remain convinced of my opinion that the day of epiphany is not far away.

9. For me, as a soldier, it is unbearable to sit with my hands folded and observe how my garden grows green, then the leaves fall, how the snow falls as well, and then how everything grows green again, all while the fate of my people is being decided on the battlefields. Why do they not give me anything to do? At least give me something small – like a division, for example – and I could show them what I am capable of.

10. Fifteen million Russians are on this side of the front. A large share of them were drawn in and fooled with the help of my name. And I participated in that trickery because I remained silent. I also share responsibility for the fate of these Russians. The possibility for these people to return to the Soviet Union is gone. They believed me, or, more precisely, they believed my name, and therefore I am now obliged to show them the way they should go.

11. Thousands and thousands of Russian people, whether they are fighters in the RLA, Eastern Workers [*Ostarbeiter*], or POWs, feel tricked and lost. They placed their trust in me. They see in me an honest Russian general who should lead them. The Stalinist propaganda that announced that I was a traitor and an enemy of the people achieved the opposite of its intended result.

12. To this point, German propaganda and the kinds of actions taken in the East have done everything possible to strengthen Stalin's position. Today Stalin is far stronger, and also more popular, than he was just one year ago. Lenin says in one of his works, "Victory goes to him, who has the people on his side." The Germans rejected the Russian people and drove them into the Stalinist camp. If the actions [of the Germans] in the east do not undergo fundamental changes, the outcome of the war is clear to me. My own life plays no role. But the fate of 15 million Russian people plagues my conscience.

13. More than anything, I value my reputation. No one can accuse me of dishonest deeds. Here in Germany, I gave my word to cooperate. And I am keeping my word, and if it becomes necessary, I will personally take part in battle. Even if fate turns out to be against us, I will nonetheless remain loyal to the partnership. I am also convinced that the Germans would never hand me over to Stalin, whatever the potential terms for peace might be.

14. Thousands of Russians, with weapons in their hands, stand on the side of the Germans. But they have no goal to fight for. I fear that these troops could disappoint in the coming military actions in the west. And from this, certainly, false conclusions will be drawn. They will say that they support the communists, but these are just Russians who want to fight for their homeland and not for "three cigarettes." But it would be so easy to turn these disappointed battalions into first-class troops. What pleasure it would give me to take on this task. But they do not need my help. They know everything as it is without me.

15. The offensive has begun in the west. The English and the Americans are on the continent. The hour of truth is at hand. If it is to be defeat, then the fate of 15 million Russians is already decided, a fate that has no equal in history in terms of its cruelty and hopelessness.

16. I think that I could have done much to influence events in the west for the better. Defense has always been the Russian soldier's strong suit—he just has to know what he is fighting for and believe in his great leader.

If they were to put a task in front of me, I would gladly take it up. In this critical time I do not want to speak of any political treaties, promises, or the like. This is not the time for that. For all of us, Germans and Russians, it is a matter of to be or not to be. I would multiply the battle strength of the Russian troops in the west tenfold. I would see to it that they were capable, even if nine out of ten had already died, of rushing the machine guns during an advance of the enemy infantry and of fighting to the last shell.

Copy is authentic
Oberleutnant

BA-MA. RH/2/1517. Bl. 220–226. Authenticated copy. Translation from the German.

N°46. Letter from representative of the Reich Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Supreme High Command of Army Forces von Etzdorf to the Legation Counselor [*Legationsrat*] (with the right to report) von Schmieden on the actions of the Eastern battalions on the Western Front.

27 June, 1944
Headquarters [HCW], 27 June, 1944
No. 1326/44

Dear von Schmieden,

Thank you for your words from the 23rd of this month.

Regarding the use of Eastern and Turkestani battalions in the West, I am sending material separately. I would like to note that according to the information of the Intelligence Corps under the general of the volunteer formations, the Eastern battalions (that is, the Russian and Ukrainians) have made a good show of themselves in the West. In several positions they fought literally to the last man. This was reflected in the Wehrmacht report you made note of, the

contents of which were agreed upon with Field Marshals von Rundstedt and Rommel.¹³² There is a small shadow over the Turkestani units, including the Georgian battalion, which did not live up to expectations.

Kamphefner arrived this morning and before going any farther, he will stay here for some time to await a vehicle, driver, etc. During that time he will have a seat at my desk, since the State Secretary has allowed me to step away for a couple of days.

With heartfelt greeting

Heil Hitler!

[signature] von Etzdorf

P.S. I would be very grateful if it turned out to be possible for me to continually receive copies of communications officer Richter's reports.

Published in: *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945*. Serie E. Bd. VIII: 1 Mai 1944 bis 8 Mai 1945 (Göttingen, 1979), p. 141. Doc. 80.

N°47. Dispatch of the Head of the Political Administration of the 1st Belorussian Front S. T. Galadzhev to the head of the Main Political Administration of the Red Army A. S. Scherbakov on former Red Army service members ending up in enemy camps.

1 July, 1944

Secret

TO THE HEAD OF THE MAIN POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION
OF THE RED ARMY
COLONEL GENERAL Comrade SCHERBAKOV

On the former service members of the Red Army ending up in enemy camps

The head of the Political unit of the 48th Army Colonel MIFTAKHOV reported to me today that of the prisoners taken by the 48th army in the region of Bobruisk, it was determined that more than 3 thousand were former Red Army service members. The majority of them were born in and live in Kursk and Orel' districts, fell prisoner to the Germans in 1941–1942, and then served in the units of the traitor and German spy VLASOV.

So far we lack exact data describing the true frame of mind of these people, since we are currently sorting and studying them. But from the stories of the soldiers who met with the Vlasov-supporters in battle, it is clear that in the first days of our advance they fought on the side of the Germans with the despair of the doomed.

In order to fool our soldiers and cause us losses, the Vlasov-supporters would engage in any provocation.

FOR EXAMPLE, during battle, a Red Army soldier firing from somewhere under cover would suddenly hear in front of him Russian speech. Most often it was the words "Don't shoot!" or "Where are you shooting—we are on your side!" But after that, when our soldier ceased fire and came out from cover, the Vlasov-supporters would open fire on him with a machine gun.

They also used another method of provocation. Somewhere in the rough terrain, the moan of a wounded man was heard and again: "Help me, guys!" Not suspecting anything, the Red Army soldiers would rush to help, but instead of our wounded soldier, it would turn out to be a Vlasov-supporter, who met them with a hail of bullets.

All this has exacerbated the Red Army soldiers' hatred of the Vlasov-supporters. Many soldiers say, "These traitors are worse than the Germans." Political workers from the 28th Army¹³³ note that during battle the Red Army soldiers did not take the Vlasov people prisoner, but killed them on sight.

HEAD OF THE POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION

1ST BELORUSSIAN FRONT¹³⁴

MAJOR GENERAL GALADZHIEV

The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. F. 32. Op. 11289. D. 577. L. 105-106. Original.

N°48. From the journal entry of Reich Minister for Propaganda P. J. Goebbels on the German command's decision to create the National Committee "Free Russia."

29 August, 1944

[...] At last we have made a decision regarding the Russian opposition movement and General Vlasov. Vlasov should receive particular recognition from our side. The Russian opposition movement should form, following the example of the National Committee "Free Germany,"¹³⁵ a National Committee "Free Russia," though not under the name of Russia, since we do not want to have anything to do with Russians as a whole, but only with individual peoples of Russia, and in particular with Ukrainians, Belorussians, etc. The statute has been worked up, though currently it seems somewhat illusory. The question could be asked of why we did not choose to take this entirely correct course of action two years ago? At that time, we would have been able to achieve significant political advantages. Currently, these advantages are more of a theoretical nature due to a lack of numbers.

Published in: Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels.¹³⁶ Teil II. Diktate 1941-1945. Band 13: Juli-September 1944. München. 1996. S. 352.

N°49. From the journal entry of P. J. Goebbels on the tasks before the newly created National Committee "Free Russia."

17 September, 1944

[...] D'Alquen [D'Alquen]¹³⁷ explained the Vlasov problem to me. He still thinks that it is possible to create a government with Vlasov – if no longer with the peoples of the East, then at least with the Eastern workers. He therefore wants this task given to Vlasov immediately. The Führer has also stated that he is more or less in agreement. It is true, I think, that it is already too late for all this. Vlasov should create the National Committee “Free Russia” on the example of the National Committee “Free Germany,” the Moscow head of which is General Seydlitz.¹³⁸ In this way, on both sides it is a case of generals who have betrayed their people. But with regard to Vlasov, it is possible to stand by the point of view, “I despise betrayal, but I make use of the betrayer.” [...]

Published in: Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels. Teil II. Diktate 1941–1945. Band 13: Juli–September 1944. München. 1996. S. 503.

N°50. From the daily meeting schedule of Reichsführer SS H. Himmler.

18 September, 1944

Business meetings of Reichsführer SS 18.9.1944

[...]

14:00 Lunch with

General Vlasov

Obergruppenführer SS Berger

Oberführer SS Krüger

Standartenführer SS D'Alquen

Obersturmbannführer SS Grotman

16:00 Conversation with

General Vlasov

Obergruppenführer SS Berger¹³⁹

Oberführer SS Krüger¹⁴⁰

Standartenführer SS Ehlich

Standartenführer SS D'Alquen

17:00. Obersturmbannführer SS Franke-Griksch
[...]

The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. F. 500. Op. 12493. D. 5. L. 43. Copy. Translation from the German.

N°51. Letter of General A. A. von Lampe to the head of the Southeast Division of the Unification of Russian Military Alliances Colonel S. D. Gegelashvili on his participation in the meeting with General A. A. Vlasov and criticism of the preparation of the manifesto.

Berlin, 4 October, 1944

Highly respected Solomon Davidovich,¹⁴¹

Her Highness¹⁴² already wrote to me that a “most lovely and charming young Tsurikov” came to see her. I already wrote to thank him. I send heartfelt thanks to you as well. How much did the trip cost? I will pay for it.

Regarding the archive and my archive, I already sent you a revision of your statement, to which I did not add anything for lack of time.

General Vlasov is conducting meetings. Yesterday, at one such meeting, there was a General Biskupsky, General Abramov,¹⁴³ and I. The latter departed to you in Prague—ask him and he will tell you all in detail. I do not know yet *how* I will react to all this. I need to focus better. It is possible that the necessity of not leaving the interests of the *Whites* undefended could cause me to *personally* go farther than I would like. But I cannot yet say that definitively. In any case, I already wrote to Vlasov protesting the fact that in the manifesto of the future committee (government), nothing is said of the *White* soldiers of the 1917–1920 war in Russia.

How did S. V. Taboritsky behave with you?

I warmly shake your hand, with sincere respect for you,

A. von Lampe¹⁴⁴

Note: 11 October, 1944. Answered.

The State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF). F. 5796. Op. 1. D. 21. L. 264. Original. On the letterhead of Major General of Headquarters A. A. von Lampe.

N°52. Report of Hauptsturmführer SS to the division of the Security Services III B 2 Gestapo Weimar on the opinion of the Eastern workers regarding the “Vlasov Project” and the possibility of joining the RLA.

Weimar, 7 October, 1944

Security Services Reichsführer SS Weimar, 7 October, 1944
Division of the Security Services, Weimar, Mayerstrasse 50, tel. 3424
Journ. No. 1271-44
Vf/W
to the division of the Security Services – III B 2

Weimar

Re[garding]: the project of General Vlasov
Doc[ument]: Circular letter from 27 September, 1944

Regarding the meeting of Himmler¹⁴⁵ with Vlasov, two differing opinions of Russian workers can be pointed out. The minority thinks that Germany will nonetheless lose the war and be occupied by the English and Americans. In this case, it is worth trying not to fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks, because the Bolsheviks will

never forgive those who worked for Germany and they are the allies of the English and the Americans. Among these Russians there is a widespread opinion that England and America will liquidate Bolshevism in Russia after victory and establish "true democracy." "If we fight with Vlasov today, we will surely be lost," say these Russians, "because the English and Americans will not forgive it." The other group of Russians believes that the meeting between Himmler and Vlasov is the salvation for the Eastern workers and honors them. However, it should have happened much sooner, and they regret that the Germans did not understand this earlier. Victory over Bolshevism in Russia is possible only in the event of coordinated action with the real Russian army. Therefore, it is necessary to have exclusively Russian military institutions that understand well the needs of the Russian soldiers. Further, the Russians said, "We expressed the desire to join Vlasov's army many times, but we were always refused. They always told us that we should join the SS forces. But we do not want to do this, because it is not a real Russian unit." Other Russians said, "Even in the event that Germany is defeated, it will be better for us to die as soldiers then end up as slaves in Siberia and be hung by the Bolsheviks. We also think that the life of a soldier is better than life in a camp."

Obersturmführer SS

The State Archive of Thuringia - Main City Archive of Weimar. NS 29/17. Bl. 3r. Original. Translation from the German.

N°53. Telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany J. von Ribbentrop to envoy F. von Leitner on the possibility of using General A. A. Vlasov and the creation under his leadership of a liberation committee.

Special Train "Westphalia" 21 October. 1944

Telegram

Copy (of a copy)

Special Train "Westphalia," 21.10.1944

Re[garding]: Russian politics

I had hoped to see the Reichsführer SS in his headquarters in order to speak to him on the following matter. But as this was not a possibility for the Reichsführer and as I must leave this evening on the orders of the Führer, I ask you to find the Reichsführer SS and tell him the following from me: the entire German-Russian coalition presents a question that occupies me every day regarding our foreign policy. I recently read in the press that the Reichsführer SS received General Vlasov in order to discuss with him the question of military use of Russian forces in the fight against the East. At the same time I hear that the main SS administration is making an effort to activate the military and labor use of Russian forces in our hands for our fight against Bolshevism. Please tell the Reichsminister SS that I wholly welcome these efforts and I hope that they will significantly ease the further conduct of the war for us and will end, in all senses, in success. Now, I ask you to inform the Reichsminister SS that I have long ago suggested to the Führer that he make an attempt to use General Vlasov as a partner against the Russians and organize some sort of Liberation Committee under his leadership and that of other Russians with famous names. At the time, the Führer did not show any inclination toward a more detailed discussion of the question, since, as I recall, the possibility of success of such a venture against Stalin seemed very unlikely to him, and in addition, he did not consider it generally desirous to take on the question of a political resolution to the eastern problem, since he did not want it to have a negative effect on the fighting spirit of the German army.

I just raised the question of Vlasov with the Führer again through you, in the framework of our general foreign policy and in connection with the intentions of the Head Administration of the SS in Berlin, which informed one of our people, and articulated to the Führer from the point of view of foreign policy my point of view on the entire Vlasov situation. As I was told, the Führer answered that I should handle the political regulation of issues connected

with the Vlasov situation and other issues directly concerning him myself.

I am therefore planning to meet with General Vlasov myself soon, something I have continually postponed in the past – in spite of the pressure put on me by my Russian colleagues – due to the Führer's position on this issue. I hope during this meeting with Vlasov to create a clear picture for myself of which ideas he supports and how practical it would currently be to move him forward politically speaking. As has been reported to me, there is some thought in the SS main administration as well in the course of using the Russian forces we already have as to whether it might not be useful to offer General Vlasov a somewhat broader political platform. As has been reported to me, the thought was raised of possibly, if need be, creating a Russian Liberation Committee under Vlasov's leadership. Does the creation of this make sense from the political perspective; who could, under certain circumstances, be included in this committee aside from Vlasov; what is the relationship to this question of various representatives eager for the independence of the Russian peoples; and how capable will such a committee be of influencing the East, or the West, in the interests of our foreign policy?

In any case, if it is indeed created, then it will be led politically by myself or people appointed by me, at the same time that the issues concerning its activity in spheres under our authority (military issues, questions of using labor forces, etc.) will be resolved by the Reichsführer SS and his people. Therefore it is absolutely clear that close cooperation between my channels and the channels of the Reichsführer SS is necessary. Please tell the Reichsführer of my mandate and that I will immediately inform him of the results of my conversation with Vlasov. As you know, from the very beginning of the war we have been studying the Russian question both within the Russian department and in a specially organized Russian committee. This committee will become the channel that, under my guidance, will implement the political leadership of Vlasov and his people, etc., and which will be responsible for all political questions connected to the Liberation Committee that is to be organized.

Please inform the Reichsführer SS that I would welcome him assigning one of his people to continual participation in the meetings of my Russian committee. Since I do not know when I will meet with the Reichsführer SS in the near future, and in order to provide for close cooperation from the very beginning between political interests concerning Russia and the interests that the Reichsführer represents, I appointed state secretary Steengracht to contact the SS Headquarters in Berlin. I would be grateful to the Reichsführer if he would give corresponding instructions to his Berlin deputy who handles these issues in the SS main administration, so that he and state secretary Steengracht have the opportunity to discuss these questions and accurately determine the organizational tasks of both channels.

I ask you to give the SS Reichsführer my warmest greetings, and to inform state secretary Steengracht of the name of the gentleman in Berlin who, as deputy to the Reichsführer SS, should handle these questions from the SS main administration of the SS. State Secretary Steengracht has been informed by me.

Ribbentrop¹⁴⁶

Published in: *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945* (ADAP). Serie E. Band VIII. 1 Mai 1944 bis 8 Mai 1945. (Göttingen, 1979), pp. 510–512. doc. 279. Translation from the German.

Republished in part in: *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine*, Vol. 5. Book 2 (Moscow, 2007): pp. 809–811.

N°54. Memorandum of the Inspector of Foreign Personnel of the Air Force “East” regarding the planned formation of air forces of the RLA.

Berlin, Kladow, 22 October, 1944

Secret

Inspector of Foreign Personnel
of Air Force “East”

N°229/44 geh. (I)

MemorandumTasks and activities of service— Inspector of Foreign Personnel
of Air Force “East” for the introduction of the planned formation
of air forces of the Russian Liberation Army

Distribution:

(only draft)

to the head of the General Headquarters for the Air Force

A. In the course of the planned creation of a regular, battle-ready Russian Liberation Army, as discussed between Reichsführer SS Himmler and Lieutenant General Vlasov, it should at first consist of three infantry divisions, and then there are plans to form an air force of the Russian Liberation Army. In this framework, according to the plans of Colonel (of the RLA) Maltsev,¹⁴⁷ whom Lt. Gen. Vlasov appointed to command the air force of the Russian Liberation Army and who ordered him that there should be formed:

- 1) Headquarters of the Air Force of the Russian Liberation Army (46 officers, 25 non-commissioned officers, 30 people of rank and file).
- 2) Aviation units
 - a) 1 squadron of fighter aircraft (83 persons of flight crew), 10 Me-109 or Fv-190;
 - b) 1 squadron of attack bombers (93 persons of flight crew; 10 Yu-87);
 - c) 1 cell of bombers (97 persons of flight crew, 5 Khe-111);
 - d) 1 squadron of communications (83 persons of flight crew; 5 Fi-156, 5 U-2);
 - e) 1 reserve squadron (189 persons basic flight crew, up to 500 persons temporary flight crew, 2 Me-108, Khe-111, Yu-87, Fi-156 and U-2, 1 Me-109.)
- 3) Units of air defense artillery
 - a) 3 anti-aircraft battalions, in each 3 batteries (in each four 7.5 cm guns) (in each battalion 367 people)

- b) 1 reserve anti-aircraft regiment of 5 units with 3 batteries (in each four guns from 3.7–7.5 cm.) (212 permanent staff, up to 1,380 persons temporary staff)
- 4) 4 companies of propaganda (in each 10 officers, 150 non-commissioned officers and rank and file)

II. Colonel (of the RLA) Maltsev, with the agreement of Lt. Gen. Vlasov, suggests that:

- 1) The formation and deployment of units indicated in points 1), 2) and 3) be implemented if possible in the Sudetes, where ground forces for the Russian Liberation Army should likewise be formed and deployed;
- 2) The development of resources indicated in points 1) and 2) for aviation units be conducted on one aviation base, and the headquarters of the air forces of the Russian Liberation Army likewise be located near this aviation base.

III. Recruitment of personnel from the eastern peoples for the planned headquarters and military units [air forces of the RLA] will be conducted directly by the leadership of the air force of the Russian Liberation Army for the participation of

- a) volunteer air force—representatives of eastern peoples,
- b) Soviet POWs suitable for service in the air force,
- c) specially selected volunteers from eastern peoples serving in the infantry forces of the Wehrmacht,
- d) other representatives of peoples of the Soviet Union called to the Russian Liberation Army who are located on the territories controlled by Germany.

IV. All provisioning of the air force of the Russian Liberation Army with technical equipment—first and foremost planes, trucks, weapons, and ammunition—should be, on the contrary, the task of the German Air Force. Thus, the services of the German Air Force should provide them, since the AF of the RLA does not as yet have specially trained cadres in the areas of:

- a) issues of communications and signals,
- b) administration in general,
- c) legal support.

The Russian Liberation Army should be able to provide sanitary service of the actual members of the air force from its own sources, initially in planned units. The administration of sanitary service, and likewise the organization of field hospitals, on the other hand, should be implemented by the German side.

V. The leadership of the AF of the RLA should create its own institutions of security within its units. But the task of the German leadership remains to introduce measures taken by this side to agree with the fundamentals of the German Abwehr.

VI. In the current presented plans of the leadership of the air force of the Russian Liberation Army there is no provision for an organization that would manage the issues of leave, families, wounded and invalids, and relatives of the deceased service members. However, in light of the use of a large number of volunteers from among the eastern peoples, it is critically necessary to create one for these air forces. It should be created by the German side with the participation of representatives of the eastern peoples.

B. On the basis of contacts with those services of the General Command of the Air Force that will be undertaken in this regard, today we can confirm that:

- 1) The leadership of the German Air Force is prepared to support the formation of an air force of the Russian Liberation Army.
- 2) The transfer of personnel necessary for this formation from among the eastern volunteers and POWs suitable for service in the air force will not present any difficulties.
- 3) The transfer of airplanes to outfit the aviation units is possible.

- 4) At the same time, [the air force] in the near future lacks the material necessary to conduct training exercises and training and combat flights.
- 5) In light of a lack of large guns, the planned anti-aircraft units may at first be organized so that individual anti-aircraft batteries are gradually replaced by personnel from the eastern peoples and then given to the air force of the Russian Liberation Army.
- 6) For the development and deployment of aviation units of this Air Force, they may be provided with the aerodrome Eger, on condition that the 2,200 cadets of the SS currently located there be withdrawn. In addition, opportunity to locate the flight school A at that location must be provided.
- 7) Implementation on the part of the leadership of the German AF of all necessary measures for the deployment of air forces of the Russian Liberation Army are given to Lt. Gen. Aschenbrenner¹⁴⁸ as inspector of foreign personnel of the Air Force "East,"¹⁴⁹ who retains his leadership of the communications units of the AF. Personnel of the inspector's headquarters, the size of which needs to be increased, will be used to staff the services responsible for communications with the leadership of the German AF and the leadership of the AF of the Russian Liberation Army. A German communications officer, together with the most essential auxiliary personnel, should be appointed to individual units of the air force of the Russian Liberation Army.

C) In planning the organization of services in accordance with section B, points 7 and 8, it is necessary to consider the following:

- 1) The decrease in the number of eastern volunteers and Soviet POWs directly active in the German AF due to their transfer in the near future to the AF of the Russian Liberation Army will be insignificant (max. approximately 2,500 persons); in direct service to the German AF there will remain around 20,000 eastern volunteers and around

120,000 Soviet POWs, of whom approximately 95% will be activated as auxiliary personnel in anti-aircraft units and practically 100% of the volunteers and prisoners who are occupied in construction units of the air force.

- 2) It is worth considering that the formation of the Russian Liberation Army will provide a powerful jolt to the efforts of the majority of the Soviet POWs who are among those troops to cross over to the status of volunteer, especially as it concerns the auxiliary personnel of the anti-aircraft batteries.
- 3) In these circumstances, further leadership should be provided by the eastern volunteer troops activated on a full-time basis and by Soviet military POWs who are still in the hands of the Inspector for Foreign Personnel of the Military Forces “East.”
- 4) It will somewhat lessen the burden of the inspector in the assignments before him to transfer to the air force units of the Russian Liberation Army
 - a) battle-ready eastern volunteers and flight-technical staff,
 - b) those forces of the eastern propagandist-volunteers already activated in air force units and intended for use for the same purposes in the future.

In this case, the already-formed units of eastern propagandists within air force units (company Hiwi¹⁵⁰-propaganda of the Air Force, 6th company of Eastern Propaganda of the air fleet) should be re-educated in a unit of the air forces of the Russian Liberation Army. It is possible to forego the planned and already prepared creation of other units of eastern propaganda in the Air Force, along with extra squads of eastern pilots. This will to a certain degree free up the German personnel trained for communications with representatives of the eastern peoples, and they can be used in the communication services of the Air Force of the Russian Liberation Army.

- 1) On the contrary, among those units whose leadership should be provided by the German side in the inspector's area of activity should remain or be formed:
 - a) a special camp for Air Force "East" and an infiltration point for the deserters from the military forces of the Soviet Air Force and other AF personnel of representatives of eastern ethnicities, the future use of which has still not been determined;
 - b) a reserve anti-aircraft detail for the auxiliary eastern personnel, who should be transferred to the status of volunteers;
 - c) auxiliary battalions for others, specifically eastern volunteers currently in construction units of the [German] Air Force;
 - d) a training unit for the preparation of young commanders and translators from among these volunteers.
- 2) The headquarters of the Inspector of Foreign Personnel of the Air Force "East," which should be reinforced according to section B, point 7, will be able from the moment of actual deployment of the Air Force of the Russian Liberation Army to execute a dual mission: on the one hand, to continue and further fulfill the previous functions of the inspector, and on the other, to function as a center for communications with the Air Force of the Russian Liberation Army. Both missions will be most effectively fulfilled if the headquarters is located near the Main Command of the Air Force of Germany and the Reich Ministry for Air Forces, that is, outside Berlin. Such a location is also appropriate from the point of view of having Lieutenant General Aschenbrenner oversee the communications units of the Air Force. Since the desire of the leadership of the Air Force of the Russian Liberation Army is to be located directly adjacent to the majority of its subordinate units, specifically the flight formations, it is

worth paying attention to the fact that it is impossible to locate these formations near Berlin, that the headquarters of the Air Force of the Russian Liberation Army must be territorially located with it, separately from the German center of communications, the headquarters of Lieutenant General Aschenbrenner. This should be compensated for by assigning the headquarters of the Air Force of the Russian Liberation Army a small German communications headquarters, the main mission of which would be the passing of orders from the central communications service to the leadership of the Russian Air Force, along with passing the desires and suggestions of the leadership of the Russian Air Force back to the central communications service, directly in the form understood by the receiving end. In addition, this headquarters of communications could take on the following functions:

- a) the function of the direct high-ranking authority in relation to the German groups and officers of communications assigned to the individual units of the Air Force of the Russian Liberation Army;
- b) direct coordination on the question of security – if the issue is important for the leadership in general – and likewise on the questions of leave, family support, wounded and disabled. Families of the deceased to communicate with the German authorities that are responsible for those issues.
- c) service oversight for authorities located on the same territory and subordinate to or requiring the subordination of that which concerns their activities or training, to the Inspector of Foreign Personnel for the Air Force “East” (see point 5).

D. Therefore, according to section B (points 7 and 8), the following structure is proposed for the communication services of the Air Force of the Russian Liberation Army, to be created and equipped by the acting Inspector for Foreign Personnel of Air Force “East.”

I. Directly subordinate to the head of the General Headquarters of the Air Force, a general of eastern volunteer military units, with a dual mission: on the one hand, to take on the function of center of communications for the Air Force of the Russian Liberation Army, and on the other, to complete assignments now under the competency of the Inspector for Foreign Personnel of the Air Force “East.” Place of deployment: Berlin. Staffing table:

- 1) General (Lieutenant General Aschenbrenner)
- 2) Chief of Staff (Headquarters officer of the Main Headquarters), simultaneously [performing the functions of] Ia
- 3) Ic (officer of the Main Headquarters), subordinate to him:
 - a) a colleague responsible for propaganda and combat support, and b) a security officer
- 4) Head of Communications
- 5) Quartermaster
- 6) Colleague responsible for the organization, training, and use of the eastern volunteers and those Soviet military POWs transferred to the status of the Wehrmacht, with the exception of auxiliary personnel of anti-aircraft units
- 7) An adjutant, simultaneously performing the function of IIa
- 8) IIb Administrative Judge
- 9) Head of Sanitary Services
- 10) An intendant

II. The German Communications Headquarters under the Air Force of the Russian Liberation Army is in all cases subordinate to the general for eastern volunteers of the Air Force. On his mission, see section C, point 7. Place of deployment: according to section B, point 6, preferably in the region of Eger. Staffing table:

- 1) Commander
- 2) Adjutant, who is responsible for propaganda and questions of security
- 3) Responsible party for aviation units
- 4) Responsible party for anti-aircraft units
- 5) Responsible party for communications

- 6) Responsible party for questions of billeting
- 7) Leader of the administration group

All officers and service personnel of the communications headquarters should know the Russian language.

III. German communications groups under the headquarters of the various units of the Air Force of the Russian Liberation Army are in all questions subordinate to the German headquarters for communications under the command of the Air Force of the Russian Liberation Army. One group each should be provided to:

- a) all flight units, indicated in section A I, point 2.
- b) each of those indicated in section A I, point 2 anti-aircraft division (see a), and likewise to the auxiliary anti-aircraft regiment mentioned there (see b).

Staffing table [of communications group]:

- 1) 1 officer of the Air Force, correspondingly 1 officer of anti-aircraft artillery
- 2) 1 officer of military special forces, correspondingly 1 administrator

In addition, 1 non-commissioned officer with a shoulder belt from communications units of the Air Force.

IV. German communications officers stationed separately from the above-mentioned individual units of the Air Force of the Russian Liberation Army in issues of training and material supplies are subordinate to the German communications headquarters under the command of the Air Force of the Russian Liberation Army, and, for questions of battle use and military service, to the communications service at the location where they are stationed. It is necessary to appoint one officer each to:

- a) each of the propaganda companies indicated in section A, point 3
- b) if necessary, as indicated in section B, point 5, anti-aircraft batteries intended for transfer to the chain of command of the Air Force of the

Russian Liberation Army, who in the framework of this branch of service are not assigned to one of the anti-aircraft divisions.

Staffing table: 1 officer.

Inspector

BA-MA. RL/2 II/459. Bl. 2–11. Copy. Translation from the German.

N°55. Report on the meeting in the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda of Germany on the question of the preparation of a meeting in Prague in connection with the creation of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia.

Berlin, 3 November, 1944

Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories

PPr. 1

Referent Dr. Krause

Regarding: The meeting dedicated to the opening of the Vlasov committee in Prague

On Tuesday, 31 October, under the leadership of Dr. Taubert, the advisor to the Ministry of Propaganda (Eastern Division, Kanonierstrasse 40), there was a meeting (*soveschanie*) of the advisory staff of the Vlasov's propaganda headquarters, in which along with the representatives of the Ministry of Propaganda and the Eastern Ministry, Captain Dr. von Grot from the High Command of the Wehrmacht (Propaganda Administration) also participated, along with Untersturmführer Kretz and Obersturmführer Dr. Bosse from the Main Administration of the SS. Untersturmführer Kretz read the minutes determining the program of the meeting (*miting*) in Prague during which the Manifesto of the Vlasov Movement is to be read and the Statutes of the Liberation Committee accepted (the date of the meeting [*miting*] is yet to be determined).

In these minutes there was a mention of the fact that after the acceptance of the manifesto on the eve of its reading there should be a working session of all members of the Liberation Committee at the apartment of General Malyshkin. It is worth inviting the representative of the Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples' groups there as well, since there will soon be an agreement reached with them. After this, the next day there should be a meeting (*miting*) of celebratory nature in Prague. General Vlasov should enter the conference hall accompanied by the representative of the Imperial Government. After this, he is to read the Manifesto and voice the statutes of the Liberation Committee. After this, the Manifest and statutes are to be approved by those gathered.

Signature Dr. Krause

Authenticated:

Record clerk

BA. R/6/38. Bl. 25. Authenticated copy. Translation from the German.

N°56. Minutes of Lt. Colonel Baryshev on the inaugural session of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia.

Prague, 14 November, 1944

Lt. Colonel Baryshev¹⁵¹

Minutes of the session of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia¹⁵² on 14 November, 1944

The CLPR consists of 75 people and 20 candidates.

The presidium— 17 people and 2 candidates.

The CLPR includes: the Presidium, the Headquarters of the Air Force, the Propaganda Administration, the Civilian Administration, and the Organizational Administration.¹⁵³

Minutes of the session:

15.00— Opening.

15.05 – Greeting from Dr. Frank.¹⁵⁴

15.15 – vote for General Vlasov.

15.17 – Vlasov won the chair position and read aloud the Manifesto.

15.46 – the Manifesto was accepted and signed by the members of the CLPR.

15.48 – discussion of the project of Provisional Regulations of the CLPR.

15.57 – acceptance and confirmation of the Provisional Regulations of the CLPR.

16.15 – confirmation of the staff of the Presidium of the CLPR: chair – General Vlasov, members – General Zhilenkov, General Trukhin, General Zakutny,¹⁵⁵ General Malyshkin, General Balabin,¹⁵⁶ Prof. Rudnev, Prof. Bogatyrchuk. Candidates: Prof. Ivanov, and docent Musychenko.

16.42 – session is closed.

How the inaugural session of the CLPR went (14 November 1944)

Until 15:00 all members of the CLPR were in their seats in the hall of the Prague castle. We, the Russian guests, were seated in the left half and the German guests in the right half. The members of the Committee were behind the tables. At exactly 15:00, A. Vlasov comes out accompanied by two adjutants – Pozdnyakov and Sakharov – and after them Dr. Frank and other individuals. Everyone stands and greets General Vlasov. He passes by and sits in the first row on the right side. The session is addressed by Dr. Laurence Frank. After this, the oldest member of the committee, Prof. Rudnev, opens the session. Elections are conducted and A. Vlasov is unanimously chosen. There are three issues for the day: 1. The confirmation of the Manifesto. 2. The confirmation of the Provisional Regulations for the CLPR. 3. The confirmation of the Presidium of the CLPR.

BA-MA. MSg/2/17818. Bl. 44. Copy.

N°57. Speech of A. A. Vlasov at the formal session on the creation of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia.

Prague, 14 November, 1944

Introductory remarks of General A. A. Vlasov

For more than a quarter of a century, the people of Russia have fought against the hated dictatorship of Bolshevism. This fight has not been successful only because the strength of the peoples of Russia was beaten down, because their revolutionary activities remained without leadership, and at the head there were none who fully expressed the ambitions of the people. Only the war opened the possibility for the leading forces of the peoples of Russia to come out from under the yoke of Stalin's tyranny and end up in conditions where they were protected from the Bolshevik terror and received the possibility to conduct great work in gathering anti-Bolshevik forces together. At the beginning of the war, many counted on the internal breakup of the USSR, on an overthrow from within, and they had reasonable basis to believe this would happen.

This expectation was justified if we take into account the people's ongoing fight against the ruling regime, the struggle within the ruling Bolshevik party, the growing nationalist aspirations, the number of significant opposition elements in the ranks of the intelligentsia, and the people's general dissatisfaction. And if that internal breakup did not occur, then it happened this way not because the idea was wrong in and of itself, but because they wrongly thought that the overthrow would just happen with the help of elementary violence.

We think that now is not the time and there is no need to talk about possibilities that might have been realized. Now, the important thing is the fight against Bolshevism and its successful conclusion. It is clear to us that this fight will not be concluded by the ongoing events at the front. In spite of the onslaught of the Red Army, the situation for the destruction of Bolshevism is now more fruitful than it was two years ago. The patriotic frenzy artificially planted by Bolshevik propaganda is melting away, and people are

beginning to comprehend the criminal goals of this war. At this very minute, the despicable character of this war is becoming clear to the peoples of Russia—it is a war of expansion and not of defense. The difficult situation for the population of the USSR, the growing dissatisfaction, the fight by the peoples and countries occupied by the Red Army for their own national and governmental independence—all these are factors that will provide us with victory and the destruction of Bolshevism.

But even if we pay attention to the favorable possibilities that have arisen, the fight of the peoples of Russia against Bolshevism would not be possible if all the strength of these peoples were not collected together into a whole and directed toward a single goal. Fragmentation and lack of unity of anti-Bolshevik forces do not strengthen the position of the enemies of Bolshevism, but rather weaken the common front against Stalin.

Therefore, the most important premise of our victorious fight against Bolshevism is the creation of a center that would be able to unite all anti-Bolshevik forces and organize them into a single and disciplined offensive in all directions.

The Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia is such a center.

The Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia expresses the will of these peoples for a common fight of all national forces against a common enemy, specifically Bolshevism.

The Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia is called to act as the head of the great movement of the peoples of Russia, whose goal is the overthrow of the tyranny of Stalin and achievement of lasting peace, freedom, and prosperity.

In order to save the Fatherland, we have entered an honest alliance with Germany. We know that the help that the German people are providing to us is the only real possibility to organize the fight against Bolshevism. During my visit to Reichsminister Himmler, in the course of our in-depth and heartfelt conversation, which flowed in the spirit of mutual agreement and touched on all the issues of a happy future for the peoples of Russia, I said:

We have a common enemy. The prosperity of our peoples rests in victory over that enemy. Our peoples cannot harbor any feelings of hatred for one another. The future and greatness of our nations lies in friendship, in the common fight and working together. Now is not the time to remember mistakes and personal injuries.

It only benefits the enemies of the peoples of Russia and the German people when we have enmity and hatred between us. Stalin has managed to artificially inflame that hatred. It has grown stronger due to the Germans' mistaken impression that all Russians are Bolsheviks. The Liberation Movement of the Peoples of Russia will show the German people and the other peoples of Europe that the peoples of Russia are enemies of Bolshevism.

On the basis of trust and common interests, on the basis of mutual respect between the German and Russian peoples, with unyielding will for victory, we are building our common friendship. Today we can reassure the Führer and the entire German people that in their difficult fight against a most cruel enemy of all of humanity – Bolshevism – the peoples of Russia are your loyal allies, and they will never put down their weapons, but rather fight shoulder to shoulder until full victory is achieved.

By their blood spilled on the fields of battle and their honest labor, the peoples of Russia have shown that they are intransigent enemies of Bolshevism. The will of the peoples of Russia to further action and the continuation of the fight has found its reflection in the Manifesto of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, which we proclaim today before the entire world.

Before finishing, I would like to inform you that a few days ago the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ribbentrop, received me and showed full understanding of the aspirations of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia and promised me his support.

BA. R/6/72. Bl. 32–34. Copy. Translation from the German.

N°58. Manifesto of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia.

Prague, 14 November, 1944

Manifesto

Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia

Countrymen! Brothers and Sisters!

In an hour of difficult trials, we must decide the fate of our Homeland, our peoples, our own fate.

Humanity is suffering an epoch of the most grave upheaval. The ongoing world war is a fight to the death between opposing political systems.

The forces of imperialism, led by the plutocrats of England and the USA, whose might is built on the oppression and exploitation of other countries, and other peoples are fighting. The forces of internationalism, led by Stalin's gang dreaming of a world revolution and the destruction of national independence for other countries and peoples, are fighting. Freedom-loving peoples thirsting to live their lives determined by their own historical and national development are fighting.

There is no greater crime than to ravage, as Stalin does, entire countries and to repress entire peoples who seek to preserve the land of their forebears and by their own labor create their own happiness in that place. There is no greater crime than the oppression of another people, foisting your will on them.

The forces of destruction and enslavement hide their criminal goals with the slogans of defending freedom, democracy, and culture and civilization. Under the defense of freedom, they see the conquest of foreign lands. Under the defense of democracy, they see the violent imposition of their political system on other states. Under the defense of culture and civilization, they see the destruction of monuments of culture and civilization created by a thousand years of labor of other peoples.

What are the people of Russia fighting for in this war? Why are they doomed to countless losses and suffering?

Two years ago, Stalin could still fool the people with words about the patriotic, liberating nature of the war. But now the Red Army has crossed the state borders of the Soviet Union, forced its way into Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, and is spilling blood on foreign soil. Now the true nature of the war that the Bolsheviks continue to fight is becoming more obvious. Its goal is to further strengthen the supremacy of Stalin's tyranny over the peoples of the USSR and to establish that supremacy throughout

the world. For more than a quarter of a century, the peoples of Russia have felt the weight of the Bolshevik tyranny.

In the revolution of 1917, the peoples inhabiting the Russian Empire sought the fulfillment of their aspirations and fairness for the common welfare and national freedom. They rose up against the outmoded tsarist structure that did not want to and could not destroy the reasons that gave rise to the social inequality, the remnants of serfdom, the economic and cultural backwardness. But the parties and the public figures, unable to decide on bold and progressive reforms after the overthrow of tsarism by the peoples of Russia in February 1917, through their fence-straddling politics, appeasement, and lack of desire to take responsibility for the future, did not justify themselves to the people. The people spontaneously followed those who promised immediate peace, land, freedom, and grain, those who proffered the most radical slogans.

It is not the fault of the people that the Bolshevik party, having promised to create a social fabric that would allow the people to be happy and in whose name they instead suffered countless losses – that this party, in taking power conquered by the people, did not only not achieve the demands of the people, but, gradually strengthening its violent apparatus, has taken from the people the rights they fought to gain, has pressed them into a constant state of need, lack of rights, and the most heartless exploitation.

The Bolsheviks have taken away from the people of Russia their right to national independence, development, and identity.

The Bolsheviks have taken away from the people the freedom of the press, the freedom of their own convictions, the freedom of their individuality, the freedom of choosing a place to live and freedom of movement, the freedom of trade and the possibility for each person to occupy his place in society according to his own abilities. They have replaced these freedoms with terror, party privileges, and arbitrary whims over the people.

The Bolsheviks have taken from the peasants the land that they have fought for, the right to freely work the land and freely enjoy the fruits of their labor. Chaining peasants into collective farming organizations, the Bolsheviks have turned them into

fieldhands of the state without any rights, the most exploited and the most oppressed.

The Bolsheviks have taken from the workers the right to freely choose a profession and place of work, to organize themselves and fight for better conditions and pay for their work, to influence the production, and they have made the workers into slaves of state capitalism without any rights.

The Bolsheviks have taken from the intelligentsia the right to freely create for the good of the people and instead try, through violence, terror and bribery, to make them the weapon of their false propaganda.

The Bolsheviks have doomed the peoples of our homeland to continual poverty, hunger and death, to spiritual and physical slavery and have, at last, led them into a criminal war for interests foreign to them.

All of this is hidden with the lie of the democracy of Stalin's constitution, of building the socialist society. Not one country in the world has known or knows such a low standard of living while having such great natural resources, such a lack of rights and lowering of human values as has been experienced and is experienced in the Bolshevik system.

The peoples of Russia have given up forever on Bolshevism, under which the state is an all-devouring machine and its people have no rights and are disenfranchised and impoverished slaves. They see the stark danger hanging over them. If Bolshevism managed even temporarily to find a foothold in the blood and the bones of the peoples of Europe, then the long fight of the people of Russia over the years would have turned out to be without result while costing countless lives. Bolshevism would make use of the exhaustion of the peoples in this war and would finally remove their capacity to oppose. Therefore, the efforts of all peoples should be directed toward the destruction of the monstrous machine of Bolshevism and toward guaranteeing the rights of all people to live and create freely, to the best of their ability and strength, toward the creation of order protecting the individual from the whims of fate and not allowing anyone, including the state, to steal the results of their work.

For these reasons, the representatives of the peoples of Russia, in full comprehension of their responsibility to their peoples, to history and to their descendants, with the goal of organizing a common fight against Bolshevism, have created the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia.

The Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia names as its goals:

- a) The overthrow of Stalin's tyranny and the liberation of the peoples of Russia from the Bolshevik system and the return to the peoples of Russia the rights they earned in the people's revolution of 1917
- b) The cessation of the war and signing of an honorable peace with Germany
- c) The creation of a new, free people's government without Bolsheviks and exploiters

The Committee places the following main principles at the foundation of this new state of the peoples of Russia:

- 1) Equality of all peoples of Russia and their true right to national development, self-government, and state sovereignty.
- 2) Affirmation of a national-labor structure under which all interests of the state are subordinate to the tasks of improving the welfare and development of the nation.
- 3) Preservation of peace and establishment of friendly relations with all countries, and comprehensive development of international cooperation.
- 4) Broad governmental activity to strengthen the family and marriage; true equality of women.
- 5) Liquidation of forced labor and provision to all working people of the real right to freedom of labor that provides for their material well-being; establishment of reasonable pay for all kinds of labor that will provide a dignified standard of living.
- 6) Liquidation of collective farms; voluntary transfer of lands to the peasants as private property. Freedom of the form of labor in land use. Free use of the fruits of their own labor,

- the cessation of forced deliverables, and the annulment of promissory notes to the Soviet regime.
- 7) Establishment of direct private property. Restoration of trade, artisan work, and cottage industry and provision of the right and possibility for private initiatives to participate in the economic life of the country.
 - 8) Provision of the possibility for the intelligentsia to freely create for the good of the people.
 - 9) Assurance of social equality and the defense of the working people from any exploitation, independent of their origin or former activity.
 - 10) Introduction of the true rights of free education and medical assistance for all, without exception; vacation and provisions for the elderly.
 - 11) Destruction of the regime of terror and violence. Liquidation of forcible relocation and mass exile. Introduction of real freedom of religion, conscience, expression, assembly, and press. Guarantee of inviolability of person, property, housing. Equality for all before the law; independence and openness of the court.
 - 12) Liberation of the Bolsheviks' political prisoners and release from prisons and camps of all those suffering from repression in the fight against Bolshevism.
 - 13) No revenge on or persecution of those who cease fighting for Stalin and Bolshevism, whether or not they participated due to personal conviction or through force.
 - 14) Restoration of the common property of the people destroyed in the course of the war—cities, villages, factories, and plants—at the state's expense.
 - 15) The state to provide for disabled veterans and their families.

The destruction of Bolshevism is the overriding priority of all progressive forces. The Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia is convinced that the unified efforts of the peoples of Russia will find support among the freedom-loving peoples of the world.

The Liberation Movement of the Peoples of Russia is the continuation of many years of struggle against Bolshevism and for freedom, peace, and justice. The successful conclusion of this struggle is now assured through:

- 1) Having more experience in the fight now than in the 1917 revolution
- 2) The existence of growing and organizing military forces – the Russian Liberation Army, the Ukrainian Liberation Army,¹⁵⁷ the Cossack troops, and national units
- 3) The placement of anti-Bolshevik military forces in the Soviet rear territory
- 4) The existence of growing opposition forces among the people, state institutions, and armies of the USSR.

The Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia sees as the main condition for victory over Bolshevism the unification of all national forces and their service to a common goal of overthrowing the Bolsheviks. Therefore, the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia supports all those forces for revolution and the opposition of Stalin, at the same time as decisively decrying all reactionary projects connected in any way with the infringement of the rights of the people.

The Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia welcomes the help of Germany on the condition that it does not interfere with the honor and independence of our homeland. This help is now the only real possibility to organize an armed fight against Stalin's cabal.

Through this fight we have taken upon ourselves the responsibility for the fates of the peoples of Russia. Millions of the best sons of the homeland have taken up arms and already shown their courage and readiness to give their lives in the name of the liberation of the homeland from Bolshevism. With us are millions of people who have left Bolshevism and dedicated their labor to the common fight. With us are tens of millions of brothers and sisters

languishing under the yoke of Stalin's tyranny and awaiting the hour of liberation.

Officers and soldiers of the liberation forces! The blood that has been spilled in the joint fight has forged a battle friendship of warriors of various ethnic backgrounds. We have a common goal. Our efforts should also be made together. Only the unity of all armed anti-Bolshevik forces of the peoples of Russia will lead to victory. Do not let the weapon you have been given fall from your hands, fight for unification, selflessly spar with the enemy of the people – with Bolshevism and its abettors. Remember, the tortured peoples of Russia are waiting for you. Liberate them!

My fellow countrymen, brothers, and sisters in Europe! Your return to the Homeland as full-fledged citizens is possible only with victory over Bolshevism. There are millions of you. Success in the fight depends on you. Remember that you are working now for the common good, for the heroic liberating forces. Multiply your efforts and the achievements of your labor!

Officers and soldiers of the Red Army! Cease your criminal war directed at the oppression of the peoples of Europe. Turn your weapons against the Bolshevik usurpers who have enslaved the peoples of Europe and doomed them to hunger, suffering, and lack of rights.

Brothers and sisters in the homeland! Strengthen your fight against Stalin's tyranny, against the expansionist war. Organize your forces for decisive action against the removal of your rights and for justice and prosperity.

The Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia calls on you all to unify and to fight for peace and freedom!

PRAGUE, 14 November, 1944

CHAIR OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE PEOPLES OF RUSSIA Lieutenant General A. Vlasov.

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE: Lieutenant General F. Abramov; public figure G. Alekseev; Prof. S. Andreev; Prof. G. Anufriev; Lieutenant General E. Balabin; public figure Shamba;

Prof. F. Bogatyrchuk; actor S. Bolzkhovskoy; Colonel V. Boyarsky; worker K. Gordienko; staff sergeant A. Dzhalalov; Lieutenant General G. Zhilenkov; Major General D. Zakutny; Captain S. Zyb<...>; public figure G. Zherebkov;¹⁵⁸ Colonel Bunichenko; Colonel M. Meandrov;¹⁵⁹ docent A. <...>; Prof. A. Karpinsky; Prof. N. Kovalev; journalist A. Lisovsky; Major General V. Maltsev; Sergeant Major I. Mamedov; Prof. I. Moskvitinov; author Yu. Muzychenko; worker Pod<...>; Prof. S. Rudnev; non-commissioned officer G. Saakyan; docent E. Tenzorov; Major General F. Trukhin; <...> A. Tsagol; peasant Kh. Tsimbal; Captain I. Chachukh; doctor Ibragim-Chulik; public figure F. Shlippe; F. Yanushevskaya.

CANDIDATES: Lieutenant V. Dubovets; worker V Egorov; ... A. Kazantsev; engineer P. Kumin; public figure D. Levitsky; worker Ya. Rodny; ... P. Semenov; Prof. L. Smirnov; Prof. V. Stal'makov; Prof. V. Tatarinov; Major I. <...>; soldier A. Scheglov.

(The family names of some of the members and candidates of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia are not published due to the fact that they are located on the territory of the USSR or for matters of personal safety.)

GARF. F. 7021. Op. 148. D. 139. L. 327–327 ob., 328–328 ob. and BA-MA. MSg/2/17817. Bl. 135. Typographic copy. Published in: M. Semiriaga. *Kollaboratsionism. Priroda, tipologiya i proiavleniya v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voyny* (Moscow, 2000): pp. 853–854.

N°59. Note from an unidentified individual on the planned activities for recruiting POWs for work in camps in Norway.

Translation from the German

Deployment 15 October, 1944

NOTE

on the meeting taking place 15 November 1944 on the question of practically conducting

the HIMMLER-VLASOV recruiting campaign

Participants of the meeting:

- 1) Deputy Commissioner for Army Propaganda Oberleutnant KLONT. Stalag 303.
- 2) Desk Officer for Issues of Military POWs under the German Air Force in Norway Oberleutnant MRONGOVIUS.
- 3) Sonderführer Hayer—propaganda group under the army headquarters.
- 4) Obersturmbannführer SS Dr. TOSS from the SS regiment named for Kurt EGGERS.
- 5) Obersturmbannführer SS SARTOR from the head of the security police and investigative division in Oslo.

1. The enlistment of Russian volunteers conducted as part of the HIMMLER-VLASOV recruiting campaign should complete its first stage by 6 December 1944. In order for Colonel ZVEREV¹⁶⁰ to conduct practical activities, the above-mentioned individuals have noted the following directive instructions:

(15 November Colonel Z. submitted information for 30 selected for this outfit of Russian propagandists):

- 1) Propagandists with the attached order in hand are departing for the camps indicated for them;
- 2) Lists submitted by propagandists in Stalag 303 are printed by the commissioner for army propaganda in 4 copies using Latin script.

Of these four copies, the following should be distributed:

1 copy—to the commandant of the POW zone of Stalag 303.

1 copy—to Stalag 303.

1 copy—to Obersturmbannführer Dr. TOSS (Oslo).

1 copy—to Colonel ZVEREV.

The dispatch of the lists should be arranged by the fastest means possible (through a courier).

4. The commandant of the POW zone must see to the arrangements for the select camp for recruited officers and soldiers (if possible near Oslo).
5. The commandant of the POW zone is responsible for the organization of the transport of volunteers from the camps to the select camp on the basis of the submitted lists. It is necessary to prepare suitable water-based transport for 200 indicated officer-volunteers by the beginning of December.
6. Until further instructions are received, the volunteers should be seen as POWs.

Sent:

To the commandant of the POW zone – 1 copy

Stalag 303 – 3 copies

Investigative Division – 2 copies

SS Kurt EGGERS regiment – 3 copies

Air Force – 3 copies

Army Propaganda Group – 1 copy

Colonel ZVEREV – 1 copy

Authentic: Martynov

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. N°N-18766. T. 8. L. 105-106. Authenticated copy.

N°60. Letter from the representatives of various national committees and groups to A. Rosenberg on their disapproval of the creation of a representative system for a number of peoples of Russia in the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia.

Berlin, 18 November, 1944

Copy

Mr. Reich Minister, Berlin, 18 November, 1944

of the Eastern Occupied Territories
Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg

Berlin

Deeply respected Mr. Reich Minister!

We, the authorized representatives of the peoples of:

Idel-Ural (Turko-Tatar)

Caucasus (Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, and North
Caucasian peoples)

Crimean Tatars

Ukrainians and

Belorussians,

Numbering in total more than 90 million, have just learned of the Manifesto of General Vlasov that he read at the inaugural meeting of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia in Prague on 14 November, 1944.

Since we imagine that this initiative, the deep reasons for which are still unclear to us, will also influence the fate of our peoples, we consider it our duty to inform the representatives of the Reich of the following observations:

Our peoples, who have already been fighting for their independence against Russian imperialism for centuries, achieved full separation from Russia in 1918 and formed independent governments. Some of these governments have been recognized by Germany and other states, among them even the Soviet government. In spite of this, the Russian government has annulled the recognition they themselves signed, have occupied our countries, and, in blood-spilling battles, have broken their opposition. Since this time, millions of people across the great expanses of Eastern Europe and Asia have been subjected to oppression and exploitation by the Kremlin dictatorship, which has simultaneously become a danger to all humanity.

Without dwelling in too much detail on the motives, it is possible to assert that thus far the most passive element in the fight against Bolshevism has been the Russian people themselves. In spite of the silence of the Russian people, our people have waged a

relentless struggle against Bolshevism throughout all history. The continual uprisings of the peoples of the Caucasus, Turkestan, Ukraine, Belorussia, and others represent the heroic period in the history of these peoples, who have not shied away from sacrifice and have died and are continuing to die in the fight for their freedom and for their own independent states.

It is therefore not surprising that these peoples gladly welcomed the outbreak of the war between Germany and Russia. From the first day of the war, they have stood on the side of the German army, helped in all possible ways they could, met their troops with open arms and sincere friendliness. Fighting shoulder to shoulder with German soldiers, they have proven their loyalty to the national idea.

In this fight against Bolshevism, our non-Russian peoples, the numbers of which are, as indicated above, more than 90 million, are significantly more of a positive factor both in the sense of quantity and in their will to fight than the Russian people, who to this very day demonstrate blind obedience to the orders of Stalin.

The peoples are fighting for their own ideals and clear goals. Anyone who loses sight of this risks losing the sympathy of these peoples.

We have been convinced from the very beginning of the war of the need for a precise political program in relation to the peoples of the Soviet Union. In this sense, we have advised more than once that the representatives of the German government pay attention to the nationalistic currents not only among our peoples, but within the Russian people, who have undoubtedly suffered under Bolshevik rule. It must be admitted that Germany's eastern policy has been very cleverly used by Stalin and perhaps will continue to be used in the future. Everyone still remembers how Stalin has broadened the rights of the so-called Soviet republics during the war, offering them the right to form their own governments, which was announced ceremonially in Molotov's statement in the spring of this year. It should not be surprising if such a tactic from Stalin finds fertile ground among the peoples who dream of freedom and independence and have yet to receive any recognition of their national, independent states from Germany.

We never allowed ourselves to fall under the influence of prejudice in relation to the Russian people, but have always been ready to welcome the campaign of General Vlasov, with the limitations that we have already several times reported to the representatives of Germany.

As a Russian general, Vlasov should limit his activity to Russia, meaning Russia in the ethnographic sense of the word. He should in no way seek a leadership role among our non-Russian peoples, since the desire of these peoples in no way corresponds to the goals that General Vlasov is pursuing. General Vlasov speaks of the overthrow of the Soviet regime and wants to create a new regime in the existing borders. Our people have been waging an unrelenting fight against Moscow for many years in order to fully separate from Russia and once again form our own states on the basis of full national independence. Therefore, our peoples cannot trust General Vlasov's promises, and for this reason his Prague Manifesto cannot count on the support of our peoples.

General Vlasov's campaign has had no chance with our countrymen from the very beginning: not with the volunteers, the workers, or refugees that are located within German borders, since the entire experience of these peoples speaks to the need for the most cautious relationship to any Russian initiative.

It would be a great mistake to see among the individuals from the non-Russian population that General Vlasov has brought into his Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia persons who express the will and ideals of our peoples. They have neither the formal nor the moral right to speak in the name of our peoples.

For these understandable reasons stated above, we believe that the Manifesto of General Vlasov answers the interests of our peoples to the extent that he suggests he has the right to represent our peoples, to lead them or to speak in their name. The wellbeing of our peoples and the preservation of our real breakthrough in bilateral relationships make it necessary for us to ask the government of the Reich:

1. to discourage any claims by General Vlasov to the leadership of our peoples

2. to immediately recognize the rights of our peoples to (the creation of) independent states and voice definitive recognition of our national governments
3. to allow the formation of our national structures under our own single command for the fight against Bolshevism under the operational chain of command of the German Wehrmacht and to entrust political leadership within these units to our national governments.

In conclusion, we also think it our duty to state in the most decisive way that if General Vlasov's claims to leadership of our peoples are not decisively discouraged, none of the governing bodies of our peoples will accept responsibility for the consequences that could result in our environment from the Vlasov campaign.

Idel-Ural

By the order of the military alliance of the Turkic-Tatars

Idel Ural:

Signed: A. Shafi-Al'mag

Caucasus:

By the order of the Armenian communications headquarters:

Signed: Dzhamilyan

By the order of Azerbaijani communications headquarters:

Signed: A. Alibekov

By the order of Georgian communication head:

Signed: M. Kedia

By the order of the National Committee of the North Caucasus:

Signed: A. Kantemir

Crimean Tatars:

By the order of the Crimean Tatar Center:

Signed: Edige Kirimal'

Turkestan:

By the order of the president of the National United Turkestan Committee Veli Kaium-khana:

Signed: Doc. Sharimi

Ukrainians:

By the order of the Ukrainian National Political Groups:

Signed: Andrii Mel'nik¹⁶¹

Belorussians:

President of the Belorussian Central Rada

Signed: Ostrovsky

BA. NS 31/28. Bl. 19–22. Copy. Translation from the German.

N°61. Excerpt from the report of the leader of operational group X, Obersturmbannführer SS J. Witiska, to the head of the Reich Main Security Office, Gruppenführer SS G. Müller, on the Ukrainians' negative reception of the idea of fighting together under the leadership of A. A. Vlasov.

Bratislava, 28 November, 1944

Copy

Secret

Reich Main Security Office¹⁶²

IV H

Personally to Gruppenf[ührer] SS and Lt. Gen. of the Police Müller¹⁶³

or duty officer

Berlin

Re[garding]: The project of General Vlasov – settling the Ukrainian question

Goal: Ongoing report

It has just become known here, from a source of information referenced multiple times in the present report, that there is a rumor circulating among the Ukrainian refugees from eastern districts now located in Slovakia along the lines that the German government of the Reich is insisting that Vlasov and Bandera¹⁶⁴ acted together against the Bolsheviks under the command of

Vlasov. Bandera is supposedly not allowed to conduct an operation with only Ukrainians. Since almost all Ukrainians are against being in the chain of command under General Vlasov, there has been a wave of arrests of Ukrainians within the borders of the “old Reich.” Later, it became known that the SS Security Division “Galichina,”¹⁶⁵ which is currently on leave in Slovakia, should also act under the command of Vlasov. Due to these measures, which became known on the basis of rumors, a great confusion reigns among the Ukrainians that will again negatively impact the rather good start to the cooperation with the Germans. True, when handing in this report, the source of the information underscored that the message is based on rumors. As soon as the rumors appeared, right-thinking Ukrainians supposedly stated that there was no chance that forcible measures against Ukrainians had been made by the German government of the Reich, since Bandera does not want to work with Vlasov or answer to him.¹⁶⁶

Agency III will be informed separately.

Head of the Operational Group X
Security Police and Investigative Division in Pressburg
No. daily No. 95 – 44

Signed: Dr. Witiska¹⁶⁷
Obersturmbannführer SS Secret

Copies to

Department III

Personally to Hauptsturmbannführer SS Dr. Boersch
or duty officer

Department III has been copied for knowledge and information
according to its sphere of activity

Signed Witiska
SS
Obersturmbannführer
Confirmed from original
Clerical staff

BA. R/70-Slowakei/223/Bl. 7. Authenticated copy. Translation from the German.

N°62. Report of Untersturmführer SS from Meiningen to Department III B 2 Gestapo Weimar on the low numbers wanting to join A. A. Vlasov's army.

Meiningen, 30 November, 1944

Security Service of the Reichsführer of the SS, Meiningen
Department

Journ. No. 578-44

To the base of the Investigative Division

III B 2e

Weimar

Re[garding]: The General Vlasov project

In ref. to: letter of 15 November 1944, III B 2e

After investigations in the region, the Meiningen division reports that the Vlasov project has become well known to eastern workers thanks to radio broadcasts and the Russian press and has garnered much interest everywhere. The creation of the Committee for Liberation in Prague has become the topic of conversation among eastern workers. As much as it is possible to explain without translators and corresponding trusted individuals, all eastern workers are seeking clarity in the relationships that have been formed and want the intentions of "Free Russia" to be crowned with success. In their conversations, the eastern workers devote a lot of time to the future. That said, not only is nostalgia for the homeland front and center, but so too is worry about family members still in Russia. There is great concern that eastern workers, on returning to the current Soviet Union, will be immediately killed because they were ready to work for Germany and in doing so acted against the Soviet Union. In this way, the sense of goodwill toward the creation of the Committee for Liberation comes from

practical thoughts and not just animus toward the Soviet government.

In one camp, only 6 out of 270 eastern workers voluntarily signed up for Vlasov's army. Under individual recruitment efforts, although these were purposely not conducted, there would undoubtedly have been a significantly better result, since along with the already named reasons, the statements of the workers are fueled also with the hope of improvement of rations and equipment, and also of better living conditions for Vlasov's soldiers.

Radio messages also had a great effect on the female eastern workers. Sounds and music from home called forth from them a sad mood and tears. But the Vlasov project also meets with approval. We know of only one case when a female eastern worker voluntarily stated that she was prepared to become a nurse.

In German circles there is skepticism about this. That great harm that came from the use of foreign nations has not been forgotten, and therefore they do not expect anything good to come out of the creation [of the Committee] in the present case. Since it was not created much earlier, then it will be more an additional burden than a real help in the current conditions, and it can therefore be used only with the aim of propaganda.

Division commander:

Untersturmführer of the SS

State Archive of Thuringia - Main City Archive of Weimar. NS 29/17. Bl. 59. Original. Translation from the German.

N°63. Letter from Obersturmbannführer Dr. Arlt to the Eastern Division Military Department D of the Reich Main Security Office on the organization of a selection of POWs for the first division of the RLA.

Berlin, 9 December, 1944

Reichsführer of the SS Berlin—Grunewald, 9 December, 1944
Main office of the SS military department D, Erdenerstr. 7
Eastern division—DI/5
Journ. N°199, in: V/20, Dr. O/W/Dk.

Re[garding]: the formation of Vlasov's 1st Division

I. Remarks

We have received information from the head of the administration for the POW camp that the 1st Division of Vlasov's RLA should be formed from 3 thousand volunteers from among the Russian POWs. This selection is being implemented by six commissions, for the creation of which Oberführer Burg's aide made a motion to the head of the administration for POW camps. The selection is taking place in the Stalag of military areas I, II, IV, VII, VIII (Königsberg, Stettin Dresden, Munich, Breslau). Instructions have been given that the commandant of camps for POWs inhibit in certain military areas the recruitment of non-Russian volunteers. Since General Vlasov will be responsible for the forming of this 1st Division, clearly, General of Volunteer Formations, it would make sense to immediately instruct that all soldiers of non-Russian ethnicity be removed from the contingents intended for this division. For political-psychological reasons, once Vlasov's 1st Division has been formed, their removal will become impossible.

II. Obersturmbannführer SS Dr. Arlt requests to receive information also about all urgent instructions from the General of volunteer formations regarding RLA soldiers of non-Russian ethnicity intended for the Vlasov division being removed immediately and transferred to their ethnic-national units.

DI/5k

BA. NS 31/42. Bl. 51. Authenticated copy. Translation from the German.

N°64. Letter from General A. A. von Lampe to Colonel S. D. Gegelashvili on the talks with General Trukhin, the order and course of the reception of the statements of Russian émigrés in the RLA, and the need for General A. A. Vlasov to make a public call for émigrés to join the ranks of the RLA.

Berlin, 24 December, 1944

No. 989

Highly Respected Solomon Davidovich,

Again it seems that the time between letters has been more than the indicated ten days. Somehow time both drags and flies... .

I showed the general himself my direction (circular) 935, together with the phrase from General Trukhin's letter that you sent to me, telling him that it turns out that the "enemy propaganda" is me! He completely agrees with my edition of the circular and only said that, for one thing, one phrase from a letter does not mean much, and for another, they are émigrés after all, and that they will accept it in the end, though with difficulty (in a roundabout way, as I wrote). It is true that this I also did not refute. The "enlistment" of the émigrés now goes like this:

Those who can submit a statement personally, for whom it is NOT connected with work, do submit statements. They are questioned by the commission (General Trukhin wants a White member of this commission but has not been able to appoint one), which forwards its conclusion on the right of the represented to the general in charge of volunteer forces in the German headquarters. And until a decision is reached in the headquarters, which can be delayed for a significant or at least an undetermined amount of time, everyone is enlisted as a volunteer, given a service booklet and is paid... one mark per day, with no provisions for housing not only for the family but for the service member himself.

That is what the enlistment is like. General Permikin, the former commander of the 3rd army of General Vrangeli, went to it. But he informed me right away that he is doing this because he risks being placed at a factory and asked to speak with General Vlasov so that he would not be held as a soldier.

That is the situation. As before, I am trying to get General Vlasov to approach the Whites, accept their struggles, and invite them to join him. Generals Kreuter and Turkul¹⁶⁸ have appeared in Berlin and begun their demagoguery. The former has already gone to the committee (from which I have thus far abstained) and together with the latter is drawing up a general address, not with Vlasov but with the Whites, to call on them to join the RLA. This I categorically dismissed. But that does not mean that they will not do this without me, though I did explain to Kreuter all the ways this step was undesirable. General Biskupsky shares my point of view. This is for your information and orientation.

General Balabin asked me to write to you so that you might help him in his task of representing Vlasov in Prague—I promised him that I would and said that you would help him even without my letter. I really do think that he needs help, but NOT at the expense of the organizations of General Biskupsky and NOT entering officially into anything until the address of General Vlasov is published, something I am trying to get done and which he promised me he would publish in the coming days.

Here full solidarity is needed.

I have sent you material for greeting the New Year (if the latest information does not work out, ... for Easter). Thank you for reminding me.

I received 50 copies of the 3rd sketch of Tsurikov. But the first two?

I ask you to send me another copy of the last information—I gave mine to General Vlasov so that he could read the information and included the article N. A.

Together with the latest information and proofs of the article, I, as always, was sent 20 copies of the order, but alas, not of mine, but of yours. Since they were both printed on one page, they tore it in two and sent me the one I DIDN'T need! I will transfer 300 marks to you after the holidays. Thank you for planning to spend them.

From my wife and from me I send warmest wishes to Kleopatra Davidovna, Tamara Davidovna, and you and the other members of your family for a happy New Year and Christmas holiday. We send our best, of course! All has been, all of it, to this

very day, unreachable, and it seems that it is gradually receding from us into eternity—the return of Russia and our real participation in this. My wife and I always remember you all and your dear treatment of us.

May God give you all things good,

I shake your hand firmly,

Yours from the heart, A. von Lampe

GARF. F. 5796. Op. 1. D. 21. L. 290–291. Original.

N°65. Letter from Lt. Gen. E. I. Balabin to Colonel V. N. Dronov on the disassociation of the head of the Main Administration of Cossack Forces General P. N. Krasnov from General A. A. Vlasov due to a lack of trust in him, on the negative reaction of P. N. Krasnov to the idea of the creation of a Main Administration of Cossack Forces under CLPR, and on the creation under CLPR of a department of Cossack forces headed by General F. F. Abramov.

30 December, 1944

To Colonel V. N. Dronov

Highly respected Vasily Nikolaevich,

I am very, very grateful for the package; it is such a dear one and so desperately needed. I ask you to convey my warmest thanks to the residents of the *stanitsa*. Such attention touched me deeply.

I am not able to write to you in full and in detail all that is happening, as I do not have a free minute from 8 in the morning to 10 at night. Petr Nikolaevich and the Main Administration of Cossack Forces¹⁶⁹ have sharply distanced themselves from Vlasov. My entreaties have not led to the desired result. Vlasov laments what happened and is sure that the person who wrote “From the

two-headed eagle and to the red flag”¹⁷⁰ could not have changed opinion so quickly – that this is just a temporary loss of vision and that P. N. will, in the end, join the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (CLPR) together with his administration.

When the announcement that they were organizing some kind of Main Administration for Cossack Forces under the Committee appeared in the papers, Krasnov’s people rose up in concern. The Deputy to the Military Ataman of the General Headquarters General Iv. Alekseev. Polyakov managed to break [bend to his will] both Petr Nikolaevich and Semen Nikolaevich, and in general the whole Administration. The day before yesterday, in Prague, we (General I. Tatarkin, General Polyakov, General Diakov, and S. V. Marakuev) were in full agreement. On January 3rd, we will all meet in Berlin and decide this matter definitively. I do not doubt that it will be resolved beneficially for the Cossacks. If Krasnov does not refuse his bourgeois nationalism and desire to settle all Cossacks in Europe forever (we will form, he says, Eastern European Cossacks, under the German chain of command), then a “Department for Cossack Troops” will be formed under the Committee, with Lt. General O. O. Abramov from General Headquarters at its head.¹⁷¹

General Vlasov wanted me to be at the head of the Cossacks, as a members of the presidium, but he has named me his Main Commissioner in the Protectorate, and that will take up all of my time. Krasnov’s people are scaring people with the idea of a split, but there cannot be a split since all the Cossacks and old émigrés and under-Soviets, and even the entire headquarters of Krasnov’s people, unequivocally support Vlasov. That means only three people remain to break away – two of Krasnov’s and the Kuban Ataman Naumenko, who is wavering and doesn’t know which way to turn.¹⁷² Glazkov is also asking to see Vlasov, but Vlasov told him, “Right now, the head of the Cossacks is General Balabin. Go and see him; if he will see you, you will be with us.” Of course, Glazkov did not come to see me.

With General Shkuro ¹⁷³ I have had no interaction. The Cossacks he recruited from Domanov¹⁷⁴ in Northern Italy are living in terrible conditions, all covered in lice. They do not change their clothes; there is nowhere to wash; the majority sleep on the floor;

some are still living in covered wagons, not given clothing or weapons. The rifles given to them for security, since there is heavy partisan activity there, are not suitable for serious battle. An unarmed person there is always at risk of death. Every day 4–5 people are killed. They have no mercy on the women or the children. Everyone is trying to run away from there, but Domanov said that there is no return from him. If the families have to be evacuated, let it be anywhere but there. It is awful there. There is much I cannot describe. Yesterday, Esaul Fenev of the Kuban troops came from Domanov, sent there specially to look around, and he told of such horrible things that simply cannot be described. He is going with me on the 2nd to Berlin for a detailed report.

Thus far, the German forces have not allowed evacuation into the Protectorate. They [the Germans] want to settle those arriving from Slovakia somewhere. They [the Slovaks] asked not to be sent to Domanov, and so they sent someone to have another look around. It seems they sent Iv. Iv. Bezuglov with a German officer.

I think it is better to evacuate, if not to the Protectorate, then to the former Austria, nearer the Swiss border. Your 120 educated Cossack workers, of course, should be included in A. A. Vlasov's movement so as to work according to their professional training. We old émigrés, with few exceptions, are no longer fit for service. Each qualified worker will be worth his weight in gold in the New Russia, and it is a crime to put them in with the soldiers (and these are Vlasov's words). Now everyone should work in their proper places. When the Russian army heads to the East, all will gradually find their place according to their training.

Vlasov asked me to organize my own Representatives in all the cities and towns of the Protectorate to clarify the Manifesto and the ideas and attempts of Vlasov. Of course, there is no budget set aside to pay these representatives. I have still not received a kopeck. Could you be my representative in Slovakia? If you agree, I will inform Vlasov and ask that his headquarters send you copies of all literature, orders, instructions, etc.

I must finish, as visitors have arrived and I will now have people over until evening, but I await, as you wrote, Bezuglov for the letter.

Greetings from me to all the Cossack men and women.

Sincerely respecting you,

GARF. F. 5761. Op. 1. D. 14. LL. 400–403. Authenticated copy.

N°66. List of members of the headquarters of propagandists of CLPR and individuals from the German government leading various directions of activity of the headquarters.

December 1944

Copy of a copy

SS Untersturmführer

Robert Kretz

Communications officer

Record

Re[garding]: headquarters of Vlasov's propagandists

From the Russian side	From the German side
Director: General Zhilenkov	The leadership from the German side was appointed by the Reichsführer SS personally:
Chair: Colonel Meandrov	Standartenführer SS D'Alquen, commander of SS Standart "Kurt Eggers." Representative of the commander in the propaganda sector for the Vlasov campaign: Untersturmführer SS Kretz. On an equal footing as leader of the East department in the Reich Ministry of Public Education and Propaganda, Dr. Taubert. ¹⁷⁵
1. <u>Military propaganda:</u> Colonel Zakharov, Captain Nareikis. ¹⁷⁶	Captain von Grote
2. <u>Propaganda among the troops:</u> Colonel Meandrov.	Captain Kelbrandt
3. <u>Propaganda among POWs:</u> Colonel Spiridonov.	Sonderführer Mossack
4. <u>Active propaganda</u> (brochures, posters, leaflets, especially among eastern workers, use of speakers, protests, exhibits, service for displaying illustrations, slide projectors).	Mr. Wiebe Captain Kelbrandt
5. <u>Press:</u> a) periodicals: Khromenko,	Wegener and Drescher

information bureau: Sr. Lt. Kharkov, b) Non-periodical press and brochures: Muzychenko.	Wiebe
6. <u>Radio propaganda:</u> Bolkhovskoy.	Dr. Greife
7. <u>Art:</u> a) film: Zhemchuzhnik b) game groups: ?	Dr. Kurtz
8. In general worldview (<u>ideological</u>) department: Colonel Zaitsev (In this area of activity, conceptual and worldview initial stages of propaganda should be worked up).	SS Obersturmführer Bosse
	German authority on issues regarding Ukraine and Belorussia: Dr. Kurtz
	German authority on issues regarding Turkey and the Caucasus: Sr. Lt. Durksen

BA. R/6/72. Bl. 82–82 v. Copy. Translation from the German.

January-May 1945

N°67. Notes on the meeting with Reichsführer SS [H. Himmler] on 8 January 1945 regarding the creation of new divisions of the RLA.

8 January, 1945

Copy!

Note on the meeting with the Reichsführer of the SS8 January, 1945

Present: Oberführer SS Dr. Krüger

Standartenführer SS Dr. Brandt

1) Oberführer SS Dr. Krüger reports on the military side of the Vlasov Project. The Reichsführer SS expresses his desire that the new divisions be formed gradually and for the time there should be two really solid divisions being at the front to show what they can do. The divisions will receive a single structure, specifically on the basis of the staffing chart of the infantry division of the Wehrmacht 1944. High command of these divisions should be held by General Vlasov. For the time being, it is necessary to wait for command of the entire RLA. Particular significance should be given to the crossing over from the Red Army [to our side]. Each deserter should be presented with the right to choose whether he wants to continue to fight in the ranks of Vlasov's Army or return to civilian life as a worker. After the formation of the first two divisions, it would be important to conduct a well-thought-out campaign with the goal of encouraging the crossing-over of an entire enemy division by speaking with the commander.

2) Moving on to political questions, the Reichsführer SS expressed the desire that the subversive actions that are constantly being conducted from the side of the ministry of occupied eastern territories, be informed—by way of clever manipulation, if possible—of the disagreement between the Foreign Service and the Reich Ministry for Eastern Affairs. The main person to blame, in the opinion of the Reichsführer, is the Secretary of the Ministry Bräutigam,¹⁷⁷ who continually and, of course, without much of a hidden agenda, sowed discord.

The national question needs to be handled with care. General Vlasov should be encouraged to continually refer to non-Russian peoples as allies in the fight against Bolshevism and to tell them that their future fate is determined according to their participation [in this fight]. The Reichsführer SS does not want peoples to be forced under General Vlasov's leadership against their will. However, a single front in the external fight against Bolshevism is

nevertheless necessary. Tension between the Ukrainians and the Russians, which in itself is undesirable for us, should not be allowed to grow to the point that our ability to fight is compromised. This implies that on the part of the SS, there must be a place for clear and singular leadership that will in no way allow the suspicion of hypocrisy in relation to General Vlasov. The potential for trust on the part of the Russians should in any case be maintained. In addition, it is the mission of those implementing this policy to conduct a clever game with the various nationalities. The creation of a Ukrainian National Committee independent of General Vlasov is not something the Reichsführer wants, since this will make our position vis-à-vis General Vlasov seem ambiguous.

On general questions concerning the future of Russia, the Reichsführer expressed that Moscow District should become the westernmost district of this future [state] configuration. The basis of this future Russia should be the eastern Russian Siberian empire, the expansionist policy of which should be reoriented in the direction of the Persian Gulf. If they reject expansionism toward the West, the Reichsführer SS could fully imagine friendship with Russia.

As far as General Vlasov's activity is concerned, it differs in its pan-Slavist way of thinking, and the Reichsführer has great concerns mostly that the Slavic peoples in the Balkans could end up in a situation where they will receive instruction second-hand, which is to say through General Vlasov. He therefore wants these desires to be forestalled as much as possible.

3) On the question of *Ostarbeiters* (eastern workers), and the eastern peoples in the Reich more generally, the Reichsführer SS agrees that they should have rights equal to those of foreign workers as far as rations and salary are concerned—even, if necessary, lowering the levels of other foreigners so as to achieve an equal condition. The SS Reichsführer considers the question of rule of these eastern people in the Reich an especially important aspect of the whole operation. He relates with full understanding to General Vlasov's desire to eliminate all discriminating arrangements over time. [But] the Reichsführer SS does not want to eliminate the symbol of the *Ostarbeiter*. However, he supports, on

the agreement of the High Command of State Security, the preparation of a new variant of the regulation regarding these symbols, which will allow the elimination of any discriminating nature. There is discussion of a patch or something similar as a national symbol of a fighter against Bolshevism.

4) The Reichsführer SS agrees, if possible, to see General Vlasov in the company of General Zhilenkov in the coming weeks, and asks to be kept informed on this. The Reichsführer SS wants General Vlasov to be accorded an appropriate expression of appreciation. In general, [The Reichsführer SS] intends to further lead the operation and correspondingly plan it.

8 January, 1945

Dr. Krü.

Signed Krüger

Oberführer SS

To Hauptsturmführer Dr. Olscha with the request to please take note.

BA. NS/31/33. Bl. 16–18. Copy. Translation from the German.

N°68. Briefing of Rottke, Desk Officer of Referat Ekhardt from the Reich Ministry of Culture, on meeting with Tannenberg, the adviser of the Reich Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the methods of financing CLPR.

Berlin, 17 January, 1945

Copy

Referat Ekhardt

Y5368 – V 24/I Berlin, 17 January, 1945

Financing the Committee for the Liberation
of the Peoples of Russia Lieutenant General Vlasov
Secret!

1. Meeting with councilor [*legationsrat*] (with the right to report) V. Tannenberg in the Reich Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 16 January, 1945.

Present: below-signed

Senior administrative official [*amtsrat*] Schmidt (Reich Ministry of Finance, Dept. I)

Assessor Wapenhensch (Reich Ministry for Foreign Affairs)

Thus far, the Committee has been overseen and financed by the SS Main Administration. As with other governments in exile, it has wanted to receive financial support from Germany, but to control its own funds for its payments. Therefore, an agreement must be drawn up with the Committee analogous to that which has already been signed with Degrelle and van der Wiel and which must be agreed upon with the Serbian, French, and Bulgarian governments. The text of the agreement between Germany and the Committee was approved by the Reich Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the SS Main Administration and Lieutenant General Vlasov. It is almost word for word the same agreement that Degrelle signed, which served as an example.

In the course of the discussion, Councilor Tannenberg passed a copy of the project and commented on the following points:

According to point 1, Germany provides the necessary means in the form of credit.

According to point 2, the Committee will be provided as credit on the account of the Main State Treasury. These funds should cover only direct financial needs of the Committee (reimbursement of expenses of the members [of the Committee], stipends and salaries for service members and a small reserve fund). Intermediated expenses (provisions and armament of the Russian legions, propaganda, social safety net) will be provided, as previously, by the German services on behalf of the Committee. According to Tannenberg's information, the Committee has no influence over these expenses. It can only express desires. But the Committee can reject the encumbrance of these expenses. If in any such case agreement is not reached, then the Committee does not accept the encumbrance and, in the end, it is borne by Germany. But then in the future, the Committee cannot express its desires in

such cases. The chain of command that completes such intermediated expenses (Wehrmacht, Ministry of Propaganda, Ministry of Eastern Affairs) is required on a quarterly basis to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about them. Payments in accordance with the budget go to the account of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and are reimbursed to the agencies.

The Reich retains the right to limit the amount of credit.

According to point 3, Lieutenant General Vlasov appoints an authorized person for finances who will manage the funds transferred to the account of the Main State Treasury and will answer for the management of financial affairs. Vlasov wants to appoint one of his coworkers, a Russian general, to this position. It is not necessary to appoint a German finances consultant, since the sums that will be made available to Vlasov for direct payment needs will not be great, and the Committee will in the long run be overseen by the SS Main Administration Mr. Tannenberg could not indicate the value [monetary equivalent] of direct financial requirements.

According to point 4, the Committee will repay the credit from Russian valuables and property. Depreciation and loan interest will be regulated at a later date.

According to point 5, the agreement will take effect on 1 December 1944.

There are no objections to the text of the agreement. It corresponds with the example.

The agreement was not negotiated with the Ministry for Eastern Affairs. The Ministry should be informed on it only after its signing. For propaganda purposes, the agreement should be published in Germany's Russian-language newspapers and read aloud on the radio in Russian, just as the Manifesto was in its time. On the question of correspondence between the point of view represented by the Committee and that of the former civilian administration of the occupied eastern territories, Councilor Tannenberg stated that in the event of another conquest of Russian territory, a decidedly different approach should be used than was earlier, one precisely in the spirit of the Manifesto. But the Reich

commissars and the Ministry for Eastern Affairs should not draw any conclusions from this.

After concluding the agreement on 18 December, 1945, the Committee should present a preliminary budget proposal for the quarter that will be approved by the Foreign Policy Authority in cooperation with us. All questions arising in connection with the agreement should be discussed in the Russian panel of the Ministry for Eastern Affairs with the inclusion of representatives of the agencies, including the Reich Ministry of Finance.¹⁷⁸

Vlasov also raised the question of whether he could now cover part of his expenses from the salaries for eastern workers or from taxes on their salaries. This suggestion was rejected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because the eastern workers and Russians in the Reich could speak out against the Committee due to such a burden. From the point of view of propaganda, such taxation could work against us. And from our point of view, any tax burden on the eastern workers in Germany to the benefit of the Committee should be postponed.

To Mr. Director of the 5th Division with a request to approve

To Mr. Head Councilor Litter

To Breian

for reference

To Desk Officer Burmeister

Rottke

for [Referat] Ek[hardt]

In my opinion, we should not object to the salaries.

Rhdt.

Councilor Tannenberg has been informed of this.

BA. R/2/271. Bl. 134–135. Copy. Translation from the German.

N°69. Telegram from Reichsführer SS H. Himmler to A. A. Vlasov on the appointment of Vlasov to the High Command of the 600th and 700th Russian Divisions.

28 January, 1945

[Translation from the German]

Telegram from the Reichsführer SS to General VLASOV

Composed on the order of
Obergruppenführer BERGER

The Führer has appointed you, from the day of signing this order, the high commander of the 600th [179] and 700th divisions. Simultaneously, you will receive the high command of all newly formed and regrouped Russian unions. The disciplinary power of the high command will be recognized as yours, along with the right to appoint officers to new ranks up to Lt. Colonel. The appointment of colonels and generals will occur in agreement with the head of the Main Administration of the SS according to the existing conditions of the Great German Empire.

Signed: H. HIMMLER

Seen and approved

Signature: Doctor KALTENBRUNNER¹⁸⁰

RICHART (presumedly)

Second signature illegible

Verified: Martynov

This document is an original message from HIMMLER on HITLER's appointment of me to the post of high commander of the RLA units. This message was given to me by a representative of the SS, Oberführer KRÜGER, in March 1945, in Dalemendorf (Berlin) [sic.

Possibly Dabendorf]. The document has the personal signatures of HIMMLER and KALTENBRUNNER.

VLASOV

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. N°N-18766. T. 7. L. 12. Authenticated copy. Translation from the German, contemporary to original.

N°70. Telegram of communications officer Gruppenführer Fegelein to H. Himmler on the refusal of soldiers from RLA units to fight against their countrymen.

4 February, 1945

Secret for command only

Imperative!

To the Reichsführer SS, special train, Styria

To: Obergruppenführer SS and General of SS Troops Gottlieb Berger, Berlin-Grunewald Duglasstr. 7-10

Head of the SS Main Administration

Reichsführer SS, special train, Styria

The Head of the General Administration of the Wehrmacht, General Reineke¹⁸¹, reports on 4 February, 1945 by telephone:

When relocating the scientific research institute in Wulkow (on Oder), one leading engineer (a very reliable person) entered a conversation with various assigned German personnel in one of the Vlasov units. Everyone told him the same things, including one person ranking as high as warrant officer:¹⁸²

- 1) The “volunteers” stated that they would in no way wage war against their own countrymen.
- 2) A large number [of the military personnel in Vlasov’s army] had already crossed over to the other side.
- 3) Individual military service members of German appointed personnel had already been killed by the “volunteers.”

The warrant officer states that the information of these conditions is supposedly not known to high-ranking authorities because they [the German appointed personnel of the RLA] are strong-armed.

The entirety of the [German] appointed personnel is afraid that when they come into contact with the enemy, they will be killed by the volunteers, and are considering how they might avoid this.

SS Communications officer for the Führer
signature Fegelein, Gruppenführer SS and Lieutenant General of the SS troops.

BA. NS/19/3823. Bl. 8-8v. Telegraph form. Translation from the German.

Nº71. Order of the SS Main Administration to the Chief of Staff of the RLA F. I. Trukhin on the selection of 100 persons from RLA units for a special anti-tank team.

Berlin – Wilmersdorf, 6 February, 1945

SS Reichsführer Berlin – Wilmersdorf
SS Main Administration, 6 February, 1945
Department D. Westfälischestrasse 1/5
Communications officer with General VLASOV tel: 86 73 61/335
Ref No. 200/45 secret
SECRET

To the unit of Major General TRUKHIN
Berlin-Dahlem
Til-alley 17
CONTENTS: anti-tank unit

According to the report of Obersturmbannführer SS Dr. Richert, Major GONYAKOV departed for Dabendorf today to select 100 persons intended for the execution of a special assignment (an anti-tank unit).¹⁸³ 80 persons are ordered to go directly from Dabendorf

to Nimechk, and 20 to Berlin, Duglasstrasse 7/11, to receive weapons from the Sturmbannführer SS Walser.

Additional camouflage equipment will be received in Berlin upon completion of preparations for the march to Nimechk, to the place of operation. Weapons should be received 6 February, 1945.

25 Automatic rifles

75 Automatic rifles, 1938 model

100 "Panzerfaust"

(signature illegible)

SS Hauptsturmführer

Verified: Martynov

This order from the SS Main Administration was received by me in February 1945.

In accordance with this order, I formed from the service members of the RLA an anti-tank unit of 100 persons, which was sent to the eastern front at the end of February.

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. N°N-18766. T. 8. L. 28. Original. Translation from the German, contemporary to original.

N°72. Report of Oberführer of the SS Main Administration E. Krüger on Reichsmarschall H. Göring's conversation with A. A. Vlasov on 2 February 1945.

7 February, 1945

SS Reichsführer Berlin-Grunewald

Head of the Main Administration of the SS Duglasstr. 7-11

Be/R. – Vs. Nr. 1542/45g.

Adj. Tgb. Nr. 392/45g.

Re[garding]: Meeting of the Reichsmarschall with General Vlasov

Attachment: 1 Secret

To Standartenführer SS Dr. Brandt

Personal Headquarters of the Reichsführer SS
Berlin SW 11

Dear Doctor!

In the attachment I am sending a copy of the record of General Vlasov's conversation with the Reichsmarschall. I ask that you let the Reichsführer SS know about this.

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

G. Berger.

Copy!

SS Main Administration – Group D

Russian Division, Berlin, 4 February, 1945

Secret!

Re[garding]: conversation with Reichsmarschall Göring
Report

On 2 February, 1945, Reichsmarschall Göring¹⁸⁴ had a conversation with General Vlasov. Present for this were Lieutenant General Lerzer, Lieutenant General Aschenbrenner, and Oberführer SS Krüger.

The conversation lasted 3 ½ hours, during which time the Reichsmarschall showed great interest in the whole project.

On the question of *Ostarbeiters* (eastern workers), the Reichsmarschall, after a detailed consultation on this problem, stated that he would immediately speak for the equal rights of the eastern workers on a level with the other foreign workers as regards pay, rations, and their general treatment. The Reichsmarschall explained the high number of cases of corporal punishment meted out against the eastern workers, telling General Vlasov of the perception in Germany—one which he also held—that Russians generally accepted being addressed with a whip, so to speak, that it was characteristic of that people, and that without such treatment there could be no expectation of results of their work. He has now corrected his impression and will intervene in this regard.

The Reichsmarschall exhibited particular interest in the person of Stalin, about whom he asked many questions. General Vlasov stated his opinion that the modern system in Russia is to a significant extent based on the personality of Stalin and serious internal unrest should be expected in the event of his death. But despite any view from the side, the state of affairs in Russia is extremely unstable, and any large defeat could have destructive consequences for the Soviet regime. But, of course, as long as Stalin leads his army from one victory to another, such a defeat can hardly be counted on.

Then the Reichsmarschall moved the conversation to Vlasov's military plans. To the question of how many divisions Vlasov is capable of forming, Vlasov answered that the officer staff and enlisted men at his disposal were enough for about 5 divisions in the beginning, if there were the possibility of providing appropriate officer training. The Reichsmarschall expressed the opinion that he supported Vlasov in this respect as well.

Later, the Reichsmarschall showed particular interest in internal and external propaganda. Vlasov expressed his readiness to intensify his propaganda both on this side of the front and on the other, but he repeated that any propaganda will lack a lasting effect if it is not shored up by real factors. Thus, this question again delved into the problem of the eastern workers. Improvement in the issue of the eastern workers would be the best propaganda, and news [of this] would spread quickly on both sides of the front. In any case, his propaganda would become reality if the Committee could be established somewhere and generate at least the feeling of a defeat.

Finally, the Reichsmarschall asked if it was really true that Stalin's attitude was more anti-English than anti-German, and why then was war being waged mainly against Germany? General Vlasov answered that this opinion was absolutely true, that he knew that Stalin had an absolutely fanatical attitude against England. And the war against Germany was being waged because from the days of Lenin there has existed in Russia the conviction that only Germany was preventing Bolshevism from spreading throughout Europe. If that opposition could at some point be broken, then it would be easy to manage England after that.

In conclusion, the Reichsmarschall expressed his joy at meeting General Vlasov and guaranteed him full support. He optimistically spoke of holding the [front] line along the Oder and expressed his hope that then General Vlasov could be more involved. He admitted that, due to his lack of knowledge, he had made great mistakes in policies relating to the Soviet Union.

Signature Krüger
SS Oberführer

BA. NS/19/3823. Bl. 4–7. Original. Translation from the German.

N°73. Letter from H. Himmler to A. A. Vlasov on the awarding of the Iron Cross to individual officers in Vlasov's guard detail. 9 February, 1945.

9 February, 1945

Secret!

SS Reichsführer
SS Obergruppenführer Berger
to be passed to General Vlasov

Dear General Vlasov!

Your guard detail at headquarters under the command of Colonel Sakharov ¹⁸⁵ has distinguished itself in its first battle most excellently.

I radioed the order to award the Iron Cross¹⁸⁶ to those officers and enlisted men named by me.

I can only congratulate you on this brave and courageous unit.

With comradely greeting,

Yours, H. Himmler

Also send communication to:

2. Head of Main Administration for Imperial Security

3. General of Volunteer Formations Köstring/HCGA
4. SS Gruppenführer Fegelein
5. SS Standartenführer D'Alquen
6. Lt. Colonel Suchaneck
7. Army Group "Vistula"¹⁸⁷

with the request to take under advisement

BA-MA. RH/19 XV/4. Bl. 42. Copy. Translation from the German.

N°74. Telegram of General of Volunteer Formation E. Köstring regarding the transfer of the 600th (Russian) Infantry Division to the command of Vlasov.

10 February, 1945

Copy

Telegram

Secret, for command only

Copy in first part

General of Volunteer Formations under the HCGA N 630 Lu

To the Chief of Staff of the Army Headquarters

Commander of the Reserve Forces/SS Reichsführer, field command post SS II

Commander of Reserve Forces/SS Obergruppenführer and General of SS Forces Juttner

Secret!

Upon receipt treat as secret document Kommandosache!

Today I transferred to General Vlasov the 600th (Russ.) Division, and my impression was as follows:

- 1) The division demonstrated good condition and obvious preparation for use in the fight against Bolshevism.
- 2) However, the division will not be prepared for use in battle situations by 29 February 1945 as was ordered. In order to

avoid future serious delays, it is necessary to supply the following material shortfalls:

(55% of uniforms and weapons)

(85% of trucks)

Every day of delay under today's conditions, when the Vlasov units are faced with the question of To Be or Not to Be, holds within it the danger of a crisis of mistrust.

Therefore I consider it necessary to speed up the provisions for the division's battle-readiness and its use on the eastern front. Its use is at the same time a deciding factor for the ongoing retention of the 6 million Russian fighters and workers who are with us.

Signature

Köstring

Cavalry General and

General of Volunteer Formations

under the Main Headquarters of Ground Troops

Nr. 103/45 g. Kdos.

Verified from original

Major of headquarters

After sending:

For information:

- General Army Headquarters / Head of Operational Group
- General Army Headquarters / Organizational division
- Commander of the Reserve Forces / General Military Division / Head

BA-MA. RH//2/849b. Bl. 84. Authenticated copy. Translation from the German.

N°75. Report from an unidentified individual on the welcome speech of E. Köstring upon the transfer of the Russian 600th and 650th Infantry Divisions of the RLA at the Military Training Square in Münsingen.

20 February, 1945

Organizational Division, Headquarters, 20 February, 1945

Nr. II/71104/45 geh. Connection: Zeppelin 2647

Re[garding]: trip to Münsingen

Report

1) By the order of the Führer, General Vlasov is hereby given the command of the Russian armed forces and authority to appoint and advance the rank of officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted staff of Russian ethnicity. With this goal, Cavalry General Koestring was ordered on 10 February 1945 to hold a formal transfer ceremony at the point of formation of the 600th (Russian) Infantry Division (Military Training Square Münsingen).

2) Departure from Berlin in a train car provided by the Reich Ministry of Transport to special deployment location. This served to make the trip more official.

3) The following took part in the transfer:

Representatives of the party, state, and Wehrmacht
Among others:

Obergruppenführer SS Hoffmann as representative of
Gauleiter Murr,

Infantry General Pfeil, commander of military area V,

Oberführer SS Krüger as representative of

Obergruppenführer SS Berger,

Leading individuals of the party and its organizations.

4) The transfer occurred in the following way:

a) The commander of the 600th Infantry Division
(Russian) reports on the arrival of the division to

- General Köstring, the General for Volunteer Formations under the HCGA;
- b) circling of the honor guard:
Cavalry General Köstring,
General Vlasov,
Chief of Staff of the Formation Colonel of
Headquarters Gerre,
Commander of the 600th Infantry Division (Russ.)
Colonel Bunyachenko;¹⁸⁸
 - c) Cavalry General Köstring, by order of the Führer, transfers the command to General Vlasov and gives a speech, at the end crying “hurrah” to the High Commander of the Armed Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, General Vlasov.
 - d) Raising of flags:
On the second flagpole, the Russian flag is raised together with the already displayed German flag.
 - e) Playing of the Vlasov anthem to the choral melody of “I bow to the power of love.”
 - f) General Vlasov accepts the division for the joint struggle against Bolshevism and gives a speech which ends with “hurrah” to the High Commander of the German Wehrmacht Adolf Hitler.
 - g) Playing of “Song of the Germans” and “Horst Wessel.”
 - h) Exit in ceremonial march in the style of the Red Army.

To conclude, a ceremonial dinner in the Russian fashion with a large number of ceremonial speeches.

5) Personal impressions

General Vlasov gives the impression of being a sober thinker, reliable, and a prudent man. His voice sounds clear and well-thought-out, and the way he formulates his thoughts reflects his expressive intellect. His most significant and successful memories of his military life are the battles for Kiev and Moscow. All the ceremonial speeches included the words:

These Russians love their homeland, they want to return to Russia together with Vlasov and see in him the only guarantee that can, through the strength of his people and the help of the Germans, achieve that which they are dreaming about. Correspondingly, their hopes, their faith, and their trust in Germany are great. It depends on us, on how we treat these 6 million people.

General Vlasov himself thinks that he can free the Russian people from the spirit of Bolshevism by freeing their soul, which has been oppressed by the Bolsheviks for decades. The first step to achieving this, he sees to be freeing the Russian people from the fear that currently weighs on every Russian due to the Stalinist regime of violence. If the people are freed from this nightmare, then within them the strength to throw off this yoke will rise on its own.

General Vlasov promotes the theory:

Only another Russian can understand a Russian, and liberation can only be brought to him by a Russian. Therefore he thinks that a German victory over Bolshevism is possible only under the condition that enough Russian forces are drawn in to smite Bolshevism in its weak places. Today's Russian can only be beaten by another Russian.

Therefore, Vlasov considers it a common objective for him and the Führer for his own benefit and the benefit of Russia. He believes that then both sides will reach their goals.

16. The Russian divisions are not just military divisions that, as Germans currently think, should be completely formed by a particular day and from which success can be expected in defending the front. In the deepest sense, the Russian divisions are a political phenomenon. Their actions and their successes serve the single standard for us as to whether the Soviet question can be decided by the Russians themselves.

The problem consists of the following:

A Russian has a sixth sense about whether he is taken seriously as an equal or not. He will immediately become a reliably helper if he feels trust in him from the other side. He answers trust with trust. Does Germany need the help of 6 million Russians? Is it worth offering them trust in order to earn their trust in us?

Our demands should sound thus:

Equalization of the rights of eastern workers with those of all other foreign workers.

Clear, direct propaganda among the German population.

Support for the formation of armed formations for Vlasov.

[Attachment]

General Köstring's speech before the 600th and 650th (Russian) infantry division when transferring them to General Vlasov.

Soldiers!

This is a historic day for Russian soldiers.

Today, for the first time, the Russian 600th division and those on detail from the 650th division meet in order to be transferred – on the order of the Führer and the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht – to your High Commander, General Vlasov.

In this hour we want, first of all, to honor the memory of those of our ranks who have died, those who through their heroic death made possible the existence of today's large Russian formations.

Their memory will live on.

But today we want to thank not only those who fight with weapons in their hands. We should not forget about the great service also of our brothers and sisters. Those many millions who performed auxiliary jobs in the army, who labored at the workbench and behind the plow, and made their contribution in other places in the fight and helped. The result of that is that now this fight will be continued under Russian leadership.

To you, General Vlasov, we are primarily obliged for the fact that this day has dawned. Your work, your efforts over the course of years have been directed at destroying our most evil common enemy – Bolshevism.

Thanks to what you have lived through, no one knows more than you what danger it poses to our peoples. No one understands better than you how it has, over the course of decades, plunged our once flourishing homeland into such need.

As general of the volunteer formations, I transfer to you part of the battle-hardened units that have heretofore been under my command. I express my gratitude to you for your loyal service in the many years of the fight on the side of your German comrades on all fields of battle in the name of a common goal.

And I call on all those who voluntarily came from all kinds of units, from POW camps, from factories and farms: Stick together; only the fight and unity will lead you to the great goal:

to the liberation of your homeland, to a happy life for you, your children and grandchildren.

And may the Almighty help you in this!

General Andrei Andreevich Vlasov!

On the order of the Führer and Supreme High Commander, I have the honor to transfer to you the 600th and 650 divisions. I am convinced that under your experienced leadership these battle-hardened soldiers of the division will cover their new colors in everlasting glory.

To the High Commander of the armed forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, General Vlasov!
Hurrah!

BA-MA. RH/2/849b, Bl. 92-94. Copy. Translation from the German.

N°76. From the daily meeting schedule of Reichsführer SS H. Himmler.

Birkenwald, 21 February, 1945

Business meetings of Reichsführer SS 21 February, 1945
(Birkenwald)

[...]

17:30. Tea with General Vlasov
Obergruppenführer of the SS Berger

Oberführer of the SS Krüger

19:30. Gruppenführer SS Gephardt.

[...]

BA. NS/19/1793. Bl. 32. Copy. Translation from the German.

N°77. Dispatch of Lance Corporal Hennecke on the actions of the headquarters guard of A. A. Vlasov under the command of Colonel Sakharov against the advancing units of the Russian Army in the area of the Oder River.

25 February, 1945

Brief dispatch RK 612

Lance Corporal Hennecke

Vlasov's Army in joint battle on the eastern front

The Guard of General Vlasov's headquarters, under the leadership of Russian Colonel Sakharov, was used during the night advance on the base of the people's infantry division for the destruction of the Soviets' bridgehead on the Oder River. Over the course of the entire battle (12 hours), the command of Vlasov's army was set apart by its outstanding bravery and skillful battle technique.

Vlasov's people fought stubbornly, with a readiness for battle that bordered on fanaticism. They proved themselves to be well-taught specialists in close combat. They earned the nickname of "Panzerknacker" from their German comrades.

During the battle, they used various means to call out to the Soviets and call on them to put down their weapons, and as a response to this, one unit ceased fire. According to what the prisoners later reported, a significantly larger number [of military service members] would have put down their weapons if they knew in advance that it was not a distraction maneuver and that they were truly being met by a powerful Russian unit.

In the course of the fight, after fierce close combat and street fighting, we managed to occupy several well-defended population centers. Suitably impressed by the fierceness of the attack, the remaining defenders put down their weapons. We captured many trophies and took many prisoners. Colonel Sakharov and four people under his command were personally awarded the Iron Cross of the Second Degree by the division commander for exemplary bravery and brash temerity. The losses suffered by the team from Vlasov's army compared to those of the Soviet forces were small. Thanks to their exemplary fighting spirit, the Vlasov team earned the full respect of their German comrades.

Copies given to Krieger, Wegener, Jakoby, <...> 25 February

BA. R/055/001305. Bl. 6. Copy. Translation from the German.

Nº78. Telegram from the Naval Command on sending volunteers from Norway to the RLA.

4 March, 1945

Copy

Secret, only for command

1/Skl. I West 5330/45 Geheime Kommandosache 4 March, 1945

Telegram: AÜ SSD Main naval command "Norway"¹⁸⁹

SSD Main naval command "East"¹⁹⁰

HCW/ Leader of the Wehrmacht headquarters / Operational headquarters (H) / "North" by wired communication Nr. 002077
Gkdos from 28 February

Transport requested by the head of the administration for military POWs for the Vlasov volunteers from Norway will be carried out as ordered.

However, in doing so,

- 1) it is impossible to use the rail line Mo – Oslo, which is already overburdened by the operation “Northern Lights”¹⁹¹ and
- 2) transport of the 169th and 199th Infantry Divisions to Jutland by sea should in no way be delayed.

Naval command

1. Skl. I West 5350/45 Gkdos

BA-MA. RM/7/158. Bl. 132. Copy. Translation from the German.

Nº79. Copy of excerpt from the transcript of the interrogation of V. M. Morozov on the actions of A. A. Vlasov’s “battle groups.”

9 March, 1945

EXCERPT

From the transcript of the interrogation of the detained Vasily Matveevich MOROZOV

From 9 March, 1945

Vasily Matveevich MOROZOV, born 1920

Born in the village of Zaprudnya, Taldomsky district, Moscow region, Russian, High school education, completed

Kharkov Communications Training School

QUESTION: When did you arrive at the forward German defensive line?

ANSWER: I arrived at the forward German defensive line on 18 or 20 February, 1945 as part of the RLA team named “Battle Group VLASOV”¹⁹²

QUESTION: How long were you located in the area of the German defenses?

ANSWER: I was located on the German defensive line and in the regimental rear territory until the moment of crossing over to the side of the units of the Red Army, which was 5 March, 1945.

QUESTION: What do you know of the concentration and deployment of German units in this part of the front?

ANSWER: To this question I can only say the following:

Until 4 March 1945, the 358th Grenadier Regiment occupied the defenses in the region of the village of Schletenitz, which is 8 kilometers to the southwest of the city of Stargard. When the Red Army units advanced, the regiment retreated to the village of Kunow and further in the direction of Stettin. I do not know what division the 358th Grenadier regiment belongs to, what its makeup is, or what its area of operation is. Aside from that, I know that the 381st communications regiment was located in the area of Stargard, but where exactly its sub-units were deployed, its makeup, or other information about it I do not know, since I only saw soldiers from that regiment. Lately two teams from the RLA, named “VLASOV’s battle groups,” have been operating in the area of Stargard.

QUESTION: What do you know about the actions and makeup of these groups?

ANSWER: “VLASOV’s battle groups” were created in February 1945 from among the cadets of the RLA propaganda school in Dabendorf and RLA reserve officers who voluntarily expressed a desire to complete VLASOV’s assignment. I know of the creation of two such groups. The first group was created in the beginning of February 1945 and consisted of 50 people. It was led by RLA Colonel SAKHAROV, a former White émigré. The second group, the one I was in, was created in mid-February and consisted of 85–90 people led by SS Major GOLIKOV.¹⁹³ Both groups were transferred for operations in the area around Stargard. SAKHAROV’s group operated in the area of Replin, which is 8 kilometers to the northwest of Delitz and departed for reformation, supposedly in Denmark, at the end of February. The second group, led by GOLIKOV, was assigned to the 358th Grenadier Regiment and was still part of that unit at the time I crossed over.

Included in the assignment of these groups was conducting scouting along the front lines with the goal of capturing the “language/tongue” and fighting against Soviet tanks. To conduct the front-line scouting, the participants of the groups would dress in a Red Army uniform and secretly penetrate the forward lines of

defense of the Red Army units. For fighting against the Soviet tanks, the participants of the groups would arm themselves with “Panzerfaust” rounds and run at areas dangerous for tanks on an equal footing with the German soldiers and in German uniforms.

The SAKHAROV group completed the scouting assignment in the area of the villages of Replin and Shlotenets.

The transcript has been correctly recorded from my words and read by me.

MOROZOV

INTERROGATED BY:

SENIOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATOR

4th DIVISION OKP “SMERSH” OF 61th ARMY¹⁹⁴

Captain FILLIPOV

VERIFIED: MOROZOV

REFERENCE: The original of the interrogation transcript is located in the file of the investigation against the accused, V. M. MOROZOV

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. N°N-18766. T. 5. L. 91–93. Authenticated copy.

N°80. Report of an unidentified individual from the region of Heidenheim (Württemberg) on the conduct of RLA units deployed to the Heidenheim region.

Heidenheim, 15 March, 1945

[Translation from the German]

HEIDENHEIM Region

Württemberg

Contents: Conduct of the units of Vlasov’s army

While the units of Vlasov's army were deployed in the region of Heidenheim, the following negative facts were uncovered:

1. Soldiers usually lived in the houses of peasants, and the distribution of housing was undertaken by the units themselves, without the inclusion of the burgomaster in the affair.

In the majority of cases in places with heating, the soldiers slept on the floor on straw.

At first, the local population treated the soldiers unkindly due to fear. The soldiers, alone and in groups, wandered from one house to another asking for bread, vodka, tobacco. In exchange, they offered footwear, carpets and even weapons. They promised 150 marks for a liter of vodka.

One officer, who lived in Auernheim, went to Kleinkuchen and offered his horse to the proprietor of the Hiber inn for a liter of vodka.

Thus far, not one case has been noted where the population has agreed to buy or exchange something for government-issued things. In Nottheim and Auernheim, a large share of the soldiers and officers stationed there were dead drunk. The commander of Field Post unit No. 0892 was so drunk that at 9:30 he was still asleep, even though his unit had departed the previous evening. The soldiers obtained vodka and other spirits from the locals, often even resorting to threats.

In many populated areas there was senseless firing of weapons, occasionally even with tracer rounds.

After the units departed for Gerstetten, four hand grenades were found as one carabine. In other places, discarded knapsacks, gas masks, and helmets were found.

2. In Steinweiler, at the home of Albert Horsch, the door was broken down while he was away; the whole house was ransacked and an entire roasted rabbit was eaten. In that town, the soldiers, threatening to shoot, forced people to open their doors. Since Steinweiler is inhabited mostly by women and elderly people, the soldiers got everything they demanded.

As we were able to find out today, 6 bicycles were stolen in this area, 4 of them from Steinweiler itself. Two of the bicycles were found in the units and returned to their owners.

In addition to this, a whole host of thefts of small domestic animals has been occurring, to the point that the locals have stopped even reporting them.

3. In Hohenmemingen, a 63-year-old widow named Margaret Meier was [accidentally] shot and killed by a soldier while he was cleaning his weapon.

4. As has been established, the units forcibly recruited 10 Russian workers and 1 female worker in Sontheim, four workers in Niederstotzingen, and 13 workers and one female worker in Steinheim, all of whom immediately received uniforms and service records. When the commanders of the units were asked about this, they promised to release them. But when the units departed, the workers disappeared with them. Of the 10 workers leaving Sontheim, two were detained in Elingen in a unit stationed there. During their convoy to that location, a sergeant major appeared there with 4 soldiers and, threatening them with weapons, demanded their release.

In general, it can be said that the Vlasov units behaved in a completely non-military way and evoked horror from the local population.

(signature illegible)

[Attachment]

Notes on the conducting of the march of the 600th Infantry Division of Russians

I-a. I. The planning and conduct of the march show that the movement of large unified groups happened with certain difficulties.

Therefore, in order to avoid difficulties connected with this, the division is divided into 3 similar columns, which in turn are divided into 6 similar groups, each numbering up to a battalion. These similar groups are stretched out over 6–8 kilometers (see map).

In this way, there is the possibility for each group to complete an independent march, the beginning and end points of which are

indicated by the division. Thanks to this, the leaders of the columns are freed of any administrative work connected with the march.

2. It is necessary to point out at the same time how the units complete the beginning of the movement in perfect order, and then, the closer they get to the end, the more discipline declines, and the units arrive at their destinations as disorganized crowds. In all cases noted to date, it has not been established even once that officers interfered in this affair.

During the first days, the officers did not walk with the columns at all. However, this situation was eliminated through an order from the division commander. In addition, on 11 March 1945, on the road between Albeck and Lagenau, around 10 crates of shells and mines were found. These cases were reported to the division commander, who ordered the ammunition collected and began an investigation of the incident.

3. The division carried with it too much unnecessary cargo. As a result of this, all the carts were overloaded and the guns stacked with baggage and all sorts of equipment, which rendered the rapid transition of the anti-aircraft guns into battle ready status completely impossible. In addition, it was noted more than once that a large number of soldiers were sitting atop the overloaded carts.

4. In general, if these minor troubles are not taken into account, the division completes the march according to plan and the units accurately arrive at the destination indicated by the division.

5. In spite of the fact that on 9 March 1945 the Chief of Staff of the division stated authoritatively that all tanks and assault guns would be loaded, on 12 March, 1945 it was determined that the central column was accompanied by three T-34s.

I-a. II. The division loaded all the property of the telephone company into the railway squadron and therefore made the study of the layout of the telephone lines impossible.

During radio conversations, 2 open texts were sent, in one of which the last names of two regimental commanders were mentioned, and in the other a population center.

The key that was used is a standard two-digit key, which of course will be easily decoded by the enemy.

In general it is worth mentioning that the division is capable of transmitting by radio the most important orders and dispatches to its marching columns.

IV-a. In spite of all the demands, the Russian teams have thus far not been sent to the meal stations in Günzburg and Heidenheim.

On the contrary. The restocking of provisions conducted by the Russian Chief of Staff of the logistics unit is going very smoothly.

IV-c I. According to information we have received, the amount of people leaving the march formation is not exceeding norms.

Sending horse-drawn transport and cargo vehicles under the leadership of the German service individuals is proceeding in a fully normal way.

2. Around half of all regiments that the division received as a result of its insistent request have been left in Münsingen.

V. I. The amount of fuel taken with them was determined by the division independently, rejecting the suggestion of the German communications headquarters to limit the amount of means of transportation to 15 motorcycles, 20 light automobiles, and 20 cargo vehicles.

However, the calculations of the division turned out to be incorrect and already in the second twenty-four hour period a large share of the vehicles could not keep moving due to a lack of fuel, though the division received all the fuel that was promised to it.

2. Providing new automobiles to the unit at the last minute, right before the movement of the column, is not recommended. Firstly, the Russian driver does not know the new vehicle and therefore cannot undertake even the most insignificant repairs independently, and secondly, new vehicles are overloaded on the march and are driven at high speeds. The result of all this is that the affair ends with serious losses to the motorpool.

General:

Unit discipline

If we ignore individual cases, then the behavior of the Russian soldiers can be characterized as fully satisfactory. In individual cases, units were even seen off to the edge of the village at the beginning of a march by the local population. Difficulties arise only when they approach camps of Russian workers. It is impossible to explain to the soldiers that they should not go to the camp located near Guntzberg. What's more, Russian soldiers are taking the arm bands with the word "East" from the workers. All of the difficulties that have arisen in connection with this have been resolved at the meeting with the regional head.

It is possible to say with confidence that the repetition of such cases can be expected until such time as the corresponding high-ranking individuals take some measures to regulate the issue according to the current political situation. The fact that the 7th Military Precinct has, for thus far unexplained reasons, instead of informing about the progress of the Russian division, reported on the progress of the Hungarian unit of 6 thousand has caused some alienation among the soldiers.

In addition, it is possible that connected to this is a fact related by the division commander to the German communications headquarters:

One female Russian worker, on hearing the singing of Russian soldiers passing by in the night, woke her boss with the cry, "The Russians are coming!" Then he raised the alarm, not knowing of the passage of Russian formations, and woke the Volkssturm unit,¹⁹⁵ which was then waiting on the edge of the village for the Russian units to appear.

(Signature illegible)

The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. F. 500. Op. 12462. D. 627. L. 85–91. Copy.

N°81. Instruction of the German High Command on the text of the oath for the service members of the armed forces of CLPR.

16 April, 1945

Supreme High Command of the Infantry Forces, Headquarters, 16 April, 1945

General Headquarters for Infantry/Organizational division At telephone: DV Alps 44265

Secret!

For: the chain of command for General for Volunteer Formations under the HCW N°4/15/45 secret from 6 April, 1945

Re[garding]: the formula for the oath of military formations serving under the High Command of the Armed Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia [CLPR].

General of Volunteer Formations under the HCW

To the High Command of the Armed Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia

For reference:

HCW/ Operational Headquarters of the Wehrmacht/ Organizational Division

HCW/ Operational Headquarters of the Wehrmacht/ Quartermaster

HCW/ Operational Headquarters of the Wehrmacht/ Propaganda Administration

Main command of the Air Force/ General Headquarters/ General Quartermaster

Main command of the Navy/ Naval Fleet

HCGA/ Commander of Reserve Forces/ General Military Division/ Headquarters I a (3)

SS Reichsführer/ field command post

SS Main Administration

SS Main Operational Administration

Command staff of the Army Group “Vistula”
Command staff of the Army Group Center

On the agreement of the Reichsführer SS and the High Command of the armed forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, the following formula is confirmed for the oath of military service members of formations located in the chain of command of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia:

“As a loyal son of my Homeland, I voluntarily join the ranks of the Armed Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia; in front of my countrymen I solemnly swear that I will honestly fight to the last drop of my blood under the command of General Vlasov for the good of my people against Bolshevism. This fight is led by all the freedom-loving peoples in alliance with Germany under the High Command of Adolf Hitler. I swear that I will remain loyal to this alliance. I am ready at any time to give my life in order to fulfill this oath.”

on behalf of
signature

Major of the Main Headquarters and Gruppenleiter
[group leader]

After sending:

Foreign formations “East”
KTV

BA-MA. RH/2/921b. Bl. 44. Original. Translation from the German.

N°82. Order of A. A. Vlasov to S. K. Bunyachenko, commander of the 1st (600th) Russian Division, on the organization of the march and statement of gratitude to the entire personnel of the division.

Bautzen, 16 April, 1945

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 1st (600th) RUSSIAN DIVISION
Major General BUNYACHENKO S. K.

1. I request today after the fall of dark the redeployment of the division entrusted to you to the region of Wittichenau, Hoyerswerda, Bernsdorf. In the future, continue the march in the general direction of the south.

[Changes to] The route will also be reported by the German front headquarters through the appropriate armies.

2. In the case of a sharp deterioration in the situation to the north and northeast of you (a breakthrough of enemy forces), the strong rear guard is to provide cover and hold the enemy, in cooperation with the German units.

HIGH COMMANDER OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF CLPR
Lieutenant General VLASOV

P.S. For the successful actions of the division in the name of CLPR and personally I want to express my gratitude to you, Chief of Staff Lt. Col. NIKOLAEV,¹⁹⁶ and all the personnel of the units entrusted to you participating in this operation.

VLASOV

Bautzen

Headquarters of the 4th Tank Army

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. N°N-18766. T. 7. L. 114. Original. Manuscript. Autograph.

**N°83. Letter from Deputy Director of the CLPR Security Division
M. A. Kalugin to A. A. Vlasov's adjutant, Iu. L. Khmyrov, on the
airlifting of sabotage agents to the territory of the Red Army.**

16 April, 1945

Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov
CHANCELLERY
Field post 28264
To

CAPTAIN KHMYROV¹⁹⁷

Take measures to see that the groups are airlifted.

The assignment and the regions for infiltration remain the same.

Inform the groups about the regions.

In general, scouting in the woods, communication with the partisans, and preparation of points for infiltration of partisan groups and for the headquarters of political and military leadership.

If the matter of the airlift is delayed and becomes untenable, then head to Kempen together with the groups.

I am sending DELLE to you to make the drafting of documents easier and speed their sending.

DELLE has all the information on the regions and landing areas.

I am sending you my best wishes and wishes for success.

Nothing was to come of the numbers and conversational codes, therefore inform the group leaders that communications will be through the German stations.

We have agreed on everything with the German representatives.

Once more, tell the groups I said hello and hello from A. A.

I firmly shake your hand,

Lt. Colonel Kalugin¹⁹⁸

DELLE will tell you details of us and everything of interest to you.

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. N°N-18766. T. 8. L. 2-27. Original. Manuscript. Autograph.

N°84. Letter to the Head of the Main Headquarters of the Central Army Group of Germany S. K. Bunyachenko on the 600th division's rejection of the route and non-compliance with orders from the German command.

28 April, 1945

Translation from the German

High Command of the Central Army Group, Main office
Head of the Main Headquarters

To the Commander of the 600th Infantry Division (Russ. No. 1)
Mister Lieutenant General Bunyachenko

I have heard rumors that, contrary to our agreed-upon and unambiguously clear tactically issued order, your division has chosen an unprescribed route. I assume this is a matter of misunderstanding. If this is not the case, I am calling for decisive intervention and to follow the given order in word and meaning.

General Vlasov has been informed of this matter.

I ask you to inform me by courier of the measures you have taken in order that I may report on this to the Field Marshal General.

I ask in advance that you dispatch information of your place of arrival to me on the morning of 29 April, since the Field Marshal, if the situation permits, would like to visit you.

Lieutenant General

(signature illegible)

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. N°N-18766. T. 25. In envelope. Original. Manuscript. Translation from the German, contemporary to original.

N°85. Letter from Colonel of the American Army Chess H. Reed to Major General V. I. Mal'tsev on the American forces' agreement to hand the RLA forces over to them.

Zwiesel-Grafenau, 29 April, 1945

Translation from the German
American Headquarters in the area of Zwiesel-Grafenau
29 April, 1945

To Major General MALTSEV

Your messenger reached me at the headquarters in Zwiesel. I informed him that I accept the surrender of your troops after their entrance into my zone and that I am adhering strictly to the rules of the Geneva Convention in relation to your soldiers and officers.

In that case, your troops will be sent from Zwiesel to the rear territory.

My armored forces will be moving around lunchtime on 30 April in the direction of Eisenstein. If there is resistance, I will open fire with heavy artillery and give the order to attack from the air.

In order to ease the surrender and speed up the transfer of your troops, you should open fire from hand-held weapons in the direction of the rear territory of the barricades in front of you.

Order your columns to have white flags so that they can be identified by my pilots. We have reached the end of the war, and you are faced with the decision to die at the last minute, to surrender to the Soviet troops or to cross over to our side.

CHESS H. REED

Colonel US Army
Authenticated: Martynov

This letter from the commander of an American tank unit, Colonel Reed, on the conditions for surrender to the American troops of those units of the RLA under my command was received by me on 29 April, 1945 from the head of the Propaganda Division of the Air Force of the RLA, Major Albov, whom I sent to negotiate with the Americans. Maltsev.

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. N°N-18766. T. 8. L. 97. Authenticated copy.

N°86. Academic program for the preparation of agents for sabotage and terrorist activity on the territory of the USSR, created on the orders of F. I. Trukhin.

April 1945

Secret

SEEN AND CONFIRMED
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES CLPR

Major General TRUKHIN

ACADEMIC PROGRAM

for individual preparation of agent personnel of the 2nd division
Intelligence division for insertion into territory of the USSR

With the aim of rapid deployment of intelligence work on the territory of the USSR by means of inserting our special agent groups into a number of planned regions, and likewise for the preparation of a large cadre of agents for individual assignments, the training of intelligence personnel is intended to be conducted in an accelerated program by specially organized instructor staff within a set time frame:

- a) for the preparation of agent groups, center of organization of insurrectional and partisan movements in the rear territory of the enemy – 100 hours
- b) for the preparation of agent groups, center of general intelligence – 120 hours
- c) for the preparation of agent groups, center for military intelligence – 90 hours
- d) for the preparation of group leaders for resident agents – 140 hours
- e) for the preparation of agents with individual assignments – time of preparation depends on the nature of the activity to be undertaken by the agent

The program of academic hours for the preparation of agent groups includes:

a) On the preparation of workers of the center for insurrectional and partisan movements

- 1. Political training – “Soviet Reality” (Soviet radio reports, evaluation of the true situation, criticism) – 26 hours
- 2. Study of the area of operation – 4 hours
- 3. Crossing the front line, parachuting, landing – 4 hours
- 4. Tradecraft (illegal status, methods of legalization, court appearances) – 6 hours
- 5. Work methods of the offices of the NKVD and insurance – 20 hours
- 6. Propaganda work, print, leaflets – 6 hours
- 7. Communications (ciphers, code, radio) – 10 hours
- 8. Work in the surroundings, scouting of partisan groupings, organization of rebellious cadres – 14 hours
- 9. What to do in case of failure – 4 hours
- 10. Study of legends – 2 hours
- 11. Study of assignment – 4 hours

b) On the preparation of personnel of center for general intelligence-gathering

1. Political training and Soviet reality (Soviet radio reports, evaluation of the true situation, criticism) – 26 hours
2. Study of the region of operation or the object – 10 hours
3. Crossing the front line, parachuting, landing – 4 hours
4. Tradecraft (illegal status, methods of legalization, court appearances) – 10 hours
5. Work methods of the offices of the NKVD and insurance – 20 hours
6. Recruitment of agents: handling, recruitment for loyalty, compromising materials, for us and under the NKVD and others, foreign intelligence, use of the environment without direct recruitment – 6 hours
7. Communications (ciphers, codes, radio) – 10 hours
8. What to do in case of failure – 4 hours
9. Study of legends – 2 hours
10. Study of the assignment – 8 hours

c) On the preparation of personnel of center for military intelligence

1. Political preparation and Soviet reality (Soviet radio reports, evaluation of the true situation, criticism) – 26 hours
2. Organization of the Red Army (fronts, identifying insignia, medals, regulations) – 14 hours
3. Drilling preparation (familiarity with commands, formation, salute, relations with others in surroundings, the word “comrade”) – 6 hours
4. Topography (reading maps, bearings) – 6 hours
5. Study of the area of operation – 2 hours
6. Tradecraft (illegal status, methods of legalization, court appearances) – 6 hours
7. Recruiting agents – 6 hours
8. Communications (ciphers, codes, radio) – 10 hours
9. What to do in case of failure – 4 hours

10. Study of legends—2 hours
11. Study of the assignment—4 hours

d) Preparation of leaders of workers (resident agent)—conducted under the program of general intelligence except for the following topics:

1. Leadership among resident agents—4 hours
2. Coding and decoding—12 hours
3. Organization of radio communications at the leader center—4 hours
4. Preparation of Funker agents—according to the school's program
5. Preparation of cadre of resident agents intended for possible use in sabotage assignments, and preparation of soldiers to conduct according to the studied topic for the corresponding center, including in addition the following topics:
 - i. Explosives in the context of the relegated assignment
 - ii. Military preparation (weapons, shooting, poison).

Temporary Acting Head of 2nd Department
Investigative Division
Lieutenant GAI

The current program for the preparation of terrorist agents to be inserted into the rear territory of the Soviet army was compiled on my instruction by the temporary acting head of the 2nd Department of the Investigative Division, Lieutenant GAI, and presented to me for confirmation: "Note—Here especially ideological preparation and conditioning are needed" on the first page was written by me in April 1945 in the Hoiberg camp on reviewing the program.

11 February, 1946 F. TRUKHIN

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. N°N-18766. T. 8. L. 20–25. Original, authenticated copy.

N°87. Letter from the Commander in Erzgebirge to S. K. Bunyachenko on conducting talks with the command of the armed forces of CLPR on the need for the 1st Division of the RLA to carry out the orders of the German command.

2 May, 1945

Commander Erzgebirge, Headquarters 2 May, 1945

To Commander of the 1st Russian Division of the Armed Forces of the Peoples of Russia

Mr. Major General Bunyachenko

The commander of the city of Prague, General von Tausant, has authorized Oberlieutenant Baron von Kleist to conduct negotiations with the division commander, Mister General Bunyachenko, or, if that is not possible, with the High Commander of the Armed Forces of CLPR, Mister Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov, personally.

The goal of the negotiations: clarification of the intentions of the division and regulation, on the basis of the negotiations, the occurrences of lack of discipline.

Oberlieutenant Baron von Kleist is authorized to inform the negotiating party that, should the division diverge from the road that has been prescribed for it and from the assignments given in connection with this, then force will be used against the division. Armed force will not be used until such time as Oberleutnant Baron von Kleist has finished the negotiations. In all likelihood, measures will be taken against the lack of discipline in the division which will exclude the use of armed force against the division.

Oberleutnant Baron von Kleist has with him as escort Sonderführer von Rosenberg and as driver Sergeant Major Kuster.

For Commander Erzgebirge
Chief of Staff 1a
Major of General Headquarters

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. N°N-18766. L. 25. In envelope. Original. Translation from the German, contemporary to original.

N°88. Mandate issued by F. I. Trukhin to Major General V. G. Assberg, Colonel V. V. Pozdnyakov, and a number of members of CLPR on conducting negotiations with the Anglo-American command.

4 May, 1945

COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE PEOPLES OF
RUSSIA

___ May 1945

N°4/7 5/45

Major General of the Russian Liberation Army Vladimir Gavrilovich ASSBERG¹⁹⁹ and Colonel Vladimir Vasilievich Pozdnyakov²⁰⁰ accompanied by adjutant General ASSBERG, follow Second Lieutenant BUDKOV, translator Nina Sergeevna SMIRNOVA, and driver Sergei TRUTNEV to the location of the American and English Armed Forces with authorization from the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (CLPR).

Major General ASSBERG and Colonel POZDNYAKOV are authorized by the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia to inform the Anglo-American command of the goals and missions of the Russian Liberation Movement, headed by the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia under the leadership of the Chair of the Committee and High Commander of the Armed Forces, Lieutenant General VLASOV.

The Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia authorizes Major General ASSBERG and Colonel POZDNYAKOV

to conduct talks and considers it necessary to state that the Russian Liberation Army will not enter into any armed conflict with the Anglo-American armed forces.

MEMBER OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE
LIBERATION OF THE PEOPLES OF RUSSIA AND CHIEF OF
STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES

Major General TRUKHIN

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE: Major General BOYARSKY

Major General MEANDROV

Major MUZYCHENKO

Docent GRECHKO

This document is a copy of the mandate issued by me and other members of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia to ASSBERG and POZDNYAKOV for the conduct of negotiations with the command of the Anglo-American troops. F. Trukhin.

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. N°N-18766. T. 8. L. 56. Authenticated copy.

N°89. Dispatch from Major General M. M. Shapovalov to F. I. Trukhin in the name of A. A. Vlasov, with a message on the conditions for talks with the command of the Anglo-American forces.

Deutsch Brod. 5 May, 1945

08:45

Major General Trukhin

DISPATCH

The assigned task has been completed.

I found General A. A. Vlasov and the 600th Infantry Division and personally made contact with General Vlasov and General Bunyachenko at 22:00 on 4 May, 1945.

The location of A. A. Vlasov is together with the headquarters of the 600th Infantry Division.

The region of the deployment of the 600th Infantry Division is circled on the map.

The headquarters of the division is Suchomasty (Sukhomyst).

Today, 5 May, 1945, and tomorrow, 6 May, 1945, the division will be here at the headquarters in Suchomasty.

During the night of the 6th to the 7th, General Bunyachenko will move with the division somewhat to the south in order to move closer to us. This new region is circled with a broken line. The headquarters will be at Příbram.

General Vlasov ordered me to inform you that:

- 1) All units under your command should immediately move to the north for rapid unification with the 600th.
- 2) Follow no other orders no matter where they come from. Now the most important goal is to combine into a single fist.
- 3) Do not acknowledge anyone anywhere.
- 4) Use all means to gather as many provisions as you can carry with you. For this purpose, press carts into service through the local authorities or the gendarmes of the headquarters. Maintain civility and avoid all cause for consequences in the event that the transport must be taken summarily [by force].
- 5) There it is also possible to take action to arm yourselves.
- 6) In addition to locating carts for the transport of provisions, locate carts for the transport of the sick and weary.
- 7) Should the German communications officer object to not following the orders of the commander of "South,"²⁰¹ tell him that you have the oral order of A. A. Vlasov to complete a more important task with the 600th Infantry Division.
- 8) Find out from Herre by all means necessary, questioning him as to where the movement roads are or where there are stores of provisions, supplies, or weapons in nearby towns.
- 9) Report on the results of the talks of Assberg and Pozdnyakov to General Vlasov.
- 10) The following conditions should be met by the Anglo-Americans:

- a) No surrendering us to the USSR
- b) Recognition of us as a political factor in the future, strong in the military sense as well.
- c) General Maltsev and 3 thousand of his soldiers and up to one-third of the weaponry already crossed over to the side of the Americans on 1 May, 1945 after negotiations with the American command. For this reason, he is not here with us.

The surrender took place in the town of Zwiesel, which is 90 kilometers to the south of Pilsen or 110–120 kilometers to the south-southwest of Marienbad. General Maltsev conducted negotiations with the German General Aschenbrenner, and thus Aschenbrenner surrendered together with Maltsev.²⁰²

The results of the negotiations are not known to anyone. There are no dispatches from the other side about how they are being treated. The Americans supposedly promise not to surrender us to the Soviets.

As for the flight and technical personnel, they have remained here in Deutschbrod and now the automobiles in Deutschbrod are going on their own to unite with the 600th Infantry Division. The airplanes are German, and they are not giving them.

That is all. Secondhand personally-orally this evening.

Major General Shapovalov²⁰³

P.S. I am sending this dispatch by motorcycle with Major Sanzherov.

I ask that you send Sanzherov back to me immediately by the route that he knows.

Shap[ovalov]

- 1.) A. A. Vlasov asks that marches be not less than 40–45 kilometers in a 24-hour period. Use as an example the 600th Infantry Division, which, en route to the south from near Berlin, (out of necessity) completed 75–80 kilometers in a 24-hour period.

- 2.) Explain to the people the goal of the movement to the north.
- 3.) Rescind the order of greeting as it was up to now. Implement Russian greeting.

This dispatch was entrusted by me on 5 May, 1945 from Major General of the RLA Shapovalov, whom I sent to coordinate the arrival of Vlasov. F. Trukhin.

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. N°N-18766. T. 8. L. 50–54. Original. Manuscript. Autograph.

N°90. Conditions for the transfer of units of CLPR to the status of POWs of the 3rd American Army, set by commander of the 11th Tank Division of the USA Major General Deger.

6 May, 1945

Conditions for the crossing of units of the Armed Forces of CLPR to the status of POWs of the 3rd American Army,²⁰⁴ set by commander of the 11th Tank Division

1. Cease all fighting and free allied POWs.
2. Keep all weapons and property, not passing them to German units.
3. Do not spoil weapons, property, ammunition, etc. and leave them until the moment of crossing over.
4. Gather all units into one general area (to the south of Budweis), from where along the indicated route (on the accompanying map) you will concentrate forces in the area to the northwest of Lintz (indicated on the map).
5. Complete the crossing over during the day, in one column, displaying clear signs of identification.
6. Time period for the acceptance of conditions—36 hours, counting from 18:00 on 6 May, 1945.

Commander of the 11th Tank Division, Major General Deger

Czechoslovakia

6 May, 1945

BA-MA. MSg/2/17818. Bl. 61. Copy.

N°91. Appeal from S. K. Bunyachenko to the commandant of Prague with the suggestion to cease hostilities and go home.

Prague, 7 May, 1945

To the German commandant of the city of Prague

1. Almost all armed forces—the local garrisons of the Protectorate—having understood the senselessness of opposition, have laid down their weapons.

1. I propose that upon surrendering weapons, each can depart for their homeland or, if so desired, be handed over to the Anglo-Americans.

2. I give my honest word as an officer and guarantee the fulfillment of my proposal.

If my demands on capitulation are not accepted by 10:00, then I will use artillery to break down any further opposition.²⁰⁵

Commander of the 1st Russian Division

Major General Bunyachenko

Executive Officer

Lt. Colonel Nikolaev

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. N°N-18766. T. 15. In envelope. Original manuscript. Translation from the German contemporary to the original.

N°92. Letter from the Military Commandant of the city of Prague, Lieutenant General Müller-Gebhardt, to Colonel of the Armed Forces of CLPR I. K. Sakharov on the readiness of the German armed forces in Prague to continue the fight against the Red Army.

Prague, 7 May, 1945

Military Commandant of the city of Prague

Mr. Colonel Sakharov,

In reference to our conversation today at noon, I shall explain that after conversing with the German state minister and authority for the armed forces, we will, it goes without saying, continue to fight against the Bolsheviks with great force going forward.

Seeing how the group of troops under Schörner²⁰⁶ (over 1 million persons), along with all the units of the armed forces in Prague, stand at the ready to fight against Bolshevism, whose defeat is our singular goal in today's fight. We expect that the units under Vlasov have sworn to be our allies, as General Vlasov confirmed in his handshake with the state minister and the authorized German general, and if they do not want to support us in this fight, they should at least not impede us in it and continue their march to the region indicated by the commander.

If they, however, turn against us, then we, as soldiers who have never run to become betrayers, will not be able to understand this in any way. We are strong enough to beat back such an attack.

Lieutenant General Müller-Gebhardt

The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. N°N-18766. T. 25. In envelope. Original. Translation from the German, contemporary to original.

N°93. Order from A. A. Vlasov to immediately transfer all RLA soldiers to the side of the Red Army.

12 May, 1945

Order

I am located with the commander of the 25th Tank Corps, General Fomin. All my soldiers and officers who believe in me, I order you to cross over immediately to the side of the Red Army.

Servicemen of the 1st Russian Division of Major General Bunyachenko, located in the position of the tank brigade of Colonel Mischenko, immediately join his forces.

All are guaranteed life and return to the Homeland without suffering repression.

Lieutenant General Vlasov

12.05.[19]45. 20.15

The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. F. 236. Op. 2727. D. 30. L. 184. Original. Manuscript.

N°94. Dispatch from the commander of the 25th Tank Corps, Guard Major General of Tank Forces Fomin, and the Tank Corps' Chief of Staff Zubkov on the capture of A. A. Vlasov in the Brezhi area.

Not earlier than 15 May, 1945

Secret

To the Military Council of the 1st Ukrainian Front²⁰⁷

Copy to: Commander of the 13th Army

DISPATCH

on the defeat of the Vlasov group and the capture of the traitor to the Homeland

Commander of the RLA VLASOV

1. The 25th Tank Corps, operating in the region of GORZHOVITSE, which is to the west of Prague, headed to the south and southwest with the mission: follow the retreating enemy, the defeated troops of the SS and the units of Vlasov's RLA. By 12:00 on 11 May, it was the first unit to arrive on the western edge of KLATOVY and the main force in the NEPOMUK area. Arriving at the indicated areas, the corps deeply cut into the territory of the American troops, thus creating a difficult situation for the enemy, which had intended to avoid our unit and surrender to the Americans.

Further movement of the corps was impeded because the command of the American units considered the indicated regions their border.

After meeting with the American units, I DECIDED to stop the corps, cover the main roads and crossings with ambushes and pickets, and conduct scouting with the goal of killing or capturing Vlasov's followers and in case we came across units of the SS.

2. With information from scouting conducted in the area of Březnice and to the west, and likewise from the questioning of captured followers of Vlasov, it was discovered that the 1st VLASOV Division was in that region under the command of former general BUNYACHENKO, as was VLASOV's headquarters, with the general also present. Having learned such information, I tasked the commander of the 162nd Tank Brigade to find and capture VLASOV at any cost. And, in the event that he was already in the hands of the American units, to steal VLASOV away from them.

Having received this order, the units began conducting a search for the division headquarters and VLASOV.

3. On 11 May, 1945, the 162nd Tank Brigade, which is commanded by Colonel MISCHENKO, discovered that the 1st Vlasov Division and its headquarters was located in BREZHI. At 16:00 on 12 May, 1945, Colonel MISCHENKO ordered the commander of the 162nd Tank Brigade, Captain Yakushov, to go out

into the territory of the 1st Division of the RLA and capture VLASOV, his headquarters, and division commander BUNYACHENKO. Two kilometers south of BREZHI, Captain YAKUSHOV met the commander off the second battalion, third regiment, first division of the RLA, Captain KUCHINSKY, who indicated that ahead of them was a column of automobiles containing the headquarters of the division, where VLASOV himself was. Captain YAKUSHOV passed that column and blocked the road with his car. The division commander, BUNYACHENKO, was discovered in the first stopped car, and YAKUSHOV offered to have him follow him, but BUNYACHENKO categorically refused.

At that time, the Vlasov-follower KUCHINSKY informed Captain YAKUSHOV that VLASOV was in that column as well. On the first search, YAKUSHOV did not find VLASOV, but one of the officers of the column pointed out the car that VLASOV was in. Approaching VLASOV's car, YAKUSHOV found VLASOV covered with a blanket and leaning against the translator and a woman sitting in the car. VLASOV did not follow YAKUSHOV's order to exit the vehicle and follow him to the headquarters of the 162nd Tank Brigade, explaining his refusal by saying that he was going to the headquarters of the American army and was under their authority. Only under threat of being shot did YAKUSHOV force VLASOV to get in the car. On the way, VLASOV made an attempt to jump from the car, but he was detained. On the way to the brigade headquarters, YAKUSHOV met brigade commander MISCHENKO. YAKUSHOV handed VLASOV over to Colonel MISCHENKO. When VLASOV spoke with MISCHENKO, he again repeated that he should go to the headquarters of the American army. After a short conversation, MISCHENKO left VLASOV with me at 18:00 on 12 May.

5. After questioning and conversation with VLASOV, I suggested that he write an order to all units on surrendering their weapons and crossing over to our side. Vlasov agreed and immediately wrote out the order in his own hand. Four copies of Vlasov's order were printed and again signed by VLASOV. Of his imprisonment, VLASOV immediately reported to the Commander of the 13th Army and Headquarters of the Front.²⁰⁸

At 22:00 on 12 May, 1945, VLASOV, accompanied by the Chief of Staff of the 25th Tank Corps, Colonel ZUBKOV, and the head of Counterintelligence for SMERSH, Lt. Colonel SIMONOV, was sent to the headquarters of the 13th Army, where he was on 13 May, 1945 handed over to the Counterintelligence Division of SMERSH of the 13th Army.

Two days later, on 15 May, 1945, the commander of the 1st Division BUNYACHENKO was taken, along with the Chief of Staff of the division NIKOLAEV, special forces officer OL'KHOVIK, and VLASOV's personal translator, RESSLER.

6. As a result of the capture of VLASOV on 13 and 14 May, 1945, the 1st Division, consisting of 9 thousand people, was disarmed. Five tanks were taken, along with 5 motorized guns, 2 armored transport vehicles, 3 armored cars, 38 light automobiles, 64 cargo vehicles, and 1,378 horses.

Commander of the 25th Tank Corps,
Guard Major General of Tank Forces FOMIN

Executive Officer, Colonel ZUBKOB

LIST

Enlisted and officer personnel who took part in the capture of the traitor to the Homeland VLASOV

- 1) Head of the OKR SMERSH 162nd Tank Brigade, Major Pakh Antonovich VINOGRADOV
- 2) Authorized OKR SMERSH 162nd Tank Brigade, Ilya Petrovich Lieutenant IGNASHKIN
- 3) Red Army member Stepan Mikhailovich CHEBOTAREV

Chief of Staff of the 25th Tank Corps
Colonel ZUBKOV

The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. F. 236. Op. 2727. D. 30. L. 180-183. Original.

¹ The Second Shock Army was formed in October 1941, in the Volga Military District (VMD) as the 26th Reserve Army on the basis of a directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated 24 October, 1941. By order No. 00119 of the People's Committee of Defense of the USSR on 13 December, 1941, it was renamed the 2nd Shock Army; on 17 December, 1941, included in the Volkhov Front; and from January to April, 1942, took part in the Lyuban' operation. It participated in military actions from 25 December, 1941, through 30 September, 1944, as well as from 16 October, 1944 through 9 May, 1945. Commanders of the army in 1941 and 1942 were: Lieutenant General G. G. Sokolov (October 1941 - January 1942), Lieutenant General N. K. Klykov (January - April and July - December 1942), Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov (April - July 1942), and Lieutenant General V. Z. Romanovsky (December 1942 - December 1943).

The 52nd Army was formed in August 1941 in the northwest direction on the base of the 25th Rifle Corps as the 52nd Reserve Army by order No. 001200 of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated 23 August, 1941. Until 17 December, 1941, it was called the 52nd Separate Army. It engaged in combat along the main course of the Volkhov River, participating in defensive operations of Tikhvin (October - November 1941) and advancing operations (November - December 1941). On 17 December, 1941, it was included in the Volkhov Front, and in January - April 1942, it took part in the Lyuban' operation. On 24 April, 1942, it was included in the Leningrad Front, and on 9 June it was included in the Volkhov Front second formation. The commanders of the army in 1941 - 1942 were: Lieutenant General N. K. Klykov (August 1941 - January 1942), Lieutenant General V. F. Yakovlyev (January 1942 - July 1943).

The 59th Army was formed in November 1941 in the Siberian Military District by order No. 004276 of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command from 2 November, 1941. In November 1941 it was redeployed to the Arkhangelsk Military District in the region of Vologda-Cherepovets. On 17 December, 1941, it was included in the Volkhov Front, and from January - April, 1941, it participated in the Lyuban' operation. On 24 April, 1942, it was included in the Leningrad Front; on 9 June, transferred to the Volkhov Front 2nd Formation; and over the course of 18 months it defended the base on the Volkhov River in the area of Myasnoi Bor. The commanders of the army in 1941 - 1942 were: Major General I. V. Galanin (November 1941 - April 1942), Lieutenant General I. T. Korovnikov (April 1942 to the end of the war).

² Georg Lindemann (8 March, 1884 - 25 September, 1963) was a German military leader, rank of Colonel General. From 1 October, 1940, he was the Commander of the 50th Army Corps; from 17 January, 1942, the Commander of the 18th Army; from 3 March, 1942, Colonel General; from 10 March, 1944, he commanded the Army Group North; from 27 January, 1945, he was the commanding officer of the Wehrmacht in Denmark. On 8 May, 1945, he surrendered to the British Army in Copenhagen.

³ Andrei Andreevich Vlasov (1 September, 1901 - 1 August, 1946) was a Lieutenant General of the Red Army, Lieutenant General of the CLPR Armed Forces. From 17 January, 1941 he served as the commanding officer of the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Kiev Military District. On 22 February, 1941, he was awarded the Order of Lenin; from 23 July, 1941, he served as the commanding officer of the 37th Army of the Southwest Front; and from 20 November, 1941, as commanding officer of an operational group under A. I. Lizyukov of the 20th Army of the Western Front. On 24 January, 1942, he was made Lieutenant General; on 1 February, 1942, he was

awarded the Order of the Red Banner. On 8 March, 1942, he was named Deputy Commander of the Volkhov Front; and 16 April, 1942, appointed Acting Commander of the 2nd Shock Army while remaining Deputy Commander of the Front. On 12 July, 1942, he surrendered and was held in a camp in Lötzen (now Gizycko) in Eastern Prussia from 15 July, 1942, and later at a special camp in Vinnitsa, and he became the Russian anti-Stalinist movement in the occupied territories. He read the Prague Manifesto in Prague on 14 November, 1944, heading CLPR and its armed forces; on 12 May, 1945, he was arrested and handed over to the Soviets. By the sentence of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, he was hanged in the yard of the Butyrka prison at night on 1 August, 1946.

⁴ An analogous story of the capture of A. A. Vlasov from the words of a female resident of the village of Sennaya Kerest is included in the report to the People's Committee of Defense from 3 July, 1943, by Dep. Head of the political section of the 46th Rifle Division of the 2nd Shock Army, A. I. Zubov (See: The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. L./d No. 641008. L. 34–35 ob.).

⁵ Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko (18 March, 1895 – 31 March, 1970) was Marshall of the Soviet Union (1940), twice named Hero of the Soviet Union (1940, 1965). From 23 June to 19 July, 1941, he was Chair of the Main Command Headquarters. From 2 July to 12 September, 1941, he was commanding officer of the Western Front, and he led the battle of Smolensk. On 13 September, 1941, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Southwest direction by orders from the main Headquarters, and he tried to hold onto Kiev, but the time of advantage had passed and a large portion of the soldiers were surrounded. At the end of November 1941, Timoshenko commanded a return attack of Soviet forces near Rostov-on-Don. In May 1942, he led the Kharkov operation, as a result of which a large grouping of the Red Army suffered defeat, on July 1942 was appointed commanding officer of the Stalingrad Front; October, 1942 – 13 March, 1943, he commanded the Northwest Front. From March 1943 until May 1945 he was a representative of the Supreme High Command headquarters and facilitated the coordination of actions for a number of fronts, taking part in the planning and execution of several operations (Yassko-Kishinevskaya and others).

⁶ Pavel Semyonovich Vinogradov (18 December, 1901 – July 1942) was a Soviet military leader, rank of colonel (1938). At the beginning of the war, he was appointed to the post of Chief of Staff of the 25th Rifle Corps, which was in the 19th Army, in reserve for the headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and in the beginning of July 1941, he was transferred to the Western Front. He took part in the battle of Smolensk. In September 1941, he was appointed to the position of Commander of the 191st Rifle Division (4th Army, Volkhov Front); in December 1941 made Chief of Staff of the 4th Army; and on March 1942 made Chief of Staff of the 2nd Shock Army. In May 1942 he was appointed to the position of Dep. Chief of Staff for the Volkhov Front. He was missing in action from July 1942 onwards.

⁷ Morg, from the German *Morgen* (morning), is an outdated unit of measurement for area in medieval Western Europe that is equivalent to approximately 0.56 hectares.

⁸ The Leningrad Military District (LMD) takes its history from the Petersburg Military District that was formed in 1864 as a result of broad military reforms. After Saint Petersburg was renamed Petrograd in 1914, the military district also took on the new name. After the October revolution, on 20 March, 1918, from the existing district the Petrograd Military District of the Red Army was formed, and was renamed the Leningrad Military District (LMD) on 1 February, 1924. The territory of the district included the gubernias of Leningrad, Pskov, Novgorod, Olonets,

Cherepovets, and Murmansk (which from 1927 became Leningrad District) and the Karelian Autonomous Republic. Later, the territory of the district changed. On 24 June, 1941, the Northern Front was created from the command and soldiers of the LMD, and it was divided in August 1941 into the Leningrad Front and the Karelian Front. On 21 – 30 September, 1941, the LMD was deactivated (order of the People's Commissariat of Defense No. 0363 from 21 September, 1941). On 9 June, 1945, the LMD was reestablished and included the territory of Leningrad, the Leningrad District, the Novgorod District and the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The Kiev Military District (KMD) was formed during the military reforms of Minister D. A. Miliutina in August, 1862, and it included the territories of Kiev Guberniya, Volynsk Guberniya, Podolsk Guberniya, and from 1888 also Kursk, Poltava, Kharkov and Chernigov Guberniyas. The commanding officer of the forces of the military district was often the same person holding the post of Governor General of Kiev, Podolsk and Volynsk. On 17 May, 1935, according to order No. 079 of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, the KMD was recreated as a result of the division of the Ukrainian Military District into Kiev and Kharkov Districts. It included the territories of Kiev, Chernigov, Vinnitsa, and Odessa, along with the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and in 1939 Western Ukraine (annexed to the USSR). On 26 July, 1938, the KMD was reorganized as the Kiev Special Military District (KSMD). In 1939, Odessa and the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic were removed from the KSMD to form a new Odessa Military District. By 1941, the KSMD included Kiev, Vinnitsa, Zhitomir, Kamenets-Podolsk, Stanislav, Ternopol, Chernovtsy, Rovno, Volynsk, Lvov, and Droboych regions of Ukraine. The KSMD was, in its composition, the strongest of all the border regions in the west.

From the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Southwest Front was formed from the KSMD. The district also continued to function as subordinate to the commanding officer of the Southwest Front. On 9 August, 1941, the command of the KSMD was relocated to the city of Konotop, and later to an area near the city of Sumy. At the decision of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command, on 10 September, 1941, the district was deactivated and its units and institutions transferred to the Southwest Front. On 15 October, 1943, the Kiev Military District was again reestablished.

⁹ The 37th Army was formed in August 1941, within the Southwest Front, on the basis of directive No. 4/1293/org dated 23 July, 1941, from the head of the General Headquarters of the Red Army. During the operation to defend Kiev, the army was surrounded and destroyed. Its commanding officer was Major General A. A. Vlasov (July – September 1941).

¹⁰ The Southwest Front was initially formed in the area to the southwest on 22 June, 1941, on orders from the People's Committee of Defense of the USSR dated 22 June, 1941, from the Kiev Special Military District's 5th, 6th, 12th, and 26th Armies. Later, it included the 3rd, 9th, 13th, 21st, 28th, 37th, 38th, 40th, 57th, and 61st Armies and the 8th Air Force. In the second half of July through the beginning of August 1941, units of the front, together with units from the Southern Front, became surrounded in areas near Uman' and Kiev, and more than 500,000 soldiers and commanders were taken prisoner. The commanding officer of the front, Colonel General Kirponos, along with the Chief of Staff of the front, Major General Tupikov and member of the Military Soviet of the front, Burmistenko, all died attempting to escape the encirclement. In September – November 1941, the remaining forces of the Southwest Front retreated to a line east of Kursk, Kharkov, and Izium, where they were reinforced with new recruits, and the front conducted the Yelets operation

with forces from the right flank in December 1941, the Kursk-Oboyan' operation with forces from the right flank in December 1941 – January 1942, and a joint operation with the Southern Front, the Barvenkovo-Lozovskaya operation, with forces from the left flank in January 1942, moving the line ahead 100 kilometers and occupying the large military base on the right bank of the Northern Don. In the battle for Kharkov at the end of May 1942, forces from the front became surrounded and suffered serious casualties. On 12 July, 1942, the front was deactivated. Commanding officers of the front were: Colonel General M. P. Kirponos (deceased) (22 June – 20 September, 1941); Field Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko (30 September – 18 December, 1941); Lieutenant General F. Ya. Kostenko (18 December, 1941 – 8 April, 1942); Field Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko (8 April, 1942 – 12 July, 1942).

¹¹ The 20th Army's second formation was formed by reconstituting the operational group of Colonel A. I. Liziukov, created 27 November, 1941, from the forces of the Moscow defense zone, on the basis of orders from the headquarters of Supreme High Command dated 29 November and was listed with the Western Front. It took part in the Klinsko-Solnechnogorsk advance operation (6 – 25 December, 1941) and the Rzhevsko-Vyasemskaya strategic operation (8 January to 20 April, 1942). It was deactivated on 21 April, 1944, on the basis of directive No. 220082 from the headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated 18 April, and its command staff was directed to the formation of the command of the 3rd Baltic Front. Commanding officers of the army 1941 – 1943 included: Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov (November 1941 – March 1942), Lieutenant General M. A. Reiter (March – September 1942); Major General N. I. Kiriukhin (October – December 1942); Lieutenant General M. S. Khozin (December 1942 – January 1943).

¹² The Volkhov Front was created on 17 December, 1941, on the basis of directive No. 005581 from the headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated 11 December, 1941. The forces of the front were tasked with the assignment to destroy enemy groupings on the right bank of the Volkhov River and advance to the northwest to break through the blockade of Leningrad in cooperation with the Leningrad Front. On the basis of directive No. 170301 from the headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated 21 April, 1942, the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts were combined into a single Leningrad Front consisting of two groups of forces – those of the Volkhov Front, including the 4th, 8th, 52nd, 54th, 59th, and 2nd Strike Force Armies (commanding officer, Lieutenant General M. S. Khozin, simultaneously commanding the forces of the Leningrad Front) and those of the Leningrad Front, including the 23rd, 42nd, and 55th Armies, as well as the Nevsky and Primorsky groups (Lieutenant General L. A. Govorov). On the basis of directive No. 170450 from the headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated 8 June, 1942, the Volkhov Front was reinstated. In August – September 1942, the forces of the front conducted the unsuccessful Sinyavskaya operation with the goal of breaking through the blockade of Leningrad. In January 1943, they participated in the breakthrough of the Leningrad blockade, and in January – February 1944, as part of the Novgorod-Luga operation, they drove the German forces back. On the basis of directive No. 220023 from the headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated 13 February, 1944, the front was deactivated on 15 February. The commanding officer of the front was Army General K. A. Meretskov (9 June, 1942 – 15 February, 1944).

¹³ The 4th Army Second Formation was formed in September 1941, from the command staff of the 52nd Army according to directive No. 002339 of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated 26 September. Until 17

December, 1941, it was called the 4th Detached Army. It engaged in combat along the lower portions of the Volkhov River, also taking part in the defense of Tikhvin (October – November 1941) and the Tikhvin advance (November – December 1941) operations. On 17 December, 1941, it was included into the Volkhov Front. It was deactivated on 25 November, 1943, on the basis of a directive of the General Headquarters dated 28 October in connection with staffing changes for the forces of the Volkhov Front. The commanding officers of the army 1941 – 1942 included: Lieutenant General V. F. Yakovlev (September – November, 1941), Army General K. A. Meretskov (November – December 1941), Major General P. A. Ivanov (December 1941 – February 1942), Major General P. I. Lyapin (February – June 1942), Lieutenant General N. I. Gusev (June 1942 – November 1943).

¹⁴ Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov (26 May, 1897 – 30 December, 1968) was a Soviet military leader, Marshal of the Soviet Union (1944). On 23 June, 1941, he was arrested for anti-Soviet conspiracy activities, being freed on 6 September, 1941. From September 1941, he was the Commander of the 7th Detached Army; from November 1941 the commanding officer of the 4th Detached Army; from December 1941 the commanding officer of the Volkhov Front; from April 1942 commanding officer of the 33rd Army on the Western Front; from February 1944 commanding officer of the Karelian Front; and from 1944 Field Marshal of the Soviet Union. From April 1945, he was the commanding officer of the Primorskaya group in the Far East, and from July 1945 he was commanding officer of the 1st Far Eastern Front. From September 1945, he was the commanding officer of the Primorskoy, Moscow, Belomorskoy and Northern Military Districts.

¹⁵ The 54th was formed in September, 1941, from the 44th Rifle Corps, according to directive No. 001563 of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated 2 September, 1941. It engaged in combat in southern Priladozhye with the goal of breaking through the Leningrad blockade. From 26 September, 1941, it was included in the Leningrad Front. In January – April, 1942, it took part in the Liubansk operation. From 9 June, it was included in the Volkhov Front second formation. The commanding officers of the army in 1941 – 1942: Field Marshal of the Soviet Union G. I. Kulik (September 1941), Lieutenant General M. S. Khozin (September – October, 1941), Major General I. I. Fediuninsky (October 1941 – April 1942), Major General A. V. Sukhomlin (April 1942 – March 1943).

¹⁶ Mikhail Semyonovich Khozin (22 October, 1896 – 27 February 1979) was a Soviet military figure, Colonel General. January 1939 – June 1941, he was the commanding officer of the Frunze Military Academy; from July 1941 the Deputy Commander of the Reserve Front of G. K. Zhukov; from September 1941 the Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Front and commanding officer of its forces; from April 1942 the commanding officer of the Volkhov group. On 8 June, 1942, he was removed from his position, later being made commanding officer of the 33rd Army of the Western Front. During October – December 1942, he was the Deputy Commander of the Western Front; from 4 December, 1942 – 1943, commanding officer of the 20th Army; from January 1943 representative of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the 3rd Tank Army; from March – December 1943 Deputy Commander of Forces of the Northwest and Western Fronts; and from March 1944 Commanding Officer of Forces in the Primorskoy Military District.

¹⁷ The Leningrad Front was created on 27 August, 1941, by dividing the Northern Front according to directive No. 001199 of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated 23 August, 1941. Forces of the front were tasked with covering direct access routes to Leningrad and not allowing them to be taken by the enemy. From 30 August, 1941, it was given control of the Baltic Front. In January, 1943, forces

of the front joined with those of the Volkhov Front to break through the Leningrad blockade. Decisive removal of the blockade was achieved as part of an advance operation in January, 1944. Commanding officers of the front 1941 – 1945 were: Lieutenant General M. M. Popov (27 August – 5 September, 1941), Field Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Ye. Voroshilov (5 September – 12 September, 1941), Army General G. K. Zhukov (13 September – 7 October, 1941), Major General I. I. Feduninsky (8 October – 26 October, 1941), Lieutenant General M. S. Khozin (27 October, 1941 – 9 June, 1942), Lieutenant General of Artillery [from January 1943 Colonel General, from November of 1943 Army General, from June 1944 Field Marshal of the Soviet Union] L. A. Govorov (9 June, 1942 – July 1945).

¹⁸ The 18th Army of the Wehrmacht was formed on 4 November, 1939, from command staff of the border region “Center” of Army Group B in the West. In May – June, 1940, it participated in the Western Campaign. From July, 1940, it was in Poland on the Soviet-German border, from May 1941, in Eastern Prussia. From 22 June, 1941, was included in the Army Group “North” on the Soviet-German Front. The commanding officers of the army from 1941 – 1942: Colonel General G. von Kuchler (November 1939 – January 1942); Cavalry General, from July 1942 Colonel General G. Lindeman (January 1942 – March 1944).

¹⁹ The institution of military commissars was founded during the Civil War. On 4 March, 1918, by order of the Soviet of People’s Commissars, the High Council was created with a military leader and two commissars. Other governing bodies for the army and the navy were created according to the same principle. On 31 March, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party discussed the role of commissars in the army and the navy. According to the decision of the Plenum of People’s Military Commissars and the High Council, a regulation was published on 6 April “On military commissars, members of military councils.” It indicated that commissars were the direct “political body of the Soviet regime within the Army.” The institution of military commissars was introduced into all military units, formations, offices, and military training institutions, in the armies and at the fronts. The main responsibility of the commissars was to carry out the policies of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet government within the army. In order to coordinate and unify the activities of the military commissars and to establish control over them on a country-wide scale, the Council of People’s Commissars on War and Navy Affairs ordered, on 8 April, 1918, the creation of an All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars that in April 1919 was reorganized into the Political Division of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, and on 15 May was renamed the Political Command of the Revolutionary Military Council, receiving the rights of a military department from the party’s central committee. In 1925 – 1928, unity of command was gradually introduced into the Armed Forces of the USSR, and military commissars were replaced with assistant commanders for political units, who directed the political education of the staff, plus all party and communist youth league duties. In May 1937, the position of military commissar was reinstated in units, formations, and offices of the Red Army, in 1940 again being replaced with the position of Deputy Commander (head) of political units. The institution of military commissars, introduced on 16 July, 1941, lasted until 9 October, 1942, when unity of command was definitively established within the army and the navy.

²⁰ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov (Skryabin) (5 February, 1890 – 8 November, 1986) was a Soviet political and state figure. 1941 – 1957: first Deputy Chair of the Council of People’s Commissars and Council of Ministers of the USSR. 1941 – 1945 first Deputy Chair of the State Committee for Defense. 1943: Hero of Socialist Labor. 1939 – 1949: people’s commissar; 1953 – 1956: Foreign Minister of the USSR.

²¹ Order No. 130 from the Supreme High Commander dated 1 May, 1942, stated: "I order...the entire Red Army to see to it that 1942 becomes the final defeat of the Fascist German forces and the liberation of the Soviet land from Hitler's scoundrels!" (Stalin, J. V., *On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*. P. 44–52.)

The Kharkov operation (12 – 29 May, 1942), was an unsuccessful offensive of Red Army forces on the Southwest Front that intended to destroy the Kharkov group of the Wehrmacht, liberate Kharkov and occupy strategic initiatives in the Southwest region. The German command had also prepared an offensive in that region. Forces of the Southwest Front that entered into the offensive on 12 May were able to break through the enemy defenses by May 14. On that same day, the German forces launched counter-attacks against Soviet units advancing on Kharkov from the Northeast, in several locations forcing them to retreat. Simultaneously, the German army group "Kleist" entered the offensive on the south face of the Barvenkovo Bulge, broke through the defenses of the 57th and 9th Armies of the Southern Front, and pushed into the rear area of the strike group of the Southwest Front. The command of the Southwest Front continued the offensive on Kharkov and only on 19 May did it order the forces to return to defensive positions. On 23 May, the strike group of the Southwest Front was surrounded by the enemy and continued combat while surrounded until 29 May. Approximately 22,000 people were able to escape the encirclement, but the majority of the surrounded forces either died or were taken prisoner by the enemy. Total losses of Soviet forces in the Kharkov operation amounted to 277,190 people, of which 170,958 were irrecoverable, 775 tanks, more than 5,000 large guns and mortars.

²² Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov (19 November, 1896 – 18 June, 1974) was Field Marshal of the Soviet Union (1943), four-time recipient of the Hero of the Soviet Union (1939, 1944, 1945, 1956). On 28 February, 1941, he was appointed head of the General Headquarters. During the Great Patriotic War, he showed himself to be a talented regimental leader who played a most important role in the defeat of the Fascist German forces in the battles of Leningrad and Moscow (1941 – 1942), during the breakthrough of the Leningrad blockade, in the battles for Stalingrad and Kursk (1942 – 1943), in advancing to the right bank in Ukraine and in the Belarus operation (1943 – 1944), in the Vislo-Oderskaya and Berlin operations (1944 – 1945). From August 1942, he was the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Deputy Supreme Commander. In 1945 – 1946, he was the commanding officer of the Soviet Forces and the head of the Soviet military administration in Germany.

²³ Boris Mikhilovich Shaposhnikov (20 September, 1882 – 26 March, 1945) was a Soviet military and state figure, Field Marshal of the Soviet Union. From 15 August, 1940, he was Deputy People's Commissar for Defense of the USSR for the Formation of Fortified Regions (FR); from 10 September, 1939 until 9 April, 1941 he was a member of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR; from 1937 – 1945, Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; from 21 March, 1939, a candidate for membership in the Central Committee of the Communist Party. From 23 June – 16 July, 1941, he was on the Council for Evacuation under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. From 10 July, 1941, he was a member of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command; 29 July, 1941 – 11 May, 1942, head of the General Headquarters of the Red Army; May, 1942 – June, 1943, Deputy People's Commissar for Defense of the USSR; from June 1943, head of the Military Academy of the General Headquarters.

Grigorii Ivanovich Kulik (9 November, 1890 – 24 August 1950) was a Soviet military leader. On 23 June, 1941, he was appointed to coordinate the activities of the 3rd and 10th Armies; from September 1941, Commander of the 34th Detached

Army; from October 1941, Commander of the 56th Detached Army. On 16 February, 1942, he was found guilty of professional misconduct in abandoning Kerch, relieved of the rank of Field Marshal, and removed from the Central Committee; from 17 March, 1942, he was a Major General in the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR; from 15 April, 1943, Lieutenant General, commanding officer of the 4th Guard Army. From January 1944 until April 1945, he was Deputy Head of the Main Directorate for the Formation and Staffing of the Red Army. On 12 April, 1945, he was removed from his job for "inactivity" (which is to say, for "drunken conversations"). On 27 April, 1945, he had his party ticket revoked, and on 19 July, 1943 his rank was reduced to Major General. On 11 January, 1947, he was arrested; on 23 August, 1950, sentenced to capital punishment; and on 24 August, 1950, he was shot. On 11 April, 1956, he was posthumously rehabilitated.

Aleksandr Mikhailovich Vasilyevsky (18 September, 1895 – 5 December, 1977) was a Soviet military leader, Field Marshal of the Soviet Union. From May 1940, he was the First Deputy to the Head of the Operational Division of the General Headquarters; from 26 June, 1942, the head of the General Headquarters; from 14 October, 1942, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Field Marshal of the Soviet Union (16 February, 1943), member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. From February 1945, he commanded the 3rd Belorussian Front. In 1945, he was the commanding officer of Soviet forces in the Far East in the war with Japan.

Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny (13 April, 1883 – 26 October, 1973) was a Soviet military leader, Field Marshal of the Soviet Union (1935), three-time Hero of the Soviet Union (1958, 1963, 1968). 1939 – 1941 he was the Deputy People's Commissar for Defense of the USSR. In the Great Patriotic War (1941 – 1942) he was Commander-in-Chief of the forces in the Southwest and Northern Caucasus areas, the commanding officer of the Reserves and the North Caucasus Front.

Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov (4 February, 1881 – 2 December, 1969) was a Soviet state and military figure, Field Marshal of the Soviet Union (1935). In the years of the Great Patriotic War, he was a member of the State Defense Committee (GKO) from the moment of its formation on 30 June, 1941. On 10 July, 1941, he was appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the forces in the Northwest region; 5 – 14 September, 1941, commanding officer of the forces of the Leningrad Front; September 1941 – February 1942, representative to the Headquarters on the formation of troops; February – September 1942, representative of Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on the Volkhov Front; September 1942 – May 1943 Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement; May – September 1943, Chair of the Trofeiny Committee under the State Defense Committee; September 1943 – June 1944, chair of the Commission for Peace Negotiations. On 22 November, 1944, he was removed from the staff of the State Defense Committee. From 1940 – 1953, he was Deputy Chair of the Council of the People's Commissars (Council of Ministers) of the USSR.

²⁴ The Central Headquarters for the Partisan Movement under the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was the central body for military control of the partisan movement during the years of the Great Patriotic War. It was created in order to unite the leadership of the partisan movement in the rear areas of the enemy by order No. GOKO-1837ss of the State Defense Committee dated 30 May, 1942. In order to implement this directive, the People's Committee of Defense of the USSR issued Order No. 00125 dated 16 June, 1942, "On the formation of the Main and regional headquarters for the partisan movement." In March 1943, the Main Headquarters for the Partisan Movement was phased out, but one month later, on

17 April, by Order No. 3195ss of the State Defense Committee, it was again reinstated under the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The Ukrainian Headquarters for the Partisan Movement was removed from the chain of command of the Main Headquarters. On 13 January, 1944, considering that the majority of partisan units were acting on the territory of the Ukrainian and Belorussian SSRs and that they each had their own headquarters, the State Defense Committee of the USSR dissolved the Central Headquarters for the Partisan Movement through order No. 4945. With this decision, the State Defense Committee handed over leadership of the partisan movement on the still-occupied territory to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Republics.

The structure of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement included: the intelligence division, the operational division, Political Command of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (from 28 September, 1942), the Ukrainian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (from 30 May, 1942), the Bryansk Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (23 April, 1942 – 13 May, 1943), the Western Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, the Kalinin Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, the Leningrad Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, the Karelo-Finnish Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, the Lithuanian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, the Latvian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, the Estonian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, the Orlov Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, the Smolensk Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, the Stavropol Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, the Crimean Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, the Astrakhan Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, and the Polish Headquarters of the Partisan Movement.

On 28 September, 1942, representatives of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement were created under the Military Councils of the fronts. Due to the fact that the lines of the fronts did not coincide with the borders of the republics and districts, it was decided to have representation from the Central Headquarters at the Military Councils of the fronts. Included in the staff of the Central Headquarters for the Partisan Movement were: Chief of Staff Ponomarenko, P. K. (from the Central Committee of the Communist Party), Sergienko, V. T. (from NKVD), Korneev, T. F. (from the Intelligence Division of the People's Commissariat of Defense).

²⁵ Panteleimon Kondratyevich Ponomarenko (27 June, 1902 – 18 January, 1984) was the leader of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement. 1938 – 1947 he was the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia; simultaneously, 1944 – 1948 the chair of the Council of People's Commissars of the Belorussian SSR. During the Great Patriotic War, he was a member of the Military Councils of the West, Central, Bryansk and 1st Belorussian Fronts. 1942 – 1944 he was the leader of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement under the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

²⁶ Aleksey Vasilyevich Afanasyev (1897 – 1984) was a Soviet military leader. From December 1941, he was the head of communications for the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front; from 13 July, 1942, served in a partisan unit under the command of former Secretary of the Regional Communist Party Committee in Luga, I. D. Dmitriev; from 24 July, 1942, he served in the headquarters of the Volkhov Front; and from August 1942 as the head of communications for the 2nd Shock Army. From November 1943, he was the Deputy Head of Communications for the 2nd Ukrainian Front; from December 1943 he was head of the Command Engineering Faculty at the S. M. Budyonny Military Electro-technical Academy; from October 1944 he was the

head of the Ordzhonikidze Military Communications Training Facility; and from April 1946 head of the Grozny Military Communications Training Facility.

²⁷ The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (HSHC) was the highest body of military control, which from 1941 – 1945 exercised strategic leadership of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. It was founded on 23 June, 1941, on the basis of order Ni. 1724-733ss from the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party and it was initially called the Headquarters of the Main Command. It included: Field Marshal S. K. Timoshenko (chair), Army General G. K. Zhukov, J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, Field Marshal K. Ye. Voroshilov, Field Marshal S. M. Budyonny, and Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov. On 10 July, 1941, by order No. 83ss of the State Defense Committee, it was reorganized due to the formation of Main Command Areas (Northwest, Western, and Southwest) into the Headquarters of the High Command, and the chair became J. V. Stalin; on the staff, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov was replaced by Field Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov. On 8 August, 1941, it was renamed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in connection with the appointment of J. V. Stalin as Supreme High Commander by order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council for People's Commissars of the USSR, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party. HSHC fulfilled its function under the leadership of the State Defense Committee.

²⁸ The Northwest Front was a formation (an operational grouping) of the Red Army during the years of the Soviet-Finnish War and the Great Patriotic War (formed 22 June, 1941, from the forces of the Baltic Special Military District). At the moment of its formation, the Northwest Front included: the 8th, 11th, and 27th Armies and the Air Force of the Baltic District. Later added to the Northwest Front were the 1st, 3rd, 4th Strike Force; 34th, 48th, 53rd, 27th (second formation), 68th, 22nd and 43rd General Infantry Armies; the 1st Tank and 6th Air Armies; the Special Forces Group (1TA and 68A) of Lieutenant General M. S. Khozin; and the Novgorod Army Group. Commanding officers were: Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov (22 June – 3 July, 1941), Major General P. P. Sobennikov (4 July – 23 August, 1941), Lieutenant General P. A. Kurochkin (23 August, 1941 – 5 October, 1942 and 23 June – 20 November, 1943), Field Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko (5 October, 1942 – 14 March, 1943), and Colonel General I. S. Konev (14 March – 22 June, 1943).

²⁹ The Special Division was the name of military counterintelligence VchK, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, of the Committee for State Security of the USSR. Special Divisions were created on 19 December, 1918, by order of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, through which the extraordinary commissions of the armies and the fronts were united with the bodies of military control, and on the basis of this a new body was created, the Special Division of All-Russia Extraordinary Commissions under the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR. Later, with the creation of special divisions for the fronts, military districts, the fleet, armies, flotillas and special divisions under the Extraordinary Commissions of the various guberniyas, a single centralized system was created for security among the troops. 1934 – 1938, military counterintelligence along with Special Division (from December 1936, 5th Division) were listed under the Main Directorate for State Security of the NKVD of the USSR. In March 1938, with the dissolution of the Main Directorate for State Security, the 2nd Directorate (special divisions) was created from the 5th Division under the NKVD of the USSR. In September 1938, as part of another reorganization conducted at the initiative of the new First Deputy People's Commissar L. I. Beria, the Main Directorate for State Security was reinstated, and the 2nd Directorate fell under it as the 4th (Special) Division, which controlled the special divisions of the Red Army, the Red Navy and

the troops of the NKVD. On 3 February, 1941, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party published the decision “On the transfer of the Special Division from the NKVD of the USSR to the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the People’s Commissariat of the Navy of the USSR,” which liquidated the Special Division of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR, and in its place a third directorate was created for the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the People’s Commissariat of the Navy. Within the NKVD, there remained a separate 3rd Directorate, which now oversaw only the corresponding functions for its own forces and offices. Heads of the directorates answered directly to their own People’s Commissariats.

The function of the head, deputy, and investigators of the Special Division of the NKVD were as follows: to observe the political condition and morale of the members of its units, to expose individuals whose activities qualified under Soviet law as crimes against the state—treason, espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and to expose counterrevolutionary organizations and groups of individuals conducting anti-Soviet agitation, to conduct investigation into state crimes under the supervision of the Attorney General and with transfer of cases to military tribunals.

³⁰ The Kalinin Front was formed 19 October, 1941, on orders from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command from 17 October, 1941, from units of the Western Front (22nd, 29th, 30th, and 31st Armies) to the northwest of Moscow, acting against the forces of the German Army Group “Center.” The troops that formed that front participated in the defense of Kalinin, and later in January 1942, they exited to the edge of the Volga River and took Rzhev from the west and southwest. On 22 January, 1942, the troops of the right wing of the front participated in the Toropetsko-Kholmnskaia operation. In the summer, fall and winter of 1942, the Kalinin Front participated in two strategic offensive Rzhevsko-Sychevskaya operations (30 July – 1 October, 1942 and 25 November – 20 December, 1942). Both operations were unsuccessful. On 17 January, 1943, troops of the front freed Velikie Luki, and in March 1943, together with the troops of the Western Front, they began to go on the offensive; in October, the front took part in an offensive in the direction of Nevel, destroyed German defenses in the triangle of Nevel, Novosokolniki, Velikie Luki, and freed Nevel. On 20 October, 1943, on orders from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated 16 October, 1943, the Kalinin Front was renamed the 1st Baltic Front. Commanding officers of the front: I. S. Konev (October 1941 – August 1942), M. A. Purkaev (August 1942 – April 1943), A. I. Yeryomenko (April – October 1943).

³¹ Aleksandr Ivanovich Zaporozhets (15 August, 1899 – 19 February, 1959) was a Soviet political official, Lieutenant General. From March 1941, he was the Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR; from June 1941, member of the Military Council of the Southern Front; from December 1941, authorized representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and member of the Military Council of the Volkhov and Leningrad Fronts; from October 1942 member of the Military Council of the 60th and 3rd Strike Force and 63rd Armies; from February 1944 member of the Military Council of the Northern Caucasus, and later of the Don Military District

³² Georgi Maksimilianovich Malenkov (26 December, 1901 – 14 January, 1988) was a Soviet state and party figure, chair of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1953 – 1955). Candidate for membership in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (1941 – 1946). Before the war, he was involved in a wide variety of military affairs: he lead the secret apparatus of the Comintern, military personnel, was a supervisor of aviation and military reactivity. From July 1941, he

was a member of the Main Military Council of the Red Army. During the years of the Great Patriotic War, he was a member of the State Defense Committee. In August 1941, he was on the Leningrad Front; in fall and winter of 1941, he took active part in the organization of the operation to defeat German forces at Moscow. In March 1942, he went out to the Volkhov Front, in July and again from August to September 1942 to the Stalingrad and Don Fronts, and in March 1943 to the Central Front. He headed the commissions of the State Defense Committee with groups of experts from among the generals who would travel out to critical areas of the front. From July 1943, he was the Chair of the Council on Radiolocation under the State Defense Committee, headed the Committee for the Restoration of Liberated Regions, and in 1944 he headed the Committee for the Dismantling of German Industry and saw to the receipt of German reparations to the USSR.

³³ Vladimir Gelyarovich Bayersky (Vladimir Ilyich Boyarsky) (10 December, 1901 – 1945) was a Colonel in the Red Army, Major General of the Armed Forces of CLPR. From 13 September, 1941, he was the Commander of the 41st Rifle Division of the Volga Military District. Taken prisoner from 25 May, 1942, he took the name Boyarsky. He was held in a Special Camp near Vinnitsa. In August 1942, he was freed from the Vinnitsa camp; from 1 September, 1942 he was the Commander of an experimental unit of the Russian National People's Army in the Army Group "Center" in the area of Smolensk. In the summer of 1943, he joined the Vlasov movement. From 28 January, 1945, he was the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Headquarters of the Armed Forces of CLPR under Major General F. I. Trukhin; on 27 February, 1945 he was named Major General of the Air Force of CLPR. During the evacuation of the CLPR Air Force in the spring of 1945, he was located in the Southern Group of the CLPR Air Force. He was taken by Czech partisans and hanged.

³⁴ On 9 October, 1942, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued the regulation "On the implementation of unity of command and the deactivation of the institution of military commissars in the Red Army," which replaced the institution of commissars with Deputy Commanders of political units (*zampolity*). On that same day, the corresponding order No. 307 was issued by the People's Commissariat.

³⁵ The loss of very economically important regions and industrial centers in the first months of the war weighted heavily on the work of all sectors of the national economy. The end of 1941 and beginning of 1942 were the most difficult and critical period for the Soviet economy. From March 1942, the volume of defense production had already begun its rapid increase in volume. The main arsenal of the country became the Urals—which, due to old equipment and factories that had been dismantled, transported, and rebuilt, provided 40% of all military industrial production. The fact that in the eastern regions (the Volga basin, the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan, Central Asia) production of all industrial manufacturing in 1943 had increased from that of 1940 by 2.9 times demonstrates the scale of reconstruction and relocation of new industrial sites.

³⁶ Georgi Nikolayevich Zhilenkov (20 September, 1910 – 1 August, 1946) was a Brigade Commissar of the Red Army, Lieutenant General of the Armed Forces of CLPR. From June 1941, he was a member of the Military Council of the 32nd Army with the rank of Brigade Commissar; on 14 October, 1941, he was taken prisoner; until May 1942 he was a driver in a transport run of the 252nd Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht; from 17 August, 1942, he was the head of the organizational-propaganda department of the headquarters of the Russian National People's Army in Osintorf; from December 1943, he was in the Russian Committee; from January

1943, he was editor of the newspaper "Volunteer" for the voluntary units; from June 1944, he was one of the leaders of the propaganda campaign "Scorpion" in Lvov. Further, one of the authors and main editor of the Prague Manifesto of 14 November, 1944, member of the Presidium of CLPR, head of the Main Propaganda Administration, editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Will of the People." On 18 May, 1945, he was interned and placed in a camp in Augsburg; on 1 May, 1946, he was handed over to the Soviet government; on 1 August, 1946, he was hanged in the yard of the Butyrka prison as sentenced by the Military College of the Supreme Court of the USSR. He was not rehabilitated.

³⁷ The so-called Russian National Committee (RNC) was a fictitious public organization, formally created in Berlin by the occupying German authorities at the decision of the Minister of Occupied Eastern Territories, A. Rosenberg, on 12 January, 1943. Sometimes the Russian Committee was called the Initiative Group. Its membership included A. A. Vlasov (the nominal chair), V. F. Malyshkin (the nominal secretary), G. N. Zhilenkov, I. A. Blagoveshchensky, F. I. Trukhin and others. Vlasov was assigned a permanent representative of the Wehrmacht, Captain V. K. Strik-Strikfeld. The nominal founding date for the Russian Committee was considered to be 27 December, 1942. This is the date that appears in the address published on 13 January, 1943, entitled "Address of the Russian Committee to the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, to all the Russian people and the peoples of other ethnicities in the Soviet Union." The text of the address was actively used in German propaganda against the USSR. The activity of the committee was controlled by the Investigative Division, where the program and regulations for this and other such organizations were developed. From 1943, the Russian Committee became the nominal publisher of several occupationist German newspapers, such as the newspaper "For the Homeland," which in fact remained under the control of the Propaganda Division of the headquarters of Army Group "North." Several German leaflets for the USSR began to be distributed in the name of this committee, in particular the leaflets on the RLA.

³⁸ Barrier squads, special units that were positioned in the rear area of transitory troops to prevent the escape of military personnel from the battlefield, or to catch spies and subversive elements. They were created in the rifle divisions through directive No. 001919 from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated 12 September, 1941, and in the armies through order No. 227 from the People's Commissariat of Defense dated 28 July, 1942. As of 15 October, 1942, 193 army barrier squads had been created. On 29 October, 1944, the People's Commissariat for Defense issued order No. 0349 "On the dissolution of separate barrier squads," in which it was indicated that "due to a change in the overall situation at the front, the necessity for barrier squads has been reduced." Staff from the dissolved units were used as reinforcements for rifle units.

³⁹ Vasily Fyodorovich Malyshkin (26 December, 1896 – 1 August, 1946), Major General of the Red Army, Major General of the Armed Forces of CLPR. From 12 July, 1941, he was Brigade Commander, Chief of Staff of the 19th Army of the Western Front; from November 1941 he was given the military rank of Major General. On 24 November, 1941 he was taken prisoner by a German patrol. He was held in a camp for military POWs near Vyazma; from April 1942 at courses for propagandists in Wuhlheide; from July 1942 he was an instructor and assistant director to the head of the courses, Baron G. von de Ropp, editor of the newspaper "Dawn"; from November 1944 he was a member of the Presidium of CLPR, the head of the Main Organizational Administration; on 6 February, 1945 he was evacuated to Carlsbad; on 4 May, 1945, he was sent to a camp in Augsburg; on 25 March, 1946 he was

handed over to the Soviet zone of occupation. On 1 August, 1946, at the sentence of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, he was hanged in the yard of the Butyrka prison. He was not rehabilitated.

⁴⁰ On 1 April, 1939, the Department of Military Propaganda was formed under the headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, led by Colonel (later, from 1 September, 1943, Major General) Hasso von Wedel, 1898 – 1961. The Department had general oversight over the leadership of the propaganda units of the Wehrmacht, appointed personnel and managed affairs of a technical nature, worked up directives and orders for conducting large propaganda campaigns, etc. The department was also in charge of all affairs related to influencing society within the Reich and abroad, if they concerned the interests of the Wehrmacht or defense of the country. It prepared the release of film newsreels “Die Deutsche Wochenschau” (German Weekly Review). The department was in charge of special military units-propaganda companies (Germ. *Propagandakompanie*). Included in their duties was the propaganda among the German population and military service members (“propaganda in the homeland”), propaganda in the active military (“front propaganda”), and “propaganda against the enemy” directed at its armed forces and civilian population. Every field army, tank group, and air squadron was given one propaganda company. In the Department of Military Propaganda, the 4th Division worked with foreigners (the sub-divisions of Foreign Propaganda, Battlefield Propaganda, Eastern Special Propaganda, Naval Propaganda).

⁴¹ Army Group “Center” (Germ. *Heeresgruppe Mitte*) was the operational-strategic grouping of forces of the Wehrmacht during the Second World War, the most powerful of the three army groups of Nazi Germany, focused on the attack on the USSR according to the Barbarossa plan. Army Group Center was deployed in the central area of the advance of German forces against the Soviet Union. According to the initial plan, it was to destroy the Soviet forces in Belorussia, then advance on to Moscow. It delivered a defeat to the Soviet Western Front in the Battle of Belostok-Minsk and the Battle of Smolensk. On 30 July, 1941, it turned to defense after Hitler’s decision to cease the advance on Moscow and turn the Guderian Tank Group on Kiev. The Got Tank Group was sent to the north towards Leningrad. After the Battle of Kiev (30 September), the army renewed its advance on Moscow. On 1 October, 1941, as a part of the Typhoon Operation, the 2nd Guderian Tank Group of Army Center broke all the way through the defenses in its central area of the 13th Army of the Bryansk Front of A. I. Yeremenko and moved ahead 60 kilometers. In November – December, it was stopped at a point of close approach to Moscow and suffered great losses during the Battle of Moscow. In January 1942, it stopped a counter-advance in the course of the Rzhevsko-Vyazemsky Operation; then in July 1942 it successfully conducted Operation Zeidlitz, in which the Soviet 39th Army and 11th Cavalry corps were defeated. In 1943, during the Operation Citadel, it conducted an unsuccessful advance along the northern face of the Kurskaya Duga, and in the summer of 1944 was defeated in Belorussia. On 26 January, 1945, it was renamed Army Group North. In turn, the former Army Group North received the name Army Group A. Commanding officers: Fieldmarshal Fedor von Bock (summer of 1940 – 18 December, 1941); Fieldmarshal General Gunther von Kluge (19 December, 1941 – 28 October, 1943); Fieldmarshal General Ernst Busch (29 October, 1943 – 27 June, 1944); Fieldmarshal General Walter Model (28 June 1944 – 16 August, 1944); Colonel General Georg Reinhardt (17 August, 1944 – 17 January, 1945); Fieldmarshal General Ferdinand Schörner (18 January, 1945 – 8 May, 1945).

⁴² The Reich Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories (Germ. *Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete*) was one of the German ministries

created to govern the territories of the USSR, based on an order from A. Hitler dated 17 July, 1941 and entitled “On the civilian government in the newly occupied eastern districts.” The Ministry of Occupied Eastern Territories was led by Alfred Ernst Rosenberg (1893 – 1946); Deputy Minister was Alfred Meyer (1891 – 1945).

Structure of the ministry: Department Z (Central Administration): communications officer from headquarters of the Führer (Werner Koeppen, 1910 – 1994); communications officer from the Supreme Command (Otto Bräutigam, 1895 – 1992).

Main Administration I (Policy), headed by Georg Leibbrandt (1899 – 1982), then after 20 August, 1943 and through 20 January, 1945, Gottlob Christian Berger (1896 – 1975)

Main Administration II (Administration)

Main Administration III (Economy), headed by Gustav Schlotterer (1906 – 1989).

⁴³ The Lokot Autonomy (Germ. *Republik Lokot*, also in Russ. as Lokot District, Lokot Township, Lokot Republic) was an administrative national territory established in Soviet areas occupied by Germany that existed from November 1941 through August 1943. The administrative center was located in the working village of Lokot, called then a city (now as a village of the city type, the administrative center of the Brasovsky region of the Bryansk District). The district included several regions of the pre-war Orlov and Kursk Districts (and now the territory belongs to the Bryansk District). The administrative system of the Lokot Autonomy in many ways repeated the system that was practiced in other occupied districts. The main difference was the fact that all the local power was in the hands not of the German commandants but of local self-government. German authorities were prohibited from interfering in the internal affairs of the “Lokot Township.” German institutions on the territory of the Lokot District limited their activity to providing help and advice to the district’s leaders and its regions. On site in Lokot, there was a headquarters of the 102nd Hungarian Infantry Division, and its units were located in towns and villages in the territory of the Lokot District. The Lokot Autonomy was officially recognized by the German authorities on 15 November, 1941. At first, its authority covered only the Lokot (now Braskovsky) region, later including the broader Lokot *uezd* with the addition of the territories of Navlinsky and Komarichsky regions (of then Orlov, now Bryansk District) and Dmitrovsky region of Kursk (now Orlov) District. From July 1942, the Lokot *uezd* was reorganized into the Lokot District, and at that time it included eight regions, which have remained to this day (Braskovsky, Suzemsky, Komarichsky, Navlinsky, Mikhailovsky, Sevsky, Dmitrievsky and Dmitrovsky). Each region was divided into 5–6 *volost’*s, each of which had a *volost’* administration headed by a *volost’* elder, and at the head of the district administration there was a Russian burgomaster with his own complement of support staff. The first burgomaster of the Lokot Republic was K. P. Voskoboinik, and after his death in January 1942, B. V. Kaminsky took his place.

⁴⁴ Due to the increase in the number of Russian, Ukrainian, Baltic, Caucasus and other collaborator groups, on 15 December, 1942, the post of “General Inspector of Eastern Forces” (Germ. *General-Inspekteur der Osttruppen*) was instituted in the Main Command of the Army of the Wehrmacht, with the appointed head being non-Russian speaking Major General Heinz Hellmich (1890 – 1944). Later, on 1 January, 1944, the post of General Inspector of Eastern Forces was replaced with General of Volunteer Formation (Germ. *General der Freiwilligenverbände* (GdF)) under the leadership of the main headquarters of the Supreme Command, who was Cavalry General Ernst-August Köstring (1876 – 1953). From February 1944, the volunteers

were allowed to wear a German uniform with the emblem of the RLA, the Ukrainian Liberation Army or the ethnic national legions; German rank was introduced, German medals were awarded, etc. On 26 August, 1944, all the foreign ethnic formations of troops of the Wehrmacht were transferred to the forces of the SS.

⁴⁵ On 29 April, 1943, by order No. II/5000/43 of the Head of the Main Headquarters of the German Supreme High Command, Colonel General K. Zeitzler, all Russian volunteer formations were united under the name of the Russian Liberation Army (RLA).

In 1942 – 1944, Russian collaborators' units in the Wehrmacht were established at the level of companies and battalions and led by German officers. Andrei Vlasov was the Commander of the Army. After Vlasov's meeting with Himmler on 16 September, 1944, the RLA (with German endorsement) began to present itself as the main driving force of the Russian liberation movement, aimed at overthrowing Soviet power and restoring the "national Russian state". Upon creation of the Committee on the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia on 14 November, 1944, the RLA became its military branch. On 28 of January, 1945, the RLA acquired the legal status of the Third Reich's allied armed force.

⁴⁶ The Security Service of the Reichsführer-SS (Germ. *Der Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers-SS* (SD)) was an internal party security service of the Nazi Party, later the security service of the Reichsführer SS. In September 1939, it was merged with the Reich Main Security Office (*Reichssicherheitshauptamt*; RSHA).

⁴⁷ The Abwehr (meaning defense or reflection in Germ., from *Auslandnachrichten- und Abwehramt*) was a German body of military intelligence and counterintelligence. Created in 1919 as Department III b "Military Service of Communications and Information" (Germ. *Militärische Nachrichtendienst Abteilung III b*). In 1920, it was reorganized into the Service for Communications and Information for Infantry Forces (Germ. *Heeres-Nachrichtendienst*), which was again reorganized, on 1 January, 1921, into a group of "military counterintelligence" included in the newly-formed Ministry of the Reichswehr. From 1 January through 11 February, 1944, the leader of the Abwehr was Naval Captain; then from 1 May, 1935, Contr-Admiral; from 1 April, 1938, Vice-Admiral; then from 1 January 1940, Admiral Wilhelm Franz Canaris (1887 – 1945). On 18 February, 1944, A. Hitler signed a directive on the creation of a single intelligence system under the direction of Reichsführer SS H. Himmler. The Abwehr was dissolved, but its sections were included in the Main Security Administration of the Reich.

⁴⁸ The Army Group North (Germ. *Heeresgruppe Nord*) was a strategic operational grouping of forces of the Wehrmacht in the Second World War in the northern portion of the Eastern European theater of military activity from 1939 to 1945. From 1 September through 5 October, 1939, the Army Group North invaded Poland together with Army Group South under the command of Colonel General Rundstedt. Later, it was reformulated and transferred to the Western European military theater. On 10 October, it was renamed Army Group B. It was reinstated on 20 July, 1941, and it participated together with Army Groups Center and South in the Barbarossa Operation. The task of Army Group North was to take the Baltics and Leningrad. From September 1941, together with forces from Finland, it upheld a blockade of Leningrad. In 1942, it conducted the operations "Targeting Bridges," "Overboard Ladder," and "Northern Lights"; in 1943, the Staraya Russa Operation; in 1944, the Baltic, Narv and Tallinn Operations. On 25 January, 1945, it was renamed Army Group Kurland. Commanding officers: Fieldmarshal General Wilhelm von Lieb (20 June, 1941 – January 1942); 17 January, 1942, Fieldmarshal General Georg von Küchler (17 January, 1942 – January 1944); in 1944, Fieldmarshal General Walter

Model, later Colonel General Georg Lindemann, Colonel General Johannes Frisner, Colonel General Ferdinand Schörner; in 1945, Colonel General Lotar Rendulich and Colonel General Walter Weiss.

⁴⁹ Ivan Alekseyevich Blagoveshchensky (14 September, 1893 – 1 August, 1946) was a Major General of the shore authorities of the Red Army, Major General of the Armed Forces of CLPR. From April 1941, he was head of the Baltic Naval Academy of the Soviet Navy in Libava; from 21 May, 1941 he was Major General of shore authorities; from June 1941 head of defense of the northeastern area of Libava; on 6 July, 1941, taken prisoner during an attempt to escape encirclement. He was taken to Siauliai, and then transferred under guard to the Tilsit camp for military POWs. From the end of July, 1941, in Camp XIII-D in Hammelsburg, from November 1941 in the RLPP, he was a member of the Central Committee, head of the military department of the party. In April 1942, he was sent to courses for propagandists in Wuhlheide; from September 1942 he served as commandant of the camp for youth artisans under Hitler Youth; March – June 1943 he was head of the Dabendorf School of the RLA; from December 1943 he was head of the Inspectorate of the RLA for oversight of the work of propagandists; from November 1944 he was head of the ideological group of the Main Administration of Propaganda for CLPR. From April 1945, he was CLPR representative for communications with allied forces. On 3 June 1945, he was arrested by representatives of the Soviet Repatriation Commission in Marienbad and taken to Moscow. According to the sentence of the Military College of the Supreme Court of the USSR, on 1 August, 1946, he was hanged in the yard of the Butyrka prison. He was not rehabilitated.

⁵⁰ The newspaper “Volunteer” (*Dobrovolets*) was a weekly newspaper for the service members of the volunteer units of the Wehrmacht, published 1943 – 1944 in Pskov, Riga and Berlin (See: Russian State Military Archive (RGVA). F. 1699k. Op. 3. D. 1).

The newspaper «Zarya» (Dawn) of the “Russian Committee” was issued twice weekly in 1943 – 1944 in the Berlin suburb of Dabendorf. (See: RGVA. F. 1699k. Op. 3. D. 21).

⁵¹ Mikhail Fyodorovich Lukin (6 November, 1892 – 25 May, 1970) was a Soviet military leader, Hero of the Russian Federation (1993, posthumously), Lieutenant General (6 June, 1940). From 22 June, 1940, he was commanding officer of the 16th Army. From August to September 1941; he was commanding officer of the 20th Army, later Commander of the 19th Army. On 14 October, 1941, he was seriously wounded in an attempt to escape encirclement and taken prisoner, and in May 1945 he was freed from imprisonment. From December 1945, he was reinstated into the ranks of the Red Army, from 1946 in the reserves.

⁵² Fyodor Ivanovich Trukhin (29 February 1896 – 1 August, 1946) was a Major General of the Red Army, Major General of the Armed Forces of CLPR. From 28 January, 1941, he was the head of the Operational Division and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Baltic Military District; from 28 June, 1941, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Northwest Front. On 27 June, 1941, he was wounded and taken prisoner. In October 1941, he joined the RLPP; from 24 April, 1942, he was the senior internal commandant of the camp for propagandists; from October 1942, in the NARS; from March 1943, head of the Dabendorf School of the RLA; from November 1944, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of CLPR. On 9 May, 1945, he was handed over to the Soviet command and taken to Moscow. On 1 August, 1946, he was hanged in the yard of the Butyrka prison. He was not rehabilitated.

⁵³ Bronislav Vladislavovich Kaminsky (16 June, 1899 – 20 August, 1944) was a collaborator, creator and leader of the RPLA, and from 1 August, 1944, he was a

Waffen SS Brigadeführer (Major General). In August 1937, he was arrested and sentenced as an accessory to the Chayanovsky counterrevolutionary group, in exile in the village of Suyerka, Uporovsky region, Omsk District, then technical specialist at the spirits manufacturer in Shardinsk. On 28 March, 1940, he was recruited by the Shardinsk Division of the NKVD under the alias “Ultramarine” to work with exiled Trotskyites. In 1941, he was freed, sent to the town of Lokot in the Orlov District. From 1941, he was the burgomaster, from January 1942 the ober-burgomaster of the Lokot District Autonomy. In the fall of 1942, he formed a brigade of RPLA. From 30 July, 1944, he was brigadeführer and Major General of SS forces, awarded the Iron Cross of the 1st Degree. On August 1944, after the participation of the RPLA Brigade in putting down the Warsaw uprising, he was arrested by German forces and executed.

⁵⁴ The Administration for Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party was created in March 1939 as a result of the decision of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party, and it participated in the development of forms and methods of ideological work, preparation and organization of the execution of issues and orders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Soviet government, on all issues of science, culture, education; it controlled the implementation in practice of party and government institutions, means of mass information, publications, creative unions of official ideological bases. In July 1948, it was reformulated into the Department for Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee (1948 – 1956).

Georgii Fedorovich Aleksandrov (22 March (4 April), 1908 – 21 July, 1961) was a Soviet party and government official. 1940 – 1947, head of the Administration for Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party; 1939 – 1946, director of the Supreme Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

⁵⁵ Sergei Savvich Belchenko (4 October, 1902 – 9 January, 2002) was one of the leaders of the Soviet security agencies; Deputy Head of Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement; Colonel General (1958). From November 1939 through July 1941, he was Deputy Head of the KGB of Belostok District; July 1941 – July 1942, Deputy Head of the NKVD of the Western Front. From January 1942, he was Deputy Head of the Operational Group of the NKVD in Belorussia. September 1942 – April 1943, he was a member of the Military Council and representative of Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, Kalinin Front. April 1943 – November 1943, Deputy Head of Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. October 1943 – March 1953, People's Committee Minister of Internal Affairs of the Belorussian SSR.

⁵⁶ Within the framework of a propaganda campaign to distribute the Smolensk Declaration, General A. A. Vlasov completed a trip through German-occupied territory of the USSR in the rear area of Army Group Center from the end of February to the middle of March, 1943, during which he visited Osipovich, Bobruisk, and Borisov, where he gave a speech to the military personnel of the Eastern 700th and 701st Regiments, the 601st, 602nd, and 605th Eastern Battalions, and on 13 – 14 March he was in Mogilev, where he visited the 600th Cossack battalion led by I. N. Kononov.

⁵⁷ SMERSH (abbreviation from “Death to Spies!” or *Smert' shpionam*) was the name of a number of counterintelligence organizations independent of one another in the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War.

On 19 April, 1943, by order of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 415–138ss, the Administration of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR was selected from among its staff and reorganized into:

1. The Main Administration for Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR (head: Commissar of State Security 2nd Rank V. S. Abakumov) also answerable to the People's Committee of Defense, Marshal J. V. Stalin.

2. The administration of Smersh counterintelligence of the Navy of the USSR (head: Commissar of State Security, P. A. Gadkov) also answerable to the People's Committee Naval Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov.

Later, on 15 May, 1943, to serve the needs for agents and operatives among the border and internal forces, the militia and other armed formations of the NKVD, the Department of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the NKVD of the USSR issued order No. 00856 (head: Commissar of State Security S. P. Yukhimovich) also answerable to the People's Commissar L. P. Beria.

The main tasks of Smersh were the fight against spy, terrorist and other disruptive activity from foreign intelligence in the units and institutions of the Red Army; the fight against anti-Soviet elements appearing in the units and institutions of the Red Army; the fight against disloyalty and betrayal of the Homeland in the units and institutions of the Red Army.

Due to the creation of a single People's Commissariat from the People's Committee of Defense and the People's Committee of the Navy, the armed forces began a process of merging the two divisions of Smersh from both of the People's Committees. In April 1946, the Department of Counterintelligence of Smersh of the NKVD was reorganized into the Department of Counterintelligence for the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. On 4 May, 1946, by order of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the two administrations of Smersh Counterintelligence of the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR were transferred to the Ministry for State Security of the USSR and reorganized into its 3rd Main Counterintelligence Administration.

⁵⁸ Igor Leonidovich Yung (29 August, 1914 – 18 November 1971) was a Major in the Armed Forces of CLPR. From the end of the 1930s, he was a member of NARS; from March 1942 he worked for the Abwehr in Smolensk. From September 1942, he was in Berlin. From 1943, in the Investigative Division, he served in the 6th Administration of the RSHA. From October 1944, he was the head of the camp Saint Johann am Walde near Mattinghofen. From 1 February, 1945, he was the organizer of the intelligence school of the Armed Forces of CLPR, and from March 1945 he was a Major in the Armed Forces of CLPR. From April 1945, he was in Fussen. On 29 April, 1945, he was interned in a camp for military POWs in Augsburg (from 1 August, 1945, in a camp in Sekkenheim). In 1946 he was freed as a Russian émigré.

⁵⁹ Stalag (from Germ. abbr. *Stammlager*, full German name *Mannschaftsstamm und Straflager*) was the abbreviated name of concentration camps of the German army (*stalag*), air force (*stalag luft*) and navy (*marlag*) for military service members from the rank and file through non-commissioned officers of the enemy during the Second World War. The individual name of a concentration camp was determined from the Roman numeral of the military district in which it was located and the letters corresponding to the time of its creation. All stalags were under the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, and then from November of 1944 under the SS.

⁶⁰ This refers to the Treaty of Versailles, signed on 28 June, 1919 in the Versailles Palace in France and officially ending the First World War 1914 – 1918. After lengthy

secret meetings, the terms of the treaty were worked out at the Paris Peace Conference 1919 – 1920, and the peace treaty was signed by representatives on the victorious side: the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, along with Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Siam, Czechoslovakia, and Uruguay, and from the capitulating side by Germany. Peace treaties between countries of the Entente and other governments fighting on the fronts of the First World War on the side of Germany were signed later: with Austria on 10 September, 1919 (Saint Germain Treaty), with Bulgaria on 27 November, 1919 (Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine), with Hungary on 4 June, 1920 (Treaty of Trianon), and with the Ottoman Empire on 10 August, 1920 (Treaty of Sevres). The Treaty of Versailles went into effect on 10 January, 1920, after ratification by Germany and the four main allied powers: Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan.

⁶¹ Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky (1893 – 1937) was a Soviet military leader, Marshal of the Soviet Union (1935). 1925 – 1928 he was Chief of Staff of the Red Army. From 1931, Dep. People's Commissar for the Army and Navy and representative to the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the USSR. From 1934, Deputy, and then from 1936, 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. In 1937, he was the commanding officer of the forces of the Volga Military District (PriVO), arrested on 22 May, 1937 under accusations of spying for Germany. He was tried on 11 June, 1937 and sentenced to death, shot that same day. Rehabilitated on 31 January, 1957. Vasily Konstantinovich Blyukher (1889 – 1938) was a Soviet military, state and Communist Party leader; Marshal of the Soviet Union (1935). At the October 1937 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) he was promoted to the rank of the Central Committee member. On 1 July, 1938, appointed Commander of the Far Eastern Front; on 29 July, 1938, hostilities erupted near Lake Khasan; 8 February, 1938, he became Commander of the troops. He was arrested on 22 October, 1938, and on 11 September, 1938, he died in Lefortovo prison (Moscow). He was rehabilitated in 1956.

⁶² Melentii (Milentii, Miletii) Aleksandrovich Zykov (alias "Moskvich N." and "ROM" and "Nikolay Yarko"); (November 1901 – ?), he was a Soviet journalist, a figure of the Vlasov movement. From 27 March, 1942, he was a private in the 535th Guard Regiment, and from August 1942 a POW. In the camps, he wrote a memorandum on the political aspects of military activity that made an impression on an intelligence officer from Army Group South, von Freitag-Loringhofen; he also facilitated the transfer of Zykov to the "Wehrmacht propaganda." He edited the newspaper "Dawn" (*Zarya*) that was published for the civilian population of the occupied territories. In the summer of 1944, Zykov was supposed to participate in a propaganda campaign planned by the SS for the Eastern Front called "Scorpion East," but on the eve before the trip, he disappeared without a trace from a village near Berlin.

⁶³ Izvestia (News) was a Soviet and Russian socio-political and business daily newspaper established in March 1917. During the time of the USSR, it was the official voice of the leadership of the Soviet regime, and in particular the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The first issue of the newspaper, entitled "News of the Petrograd Council of Worker Deputies," came out in Petrograd on 28 February (13 March), 1917 as the printed voice of the newly-formed Petrograd Council of Worker Deputies. From 27 October (9 November), 1917, Izvestia became the voice of the Central Executive Committee and the Petrograd Council of Worker Deputies; the newspaper took on the status of one of the official printed authorities of the new regime; in its pages

were published the main documents of the Bolshevik government: the Decree on Peace and the Decree on Land. Due to the Bolshevik government moving to Moscow, from 12 March, 1918, the newspaper began to be published in Moscow as well under the name “Izvestia of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Council of Peasant, Worker, Soldier and Cossack Deputies and the Moscow Council of Worker and Red-Army Deputies.” From 14 July, 1923, Izvestia was the authoritative voice of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. From 26 January, 1938, the newspaper came out under the name “Izvestia of the Councils of Deputies of the Laborers of the USSR.” The first editors of Izvestia were Yu. M. Steklov, I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, and M. A. Savelyev. Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin was the editor-in-chief from February 1934 through January 1937.

⁶⁴ Petr Nikolayevich Krasnov (10 September, 1869 – 17 January, 1947) was one of the leaders of the Cossack movement, rank Lieutenant General. From 1936, he lived in Germany; from September 1943, he was the head of the Main Administration of Cossack Forces for the Imperial Reich Ministry of Eastern Occupied Territories of Germany. He participated in the creation of the “Cossack Stan” and cooperated with the collaborator newspaper “For the Homeland” (*Za rodinu*). In May, 1945, he was in the Cossack Stan and was taken by the British. In the city of Lientz (Austria), on 29 May, 1945, together with 2.4 thousand Cossack officers, he was turned over by the British command to the Soviet military administration. He was removed to Moscow, where he was kept in the Butyrka prison. He was sentenced by the Military College of the Supreme Court to lethal punishment and was hanged in the Lefortovo prison on 16 January, 1947.

⁶⁵ This refers to the central all-Cossack weekly newspaper of the Main Administration for Cossack Forces, “Kazach’ya lava” (Berlin, 1943 – 1945) (See: RGVA, F. 1699k. Op. 3. D. 33).

⁶⁶ Bushmanov, Nikolai Stepanovich (3 December, 1901 – June, 1977) was a Colonel in the Red Army and a Colonel of the RLA. From 2 July, 1941, he was the Chief of Staff of the 7th Rifle Division; from 11 November, 1941, he was the head of the Operations Division of the Headquarters of the 32nd Army. After the defeat of the 32nd at Vyazma, he was taken prisoner. In 1942, he taught courses for propagandists in Wuhlheide, and in 1943 at Dabendorf. From March 1943, he was the Asst. Head of the Construction School; in June, 1943 he wrote an anti-German leaflet; on 30 June, 1943 he was arrested by the Gestapo, held in the Berlin prison Moabit; on 3 November, 1943 he was moved to the concentration camp Zaksenhausen, where he was held until free in April 1945. On 29 July, 1945, he was sentenced to 10 years of hard labor. On 1 September, 1958, he was rehabilitated as having been repressed without cause.

⁶⁷ The 16th German Army (Germ. 16. *Armee*) was an operational grouping of the Wehrmacht during the Second World War. Created on 22 October, 1939 from units and headquarters of the 3rd Army. In May – June 1940, the 16th Army participated in the French Campaign. From 22 June, 1941, it participated in the German-Soviet war. It led battles in Lithuania, later in the region of the Dvina River. 1942 – 43, battles in the area of Demyansk and Kholm, the Staraya Russa Operation. 1944, battles in the area of Narvy, then in the area of Riga. From November, 1944, and until the end of the war, battles in Courland Pocket. The army ceased military activity against the Soviet forces on 15 May, 1945. Army Commanders: Generalfeldmarschal Ernst Busch (October 1939 – 12 October 1943); General of Artillery Christian Hansen (12 October, 1943 – 1 July, 1944); General of Infantry Paul Laux (3 July, 1944 – 29 August, 1944); Colonel General Carl Hilpert (3 September, 1944 – 10 March, 1945); General of Infantry Ernst-Anton von Krosigk (10 March, 1945 – 16 March, 1945 (killed in

action)); General of Mountain Troops Friedrich-Jobst Volckamer von Kirchensittenbach (16 March, 1945 – 8 May, 1945).

⁶⁸ Wilhelm Bodewin Gustaw Keitel (22 September, 1882 – 16 October, 1946) was a German military figure, Fieldmarshal General (1940). In 1938 – 1945, he was Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht (Armed Forces of Germany). He signed a number of orders according to which political officers and Jews who were taken were shot on site, and an order about hostages. After the failure of the plot of 20 July, 1944, he led activities for the liquidation of participants in the attempt on the Führer's life. On 8 May, 1945, together with General G. Stumpf and Admiral G. Friedeburg, in the presence of representatives of the Soviet Union, he signed the act of unconditional surrender of Germany. He was put to death in the Nuremberg prison.

⁶⁹ On 8 March, 1943, the leader of the Ukrainian Central Committee, V. M. Kubiiovich, in a letter to Governor General G. Frank, offered to create the Ukrainian armed forces to fight against the Red Army. The idea to organize a division of volunteers from Galicia was proposed by the German Governor of District Galicia, Gruppenführer Otto von Wächter. Himmler endorsed this idea. On April 8, Kubiiovich and Wächter wrote an appeal to create a volunteer division. On 18 April, the Military Administration was established to recruit volunteers, and Hans Frank and Otto von Wächter signed the proclamation on the creation of the division. By October 20, about 6,000 volunteers had been trained. The Oberführer SS Freitag was appointed Commander of the SS 14th Volunteer Division "Galicia." On January 31, 1944, the division, including reserve units, had 14,579 men. On June 27, the division was renamed 14th Waffen SS Grenadier Division (1st Galician). In the second half of July 1944, it was encircled and routed by Soviet troops under Brody. About three thousand men broke through the encirclement. The division was rebuilt, and in September – October 1944, was used against the suppression of the Slovak uprising. 15 January, 1945, renamed the 14th SS Grenadier Division (1st Ukrainian). In February 1945, it fought against partisans in Slovenia. On March 30, it was ordered to withdraw to Austria, where it fought against the Red Army. The division, including reserve units, had 16,421 men. On 25 April it was renamed the 1st Division of the Ukrainian National Army. On 12 May, it surrendered to the British troops. Approximately 7,000 Ukrainians as citizens of Poland were not extradited to the USSR. In total, about 27,000 Ukrainians passed through the division's ranks.

⁷⁰ Alfred Ernst Rosenberg (1893 – 1946) was a political and government figure in Germany, leader of the Occupation Regime in the territories taken from the USSR, Obergeruppenführer SA. From 1933, he was the head of the Administration for Foreign Policy of Nazi Party, an opponent of Ribbentrop in the fight for the leadership of German foreign policy; 1940 – 1945 he was leader of the Central Investigative Institute for National-Socialist Ideology and Education. In 1941 – 1945, he was the Imperial Minister for Affairs of the Occupied Eastern Territories. On 16 October, 1946, he was hanged per the sentence of the Nuremberg tribunal.

⁷¹ Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria (17 March, 1899 – 23 December, 1953) was a government figure, one of the leaders of the agencies for state security in the USSR, General Commissar for State Security (1941). From 25 November, 1938 – 29 December, 1945 he was the People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR; 1941 – 1945 he was a member of the State Committee of Defense of the USSR. From 3 February, 1941 – 15 March, 1953, he was the Deputy Chair of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. 1945 – 1953 he was the Chair of the State Committee No. 1 under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In special

session of the Supreme Court of the USSR, on 23 December, 1953, he was convicted of state crimes and sentenced to lethal punishment. Not rehabilitated.

⁷² Emil Otto Paul von Rintelen (10 January, 1897 – 24 June, 1981) was a German diplomat. In 1940, he joined the Nazi Party and received the post of envoy and ministerial assistant in the political section. From 1941 through March 1943, Rintelen was included in the personal headquarters of the Reich Ministry for Foreign Affairs of I. von Ribbentrop. In 1943, Rintelen was named ambassador for special circumstances. At the end of the war, Rintelen was interned by the Americans and was a witness at judicial proceedings.

⁷³ The TODT Organization was a military construction organization acting in Germany. On 28 May, 1938, Hitler tasked it with the construction of the Western Rampart along the western border of Germany from Luxembourg to Switzerland. About a thousand firms were brought in for the construction, united under the General Inspector of Transportation Routes of Germany, Fritz Todt, in 22 construction administrations (Germ. *Oberbauleitungen*). On 18 July, 1938, A. Hitler named these administrations the Todt Organization. The headquarters of the Todt Organization (Germ. *OT-Zentrale*) was located in Wiesbaden.

With the start of the Second World War, the Todt Organization underwent changes. In the headquarters of each army a construction administration was created which included a certain number of motorized construction brigades. The units were utilized to repair bridges on main roads and rail lines along with repair of the roads and rails themselves. In the beginning, the workers of the Todt Organization did not have special uniforms and wore civilian clothes, but later all workers were issued an olive-colored uniform from the remaining supply of the former Czechoslovakian army. In time, an arm band with a swastika was added to this uniform. Initially formed as militarized construction formations, the Todt organization retained the status of assisting units of the Wehrmacht until November 1942, but later they were fully equalized in status to regular army units. In November 1944, there were 1,360 thousand people working in the Todt Organization (permanent staff: 44.5 thousand Germans and 12.8 thousand foreigners; temporary contract holders: 313 thousand Germans and 680.7 thousand foreigners; forced labor: 140 thousand prisoners and 165 thousand military POWs).

⁷⁴ Volunteer assistants of the Luftwaffe, otherwise assistants of the anti-aircraft defenses of the Luftwaffe (Germ. *Flakhelfer*), were units of the Luftwaffe formed from local residents in the occupied territories of a number of European countries during the Second World War. Their function was as service personnel in the anti-aircraft and construction units of the Luftwaffe.

⁷⁵ Silver Band (*Serebryanaya polosa*) was the code name of a German propaganda campaign on the Soviet-German front, started on the night of 7 May, 1943 and attempting to encourage Soviet military personnel to go over to the side of the enemy not so much for political reasons as for material ones.

⁷⁶ Partisan, Soviet irregular military force fighting guerilla-style warfare. German military defined them as bandits.

⁷⁷ Kurt Zeitzler (9 June, 1895 – 25 September, 1963) was a German Colonel General, Army Chief of Staff. During the campaigns against France (1940), Yugoslavia and Greece (1941), and the USSR (1941 – 1942), he was the Chief of Staff of the 1st Tank Group/Army and Army Group A. From 1 February, 1942, he was a Major General. From April 1942, he was Chief of Staff of the 1st Tank Group/Army and Army Group A. From 1 February, 1942, he was a Major General. From April 1942, he was Chief of Staff of the Army Group D in France, and in August he participated in the deflection of the British landing in the area of Dieppe, Normandy.

On 24 September, 1942, he was appointed by Hitler as the Army Chief of Staff with the rank of Lieutenant General. He unsuccessfully tried to save the remaining encirclement in Stalingrad of the 6th Army, but his efforts were not met with success due to a disagreement with Hitler. From 1 February, 1944, he was a Colonel General. He participated in developing the plans for Operation Citadel, which ended in the defeat of the German forces in the Battle of Kursk. In June 1944, he was removed from his post due to another disagreement with Hitler. In May 1945, he was taken prisoner by the American forces.

⁷⁸ Here and later in the document, this refers to Army Group North, created on 22 June, 1941, by the renaming of Army Group B for action in the Barbarossa Operation in the direction of Leningrad. It occupied the Baltics and the northwest regions of the Russian Federation and blockaded Leningrad from the south.

⁷⁹ Here the reference is to a meeting with A. Hitler in Berghof on 8 June, 1943, about the treatment of military POWs who had deserted from the other side, volunteer assistants and volunteer ethnic national Eastern battalions. At the meeting, there was also discussion of propaganda work being done at the front against the Red Army and the political activity of A. Vlasov. Present were: A. Hitler, head of the Supreme High Command; Fieldmarshal General W. Keitel, head of the General Army Headquarters; Infantry General K. Zeitzler, Chief Adjutant of the Führer Lieutenant; General R. Schmudt, military historian; Colonel W. Scherff. At the meeting, Hitler unambiguously expressed his dissatisfaction with the activities of A. Vlasov, who, according to Smundt, “wanders around everywhere like a prophet and preaches national freedom both at the locations he visits and among the volunteers and troops.” Hitler said, “This needs to be stopped. He is only necessary to me as a front. General Vlasov is of no use to me in our logistical areas... He can only take action against the other side.” In response, Keitel reported that “Vlasov has been recalled. He is not longer at the front. He is forbidden any propaganda activity at the front, including his own propaganda activities. It is only necessary to decide whether we can spread word to the other side about the so-called liberation army.” Hitler replied, “Yes, that can all be done there... a rumor about a liberation army to the other side will be effective; because people don’t want to fight, they want peace.” (See: The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. F. 500. Op. 12450. D. 161. L. 1-25.)

⁸⁰ Hans Heinrich Lammers (27 May, 1879 – 4 January 1962) was a German government figure, Obergruppenführer SS (1944). From November 1937, he was Imperial Minister without portfolio and Chief of the Imperial Chancellery. In 1943, together with M. Bormann and W. Keitel, he made up the “Committee of Three” through which every document that reached the Führer had to pass. From 1944, his influence was sharply reduced and he was essentially estranged from Bormann over a decision he had made. In May 1945, he was taken prisoner by the American forces. On 11 April, 1949, in a trial at the American Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, he was sentenced to 20 years in prison, freed in December 1951.

⁸¹ The Main Political Administration of the Red Army was the central military-political body carrying out party political work in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the USSR, in existence 1919 – 1991. The predecessor to this organization was created in April 1918: the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars (under the leadership of Konstantin Yurenev). The decision to create a central military-political body called on to lead all party political work in the Armed Forces was made by the 8th Congress of the Communist Party in 1919. On 18 April, 1919, the Political Department of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was created, and it was renamed the Political Administration of the RMC on 15 May,

1919. The system for the leadership of party authoritative bodies was fixed in the Statute of the Communist Party of 1919. The Political Administration was responsible for “all political-enlightening and agitation work in the Red Army and Navy.” The head of the Political Administration was appointed by the RMC and fell under its authority in the administrative sense. In its actions, it was directed “both by orders from RMC and directives from the Central Committee of the Communist Party.” The situation bolstered the structure that had emerged by 1 September, 1920, that began to be called the Political Administration of the Red Army. In 1924 – 1940, the administration had the name Political Administration of the Worker-Peasant Red Army; in 1940 – 1941, it was the Main Administration for Political Propaganda of the Worker-Peasant Red Army; in 1941 – 1946, it was the Main Political Administration of the Worker-Peasant Red Army; in 1946 – 1950, Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

Leaders of the administration: L. Z. Mekhlis (25 July, 1940 – September 1940; 21 June, 1941 – 12 June, 1942); A. I. Zaporozhets (September 1940 – 21 June, 1941), A. S. Shcherbakov (12 June, 1942 – 10 May, 1945); I. V. Shikin (8 September, 1945 – February 1949); F. F. Kuznetsov (February 1949 – February 1950).

Aleksandr Sergeyevich Shcherbakov (10 October, 1901 – 10 May, 1945) was a political figure, Colonel General (1943). In 1938 – 1945, he was First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee. At the same time, from 1941, he was Secretary of the Communist Party and head of the Sovinformburo; from 1942, head of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army, Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR. He died of a massive heart attack.

⁸² Aleksey Aleksandrovich Kuznetsov (7 February, 1905 – 1 October, 1950) was a party and military figure. From 1937, he was the 2nd Secretary of the Leningrad District Committee and the City Committee of the Communist Party. From 1939, he was a member of the Central Committee. 1941 – 1945 he was a member of the Military Council of the Baltic Fleet, the North and Leningrad Fronts. From 1943, he was a Lieutenant General. 1945 – 1946 he was 1st Secretary of the Leningrad District Committee and the City Committee of the Communist Party. 1946 – 1949 he was secretary of the Central Committee and head of the Personnel Division of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. On 13 August, 1949, he was arrested, on 30 September, 1950 being sentenced by the Military College of the Supreme Court of the USSR to lethal punishment and shot. He was rehabilitated on 30 April, 1954.

⁸³ The organizers of the Russian National People’s Army (RNPA) (in German documents it was also called the Russian Special Forces Battalion, a unit of the Abwehr Command 203 and the group “Graukopf”) were the Berlin émigrés S. N. Ivanov, I. K. Sakharov, K. G. Kromiadi and others. With the agreement of Abwehr, the command of Army Group Center was designated as the deployment site for the collection of units the village of Osintorf on the rail line Orsha-Smolensk. A communications team of 20 military personnel from the Wehrmacht was attached to the headquarters of the RNPA. In March 1942, there were about 100–150 people in the RNPA, in May there were about 400, and by the middle of August 1942 there were 1,500 people. Participation in the punitive operations and Soviet propaganda led to about 200 military service members of the RNPA crossing over to the side of the partisans with their weapons 6 – 15 August, 1942. After that, all émigrés were relieved of command. From 1 September, 1942, Colonel V. I. Boyarsky (V. G. Bayersky) became the commanding officer, and the political leader was Brigade Commissar G. N. Zhilenkov. In November – December 1942, battalions of the RNPA were reformed into the 633rd, 634th, 635th, 636th and 637th Eastern Battalions of the Wehrmacht, numbering four thousand in total. After unsuccessful utilization of

these battalions on the front, and taking into consideration the increasing number of cases of military personnel crossing over to the side of the partisans, Boyarsky and Zhilenkov were removed from command on 31 December, 1942. From January, 1943, Mahor V. F. Ril was placed in command of the RNPA, and the unit was reoriented to fight against the partisans. At the same time, a headquarters for the 700th Eastern Regiment of Special Forces was created, which in practice had command of the battalions formally considered the RNPA as well. After the defection of a large group of soldiers to the partisans on 22 February, 1943, Ril was removed from his post and arrested. The Russian headquarters of the grouping was dissolved, and the battalions began to be utilized separately. The 637th Battalion was dissolved in August, 1943, and the 633rd, 634th, 635th and 636th Battalions were moved, in November 1943, to France as part of the 7th Army of the Wehrmacht.

⁸⁴ The Western Front was formed from the forces of the Western Special Military District. On 22 June, 1941, the Western Front consisted of four armies. In the Belostok – Minsk Battle (22 June – 8 July, 1941), forces of the Western Front suffered a serious defeat: the major portion of the forces of the front were encircled by the enemy and destroyed as a military force. Of the 625,000 people in the front, around 420,000 were lost and a large amount of military equipment fell into the hands of the enemy. The People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, J. V. Stalin, placed the blame for the loss on the command group of the front. On 30 June, the commanding officer of the front, Army General and Hero of the Soviet Union D. G. Pavlov, was relieved of command, on 4 July he was arrested, and after a brief investigation, he was sentenced to be shot. In the Battle of Smolensk, the Western Front suffered another defeat. On 24 July, the Central Front was formed from the left wing of the Western Front (13th and 21st Armies), and later (13 August) on the left flank of the Western front the Bryansk Front was formed.

At the beginning of October, 1941, the front occupied a stretch of 340 kilometers from Ostashkov to Yelnya and consisted of six armies. On 2 October, the forces of the German Army Group Center began an advance against the Western Front and surrounded the main forces of the front in the area of Vyazma. In the Vyazma pocket, three armies of the Western front ended up surrounded: the 16th, the 20th, and the 19th (the headquarters of the 16th Army transferred its divisions to the 19th Army and broke through encirclement). In addition, two armies from the Reserve Front were also surrounded (the 24th and the 32nd). On 10 October, 1941, the forces of the Western and Reserve Fronts were united into a single Western Front under the command of Army General G. K. Zhukov. On 11 November, 1941, due to the dissolution of the Bryansk Front, the 50th Army of Major General A. N. Yermakov was moved to the Western Front.

On 15 November, 1941, the German Army Group Center renewed its advance on Moscow. On 6 December, 1941, the Western Front, with support from the Kalinin and Southwest Front, transitioned to a counter-advance, and as a result, the forces of the German Army Group Center suffered defeat and were pushed back from Moscow.

In January 1942, the Western Front renewed its advance, aiming to use the help of the Kalinin and Bryansk Fronts to surround and destroy the main forces of German Army Group Center. For coordination of activity of the fronts, a Main Command of the Western Direction was created on 1 February, 1942 (it was led by Army General G. K. Zhukov, who simultaneously remained the commanding officer of the Western Front). However, the Rzhev-Vyazma Operation of 8 January to 20 April did not meet with success. During all of 1942 and the winter of 1943, the Western Front engaged in heavy fighting on the central strategic direction (the First

Rzhevsko-Sychev Operation, the Second Rzhev-Sychev Operation), but without achieving noticeable success. On 22 February, 1943, the Western Front began a new advance, which again was not met with success, but on 2 March, 1943, the Army Group Center began to withdraw forces from the Rzhev-Vyazma base, and by 31 March, 1943, the Rzhev outcropping was completely evacuated.

During the Battle of Kursk, the forces of the Western and Bryansk Fronts took military action on 12 July, 1943, that began a counter-advance of Soviet forces on the north face of the Battle of Kursk (the Orlov Strategic Advance Operation “Kutuzov”). At the end of July, 1943, the Western Front concentrated on conducting the Smolensk Operation (7 August – 2 October, 1943; Operation “Suvorov”), and after the liberation of Smolensk, from the fall of 1943 to the spring of 1944, the Western Front undertook a number of unsuccessful advancing operations that aimed to free Vitebsk and Orsha. On 24 April, 1944, the front was renamed the 3rd Belorussian Front.

Commanding officers: Army General D. G. Pavlov (22 June – 30 June, 1941); Lieutenant General A. I. Yeremenko (30 June to 2 July, 1941); Marshal of the USSR S. K. Timoshenko (2 – 19 July, 1941); Lieutenant General A. I. Yeremenko (19 July – 30 July, 1941); Marshal of the USSR S. K. Timoshenko (30 July – 12 July, 1941); Colonel General I. S. Konev (12 September – 10 October, 1941); Army General G. K. Zhukov (13 October, 1941 – 26 August, 1942); Colonel General I. S. Konev (26 August, 1942 – 28 February, 1943); Colonel General V. D. Sokolovsky (28 February, 1943 – 15 April, 1944); Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky (15 April, 1944 – 19 February, 1945).

⁸⁵ The People’s Commissariat for State Security of the USSR was first formed on 3 February, 1941, by means of dividing the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD USSR) into to commissariats: the People’s Commissariat for State Security (NKGB USSR), which was given control over all sub-divisions directly involved in issues of state security (intelligence, counterintelligence, guarding members of the government, etc.), and the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD USSR), which retained operational (internal), convoy and border forces, units and sub-units responsible for guarding prisons and camps (GULAG), the militia, units of local anti-aircraft and fire defense, etc. On 20 July, 1941, the NKGB and the NKVD were again united as the NKVB USSR, and the apparatus of the NKGB was reorganized as the Main Administration for State Security of the NKVD USSR.

The second creation of the NKGB occurred on 14 April, 1943, at the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party P 40/91 on the basis of the operational administrations and departments of the NKVD. Its activities were subject to the “Regulations of the People’s Commissariat for State Security of the USSR” as confirmed by order No. 621-191ss of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR on 2 June, 1943. On 15 March, 1946, according to USSR law “On the Reorganization of the Council of People’s Commissars into the Council of Ministers of the USSR and of the Councils of People’s Commissars of Union and Autonomous Republics into the Councils of Ministers of Union and Autonomous Republics,” all people’s commissariats were renamed ministries, and correspondingly, the People’s Commissariat for State Security of the USSR became the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, and correspondingly, order No. 00107 from 22 March, 1946, renamed all the territorial administrations (the Ukrainian People’s Commissariat for State Security became the Ukrainian Ministry for State Security).

Head of the NKGB/MGB: People’s Commissar, Minister of State Security of the USSR, Vsevolov Nikolayevich Merkulov (3 February – 20 July, 1941; 14 April,

1943 – 4 May, 1946); Minister of State Security Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov (4 May, 1946 – 4 July, 1951).

⁸⁶ The Spanish Civil War (June 1936 – April 1939) was a conflict between the Second Spanish Republic as represented by the government of the Spanish People's Front and the opposing Spanish National Military Dictatorship led by General F. Franco, supported by Italy, German and Portugal, the result of which was the liquidation of the Spanish Republic and overthrow of the republican government that was supported by the USSR, Mexico, and, in the beginning of the war, France. The war began as a result of an insurrection on 17 – 18 July, 1936 of the conservative Nationalist forces in the Spanish Army.

Immediately after the Spanish Civil War began, it became an important factor in international relations in Europe. The USSR provided support for the Republican government, which managed to significantly strengthen its armed forces due to volunteers from various countries united in International Brigades. In May 1937, the Spanish Republican Army numbered 410 thousand, and in July, 1938, it was already 869 thousand strong. The war in Spain ended in victory for the Franco supporters on 1 April, 1939.

⁸⁷ The Blue Division was the 250th Division of Spanish Volunteers (Germ. *Einheit spanischer Freiwilliger*), which was traditionally called the Blue Division in Russian sources (Sp. *Divisiyn Azul*, Germ. *Blaue Division*) fighting on the side of Germany during the Second World War. It is nominally considered to be composed of members of the Falange Española (Spanish Phalanx), but in fact, the Blue Division represented a mix of soldiers from regular forces, veterans of the Civil War, and members of the Falange militia. It was put together according to Spanish laws: four infantry regiments and one artillery. On 13 July, 1941, the division, consisting of 18,693 soldiers, set off from Madrid and was transferred to Germany for five days of military training. Beginning with Poland, the division moved along the front marching on foot. After that, it was transferred to the Wehrmacht as the 250th Infantry Division. Over the entire time that the division existed, more than 40 thousand people passed through its ranks (and other sources and estimates claim more than 50 thousand).

The Blue Division participated in the blockade of Leningrad and was considered by the Soviet command to be the weak link. However, during Operation Polar Star to free the Leningrad District, which was conducted at the part of the front by Krasny Bor for a length of almost 60 kilometers, four Soviet divisions (approximately 44 thousand people) and two tank regiments could not break through the defenses of the Spanish (around four and a half thousand people). The Soviet forces suffered great losses in this area. On 20 October, 1943, Franco made the decision to withdraw the Blue Division from the front and dissolve the formation. In total on the Eastern Front, the volunteers lost around 14 thousand people on the Volkhov Front and 32 thousand on the Leningrad Front (winter-spring of 1943).

Division commanders: General Agustín Muñoz Grandes; General Emilio Esteban-Infantes.

⁸⁸ The Military Alliance of Russian Nationalists (MARN) was created in March, 1942, in the Suwalki camp for Soviet military POWs on the initiative of the Investigative Division. MARN was headed by Lt. Colonel V. V. Gil (I. G. Rodionov). MARN, which was initially called the National Party of the Russian People, had its own platform and charter. Lower-lever organizations of MARN were called "combat detachments." Soon the leadership of the alliance was moved from the Suwalki camp to an interim camp Zeppelin on the territory of the concentration camp Sachsenhausen. There, in April 1942, a center for MARN was created. Each of

the groups was led by an official from Zeppelin. In time, only one group remained in Sachsenhausen, training for MARN personnel, and the others left for different camps of Zeppelin. A second group for training personnel was deployed in the area of Breslau, where leadership staff for special camps were trained in "Forrest Camp SS 20." A battle group led by Gil numbering 100 people departed to the region of the city of Parczew (Poland), where they formed a special camp called "Detachment No. 1." The special group withdrew to other locations. Yablón' (Poland) was absorbed into the Zeppelin intelligence school there. In the summer of 1943, some of the members of MARN were absorbed into the RLA.

⁸⁹ The (Separate) Coastal Army was created on 20 July, 1941, on the basis of a directive of the Southern Front from 18 July from the Coastal Forces Group that was engaged in battles on the outskirts of Odessa. From 20 August, the army was included in the Odessa Defensive Region, received the name "Separate," and began to answer directly to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Due to the threat of German forces of Army Group South breaking through into the Donbass and Crimea, it was decided to evacuate the forces of the Odessa Defensive Region, including the Separate Coastal Army, to Crimea by sea. This task was completed by the Black Sea Fleet from 1 to 16 October, 1941. In the second half of October, the army came under the chain of command of the Crimean forces and took part in defensive battle against the forces of the 11th German Army and the Romanian Corps who had broken through into the steppe area of Crimea. The conflagration of armies withdrew to Sevastopol. On 4 November, 1941, the Sevastopol Defensive Region was founded, which included the Separate Coastal Army, which remained under the Crimean Forces until 19 November, and which defended Sevastopol over the next 8 months. From 20 October, the Sevastopol Defensive Region was under the chain of command of the Transcaucasian Front, from 30 December under the Caucasus Front, from 28 January under the Crimean Front, and from 26 April directly answerable to the high command of the Southwestern direction. On 20 May, the Separate Coastal Army was included in the forces of the North-Caucasus Front. On 30 June, 1942, the enemy managed to enter Sevastopol. After the evacuation on 1 July of all the command and political staff leading the defense of the city, the army for all intents and purposes ceased organized opposition. Almost all the remaining soldiers and officers of the army remaining in Sevastopol were either killed or taken prisoner. On 7 July, 1942, the Separate Coastal Army was dissolved. Commanding officers of the army in 1941 – 1942: Major General Chibisov, N. E. (July 1941); Lieutenant General Safronov, G. P. (July – October, 1941); Major General Petrov, I. E. (October 1941 – July 1942).

⁹⁰ Mikhail Vasilievich Bogdanov (pseudonym *Gvozđ* (Nail) (2 June, 1897 – 19 April, 1950) was a Brigade Commander of the Red Army, Major General of the Armed Forces of CLPR. From January, 1940 till August 1941, he commanded artillery for the 8th Rifle Corps; on 10 August, 1941, in an attempt to break through encirclement in the region of Uman, he was taken prisoner. He was kept at camps for military POWs in Zvenigorod, Belaya Tserkov, Kholm, Zamość, (Poland), and 6 April – November, 1942 in Hammelburg (Oflag XIII-D). From 18 November, 1942, he worked for the military construction organization Todt and in Shlyakhtenzee; in December 1942, he became head of the academic section of the Supreme Russian-German School for specialists near Borisov; from the summer of 1943, he was the Deputy Head of the Volga Administration for Todt. On 20 November, 1943, he was in the officers reserves of the Dabendorf School of the RLA; in December, 1943, he was in the inspectorate of I. A. Blagoveshchensky. On 14 November, 1944, he was made Major General of the Armed Forces of CLPR and appointed head of the

artillery section of the headquarters of the Armed Forces of CLPR. He was in the Southern Group of the Armed Forces of CLPR under F. I. Trukhin. On 8 May, 1945, he asked N. Lunev to turn himself in to the Soviet command. On 13 May, 1945, he was interrogated in the Counterintelligence Administration of Smersh of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. On 18 May, 1945, he was arrested. On 19 April, 1950, he was shot as sentenced by the Military College of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

⁹¹ Vsevolod Nikolayevich Merkulov (1895 – 23 December, 1953) was one of the leaders of the security agencies of the USSR. From 3 February, 1941 – 20 July, 1941, he was the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR; 31 July, 1941 – 14 April, 1943, he was First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR; from 14 April, 1943 – 4 May, 1946, People's Commissar/Minister of State Security of the USSR.

⁹² Vladimir Vladimirovich Gil' (I. G. Rodionov) (11 June, 1906 – 14 May, 1944) was a Colonel in the Red Army, founder and leader of the Military Alliance of Russian Nationalists, and Commander of the 1st SS Russian National Brigade, later crossing over to the side of the Soviet partisans. From 22 March, 1941, he was Chief of Staff of the 229th Rifle Division. From 16 July, 1941, POW, in the officers' camp in Suvalki, was the commandant of the camp for the Russian side (August 1941 – April 1942). In 1942, he created the Military Union of Russian Nationalists (MARN). In February 1943, the 31st SS Russian National Brigade "Druzhina" under Gil's command took part in actions against the partisans of the Slutsk Zone, and in May and June, against the partisans of the Borisov-Begomelsk Zone (Operation Kotbus). During the blockade, as well as after it, the majority of the soldiers and officers of the brigade treated the local population with loyalty, and it was often the case that Rodionovites did not fire on the partisans when they came across them. On 16 August, 1943, he crosses over to the side of the partisans together with his brigade. From 16 September, 1944, he was a colonel, awarded the Red Star. He died on 14 May, 1944 from a shrapnel wound in Nakol, Glubokoye District, Vitebsk Region. 16 September, 1991, his remains were moved to the village of Ushachy.

⁹³ In Moscow in December, 1918, on the basis of a decision of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic with the participation of a small group of instructors and students of the Nikolayevsky Military Academy (formerly the Imperial Academy of the General Headquarters), the Academy of the Headquarters of the Red Army was established. From 1921, the Military Academy of the Red Army, and from 1925 – 1988, the M. V. Frunze Military Academy. Until 1936, the Academy prepared senior (in the operational faculty) and mid-level command staff. From 1936, the Academy matriculated general military command and headquarters staff for the Red Army of operational and tactical profile.

⁹⁴ Pavel Vasilyevich Bogdanov (15 January, 1900 – 24 April, 1950) was a Soviet military leader, Major General, and participant in the Civil War, the Soviet-Polish War, and the Great Patriotic War. On 17 July, 1941, he voluntarily surrendered to the enemy. Until November, 1941, he was in the camp for military POWs in Suvalki, and later, after agreeing to cooperate with the Germans, he was moved to German. He wrote an address in his own name to the Russian people and to the generals of the Red Army. In the fall of 1942, Bogdanov became a private in "Detachment No. 2" created by the SS to fight the partisans. Later, the detachment was included in the 1st SS Russian National Division under the command of Vladimir Gil (Rodionov). Bogdanov led a counterintelligence regiment and received rank on April, 1943. In 14 August, 1943, Gil's brigade crossed over to the side of the Red Army, and Bogdanov was arrested and sent to Moscow. In 1950, the Military College of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced him to lethal punishment. On 24 April, 1950, he was shot.

⁹⁵ The Baltic Military District was formed on 11 June, 1940, immediately after the Red Army came into the territory of the Baltic countries, before they were formally part of the USSR. At first, this included the territory of the Latvian and Lithuanian SSR and the western part of the Kalinin District of the Russian SFSR. The administration of the district was taken from that of the famed Kalinin Military District and was located in the city of Riga. On 17 August, 1940, it was renamed the Baltic Special Military District. At that time, the territory of the Estonian SSR was included, and the portion of the Kalinin District that had been in the Baltic Military District was moved to the Moscow Military District. The district controlled all the troops on the territory of the three republics, including the armies of the formerly independent nations that had been included in the Red Army. From the start of the Great Patriotic War, it was reorganized into the Northwestern Front.

Commanding officers of the Baltic Special Military District: July – December, 1940, Colonel General A. D. Loktionov; December 1940 – July 1941 Lieutenant General and from February 1941 Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov.

⁹⁶ Ivan Filippovich Titkov (1912 – 1982) was a participant in the Great Patriotic War, Hero of the Soviet Union (1944). He served in the Red Army 1934 – 1936 and 1940 – 1945. In June 1942, he was sent to the rear, becoming one of the organizers and leaders of the partisan movement in the Minsk District. October 1942 – July 1944, he was Commander of the Zheleznyak Partisan Brigade. After the territory that the brigade had been working in was freed, he continued service in the army until 1945, when he received the rank of colonel and moved to the reserves.

⁹⁷ Petr Zakharovich Kalinin (1902 – 1966) was one of the organizers and leaders of the partisan movement in Belorussia, Major General (1943). In 1941, he graduated the Supreme School of Party Organizers under the Central Committee of the Communist Party. During the Great Patriotic War, he was Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Belorussia (1941 – 1944), member of the Military Council of the 21st Army, Deputy Head of Headquarters of the Partisan Movement under the Military Council of the Western Front (1941 – 1942), and head of the Belorussian Head of the Partisan Movement (from September 1942). 1944 – 1948 he was First Secretary of the Grodno Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia.

⁹⁸ After the failure of Operation Citadel, the German command encountered a sharp increase in the number of cases of military personnel from the Eastern formations crossing over to the side of the Red Army. In all of 1943, approximately 14,000 military service members from the Eastern battalions crossed over to the Soviet forces. For this reason, on 25 September, 1943, it was decided to redeploy the Eastern formations from the territories of the USSR to secondary theaters of military activity, which would allow the German forces thus freed up to join the Soviet-German front, and would limit the need to disarm units only to those whose reliability and loyalty truly were in doubt. On 29 September, this idea was approved by A. Hitler. Correspondingly, on 10 October, an order was issued to transfer the Eastern units to France, Italy and the Balkans, which was carried out in January, 1944. In total, 84 Eastern battalions were redeployed (600–800 thousand people). Approximately 5–6 thousand volunteers were disarmed as unreliable.

⁹⁹ Aleksey Ivanovich Spiridonov (23 February, 1899 – 11 May, 1949) was a Military Engineer of the 2nd Rank of the Red Army, Colonel of the Armed Forces of CLPR. From June 1941, military engineer of the 2nd rank; from July 1941, head of the chemical service of the regiment. From December 1941, a POW; from May 1943 a member of the RLA; from 10 July, 1943, a Colonel in the RLA; from August 1943, head of the training division; from fall of 1943, a member of NTS. From October 1944,

he was Head of the Department for Work with Military POWs of the Main Propaganda Administration of CLPR, and from March 1945 was located in Karlsbad (now Karlovy Vary, Czechia.) He avoided repatriation, living in the American occupied zone near Kassel.

Georgi Andreyevich Pshenichny (19 April 1903 – ?) was a Major in the Red Army, Lt. Colonel in CLPR. On 27 July, 1940, he was called up from the reserves and appointed Chief of Staff of the 518th Rifle Regiment. From the summer of 1941, he was in various camps for military POWs; in May 1942, he enrolled in courses for propagandists in Wuhlheide, and upon completion he remained as an assistant instructor in the courses. July – August 1942 in MARN, located in the camp for military POWs in Suwalki where Major General P. V. Bogdanov and Lt. Colonel V. V. Gil formed the SS Russian Volunteer Battalion “Druzhina.” He returned to Wuhlheide. From April 1943 he was at the Dabendorf School of the RLA, a member of the Presidium of the 1st Anti-Bolshevik Conference of Former Soldiers and Commanders of the Red Army. From August 1943, he was Commander of the cadet company in Dabendorf, and from November 1944 he was Commander of the cadet company and head of the Dabendorf School. From the beginning of 1945, he was a Lt. Colonel in the Armed Forces of CLPR. In March 1945, he departed for Karlsbad, then in April 1945 for Marienbad in the headquarters of Major General V. I. Maltsev. On 27 April, 1945, in Langdorf, he surrendered to representatives of the 12th Corps of the 3rd American Army. He avoided being handed over to the Soviet side.

¹⁰⁰ Pavel Anatoliyevich Sudoplatov (7 July, 1907 – 24 September, 1996) was one of the leaders of the Soviet security agencies; Lieutenant General 1945 (stripped of rank in 1958). 1939 – 1941, he was the Deputy Head of the 5th Department of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR. 1941 – 1943, he was Deputy Head of the 1st Administration of the NKGB-NKVD of the USSR and head of the special group under the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR. In 1945 – 1946, the head of the Special Bureau of the NKVD/MGB of the USSR. In 1945, the Head of Department F of the NKVD of the USSR, then Head of Department C of the NKVD of the USSR.

¹⁰¹ The newspaper “For the Homeland” (*Za rodinu*) was one of the first German Russian-language daily papers in the occupied territories of the USSR during the years of the Great Patriotic War. It was issued from 9 August, 1941, in the city of Dno, then from 11 September, 1942, in Pskov, then later in Riga, and until the summer of 1944 in Tallinn. Later, from the end of 1944 through 7 May, 1945, (No. 56/779) the paper was printed in Ventspils for the Russian volunteers and refugees. From the end of January, 1945, the newspaper received the subtitle “Agency of the Kurland Front Authority of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces of CLPR.” It was one of the largest regional newspapers in the northwest region of the Russian SFSR taken by the Germans, and at the same time one of many occupation newspapers with similar names. It was under the control of the Propaganda Administration (print division) of Army Group North. The editorial offices were in Pskov at the address Bashennaya St., House No. 46. The editor-in-chief was A. Petrov (F. T. Lebedev), and from January of 1944, one of the editors was A. G. Makridi, alias Stenros (1902 – 1982). The run of the paper reached 100,000 copies. (See: RGVA, F. 1699k. Op. 3. D. 4, 41, 48).

¹⁰² Walli headquarters, a notional name for a special intelligence headquarters of the Abwehr Foreign Branch Directorate (“Amtsgruppe Ausland”), established in June 1941 for the purposes of setting up and conducting intelligence, counterintelligence, and subversive activities against the Soviet Union (field post office № 57219). Walli headquarters following the structure of the Central Abwehr Foreign Branch Directorate with the following units:

Walli I: military and economic intelligence for the Eastern Front

Walli II: commando-type reconnaissance operations against the Red Army

Walli III: counterintelligence operations against the Soviet intelligence, partisans, and the underground resistance.

Colonel Heinz Schmalschläger was the head of Walli Heinz Schmalschläger, and at the same time he ran counter-intelligence unit Walli III.

Major (later Colonel) Baun was the chief officer (he surrendered to Americans, and they used him for the purposes of intelligence operations against the USSR.)

Abwehr units 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, and 106 (each consisted of three to six Abwehr teams) attached to headquarters of army groupings and armies to conduct intelligence operations on corresponding sections of the frontline, as well as teams of economic intelligence, focused on collecting information from POW, were subordinated to Walli I. Since 1942, special unit “Sondershtab (Special HQ) Russia” was placed under the direct command of Walli I. Its task was to plant moles in order to identify partisan units, anti-fascist (anti-German) organizations and groups, which were active in the rear of the German frontlines. In the fall of 1943, the Sondershtab Russia launched an energetic intelligence operation against the Red Army.

Major Selinger, Ober-Lieutenant (First Lieutenant) Müller, and Captain Becker sequentially headed Walli II. Abwehr sabotage units 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, and 206 (each consisted of two to six Abwehr teams) were subordinated to Walli II.

Abwehr counterintelligence units 301, 302, 303, 304, and 305 (each consisted of three to eight Abwehr teams) were subordinated to Walli III.

In 1944, the military intelligence structure was reorganized, and Walli I, Walli II, and Walli III along with their subordinate units were transferred to the Military Directorate (Militäramt) and 6th Directorate of RSHA (Reich Main Security Office, Reichssicherheitshauptamt) and got a new name: “Leading Front Intelligence Unit in the East” (Germ. *Leitstelle für Frontaufklärung I Ost, II Ost, III Ost*); their subordinate *Abwehrteams* and units were renamed *Frontaufklärungstrupp* and *Frontaufklärungskommando* (Frontline reconnaissance squad and Frontline Reconnaissance unit), while maintaining their old numbering system, tasks, and ways of operation.

¹⁰³ Rostislav Lvovich Antonov (Berzin) (1920 – 1977) was a Guard captain of the Red Army, captain of the CLPR (Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia) Armed Forces. From 25 September, 1941, he was a platoon commander of the 7th Mortar Regiment. From 24 June, 1942, he was chief of staff of the 5th Guard Mortar Regiment’s battalion. In August 1942, he voluntarily went over to the enemy. Until May 1943, he was personal liaison officer for internal commandant of the Lötzen (now Giżycko, Poland) special interrogation camp (*Sonderuntersuchungslager*), later becoming Personal Aide-de-Camp to the Lieutenant-General of the CLPR Armed Forces, Andrey Vlasov. On 7 May, 1945, he arrived to the meeting of the Czech National Council and signed, on behalf of the CLPR Armed Forces, the document named “Point of view of the Czech National Council with respect to the military actions of General Vlasov and his troops against German armed forces in the Prague area.” On the night of 12 to 13 May, 1945, U.S. Army Captain R.E. Donahew moved him over to the U.S. zone of occupation, where he was released.

¹⁰⁴ “*Klich*” (A Battle Cry), a weekly newspaper published in 1942 – 1943 and distributed in POW camps for the Soviet POW. In 1943, the Klich was replaced by the newspaper “*Zarya*” (Dawn); its editorial board was located in Dabendorf’s camp.

In 1933 – 1944, Russian immigrants used to publish the “Novoye Slovo” (New Word) newspaper (See: RGVA. F. 1699k. Op. 3. D. 40.). Its chief editor was Vladimir M. Despotuli.

¹⁰⁵ As far as the available documents indicate, by the end of 1943, Trukhin wrote a letter to Grossadmiral (Grand Admiral) Dönitz with a request to meet General Vlasov. As a result, Vlasov was received by the Chief of Naval Staff and the fleet commander of the Kriegsmarine Vice-Admiral (Wilhelm) Meisel (1893 – 1974). The exact date of the meeting is unknown.

Karl Dönitz (16 September, 1891 – 24 December, 1980) was a military and political leader of Germany, Grand Admiral. On 1 September, 1940, he became a Vice-Admiral; in March 1942, he was promoted to the rank of Admiral; from 30 January, 1943 he became Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy and Grand Admiral. On 29 April, 1945, he was appointed as Hitler’s successor as the head of state and supreme military Commander-in-Chief. He was arrested on 23 May, 1945, and sentenced in Nuremberg trial for 10 years of jail.

¹⁰⁶ The following persons were individually tasked with elimination of Vlasov: former POW Brigade Commander M.V. Bogdanov, who in early July 1941 had established contact with an NKGB task team; Lieutenant Augustin, a National Committee “Free Germany” member, who was transferred to the German rear; Major S.N. Kapustin who faked his defection to the German frontline near village of Yartsevo (See: Politischen Archiv des AA: Handakten Etdorf. R. 27359. Bl. 305056–305071); and Vlasov’s former lady-cook M.I. Voronova, who, in 1943, after returning to the Soviet-controlled territory was task with infiltrating “Voron” (Raven) headquarters in order to poison him. In the summer of 1943, she managed to make it to Dahlem, but fully repented and became a homemaker. Every one of the planned assassinations failed (See: The Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service. № N-18766. T. 11. Л. 162–165).

¹⁰⁷ This refers to the anti-Vlasov, anti-German group of Colonel N.S. Bushmanov. From March 1943, Bushmanov was assistant to the school principal for combatant training. In the spring of 1943 he became the head of an anti-fascist (anti-German) clandestine group in Dabendorf. After he wrote an anti-German leaflet in June, the group was discovered. On June 30, he was arrested by the Gestapo and was held in Berlin jail. On November 3, 1943, he was transferred to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, where he was held until liberation in April 1945.

¹⁰⁸ «Zarya» – the «Russian Committee» semiweekly newspaper, was issued in Dabendorf in 1943–1944 (See: RGVA F. 1699k. Po. 3. D. 21).

¹⁰⁹ This refers to HCW (*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*, the High Command of the Armed Forces) decree #43 from 21 April, 1943, regarding Red Army soldiers and officers who voluntarily went over to the German side. It said: “Every Red Army soldier and officer who voluntarily went over to our side shall be deemed enemies of the Soviet regime” and not considered POW. They should be fed well and transferred to the rear. “A special ID should be issued to everyone who voluntarily went over to our side” and they “should be given a seven-days deadline to choose whether to join the Russian Liberation Army or one of the ethnic liberation units (Ukrainian, Caucasian, Cossack, Turkestani, or Tatar), or volunteer to work in a rear unit or in regions, liberated from the Bolsheviks.” The volunteers were assured to be the first to go home after the war.

¹¹⁰ This refers to the “Open letter of the RLA officers letter to Molotov,” written in September 1943 and distributed as a leaflet. It said that the number of Soviet citizens fighting on the German side “went above one million” and kept growing due to influx of the Red Army soldiers. “We will take away your power. We will give

Russia back to Russians”: this is how officers have defined their goals. The letter was signed by a “group of Russian officers.” (See: RGVA. F. 1699k. Op. 2. D. 3. File № 10. L. 27–27 ob.)

¹¹¹ The 1st Cossack Cavalry Division headed by Major-General Helmut von Pannwitz (1898 – 1947) was moved to Yugoslavia in September 1943. It was created on August 4, 1943, out of collaborationist Cossack units, which were created in the Army Group «A» in Don and Northern Caucasus regions. On September 25, 1943, the division was transferred to the Army Group «F» in Yugoslavia. Overall strength of the division was 18,555 men: 3,827 of German lower ranks, 222 German officers, 14,315 Cossacks, and 191 Cossack officers. It was replenished by the soldiers of the 5th Cossack training-reserve regiment stationed in France, which sometimes numbered 15,000 men. In November 1944, the division was reorganized into the 1st and the 2nd Cossack Cavalry Divisions. On 1 February, 1945, they were merged into the 15th Cossack Cavalry SS Corps. Its overall strength reached 25,000 men. In April 1945, the corps was transferred to the Army Group «E».

¹¹² The Atlantic Wall was a system of long-term and field fortifications extending for more than 5,000 kilometers along the European Atlantic coast from Norway and Denmark to the Spanish border. It was built by German military after French defeat, during 1940 – 1944, in order to prevent Allied invasion to the Continent. The construction was expected to last for eight years; essentially it was launched in 1942, and by the end of 1943 it was completed by only 20%. It was designed and constructed by chief-engineer Fritz Todt, who earlier has designed the Western Wall (a.k.a. Siegfried Line) on the German-French border. The fortification were built by forced labor brought from the occupied lands under supervision of Organization Todt. There were also construction battalions made of POW and regular army soldiers. Up to a half a million men were involved in construction work by the end of 1943. From early 1944, Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel (1891 – 1944) was in charge of upgrading the system of fortifications. Under his direction, hundreds of reinforced concrete pillboxes were built on the beaches, and in some areas inland, to house machine guns, antitank guns, and light artillery. Land mines and antitank obstacles were planted on the beaches, and underwater obstacles and naval mines were placed in waters just offshore. The Atlantic Wall was a linear system of fortifications practically without backup, defense-in-depth. The depth of defense was two to four kilometers. Coastal batteries were built to protect from navy fire. They were armed with 28 different artillery systems; many of them were captured weapons. By the summer of 1944, some of the batteries were not properly reinforced, and Rommel ordered to move them to the rear. Mobile reserves were placed on the Belgian coast, Pas de Calais (68% of the projected strength), Cap Gris-Nez, the mouth of the river Seine, islands Guernsey and Jersey, and the cities of Brest and Lorient. Normandie coast had weak military posts, mostly observation and command posts, and just one artillery battery for every 20 kilometers of the coastline.

¹¹³ This refers to the Separate Russian Corps in Serbia (from 2 October, 1941, Russian Protective Corps; from 18 November, 1941, Russian Protective Group; from 30 November, 1942, Russian Protective Corps; from 10 October, 1944, Russian Corps in Serbia; from 31 December, 1944, Russian Corps) was created on 12 September, 1941. It consisted of White Russian émigrés. Later some Red Army POW also joined the Corps. By the end of 1942, the Corps had almost 6,000 men (including 2,000 Cossacks), and by September 1944, it had 11,197 men. The Corps protected key military facilities, also conducting military operations against partisans and local population. Altogether 17,090 men had served in the Corps, including 11.5 thousand émigrés. The Corps' losses in hostilities against partisans were 1,132 men.

¹¹⁴ This refers to the Vlasov's open letter "To the soldiers and officers of the Russian Liberation Army" from 15 November, 1943, which was published on 1 December, 1943, in information supplement to the "Dobrovolets" (Volunteer) newspaper for the Russian troops in Italy. Vlasov wrote that RLA soldiers should obey the HCW order to transfer RLA units from the East to the West along with the German troops against "Judeo-Bolsheviks" (See: Parizhsky Vestnik (Paris Herald). № 76. 27 November, 1943).

¹¹⁵ In 1941 – 1942, Reich Main Security Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt or RSHA) and Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (*Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete* or RMfdbO)) established the so called National (ethnic) committees: Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Turkestani, North-Caucasian, Volgo-Tatar, and Kalmyk. The North Caucasian Committee included (in 1943) the leadership: Kantemir (Ossetia), Magoma (Magomayev) (Dagestan), General Sultan Giray Klich (Cherkessia), Ulugay (Adygea), former French Foreign Legion officer Daydash Tukayev (Chechnya), Albagachiev (Ingushetia), Muratkhanov (Dagestan), Baytuganov (Ossetia). Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov joined the Committee in 1943. On 15 December, 1942, the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories has established with the assistance of General Dro (Drastamat Kanayan) of the Armenian National Council, which was promptly renamed in the Armenian National Committee. A. Abeghyan was the President of the ANC, and his deputy was A. Gulkhandanyan.

In May – June 1942, the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories initiated attempts to create the Azerbaijani National Committee. It was established in October 1942 in Berlin and headed by a White émigré Rasul-Zade. However, Rasul-Zade soon returned to Bucharest, and later Fatalibeyli Dudaghinsky came to Berlin in mid-1943. He tried (with Köstring and then the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories' assistance) to establish a new Committee. In June 1943, a new conference was convened to prepare the Azerbaijani Convention, which took place from 6 to 19 November of 1943, in Berlin's hotel Kaiserhof. The Committee lasted until the end of the war.

The Committee for the National Movement of Turkestani Peoples (later renamed to the Turkestan National Committee) was established in Berlin in August of 1942, under the aegis of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Veli Kyum-khan, an Uzbek, was the President of the Committee; Karimi, an Uzbek, was Secretary General, later replaced by Kanatbay, a Kazakh. The standing executive committee was composed of four Kazakhs, three Turkmens, three Uzbeks, two Tajiks, and two Kyrgyzs. The Committee played a certain role in creation of the two Turkestani legions on the territory of the General Government (Poland) and occupied Ukraine. Committee activists were spreading pro-German propaganda among soldiers from the Central Asia. In May 1944, the World Assembly of Central Asia Peoples was convened in Vienna under aegis of the Committee. It existed through May 1945.

The Georgian National Committee was established in early 1942 under the aegis of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories for propaganda purposes following the Wehrmacht leadership's decision from 30 December, 1941, to create legions "Georgia" and "Armenia". The Committee played the role of a government in exile. It was located in Marijampolė (Lithuania), where the Georgian Legion headquarters was moved. By the end of 1943, the Georgian National Committee was urgently transferred to Conflans (France). The Georgian battalions stationed in the USSR were moved to Normandy and Bretagne (northern France).

Colonel Shalva Maglakelidze was commander of the legion from January 1942 through early 1944.

¹¹⁶ Sergey Nikolaevich Khitrovo (4 November, 1904 – May 1945) was a Red Army captain, major of the CLPR (Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia) Armed Forces. He was drafted to the Red Army on 26 June, 1941; from July 1942, he was assistant to the chief of the mobile military hospital #500 logistical support. He was taken POW on 28 July, 1942. In January 1943, he was a propaganda student at Wuhlheide school. In 4 March, 1943, he was transferred to the Dabendorf School of the RLA; from April 1943, he was commander of the cadet company; from the summer of 1943, he was promoted to the rank of RLA major; from 1 September, 1943, he was the chief of the Lieutenant-General Vlasov bodyguards; from December 1944, he was the chief of the RLA maintenance and supply department; in February 1945, he was transferred from Berlin to Karlsbad; in May 1945, he was transferred to the Soviet authorities, who sentenced him.

¹¹⁷ Georgy Ilyich Antonov (31 May, 1898 – 17 July, 1963) was a Red Army Colonel, Colonel of the CLPR armed forces. From 31 December, 1939, chief of the mobile armored troops units of the Belorussian military district's 10th Army headquarters. He was taken prisoner in the summer of 1941; in 1942 he graduated Wuhlheide school for propaganda officers; from May 1943 he was a propaganda and recruiting officer at Częstochowa POW camp; from July 1943 he was deputy chief of inspection committee of I.A. Blagoveschensky inspectorate; from December 1944, chief of the armored forces section of the CLPR Armed Forces headquarters; from March 1945 he became chief of staff of the CLPR Armed Forces' auxiliary troops. In April 1945 he moved to Prague, and later to Salzburg (Austria). In the 1950s he was teaching in the U.S. Army military educational centers and living in Munich.

¹¹⁸ Aleksandr Grigorievich Yershov (19 February, 1892 – ?) was a Red Army Major, Colonel of the CLPR armed forces. From 31 October, 1940 he was the chief of the 24th Rifle Division's headquarters' 5th Department and assistant to the chief of staff. On 29 July, 1941 he was taken POW, and on 31 July, 1941, he was placed to the Łódź camp; from January 1943 he went to the Wuhlheide school for propaganda officers; in February 1943 he joined Vlasov movement; from the summer of 1944 he was propaganda officer in the camp for wounded RLA veterans; from January 1945 he was promoted to the rank of the CLPR Armed Forces Colonel and became support deputy for the Commander of the 2nd Division of the CLPR Armed Forces. In April 1945, he surrendered to U.S. military and was held in the Heidelberg camp. On 15 June, 1945, he was extradited to the Soviet authorities. His further fate is unknown.

¹¹⁹ Vladimir Denisovich Korbukov (Karbukov) (25 March, 1900 – 1 August, 1946) was a Lieutenant Colonel of the Red Army, Colonel of the CLPR Armed Forces. From 2 August, 1941, he was assistant to the communication chief of the 11th Army headquarters; from 3 February, 1942 he was senior assistant to the Chief of the Red Army Communications Directorate's 2nd Directorate's 1st Department; from April 1942 he was the senior assistant to the 2nd Assault Army headquarters communication chief, positioned on the Volkhov Front. In November 1942, he was taken POW. In August 1943 he joined RLA and was transferred to the RLA Dabendorf School; from January 1944 he joined Major-General Blagoveschensky inspectorate; from December 1944 he was made communication chief of the CLPR Armed Forces' headquarters; from February 1945 he was moved to the Colonel of the CLPR Armed Forces A. I. Tavantsev headquarters; on 28 February, 1945, he was promoted to the rank of Colonel of the CLPR Armed Forces; on 7 September, 1945 he surrendered to the 3rd U.S. Army 26th Infantry Division soldiers. On 7 September, 1945, American authorities transferred him to the SMERSH counter-intelligence

camp #292. On 1 August, 1946, he was hanged in the Butyrskaya prison courtyard by the sentence of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union. He was never rehabilitated.

¹²⁰ Rudolf Friedrich Ril (pseudonym Vladimir Fiodorovich Kabanov) (1 December, 1907 – 3 March, 1947) was a Red Army Major, Colonel of the CLPR Armed Forces. From 3 October, 1940, he was chief of the Artillery Directorate's 1st (operational) Department of the Ural Military District; from 14 September, 1941, he was made chief of the Artillery Directorate's Operational Department of Western Front's 22nd Army. After being taken prisoner in the fall of 1941, he began to work with one of the Abwehr's units in Vitebsk. In April 1942 he was made chief of staff of the Abwehrgroup-203 (Russian National People's Army), and in October 1942 he became Brigade Commander. In February 1943 he was arrested by Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) and put in a concentration camp. After a petition made by a number of Russian officers, he was released and from September 1943 studied in the RLA Dabendorf School. Upon graduation he was appointed head of the RLA propaganda group in Italy, and in 1944 he was promoted to the rank of RLA Lieutenant Colonel. From December 1944 he was made Operational Department Deputy Chief of the CLPR Armed Forces headquarters, and in January 1945 he was appointed acting senior liaison officer between Lieutenant-General A. A. Vlasov and the CLPR Armed Forces headquarters. In February 1945 he became chief of the 1st Unit of the CLPR Armed Forces headquarters operational department. On February 1945 he was promoted to the rank of the CLPR Armed Forces Colonel. He was interned by U.S. military in Innsbruck, was kept in U.S. camps, and cooperated with U.S. intelligence officers. In March 1946, was transferred to the Soviet Occupation Zone. On 31 December, 1946, he was sentenced to capital punishment by the Moscow Military District military tribunal and shot by a firing squad. He was never rehabilitated.

¹²¹ Vladimir Vasilyevich Pozdnyakov (17 May, 1902 – 21 December, 1973) was a Red Army Lieutenant-Colonel, Colonel of the CLPR Armed Forces. From 20 March, 1941, chief of the chemical unit of the 10th Army's 67th rifle corps, on 29 May, 1941, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. In November 1941, he ended up in an encirclement. He was held in a camp in Poland; in 1942 he went to the Wuhlheide school for propaganda officers; from January 1943 he was made senior propaganda officer in Hohenstein camp (East Prussia, today Olsztynek, Poland). From 1 April, 1943, he studied in the RLA Dabendorf School; from May 1943, he became the Chief of the RLA preparatory corps; and from November 1944 he was made operational aid to Vlasov and the Chief of the Command Department of the CLPR Armed Forces headquarters. On 9 May, 1945, he surrendered to the U.S. troops, escaped and was hiding in the U.S. occupation zone.

¹²² It refers to the RLA Lötzen (now Giżycko, Poland) Counterintelligence School. In August 1942 the "Special camp for RLA officer schooling" was established. As a part of the camp, a special school for RLA counterintelligence officers was set up in separate barracks. It was placed under direct supervision of the Eastern troops commander. Sobolev was the school director. Later he was replaced by the RLA Colonel Stalberg, his deputy was Colonel A.A. Troshin, and Maksakov was the Director of Instruction. From early 1943, Ivan Pavlovich Krupennikov was one of the school professors. The school cadets were POWs who distinguished themselves in service with RLA and in POW camps. Up to 150 cadets were enrolled in a course, which lasted six months. The curriculum included the study of ways of the Soviet, French, and British intelligence services' operation, methods of obtaining and transmitting intelligence information, recruiting agents and working with them,

demolition techniques, weapons, and martial arts. Upon graduation, the agents went back to their units and camps. In September 1944 the School was moved to Altwarp (now Stare Warpno, Poland), 40 kilometers from Stettin. In November 1944 it was moved to Hetzendorf, eight kilometers from Hirschberg, and lodged in a hotel. In January 1945 it was moved to Kinwasser. While it was stationed in Altwarp and Hetzendorf, the School had five training groups: two groups had 40 to 50 men, who were trained to be scout-saboteurs; there were two groups where RLA counterintelligence officers were trained; and one group trained female agents, who were trained to be partners to the male agents sent to the Soviet rear or to work in the RLA units. The female group was functioning under guise of a nursing school. In February – March 1945, the school was disbanded, and most of the agents were sent to the CLPR Armed Forces and POW camps to identify Soviet agents. The rest, along with the School Chief, moved to Marktneukirchen, Bavaria, where it went under the command of Holmston-Smyslovsky, who was raising his “Green Army.” Eventually, the Army and the rest of the school took a shelter in Lichtenstein.

¹²³ This refers to the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR’s Order #00189 from 5 September, 1942 “On the tasks of the partisan movement.”

¹²⁴ This refers to the 807th Azerbaijani battalion, created in December 1942 on the territory of the General Government (Poland). From February 1943 it was a part of the Army Group Centre 2nd Tank Army. In November 1943 the battalion was transferred to the 19th Wehrmacht Army, stationed in France. In April 1944 it became the 242nd Infantry Division’s 765th Regiment’s 4th Battalion. In the fall of 1944 it was captured by the U.S. troops.

¹²⁵ This refers to the 3rd Estonian Volunteer SS Brigade, created in October 1943 and consisting of two regiments. It was fighting on the Soviet-German front. In May 1944 it was reorganized into 20th Grenadier SS Division (Estonian #1).

¹²⁶ The process of creation of the so called Ostlegionen (Eastern Legions) began before the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories has created national intermediaries, on the basis of which the national representations were established. In November – December 1941 Adolf Hitler issued an order to create four national legions: the Turkestani, Georgian, Armenian, and Caucasian-Muslim legions. Three months later he allowed commanders to use Cossacks and Caucasians against partisans and on the frontlines as full-fledged allies. In August of 1942 their status was reinforced by the first “Regulation on local support units in the East.”

¹²⁷ The idea of creating a Lithuanian Army was first suggested in December 1943 by the Lithuanian autonomy after the German attempt to create Lithuanian SS Legion. However, German authorities declined it. In February 1944 they allowed the establishment of the Lithuanian Territorial Corps. However, German attempts to use the Lithuanians as a part of the Wehrmacht caused widespread discontent, and in May 1944 the Corps was disbanded. The men were transferred to the German air force to serve as airfields personnel and assistants to the FLAK batteries. In the summer of 1944 a composite military unit named “Fatherland Defense Force” was created. It consisted of two regiments. In October 1944 Soviet troops defeated it. The leftovers of the unit were reorganized in the Lithuanian Pioneer Battalion.

¹²⁸ A Belorussian Representation was opened in Berlin in November 1939, and on 19 June, 1941, a Belorussian National Center was established there. It intended to proclaim itself the Provisional Government upon Belarus being occupied. However, only on 27 June, 1943, under the rule of the Generalkommissar Wilhelm Kube, was the Belorussian Rada (Council) of Trust established as an advisory body. The Rada’s Starshina (senior leader) was Vatslav Ivanovsky, and his deputy was Yuri Sobolevsky. Eventually it was transformed into Belorussian Central Rada (BCR). On

December 1943 the representative assembly was held in a festive atmosphere in the great hall of the Generalkommissar's office to celebrate the establishment of the BCR by Germans. On 22 January, Radoslav Ostrovsky announced names of the Rada members (almost 75 men). In March 1944, BCR's vicarious representations were established in ten district Commissariats of Belarus. Each of them had 16 to 18 officials. In February 1944 the design of the plans to create Belorussian Homeland Defense was underway. Due to the Red Army offensive, the BCR moved from Minsk first to Königsberg and later to Berlin. In January 1945 the Rada adopted the new Statute and the Constitution and tried to establish contacts with the Western powers. The majority of the BCR members, including its Chairman Ostrovsky, surrendered to the Allied troops.

¹²⁹ Probably, it refers to the 30th SS Grenadier Division (Russian division #2), created in August 1944 on the basis of the Obersturmbannführer Hans Siegling's police brigade, including the 61st, 62nd, and 63rd Ukrainian Battalions, and 60th, 64th, and 65th Belorussian Battalions, as well as local self-defense units. Upon being created, it was moved to France where it suffered heavy losses in hostilities and disbanded in December 1944. At the same time a new 30th SS division began being raised with the BCR endorsement, but by April 1945 it had not been created.

¹³⁰ In a conversation which took place on 17 October, 1944, Churchill told Stalin that Allied forces had taken prisoners "who were Soviet citizens forcibly drafted to the German army." Churchill said that "entire battalions surrendered to the British." He promised to send these Soviet citizens from England back to the USSR. (See: RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 283. L. 80).

¹³¹ Sergey Berngardovich Frelikh (? – 15 December, 1982) was an activist of the first-generation anti-Soviet emigration. From 15 March, 1941, he moved to Germany; in 1941 he was in Riga, a member of the Combat Union of Russian Nationalists. From late 1942 he was General Vlasov's liaison officer; from January 1944 through February 1945 he was serving with the Head of the Main Organization Department General Vassily Fiodorovich Malyskin. From April 1945 he was a Captain of the German Air Force serving at the Lieutenant-General Aschenbrenner's headquarters; later he served with the chief of staff of the CLPR Armed Forces General Fiodor Trukhin. In 1945 he was interned by the U.S. troops and held in the Landau-Isar POW camp; in October 1945 he escaped from the camp and went into hiding in Munich.

¹³² Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt (12 December, 1875 – 24 February, 1953) was a German Field Marshal since 19 July, 1940. When Germany attacked the USSR, he was Commander of the Army Group «South». On 1 March, 1942, he was appointed the Commander of the forces in the West and the Army Group «D». On 2 July, 1944, Hitler removed him from this position for the failure to prevent Allies landing in Normandy.

Johannes Erwin Eugen Rommel (15 November, 1891 – 4 October, 1944) was a German Field Marshal. From February 1941 he was appointed Commander of the "Afrika" Corps; from January 1944 he was made Commander of the Army Group B in Northern France. From July 1941 he was made General of Armored Forces, and from 22 June, 1942 he was promoted to the rank of General Field Marshal. On 7 July, 1944, he was gravely wounded. He was charged with conspiracy against Hitler, and on 14 October, 1944, he committed suicide. On 18 October, 1944, he was buried with full military honors as a German hero.

¹³³ The 28th Army of the 3rd formation was formed on 9 September, 1942 by directive (issued 28 August, 1942) of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the basis of the command and control of the Stalingrad Military District forces as part of the South-Eastern Front. It consisted of the 34th Guards Rifle and 248th Rifle

Divisions, the 52nd, 152nd and 159th Rifle Brigades, the 78th and 116th fortified areas, and other units.

On 30 September, 1942, the Army was incorporated into the Stalingrad Front of the 2nd formation and took part in the Battle of Stalingrad. During September – October, these troops disrupted all enemy attempts to break through to the Volga and cut the Astrakhan-Kizlyar railway line. In December, the Army conducted offensive operations in the direction of Elista, Salsk, Rostov-on-Don, and liberated Elista. Then, as a part of the Southern Front of the 2nd Formation, it took Salsk (22 January, 1943) and Rostov-on-Don (14 February). On 20 February, its units reached the Mius River. In August – October 1943, the army as part of the Southern (from 20 October, the 4th Ukrainian) Front took part in the Donbass strategic (13 August – 22 September) and Melito-Polish (26 September – 5 November) offensive operations. As a result of these operations, the Donbass was liberated, and the Soviet troops reached the lower reaches of the Dnieper, to the Crimean isthmus and seized a bridgehead on the southern coast of the Sivash gulf. In February 1944, the army participated in the Nikopol-Krivoy Rog operation (30 January – 29 February); in March (from 1 March, on the 3rd Ukrainian Front) in the Bereznegovato-Snigirevskaya operation (6 – 18 March); and on 13 March jointly with the forces of other armies, it liberated Kherson and Nikolaev (28 March).

From 30 March, 1944, the army was placed in reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters; then the army was redeployed to the central sector of the Soviet-German front, where in June-July, as part of the 1st Belorussian Front, it took part in operation which ended with the defeat of the German troops in Belarus. The army troops crossed the Western Bug river in the area of Brest, crossed the state border of the USSR and continued to pursue the enemy on the territory of Poland.

On September 15, 1944, the army was moved to the Supreme Command Headquarters reserve, and on 13 October it was sent to the 3rd Belorussian Front, where it took part in the East Prussia offensive and seized the Baltic Sea coast area south-west of Königsberg. On 1 April, 1945, the army was moved to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, and on April 20 it was transferred to the 1st Ukrainian Front (with which it would participate in the Berlin operation). The army ended its military campaign in Czechoslovakia and reached the north-eastern outskirts of Prague, where it accepted the surrender of a part of the surrounded large enemy force.

Army commanders: Lieutenant-General V.F. Gerasimenko (September 1942 – November 1943); Lieutenant General A. A. Grechkin (November 1943 – May 1944); Lieutenant-General A. A. Luchinsky (May 1944 until the end of the war).

¹³⁴ The 1st Belorussian Front was formed on February 24, 1944 by directive (issued 17 February, 1944) of the Supreme High Command Headquarters and previously named the Belarussian Front. It was composed of the 3rd, 10th, 48th, 50th, 61st, 65th Armies and the 16th Air Army. Front units conducted operations on the territory of Belarus to improve their operational position, captured new bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper, and liberated Rogachev. On 5 April, 1944, by directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters (issued 2 April, 1944) it was renamed the Belarussian Front.

On 16 April, 1944, the 1st Belorussian Front was created again by the directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters from 12 April, 1944, by renaming the Belarussian Front. Front forces took part in offensive operations in Belorussia and the eastern regions of Poland and crossed the Vistula. During the winter offensive of 1945, the Front forces liberated Central Poland, crossed the Oder river, and created a bridgehead on the west bank of the river north and south of Kustrin (now Kostrzyn

in Poland). In mid-April 1945, the Front units reached Berlin and seized the capital of Germany. It was disbanded on 10 June, 1945 by the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters from 29 May, 1945. Its field office was reorganized into the field office of the Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany.

General of the Army and later Marshal of the Soviet Union Konstantin Rokossovsky was the Front Commander, and from November 1944 through the end of the war the Front Commander was Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov.

¹³⁵ National Committee for a Free Germany (Germ. *Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland* or NKFD), a German anti-Nazi political organization during WW2. It was established at the founding conference held 12 – 13 July, 1943 in Krasnogorsk, Moscow Region. The German émigré poet Erich Weinert was elected its president. The leadership of the committee included 38 people, including Anton Ackermann, Wilhelm Florin, Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht. After several unsuccessful attempts to recruit captured German officers to the Committee, a special organization for officers was suggested. On 11 – 12 December, 1943, the Union of German Officers (Germ. *Bund Deutscher Offiziere*, or BDO) was established, headed by General of Artillery Walter von Seidlitz-Kurzbach. The main purpose of the Union was to spread anti-Nazi propaganda among the German troops. Many high-ranking Wehrmacht officers joined the Union, the most prominent of whom was Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus. Later, the Union of German Officers accepted the program of the National Committee for a Free Germany and joined it.

The main task of the committee was mobilization of all strata of the population to fight against Hitler and his war crimes. The activities of the National Committee and the Union of German officers consisted in the propaganda and outreach conducted on the Soviet-German front and among POWs. The committee published the *Freies Deutschland* weekly, plus numerous leaflets for German soldiers at the front and POWs in Soviet camps. The committee had its own radio station, Free Germany. At the front, they also used mobile loudspeakers playing recorded speeches of General von Seidlitz-Kurzbach, Walter Ulbricht, Anton Ackermann, and Erich Weinert.

¹³⁶ Paul Joseph Goebbels (29 October, 1897 – 1 May, 1945) was a German Nazi politician; in 1933 – 1945 he was Reich Minister of Propaganda and Education of Germany, President of the Reich Chamber of Culture; in 1926 – 1945 he was Gauleiter (District Leader) for Berlin; in 1942 – 1945 he was Reichskommissar for Berlin's defense; in 1944 – 1945 he was city president of Berlin. He died on 1 May, 1945 and reburied in 1946 in Magdeburg. On 5 April, 1970, his remains were burned and spread over a tributary of the river Elbe.

¹³⁷ Gunter d'Alquen (24 October, 1910 – 15 May, 1998) was a Standartenführer SS Colonel, Himmler's confidant, leader of the "Scorpion" organization. In 1941 – 1944 he was the head of the propaganda formation SS-Standarte Kurt Eggers, and from early 1945 he became the head of the Wehrmacht propaganda department.

¹³⁸ Walter von Seidlitz-Kurzbach (22 August, 1888 – 28 April, 1976) was a General of Artillery. From 22 June, 1941, he took part in the hostilities on the Eastern Front; on 31 December, 1941, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General; on 1 January, 1942, he was placed in the Führer's Reserve. From March 1942 he was back in the Eastern front, and on 8 May, 1942, he was appointed the 51st Corps' Commander. On 31 January, 1943, he was taken prisoner; on 12 September, 1943, he became the head of the Union of German Officers, and eventually he was made deputy chairman of the National Committee for a Free Germany. On 26 April, 1944, he was sentenced to death for high treason. On 8 July, 1950, the Soviet court sentenced him to 25 years of jail for war crimes, and on 26 November, 1954, he was

put in Butyrskaya prison. He was released on 4 October, 1955, and moved to the BRD (West Germany).

¹³⁹ Gottlob Christian Berger (1896 – 1975) was a senior German Nazi official, one of the SS leaders, Obergruppenführer SS and SS General (1943). In 1941 – 1945 he was Reichsführer SS Liaison officer in the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories; from July 1942 he was Reichsführer SS personal representative in the Ministry and Secretary of State. From August 31 through 20 September, 1944, he was Supreme Commander of the SS and police in Slovakia. On 31 October, 1944, he was appointed Reserve Troops Commander and the Head of the POW Administration. On 25 September, 1944, he was appointed Volkssturm's chief of staff. On 8 May, 1945, he was arrested by the Allies.

¹⁴⁰ Erhard Kröger (24 March, 1905 – 28 September, 1987) was an SS-Oberführer, J.D. On 5 November, 1941, he became Commander of the 6th Einsatzgruppe C. In 1943 he was enlisted in 9th Division SS "Hohenstaufen," and in 1944 he commanded Einsatzkommando in France. In 1944 he was appointed head of the "Foreign nation of the East" Referat at the Reich Main Security Office, and from August 1944 through the end of the war he was the head of the "Russia" Department. In fall of 1944 he was appointed Reich Main Security Office's liaison officer with Vlasov. On 30 January, 1945, he was appointed Reserve SS-Obersturmbahnführer. From 1945 through 1962 he lived under an assumed name in Germany and Switzerland. In 1965 he was extradited to Germany. On 31 July, 1969, he was sentenced to a jail term for the mass killing of Jews in Western Ukraine in 1941 – 1942.

¹⁴¹ Solomon Davidovich Gegelashvili (1 May, 1885 – 4 February, 1972) was an activist of the Russian Liberation Movement (RLM). In 1939 he became a Major and the head of the Russian All-Military Union section in Czechoslovakia. In May 1945 he was an elder in the Schleißheim camp. From October 1948 he became the head of the Russian All-Military Union section in Argentina.

¹⁴² Most likely it refers to Vera Konstantinovna Romanova (11 (24) April, 1906, Pavlovsk, Russia – 11 January, 2001, Valley Cottage, New York) who was a Russian princess, the youngest child of Grand Duke Konstantine Konstantinovich of Russia and his wife, Grand Duchess Elizaveta Mavrikiyevna, and a great-granddaughter of Tsar Nicholas I. In 1918 she fled with her mother, her brother Georgy, and her nephew Vsevolod to Sweden. Later she moved to Belgium (1920 – 1922) and then Germany (1922).

She lost much of her family during WW1 and the Russian Revolution. At age twelve, she escaped revolutionary Russia, fleeing with her mother and brother George to Sweden. She spent the rest of her long life in exile, first in Western Europe and from the 1950s in the United States. In the 1930s she led many emigrant events in Berlin, especially Russian charity balls. From 1936 she headed the Berlin St. Prince-Vladimir Brotherhood. During the war, she worked as an interpreter and tried to alleviate the fate of the "Ostarbeiter" (Eastern workers, foreign slave workers from the Soviet Union) as much as possible. At the end of the war, she and her relatives walked for 12 days to the British occupation zone in northwestern Germany. In 1945 – 1951, worked as an interpreter in the English branch of the Red Cross in post-war Hamburg.

¹⁴³ Vasily Viktorovich Biskupsky (27 April, 1878 – 18 June, 1945) was a Russian General, WW1 veteran. In May 1936 he was appointed to the head office of Russian emigration in Berlin. Died in Munich.

Fiodor Fiodorovich Abramov (4 January, 1871 – 10 March, 1963) was a Russian General, veteran of the Russo-Japanese War and World War One, one of the White Movement leaders. During WW2 he joined Cossack troops and signed the Prague

Manifesto of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (CLPR). After WW2 he emigrated to the U.S. After the chairman of the Russian All-Military Union Yevgeny Miller was kidnapped in September 1937, his deputy Abramov was acting chairman for just several months. In the CLPR Abramov was in charge of the Cossack Troops Directorate.

¹⁴⁴ Alexei Alexandrovich von Lampe (18 July, 1885 – 28 May, 1967) was a Major General of the Russian Imperial Army General Staff, Reserve Major-General of the CLPR. In 1938 he reorganized the second department of the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS) into the Association of Russian Military Unions. In November 1944 he joined the CLPR, and in January 1945 he became Reserve Major-General of the CLPR Armed Forces; in the summer of 1945 he was made Russian Red Cross representative in Germany.

¹⁴⁵ Heinrich Himmler (7 October, 1900 – 23 May, 1945) was one of the leading political and military officials, Reichsführer SS (1929). On 17 June, 1936, he was appointed the Chief of German Police services, where he developed the SS troops. From 1943 on he became Reichsminister of the Interior, and after the July conspiracy failure in 1944, he was appointed Commander of the Reserve Army. On the eve of the collapse of the Reich, Hitler expelled Himmler from the NSDAP as a traitor, and stripped him of all ranks and positions. On 21 May, 1945, he was arrested by British military authorities. He committed suicide by poisoning himself.

¹⁴⁶ Ulrich Friedrich Wilhelm Joachim von Ribbentrop (30 April, 1893 – 16 October, 1946) was a senior Nazi and state official; in 1938 he was appointed SS-Gruppenführer. From February 1938 on, he was the German Foreign Minister. On 16 October, 1946, Ribbentrop was sentenced to death at Nuremberg to be hanged.

¹⁴⁷ Viktor Ivanovich Maltsev (25 April, 1895 – 1 August, 1946) was a Red Army Air Force Colonel, Major-General of the CLPR Air Force. On 1 December, 1938, he was made Aeroflot sanatorium head in Yalta; from 8 November, 1941, he worked with the German commandant's office; in March 1942 he was made Yalta's Mayor; in October 1942 he became Magistrate of Yalta. In August 1943 he joined RLA as Major-General of the CLPR Air Force and the CLPR Air Force Commander. On 30 April, 1945, he surrendered to the U.S. 12th Corps, and on 16 August, 1945, he was transferred to the Soviet authorities. On 1 August, 1946, he was hanged in the Butyrskaya prison courtyard, sentenced by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union.

¹⁴⁸ Heinrich Aschenbrenner (8 July 1895 – 11 November, 1960) was a senior Luftwaffe (Air Force) official, Lieutenant-General (1 August, 1944). On 1 October, 1939, he was made Air Attaché with the German Embassy in Moscow. In 29 June, 1941, he was appointed Supreme Signals Leader with Air-Region-Command 2. From 1 October, 1942 through 10 April, 1945, he was Supreme Signals Leader with the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, and at the same time, he was Acting-Supreme Signals Leader with Air-Fleet-Command 5. On 28 June, 1944, he was made Inspector for Foreign Personnel East. On 8 May, 1945, he was taken prisoner by Allied forces, and was released in March 1948.

¹⁴⁹ In the fall of 1943, The Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL) (High Command of the Air Force) Intelligence Department «East» Commander Lieutenant Colonel Holters suggested creating a flight school for Russian volunteers. In October 1943 a special camp for selection and training of volunteers was established in Suwalki. In December 1943, the 1st Eastern Squadron (Germ. 1. *Ostfliegerschtaffel der Luftwaffe*), a wing of the night bombers Group «Ostland» with the 1st Air Fleet headquarters. It had 9 to 12 Polikarpov Po-2 (U-2) aircraft. In March 1944 the squadron was

transferred to the 6th Air Fleet, and in July 1944 it was disbanded. Captain Tarnovsky was the squadron commander from December 1943 through June 1944.

¹⁵⁰ Hiwi (Germ. *Hilfswilliger* means auxiliary volunteers; *Ost-Hilfswilligen* means Eastern auxiliary volunteers), the so-called “auxiliary volunteers” of the Wehrmacht, recruited (including mobilized forcibly) from the local population in the occupied territories of the USSR and Soviet POWs. Initially, they served in auxiliary units as drivers, paramedics, sappers, cooks, etc. Later, the Hiwi began to be directly involved in hostilities, operations against partisans, and punitive actions. At first, the Hiwi continued to wear Soviet military uniforms, but without Soviet insignia. Gradually, they were dressed in German uniforms, but with special “Eastern” insignia. Sometimes only an armband with an inscription “Im Dienst der Deutschen Wehrmacht” (“In the service of the German armed forces”) indicating that Hiwi belonged to the Wehrmacht. Each Hiwi received a full food ration of a German soldier, and after two months of probation and admission as a “volunteer of auxiliary service,” also received money and an additional allowance. On 16 August, 1942, all units made from Soviet citizens became known as Eastern troops, and their military personnel were deemed volunteers by the directive of the Chief of the General Staff of the German ground forces. The directive distinguished between four groups of Hiwi:

- 1) Soviet POWs and local civilians who served in the German front and rear units;
- 2) police teams (*Schutzmannschaften*), auxiliary police of the German military and civilian administration in the occupied territory;
- 3) protective units (*Sicherungsverbände*), units designed to combat partisans and protect rear facilities;
- 4) combat units (*Kampfverbände*), formations that were supposed to conduct combat operations at the front.

Since 1941, as the Wehrmacht moved forward, the number of “volunteers” kept growing. Already in April 1942, there were 200 thousand people, and in July 1943, 600 thousand. A special position of Inspector General of Eastern troops was created to manage them. In October 1943 they were integrated in the traditional structure of German infantry divisions: by 2 October, 1943, the standard number of personnel of the German infantry division was “10,708 men and 2005 civilians.” In the Army Group North, the Hiwi detachments were known as “combat units of local residents” (Germ. *Einwohnerkampfverbände*); in the Army Group “Center” as “Order-maintaining Services” (Germ. *Ordnungsdienst*); and in Army Group “South” as “auxiliary security units” (Germ. *Hilfswachmannschaften*). As of February 1945, the number of Hiwi in the land forces was up to 600 thousand men, in the Luftwaffe the number was 50 to 60 thousand men and in the Navy about 15 thousand.

¹⁵¹ Mikhail Dmitrievich Baryshev (1907 – 15 August, 1946) was a Red Army Major, Colonel of the CLPR Armed Forces. In June 1941 he was the Commander of the 61st Rifle Regiment of the 45th Rifle Division. He was taken prisoner in the summer of 1941. In the spring of 1942 he became Commander of a volunteer Cossack regiment, which was of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, and promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel of Cossack troops; in 1943 he was removed from the position of the Regiment Commander and transferred to the Lötzen special survey camp. In early 1944 he was made the Chief of the propaganda group at the RLA officer’s rest house; in October 1944 he became an officer of the recruiting commission in the Dresden district; in January 1945 he was made Commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment of the CLPR Armed Forces’ 2nd Infantry Division; in February 1945 he was promoted to the rank of Colonel of the CLPR Armed Forces. On 9 May, 1945, he surrendered himself and his regiment to the 26th Infantry Division of the 3rd

American Army. On 24 February, 1946, he was transferred to the Soviet occupation zone. On 15 August, 1946, he was sentenced to death by the verdict of the Military Tribunal of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany and executed by a firing squad.

¹⁵² Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (CLPR), a political body created with the help of Nazi Germany in order to overthrow the Soviet political regime and unite, at least formally, the Russians and some ethnic organizations operating in the territories controlled by Nazi Germany. Its political platform was the “Manifesto of the Liberation Movement of the Peoples of Russia,” adopted and signed on 14 November, 1944 at a ceremonial meeting held in Prague (Hradčany).

The CLPR Presidium headed by A. A. Vlasov became the political governing body. It included Major-General Trukhin, Major-General Malyshkin, Major-General Zakutnyi, Lieutenant-General Zhilenkov, Lieutenant-General Balabin, F. P. Bogatyrchuk (who represented the Ukrainian National Council), N. N. Budzilovich (who represented the Belarussian National Council), S. M. Rudnev. Candidates to the Presidium were professors P. N. Ivanov and Yu. A. Muzychenko.

At the time of its creation, the Committee consisted of 50 members and 12 candidates (including representatives of 15 nations of Russia) and de facto was a kind of general assembly. By early 1945, the number of CLPR members increased to 102 men, and that of the Academic Council grew to 100 men.

Three meetings of the CLPR were held: on 10 November, 1944 was a preliminary meeting, where the leadership of the Committee was elected; on 12 November was the first plenary session at which the last debates and signing of the Manifesto took place; on 17 December, when it was decided to create national councils of some ethnic groups of Russia which recognized authority of Vlasov, namely the Russian National Council (Chairman General Malyshkin); Ukrainian National Council; National Council of the Peoples of the Caucasus; the National Council of the Peoples of Turkestan, the General Directorate of the Cossack troops, the Kalmyk National Committee, and the Belarussian National Council. Piotr Budzilovich became the chairman of the Belarussian Council of the CLPR. Among other ethnic representatives: members of CLPR were Maikovsky, V. M. Grechko, Komar, Demchenko, F. Zhuk, Khakhutov, Zhizhazhev, General Kreiter, Sh. Balinov, General von Lampe, later I. Medvedyuk and Pugachev were added as candidates.

On 27 February, 1945, about 60 people attended the third meeting of the CLPR. Vlasov reported on the situation on the fronts and presented the outlook for the struggle against Bolshevism. He reported on the first hostilities of the RLA volunteer detachment, commanded by Colonel Sakharov, with the Red Army on the Oder front. In conclusion, the meeting announced a number of activities of the German government to improve the conditions for workers from Russia, namely: equating the food supply of Eastern workers to that of foreign workers from Germany-friendly countries; revoking the 15% social tax on workers' wages; incorporating workers from Russia in the most beneficial tax group; punishing Germans who commit unfair treatment of “Eastern” workers, etc. The Union of Youth of the Peoples of Russia was established.

The last meeting of the CLPR was held on 26 March. Among those invited were Obergruppenführer SS Berger, Oberführer SS Kröger, several senior officials from the Ministry of Propaganda, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the German Workers Front, representatives of the Wehrmacht, national volunteer forces and national councils.

The only meeting of the Council of Nationalities was held On 20 February, 1945, attended by V. Malyshkin, N. Budzilovich, A. Tsagol and F. Bogatyrchuk.

¹⁵³ 1. The headquarters of the Armed Forces of the CLPR. The main tasks of the headquarters were to raise, equip and train the RLA units. Essentially it served as a war ministry. The active stage of building the headquarters began a few days after Vlasov's meeting with Himmler (18 September, 1944).

2. The Main Organizational Directorate headed by Major-General Malyshkin. Its main tasks were to address organizational issues of the Liberation Movement, political, as well as national, legal, social, economic and cultural issues. D. A. Levitsky was the head of the central secretariat. Within the framework of the main organizational department, special departments were created.

- a) Department of personnel headed by Senior Lieutenant Leventsev
- b) Legal department whose head initially was professor Ivanov; after his death he was replaced by I. D. Grimm
- c) Ideological department headed by A. N. Zaitsev (Artemov)
- d) Administrative and economic department headed by N. Kavas
- e) Finance department headed by professor S. A. Andreev. The activities of this department became full-fledged only after the signing of a financial contract between the German government and the CLPR.
- f) Scientific council under the guidance of Professor M.I. Moskvitinov

3. The Main Civilian Administration was headed by Major General Zakutny, his assistant was Forostivsky, and they had 53 employees. In reality, the work of the department was supervised by Yu. K. von Meyer. The Department dealt with all issues related to the living and working conditions and the legal and the social status of the Russians who ended up on the western side of the front, Eastern workers, refugees and POWs.

4. The General Directorate of Propaganda was headed by Lieutenant-General Zhilenkov. His task was to spread the political ideas of the Liberation Movement, and in a broader sense, to take care of the spiritual well-being of compatriots. The mouthpiece of the Directorate was the CLPR Information Bureau headed by N. Kovalchuk. There were several special departments the General Directorate of Propaganda:

- a) organizational and methodological department;
- b) press department (head: Burkin), responsible for the publication of the Liberation Movement newspapers with total circulation of 250 thousand copies: the official newspaper of the CLPR "Volya Naroda" (The Will of the People / chief-editors Zhilenkov and A. S. Kazantsev), CLPR military newspaper "Za Rodinu!" (For the Motherland! / chief-editor Colonel N. V. Pyatnitsky), the Air Force newspaper "Nashi Krilya" (Our Wings);
- c) Radio department headed by chief S. N. Dubrovsky and L. V. Dudin. It had a radio station that conducted six daily CLPR broadcasts in Russian.
- d) POW propaganda department headed by Colonel Spiridonov
- e) Department of culture and art headed by I. L. Novosiltsev

The department of culture and art was established at the end of 1944 on the recommendation of Generals Zhilenkov and Malyshkin. The primary task of the new department to bring together numerous prominent Russian artists and writers who had gathered at the end of the war in Berlin. The department was headed by I. L. Novosiltsev, who was recommended to this position of the general Vlasov. Several subsections were planned to be created: theater and opera headed Bagryantsev; cinema led by Stepanov. This task was never accomplished due to the end of the war.

5. Council for Religious Affairs was supervised by Professor Budzilovich. The tasks of the Council were to deal with the affairs of all churches and parishes, to

provide religious education, to create opportunities for religious services among the RLA soldiers, as well as in the POW and among Eastern workers.

6. Security Department led by Lieutenant Colonel Tenzorov. The Department was in charge of protecting CLPR officials and the RLA.

Its creation began in mid-1943, when Vlasov moved to Dahlem, Kibitzweg 9. The first employees of the Chancellery were Russians from the Baltic States, selected by Vlasov's liaison officer Sergei Froehlich: D. A. Levitsky, Lev Rahr, CLPRadi-Kondrashev, professor I. D. Grimm (later Head of the Legal Department of the Main Organizational Directorate), N. N. Ryshkov, A. P. Nikanorov (later Legal Secretary of the Secretariat), N. Kavas (later Head of the Administrative and Economic Department of the State Educational Institution), secretary-typist Antonina Freiberg, warehouse manager Baron Viktor Rosenberg. Major M. A. Kalugin was appointed the head of the Personal Chancellery.

¹⁵⁴ Frank Karl Hermann (24 January, 1898 – 22 May, 1946) was an Obergruppenführer SS, one of the leaders of Nazi regime in Czechoslovakia, SS and Police General (21 June, 1943). On 28 April, 1939, he was senior Commander of SS and Police in Prague. He was arrested by U.S. troops in May 1945 and extradited to the Czechoslovak government. In April 1946 the Czechoslovakia extraordinary people's court sentenced him to death. He was hanged.

¹⁵⁵ Dmitry Efimovich Zakutny (7 November, 1897 – 1 August, 1946) was a Major-General of the Red Army, Major-General of the CLPR. On 21 July, 1941, he was appointed Commander of the 21st Rifle Corps, which was a part of the 87th and 117th Rifle Divisions. On 26 July, 1941, he was taken prisoner. In 1943 he joined the propaganda institution "Jumneta"; in August 1944 he came into contact with Lieutenant-General Vlasov. He became member of the CLPR Presidium, beg. Civil administration. Other events were as follows: 6 February, 1945, evacuated to Carlsbad; 20 May, 1945, detained; 13 June, 1945, transferred by the Americans to the Soviet occupation zone; 1 August, 1946, hanged in the courtyard of Butyrskaya prison. Not rehabilitated.

¹⁵⁶ Yevgeny Ivanovich Balabin (22 December, 1879 – 27 October, 1973) was a Don Cossack, Lieutenant General of the Russian Empire, veteran of the First World War and the Civil War. In 1940 – 1945 he was the head and chieftain of the All-Cossack Association in the German Empire, Slovakia and Hungary. In 1944 he joined the CLPR. In June 1947 he left for South America, and later returned to Austria.

¹⁵⁷ On 29 April, 1943, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Supreme High Command (OKH), Colonel General Kurt Zeitzler, issued Order #II/5000/43, according to which all Russian volunteer units were brought together under the title of the Russian Liberation Army, and all Ukrainian volunteer units under the name of the Ukrainian Liberation Army (Ukain'ske vizvol'ne viysko). The ULA included Ukrainian "Hiwis," soldiers of the Eastern legions, Soviet POWs and volunteers. Actually, these formations never became an "army," and its units were in fact scattered throughout Europe. The head of the "army" was Lieutenant-General of the UPR Mikhail Vladimirovich Omelyanovich-Pavlenko (1878 – 1952), and in 1944 he was replaced by General-Khorunzhy (Major-General) Pyotr Gavrilovich Dyachenko (1895 – 1965). By this time, the total number of units had grown to 50 thousand men, and by the end of the war there were about 80 thousand men. On 15 April, 1945, the remnants of the ULA joined the collaborationist "Ukrainian National Army" commanded by Colonel-General Pavel Feofanovich Shandruk (1889 – 1979).

¹⁵⁸ Yuri (George) Sergeevich Zherebkov (20 June, 1908 – no earlier than 1980), ballet dancer, political activist. Since 1941 resided in Paris. Took the leadership of the Committee for Russian Refugees Mutual Assistance in France. Head of the

Department for Russian Émigré(e)s Affairs. Under the auspices of the Department established a Union of Russian Youth, and the Russian Drama Theater. Joint CLPR in October 1944, head of the Foreign Affairs department. Attempted to establish contact with the Allies via the International Red Cross, the Vatican; attempted to fly to Spain to negotiate with Franco. Arrested by the French authorities in 1945, and in 1946 sentenced by the Paris court to 5 years of “national disgrace.”

¹⁵⁹ Mikhail Alekseevich Meandrov (22 October, 1894 – 1 August, 1946) was a Red Army Colonel, Major-General of the CLPR. From early 1941, he was the 6th Army's Deputy Chief of Staff. On 6 May, 1941, he was taken prisoner and put in POW camps; in the summer of 1942 he joined the RLPP; in January 1944 he studied in Dabendorf RLA School, later being transferred to the inspectorate of the RLA Major-General Blagoveshchensky; in spring of 1944, he was appointed the head of the tactical training course at the Dabendorf RLA school. In April 1944, he was appointed editor of the “RLA Officer's Bulletin” and “Eastern Front Propagandist” bulletin. In October 1944, he became Propaganda Department head of the CLPR Armed Forces. On 9 May, 1945, he surrendered to soldiers of the 3rd U.S. Army's 26th Infantry Division. On 14 February, 1946, he was transferred to the Soviet Repatriation Committee. On 1 August, 1946, according to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, he was hanged in the courtyard of Butyrskaya prison. Not rehabilitated.

¹⁶⁰ Grigory Aleksandrovich Zverev (15 March, 1900 – 1 August, 1946) was a Red Army Colonel, Major-General of the CLPR Armed Forces. In 14 March, 1941, he was appointed Commander of the 190th Rifle Division. On 11 August, 1941, while being wounded, he was captured by German motorized intelligence unit. He was released in September 1941, as an “ethnic Ukrainian,” and later he was arrested by a destruction battalion fighters. Early in 1942 he was released and appointed Commander of the 8th Semipalatinsk Division in the Central Asian Military District; on 1 February, 1942, he became Commander of the 323rd Rifle Brigade, in the fall of 1942 he became Deputy Commander of 127th Rifle Brigade deployed in Voronezh front; on 13 February, 1943, he became Commander of the 350th Rifle Division and commandant of the city of Kharkov. On 22 February, 1943, he was taken prisoner by Germans. From 28 March, 1943 through July 1943, he was held in POW camps. In July 1943, he was released and sent to the Dabendorf RLA School. Early 1944, later he was transferred to the inspectorate of the RLA Major-General Blagoveshchensky; on 27 February, 1945, he was promoted to the rank of Major-General of the CLPR Armed Forces, and appointed Commander of the 2nd Division of the CLPR Armed Forces. In May 1945, he attempted suicide, but survived. On 1 August, 1946, according to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, he was hanged in the courtyard of Butyrskaya prison. Not rehabilitated.

¹⁶¹ Andrei Afanasyevich Melnik (ucr. Andriy Melnyk; 12 December, 1890 – 1 November, 1964) was a Ukrainian political leader. After Evhen Konovalets' assassination, on 11 November, 1938, he became head of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), and on 27 August, 1939, he was appointed leader of the OUN. He cooperated with German intelligence services (most of all with the Abwehr), since he saw in Germany a natural ally in the struggle against the common enemy, Poland. After Western Ukraine was incorporated in the USSR, he directed clandestine activities from territory occupied by Germany. In 1941, he moved to Berlin. On 6 July, 1941, he sent a letter to Hitler's headquarters, in which he indicated willingness of the OUN members to fight along with Germans against Bolshevism. He sent the so-called “marching units” of his supporters to Kiev and other large cities of Ukraine. On 21 September, 1941, he arrived to Kiev himself. However, Reichskommissar Erich Koch was displeased with the OUN's activities, and in

February 1942, almost all the openly-recognized of Melnik's followers were arrested, and some of them were executed. Melnik's paramilitary OUN units were disbanded and recruited to police units. In 1943, partially thanks to German policy, and partly by Bandera's efforts, the Melnik faction of the OUN was destroyed. The majority of Melnik's followers joined Bandera's Ukrainian Rebel Army or Vladimir Kubiyovych's Ukrainian Central Committee. On 26 February, 1944, Melnik was placed in Sachsenhausen concentration camp's special barrack for high-profile political prisoners. In September he was released. Colonel Erwin Stolz, who was deputy chief of Abwehr's sabotage directorate, in his testimony which was submitted to the Nuremberg trials, stated that he personally instructed Melnik and Bandera "to immediately convene and provoke demonstrations in Ukraine during the German attack on the Soviet Union or to break the direct rear of the Soviet Army."

¹⁶² The Main Directorate of Imperial Security (Germ. *Reichssicherheitshauptamt*, or RSHA) was the governing body of the political intelligence and security police of the Third Reich. It was created on 27 September, 1939, as a result of the merger of the Main Directorate of the Security Police (It. *Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei*) and the Security Service (SD). Its chief was Reichsführer SS and the head of the German police Heinrich Himmler. The Main Directorate of Imperial Security was one of 12 SS headquarters and had 3,000 employees.

RSHA was completely consolidated by September 1940, and included first six, and after March 1941 seven Services (Germ. *Amt*). The Directorate was subdivided into departments (Germ. *Abteilung*), which, in turn, were divided into "sections" (Germ. *Referat*). Services were designated by the Roman numerals and letter, while the sections were designated by service number with an additional Arabic numeral.

RSHA structure:

I Service: personnel and organizational issues, training and organization. It was comprised of four departments divided into 16 sections.

Chiefs: Brigadeführer SS Bruno Streckenbach (1940 – 1943); SS Brigadeführer SS Erwin Schulz (until November 1943); Gruppenführer SS Kammler; Oberführer SS Erlinger (November 1943 – April 1945); Standartenführer SS Fraké-Griksch (May 1945).

II Service: administrative, legal and financial issues. It was comprised of five departments divided in 25 sections.

Chiefs: Standartenführer SS and Police Colonel Hans Nokemann; Obersturmbannführer SS Rudolf Siegert (19 November, 1942 – 1943); Standartenführer SS Kurt Pritzel; Standartenführer SS Joseph Spacil (1 March, 1944 until the end of the war).

III Service: SD-Inland (Domestic SD).

Gruppenführer SS and Police Lieutenant-General Otto Ohlendorf was the head of the III Service of the RSHA "SD-Inland." The Service dealt with the issues of state law and order and state building of the Reich, immigration, race and public health, science and culture, industry and trade. It was comprised of four departments divided in 18 sections.

IV Service: Gestapo (Reich's Secret State Police). It dealt with counterintelligence, fight against sabotage and enemy propaganda, and annihilation of Jews. It was comprised of eight departments divided in 24 sections. The chief of the IV Service of the RSHA "Gestapo" was Gruppenführer SS and Police Lieutenant General Heinrich Müller. His deputy was Sturmbannführer SS Wilhelm Krichbaum.

V Service: Kripo (Reich's Criminal Police). It dealt with: investigation of criminal offenses (including fraud, crimes against morality, etc.) and offenses. It was

comprised of four departments divided in 11 sections. Chiefs: Gruppenführer SS and Police Lieutenant General Arthur Nebe (September 1939 – 28 June, 1944); Friedrich Panzinger (from June 1944).

VI Service SD-Ausland (SD-Overseas) which dealt with intelligence work in Northern, Western and Eastern Europe, USSR, USA, Great Britain and in the countries of South America. It was comprised of eight departments divided in seven sections and “Zeppelin” organization.

Chiefs: Heinz Jost (27 September, 1939 – 22 June, 1941); Erwin Weinmann (Acting Chief 13 July – 22 June, 1942); Walter Schellenberg (from 6 June, 1942 until the end of the war).

VII Service. Information and archive service. It was comprised of three departments divided into 12 sections.

Chiefs: Standartenführer SS Franz Six, Obersturmbannführer SS Paul Dittel (since 1943).

Chiefs of the RSHA: Reinhard Heydrich, Reich protector of Bohemia and Moravia (27 September, 1939 – 27 May, 1942); Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler (2 May – 31 December, 1942), Oberguppenführer SS and Police General Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner (30 January, 1943 until the end of the war).

¹⁶³ Heinrich Müller (28 April, 1900 – May 1945) was the head of Gestapo (Reich’s Secret State Police, RSHA IV Service) from October 1939, and Gruppenführer and Police Lieutenant General from November 1941. He died in Berlin.

¹⁶⁴ Stepan Andreyevich Bandera (1908 – 1959) was one of the leaders of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B). In the fall of 1939, he began working with Abwehr. On 30 June, 1941 he called the so-called “Assembly of representatives of the Western Lands of Ukraine” in Lvov, where “The act of or proclamation of the Ukrainian state” was declared, and the “government” of Ukraine was established. The German authorities did not recognize the “government” and placed Bandera in Sachsenhausen concentration camp, where he de facto was held under “house arrest.” He was released on 30 September, 1944. After Germany’s defeat he fled to the American zone of occupation, where he lived in Munich and worked with British intelligence. In 1959 he was assassinated in Munich by KGB agent Bogdan Stashinsky, a former OUN-B member.

¹⁶⁵ See footnote No 70.

¹⁶⁶ On the Vlasov negotiations with the Ukrainians, see the collection of documents entitled Украинские националистические организации в годы Второй мировой войны (Ukrainian nationalist organizations during the Second World War) V. 2. 1944 – 1945. pp. 397–398, 443–444. Doc. № 3.98, 3.111.

¹⁶⁷ Josef Witiska (1894 – 1946) was a Security Service (SD) Officer, JUDr. Standartenführer SS. From June 1941, he was the Deputy Head of the Gestapo Office in Prague. From March 1943, he became the Commander of the security police and SD “Galizien.” On September 10, 1944, he became the Commander of “Einsatzgruppe H” in Slovakia. He committed suicide.

¹⁶⁸ Anton Vasilyevich Turkul (11 December, 1892 – 20 April, 1957) was a Major-General of the Russian Imperial Army, Major-General of the CLPR Armed Forces. On 16 July, 1936 he established in Paris the Russian National Union of War Veterans (RNSUV) and its daily newspaper “Signal.” For his activities by General Miller’s order he was banished from the Russian All-Military Union. In April 1938, he was deported from France; in August 1939 he moved to Rome (1939 – 1940) and later to Hungary and Bulgaria (1941 – 1944). In December 1944 he joined the CLPR Armed Forces; in 1945 he was arrested and was released in 1947.

¹⁶⁹ The Main Directorate of the Cossack troops was established in Berlin as a result of arrangements between the German leadership and Cossack representatives. Its head was Lieutenant-General Krasnov.

The process of creating the Main Directorate of the Cossack troops (GUKV) was a long one. In December 1942, the Cossack administration of Don, Kuban and Terek was established under the aegis of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Its head was N. A. Gimpel. Among other things, he was tasked with organizing a temporary Cossack government abroad. Initially, the Cossacks were not allowed to form their military units. In 1944, Alfred Rosenberg approved the establishment of the GUKV. It was assumed that all Field Atamans of the Don, Kuban and Terek would become members of the GUKV by default. However, the Germans had the Don Field Ataman Pavlov, who organized and headed the Cossack camp (Kosakenlager), and Terek Army Field Ataman Lieutenant Colonel of Cossack troops Kulakov. Instead of the existing Kuban Ataman, the Germans brought the émigré Kuban Ataman Naumenko. In 1918 Naumenko was promoted to the rank of Major General by Pyotr Wrangel, and was elected an Ataman in 1920 while in emigration. Finally, the GUKV was established in March 1944 by order of the Commander of the Eastern Volunteer Forces, General von Kestring. Krasnov's nephew, Major General Semyon Krasnov, was appointed deputy chief of the GUKV. In March 1944, the GUKV was reassigned to the SS Main Directorate.

Pyotr Nikolayevich Krasnov (10 September, 1869 – 17 January, 1947) was a Cossack movement leader, Lieutenant General. From 1936 he lived in Germany and had German citizenship. In September 1943, Krasnov became the head of the Main Directorate of the Cossack troops of the Reich Ministry of the Eastern Occupied Territories of Germany and was involved in the creation of the "Cossack camp" (Kosakenlager), writing for the collaborationist newspaper "Za Rodinu" (For the Motherland). In May 1945, when he was in the Cossack camp, he was captured by the British troops. On 28 May, 1945, in the city of Linz (Austria), he was extradited by the British command to the Soviet military administration along with 2,400 Cossack officers. He was brought to Moscow, where he was kept in Butyrskaya prison. He was sentenced to death by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union, and hanged in the Lefortovskaya Prison on 16 January, 1947.

¹⁷⁰ This refers to the Krasnov's book "От двуглавого орла к красному знамени" (From the two-headed eagle to the red banner), which was published in Berlin in 1921.

¹⁷¹ The Main Directorate of the Cossack troops was established under the aegis of the CLPR in February 1945 as a counterbalance to the supreme rule of General Pyotr Krasnov. The ruling body of all Cossacks was the Council of Cossack troops comprised of Field Atamans of the Don, Kuban and Terek Armies, and representatives of Orenburg, Ural, Astrakhan, Siber, Semirechie, Zabaykalye, Amur, and Ussuri Cossacks, as well as of the Council of Cossack troops' Chief of Staff. The Chairman, like the other Council members, was a CLPR member and subordinated to Vlasov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the CLPR chairman. The Council was supposed to manage all Cossack internal affairs, dealing with recruitment and training of Cossack troops and propaganda following "orders, instructions and instructions for the CLPR Armed Forces." On March 23, 1945, Field Ataman of the Don Army Lieutenant-General Tatarkin was elected Chairman of the Council of the Cossack troops. The Council's members were: the Field Aataman of the Kuban Army, Major General Naumenko, and the chief of staff of the Council of the Cossack troops, Colonel Karpov. The absent Field Ataman of the Terek Army was represented by Colonel Vertepov.

¹⁷² Vyacheslav Grigorievich Naumenko (25 February, 1883 – 30 October, 1979) was a WWI and Civil War veteran, a White Army officer. From 1920 through 1958, he was the Army Ataman of the Kuban Cossack Army in exile, making all efforts to preserve the Cossack movement abroad. During the Second World War he was the Head of the Cossack troops' Directorate. In 1944 he moved to Germany, but promptly went to Northern Italy, where he surrendered to the U.S. troops in Tyrol.

¹⁷³ Andrei Grigoriyevich Shkuro (7 December, 1886 – 16 January, 1947) was a Lieutenant General of the Armed Forces of Southern Russia (White Army), Lieutenant General of the CLPR. In 1944 he was placed in command of the "Cossack Reserve" of the General Staff of the SS troops, promoted to the rank of Gruppenführer SS with the right to wear a German general's uniform. He was in charge of training Cossacks of the 15th Cossack Cavalry Corps to fight partisans in Yugoslavia. In 1945, he was interned by the British troops and extradited to the USSR. He was sentenced to death by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union, and hanged in Moscow.

¹⁷⁴ Timofey Ivanovich Domanov (1887 – 16 January, 1947) was a Sotnik (Lieutenant of Cossack troops) of the Don Army of the Armed Forces of Southern Russia, Major General of the CLPR Armed Forces. In 1940, although he was arrested "for the economic counter-revolution" and sentenced to 10 years of labor camp, he managed to escape. In November 1942, Field Ataman Colonel Pavlov's headquarters appointed him Commander of a Cossack half centurion. On 27 November, 1942, he became Field Ataman's Chief of Staff in Vinnitsa; he was awarded the Iron Cross; in 25 June, 1944 he was promoted to the rank of Colonel and Field Ataman; in November 1944 he was promoted to the rank of Major General; on 6 May, 1945, he surrendered to the British 36th Infantry Brigade of the General C. Kitley's 5th Corps; on 29 May, 1945, he was extradited to the Soviet command. He was sentenced to death by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union, and was hanged on 16 January, 1947.

¹⁷⁵ Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda (Germ. (нем. *Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda*), German government agency established on 13 March, 1933 in order to enforce propaganda in mass culture, education, and mass media. Its head was Joseph Goebbels. In 1940 the Ministry was organized into 15 departments. The Eastern Propaganda Section dealt with brochures and leaflets, newspapers, posters, exhibitions, mobile loudspeakers, film and radio propaganda, books, and trained officers for special assignments. It was headed by Eberhard Taubert (1907 – 1976) who in 1941 became the head of the newly created "General Office for Eastern territories."

¹⁷⁶ Nikolai Aleksandrovich Troitsky (a.k.a. Normann, Nareikis, Boris Yakovlev) (20 March, 1903 – 10 May, 2011) was a Russian construction engineer, architect, political activist, writer, librarian. In June 1941, he volunteered for the 13th Rostokinskaya Division of People's Militia. In October 1941, he was taken POW; in 1943 he joined RLA; he was chief-editor of the "Za Rodinu" newspaper. He wrote the Prague Manifesto. In April 1945 he became the head of the Propaganda Department and promoted to the rank of Captain. Since 1945 he lived in Munich, which was part of the U.S. occupation zone, using a Yugoslav passport issued under the name Boris Severovich Yakovlev.

¹⁷⁷ Otto Bräutigam (1895 – 1992) was a German diplomat, Doctor of Law. On 21 May, 1941, he became an employee of Rosenberg's agency (Dienststelle Rosenberg), and on 17 July, 1941, he began to work in the Reich Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories. From 22 June, 1941, he was on military service, liaison officer with OKH. From 18 June, 1945 through 13 March, 1946, he was in American captivity.

¹⁷⁸ Text of the agreement was published in Mikhail Semiryaga's work «Коллаборационизм: Природа, типология и проявления в годы Второй мировой войны» (Collaborationism: Nature, typology and manifestations during the Second World War). M., 2000. p. 852.

¹⁷⁹ The 1st Division of the CLPR Armed Forces (600th Infantry Division according to the German numbering system) was formed in the 5th Military District (Stuttgart) by the General Staff of the OKH order from 23 November, 1944. It was formed in Münsingen on the basis of the RPLA (Kaminsky's brigade, about 4,000 men), 30th SS Grenadier Division, 308th, 601st, 618th, 621st, 628th, 630th, 654th, 663rd, 666th, 675th, and 681st separate Russian Battalions, 582nd and 752nd Russian Artillery Battalions and some other small units, and the 1604th Russian Infantry Regiment. By 31 March, 1945, it had 12.5 thousand people. The division had 10 self-propelled guns, 10 T-34 tanks, twelve 150-mm caliber heavy howitzers, forty-two 75-mm caliber guns, 6 heavy and 29 light infantry guns, thirty-one 37-mm caliber anti-tank guns, ten 37-mm caliber Flack guns, 79 grenade launchers, 563 heavy machine guns and light machine guns, and 20 flamethrowers. In April 1945 it was transferred to the Army Group "Vistula" and on 13 April it took part in the Oder offensive (Operation "April Weather"). On 15 – 30 April, it marched towards Prague. During the march, volunteers from POW camps and Ostarbeiters joined the division. By the end of WW2 the division had two thousand men. Division commander was Major-General Bunyachenko.

¹⁸⁰ Ernst Kaltenbrunner (4 October, 1903 – 16 October, 1946) was the Chief of the Reich Main Security Office (*Reichssicherheitshauptamt*; RSHA) and State Secretary of the Reich Ministry of Domestic Affairs. Since 1938 he joined the Gestapo and was in charge of concentration camps. In 30 January, 1943, he became the Chief of RSHA, Obergruppenführer SS, and Police General. In 1944, he was granted the additional rank of General of the Waffen-SS. On 12 May, 1945, he was arrested by U.S. soldiers. At the Nuremberg trials he was sentenced to death and was hanged on 16 October, 1946.

¹⁸¹ Hermann Reinecke (1888 – 1973) was the head of the General Office of the Armed Forces (Germ. *Allgemeines Wehrmachtsamt*). On 1 December, 1939, he was promoted to the rank of Major-General; on 1 August, 1940, he became Lieutenant-General; and on 1 June, 1942, Infantry General.

¹⁸² Fähnrich and Oberfähnrich were intermediary ranks of the non-commissioned officer category in the German Imperial Army, Reichswehr and Wehrmacht, which were given to candidates for the rank of officer. Essentially, a Fähnrich was equal to a deputy platoon leader, and an Oberfähnrich to a platoon leader. Here we render the rank of Fähnrich as warrant officer.

¹⁸³ A tank destroyer detachment was created in February 1945. It consisted of officers and bodyguards of General Vlasov and cadets of the RPOA officer school. It was divided into three platoons, and its commander was emigrant Colonel Sakharov. It distinguished itself in the river Oder battle on 8 – 24 February, 1945. All personnel was awarded with Iron Crosses and Merit Badges for Eastern Nations. Reichsführer SS Himmler sent his personal congratulations to Vlasov. On 24 February – 10 March, the 1604th Russian Infantry Regiment was created out of Sakharov's detachment and two battalions of the 714th Russian Infantry Regiment moved from Denmark. The new regiment fought south of Stettin as part of the Infantry-Brigade Klossek, and on April 9 it was merged into the 1st Infantry Division of the RLA CLPR.

¹⁸⁴ Hermann Wilhelm Göring (12 January, 1893 – 15 October, 1946) was a German military and economic leader. Since 30 August, 1939, he was the Chairman of Reich Defense Council. During the Blitzkrieg he was Commander of the Air Force in the

battles in Poland, France, and the USSR. He was arrested by American troops on 9 May, 1945. At the Nuremberg trials he was sentenced to death, and on 16 October, 1946, he committed suicide by poisoning two hours before he was supposed to be hanged.

¹⁸⁵ Igor Konstantinovich Sakharov (Levin) (7 August, 1912 – 1977) was a Lieutenant of the Spanish National Army, Colonel of the CLPR Armed Forces. In 1936 – 1939 he joined the Spanish National Army and fought in the Spanish Civil War on the Generalissimo Franco's side. In 1940 – 1942 he lived in Berlin. Since March 1942 he was involved in the creation of Russian experimental detachments, composed of POWs. He was deputy of S. Ivanov, Russian Commander of the Abwehrgruppe-203 in Osintorf near Smolensk. In May 1942, he became Commander of the RNNA task force; in April 1943 he became deputy of RLA Guard Battalion Commander S. Ivanov, and in July 1943 he was appointed Lieutenant-General Vlasov's operative aide. In January 1945 he created an anti-armor unit. Since 16 April, 1945, he was serving in the 1st Infantry Division of the CLPR Armed Forces headed by Major-General S. Bunyachenko. On 9 May, 1945, he fled to the American Occupation Zone and avoided extradition to the USSR.

¹⁸⁶ The Iron Cross (Germ. *Eisernes Kreuz* (EK)), Prussian and German military decoration. It was established by King Frederick William III of Prussia on 10 March, 1813 during the Napoleonic War for battle honors in the war for the liberation of Germany from Napoleon. This award decoration open to all ranks, regardless of rank or social status. A holder of Iron Cross could be awarded with higher grades of Iron Cross. Decoration was resumed with every new war.

At the beginning of the WW2 Hitler restored the award. The Iron Cross became thicker, it had inscription 1939 on the lower beam (while on the back it was written "1813") and a swastika added in the center. The Knight's Cross was also established. It was worn not with a traditional black and white ribbon, but on a black-white-red one. The order #102 part 849 from 10 June, 1940, introduced five grades of the Iron Cross.

During the World War Two about 2.3 million Iron Crosses 2nd Class and 300 thousand of the 1st Class were awarded to land forces' soldiers only. It is estimated that three million Iron Crosses were awarded in WW2 (including to 49 women, with 19 of them confirmed). During WW2, the Grand Cross of the Iron Cross was awarded only once: on 19 July, 1940, Hitler awarded it to head of Luftwaffe Hermann Göring. The award was revoked on 23 April, 1945, after Hitler decided that Göring had betrayed him.

¹⁸⁷ Army Group Vistula, formed on 24 January, 1945 on the basis of the Oberrhine High Command. It was formed to command and control troops in Pomerania and Lower Oder region. Commander of the Army Group Vistula in 1945 were: Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler (24 January – 20 March), Colonel General Gotthard Heinrici (21 March – 29 April) and Colonel General Kurt Student (30 April – May 1945).

¹⁸⁸ Sergei Kuzmich Bunyachenko (5 October, 1902 – 1 August, 1946) was a Red Army Colonel, Major-General of the CLPR Armed Forces. On 11 February, 1940, he was appointed 26th Rifle Corps' chief of staff; on 30 March, 1942, he became Commander of the 389th Rifle Division deployed on the Transcaucasian front. On 2 September, 1942, he was court-martialed and sentenced to death by the Northern Group of Forces' Military Tribunal of the Transcaucasian front. On 24 September, 1942, the capital punishment was supplanted by 10 years of forced (camp) labor, which were supposed to be served after the end of the war. On 10 October, 1942, he was appointed Commander of the 59th separate Rifle Brigade. On 16 December, 1942,

he was taken prisoner by a reconnaissance group of the 2nd Romanian Infantry Division. On 1 June, 1942, he was placed in POW camps near Kerch, Dzhanikoy, and Kherson. On 7 May, 1943, he joined RLA and was sent to Lötzen special interrogation camp. Later he was transferred to General Keiper headquarters in Kirovograd. He was professor in a school for officers of the Eastern volunteer troops. In September 1943, he was a RLA liaison officer at the 7th Wehrmacht Army in Le Mans (Western France); from 26 June to 7 July, 1944, he was Commander of two Eastern battalions and awarded with an Iron Cross 2nd Class. On 10 October, 1944, he was appointed Commander of the 1st CLPR Armed Forces' Infantry Division; on 27 October, 1945, he was promoted to the rank of Major-General of the CLPR Armed Forces. On 15 May, 1944, American troops extradited him to the Soviet 25th tank corps. Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court sentenced him to death. He was hanged in Butyrskaya prison court and was never rehabilitated.

¹⁸⁹ The headquarters of the "Commanding Admiral in Norway" was established in Oslo in 1940, after Norway was occupied. It was in charge of the entire coast and adjacent waters. On 1 February, 1943, the headquarters were renamed in the Main Naval Command "Norway" to which Commanding Admirals of the Polar, North, and Western coasts of Norway were reporting. Commanding Admirals/Commander-in-Chief were Admiral Otto Ciliax (4 March, 1943 – 26 April, 1945) and Admiral Theodor Krancke (26 April – 26 August, 1945).

¹⁹⁰ Main naval command "East" was established on 22 June, 1943, on the basis of the Main Naval Command of the Baltic Sea (before February 1943, Baltic Sea naval station.) It was in charge of Navy Forces in the Baltic Sea including Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia.

Commanders of main naval command "East" in 1943 – 1945 were: Admiral Günter Guse (21 September, 1940 – 8 March, 1943), Admiral Hubert Schmundt (9 March, 1943 – 29 February, 1944), and Admiral (from 16 September, 1944 Generaladmiral) Oskar Kummetz (1 March, 1944 – 23 July, 1945).

¹⁹¹ Operation Nordlicht ("Northern Light"), forced evacuation and scorched earth tactics in provinces of Finnmark and northern part of Troms; a set of measures taken by German occupation forces during their withdrawal.

From Northern Norway under pressure of the Soviet Army exerted during Petsamo – Kirkenes Offensive at the end of WW2. Scorched earth policy aims to destroy anything deemed useful or potentially useful to the enemy. This policy was applied by the German military leadership, first in September 1944, and then continued on a full scale on the orders of Hitler from 26 October, 1944 regarding the withdrawal of German troops from Northern Norway to the Lyngen all the way through February 1945. A total evacuation of the local Norwegian population in the southern regions of Norway was also planned. About 60,000 civilians were forcibly evacuated by the Wehrmacht from Northern Norway. But about 25,000 Norwegians went to the mountains and hid from German soldiers until the Soviet Army moved into these areas and liberated the northern part of Norway.

¹⁹² Vlasov's "battle groups" were detachments created in February 1945 from the volunteers of the RLA propaganda officers Dabendorf school cadets and the reserve of the RLA officers. Their task was to conduct front-line intelligence to capture prisoners to be interrogated and fight against Soviet tanks. Red Army uniforms were used in order to penetrate Red Army positions. The detachments were armed with Faustpatrones to fight tanks.

¹⁹³ Sergey Nikolaevich Golikov (11 November, 1894 – ?) was a Colonel of the Red Army, Colonel of the CLPR Armed Forces. On 7 May, 1941, he became professor of tactics at the Red Army's Academy of Chemical Weapons; on 19 July, 1941, he was

appointed Commander of the engineering troops department at the Western Front's 33rd Army headquarters; on 20 March, 1942, he became a member of the Counter Bolshevism Political Center (CBPC); on 5 June, 1943, he was appointed professor at the Wehrmacht Eastern Officers' School in Lithuania; in November 1944, he became Deputy Commander of the engineering department at the CLPR headquarters; in April 1945, he served in the Southern Group of the CLPR Armed Forces; at the end of the month, he was lost somewhere near Munich. His fate is unknown.

¹⁹⁴ The 61st Army was formed according to the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 004278 from 2 November, 1941, in the Volga Military District in November 1941. On 6 December, 1941, it was sent to the Western Front; on 9 December, it was moved to the Southwestern Front; on 24 December it was moved to the Bryansk Front, and then it was a part of the Western, Bryansk, Belorussian, and 1st Belorussian Fronts. From June 1942 through May 1945, the army was commanded by Lieutenant-General Belov (who, on 26 July, 1944, was promoted to the rank of Colonel-General).

¹⁹⁵ The Volkssturm was a national militia established by Nazi Germany during the last months of World War II. It was set up by the orders of Adolf Hitler from 18 October, 1944 (on the anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig or Battle of the Nations of 1813). It was staffed by conscripted males between the ages of 16 and 60 years who were not already serving in some military unit. By May 1945, nearly 700 Volkssturm battalions were formed. Every Battalion had three companies, every company three platoons, and every platoon was composed of three squads. All the Volkssturm members were classified as soldiers following military regulations throughout the entire period of service in the Volkssturm. All the members of the SA, Hitler Youth, and the NSDAP preserved their ranks and positions in their respective organizations, but service in the Volkssturm was a priority. All the Volkssturm members pledged an oath of personal loyalty to Adolf Hitler. The Volkssturm was created under the general supervision of Himmler. Volkssturm units were placed under direct command of the local Nazi party officials, the Gauleiters and Kreisleiters. In the Fall of 1944, up to one hundred Volkssturm battalions were sent to the Eastern front and up to 50 battalions were sent to the Western front. The Volkssturm was used for construction and protection of rear defensive lines, and assistance in evacuation, as well as for the replenishment of army units. It took part in fighting in Silesia, Hungary, on the banks of Oder and Neisse rivers, and in the Battle for Berlin (six thousand Volkssturm men were fighting there).

¹⁹⁶ Nikolai Petrovich Nikolaev (1911 – 11 December, 1945) was a Red Army Major, Lieutenant Colonel of the CLPR Armed Forces. On 16 November, 1940, he was appointed senior aid to the chief of the 1st department of the 12th Army operational staff. On 10 August, 1941, he was wounded and taken prisoner. In September 1941 he escaped and was taken prisoner again. Since June 1942, he joined RNNa and became Battalion Commander; in March 1943 he was Commander of the 700th Eastern Regiment and Colonel Caretti awarded him with 2nd class bronze medal "For courage" with swords; on September 1943 Nikolayev was awarded with a silver medal 2nd class. Since early 1944 he was a professor at an Officer school of Eastern troops, and in February 1945 he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel of the CLPR Armed Forces and awarded with a bronze cross "Pour le Mérite." On 15 May, 1945, American military extradited him to the Soviet 25th tank corps. On 24 November, 1945, he was sentenced to death and on 11 December, 1945, he was executed.

¹⁹⁷ Yury Leonidovich Khmyrov (a.k.a. Dolgoruky) (23 February, 1918 – ?) was a lieutenant of the Navy, lieutenant of the CLPR Armed Forces. In November 1940 he

was navigator of the 1st Brigade of Torpedo Boats' 3rd Division; in September 1941 he was appointed the Commander of the 3rd Marine Regiment Company. In December 1942 he was taken prisoner. He was kept in the Simferopol POW camp, and in May 1942 he began to work with the Abwehrgroup-106; later he became an Abwehr officer. In 1944 he was transferred to the RLA Dabendorf school. In December 1944 he was in the CLPR Security Directorate. On 10 February, 1945, he was evacuated from Berlin to Carlsbad. On 9 May, 1945, surrendered to soldiers of the 3rd American Army's 26th Infantry Division. Before 28 March, 1946, he was repatriated to the USSR and placed under investigation. His fate is unknown.

¹⁹⁸ Mikhail Alekseevich Kalugin (19 July, 1894 – 19 June, 1953) was a Major of the Red Army, Lieutenant Colonel of the CLPR Armed Forces. On 6 September, 1940, he was appointed Company Commander of the 2nd Slutsk Rifle Regiment. In the fall of 1941 he was taken prisoner and placed in POW camps. In 1942 he joined the BSRN and served in the SD Special Brigade "Druzhina" under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Gil (a.k.a. Rodionov). In June 1943 he was sent to the RLA Dabendorf school, in July 1943 becoming Lieutenant General Vlasov's Private Office's chief and the commandant of the RLA Commander-in-Chief's High Command. He was a steering committee member for the creation of the CLPR, put in charge of the personal protection of the CLPR leadership. In November 1944 he was appointed 1st Deputy of the CLPR Security Chief V. N. Puzanov (I. V. Tenzerova). In early 1945, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel of the CLPR Armed Forces. In March 1945, he was evacuated from Berlin to Carlsbad; on 25 – 26 April, 1945, he went into hiding in the mountains near Füssen. He avoided extradition. Since late 1945 he lived in the American occupation zone near Munich.

¹⁹⁹ Vladimir Gavrilovich Artsezo (Assberg, Assbergiantz) (25 June, 1898 – 10 February, 1947) was a Colonel in the Red Army, Major General of the Armed Forces of CLPR. From 28 July, 1941, he was acting head of the section of armored vehicles of the Field Administration of the 28th Army; from 10 August, 1941, he was acting head of the section of armored vehicles of the Field Administration of the 57th Army; from 1942, the Deputy Commander of the 57th Army for logistics. In May 1942, he became surrounded by the enemy and was taken prisoner near Lozovaya. In 1943, he organized an officer's school for Eastern forces in Mariampole, and he deployed together with it to Conflance (France). He inspected Russian volunteer battalions of the RLA in France, serving in the headquarters of the Eastern volunteer forces of the Wehrmacht. From December 1944, he was head of the section of military preparedness in the headquarters of the Armed Forces of CLPR. On 27 February 1945, he was made Major General of the Armed Forces of CLPR. On 9 May, 1945, he surrendered at Krumau to representatives of the 26th American Infantry Division. On 14 February, 1946, he was handed over to the Soviet side. On 10 February, 1947, he was shot per the sentence of the Military College of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

²⁰⁰ Vladimir Vasilyevich Pozdnyakov (17 May, 1902 – 21 December, 1973) was a Red Army Lieutenant-Colonel, Colonel of the CLPR Armed Forces. From March 20, 1941, chief of the chemical unit of the 10th Army's 67th rifle corps; on May 29, 1941, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. In November 1941, he was caught in an encirclement. He was held in a POW camp in Poland; in 1942, he went to the Wuhlheide school for propaganda officers; from January, 1943, he was made senior propaganda officer in Hohenstein camp (East Prussia, today Olsztynek, Poland). From April 1, 1943, he studied in the RLA Dabendorf School; from May 1943 he became the Chief of the RLA preparatory corps; and from November 1944 he was made operational aid to Vlasov and the Chief of the Command Department

of the CLPR armed forces headquarters. On May 9, 1945, he surrendered to the U.S. troops, escaped, and was hiding in the U.S. occupation zone.

²⁰¹ Army Group South (Germ. *Heeresgruppe Süd*), Wehrmacht army group in WW2. There were several groups. In this case it referred to the Army Group South, which on 23 September, 1944 was created by re-designation of the Army Group South Ukraine. On 30 April, 1945, the Army Group South was again renamed as Army Group Ostmark. Army Group commanders were: Colonel-General Johannes Frießner (23 September – 22 December, 1944), Infantry General Otto Wöhler (28 December, 1944 – 6 April, 1945), and Colonel-General Lothar Rendulic (6 – 30 April, 1945).

²⁰² After departing from Marienbad on 20 April, 1945, the Air Force units along with their Commander Major-General Maltsev surrendered to the 3rd U.S. Army 12th corps troops at 12 P.M. on 30 April, 1945, failing to join the Southern group. Along with them, 800 to 2,000 volunteers of the SS-Sturmbrigade Belarus' 1st infantry regiment of Obersturmbannführer SS Kuschel crossed the front line. On 22 – 23 April, 1945, they subordinated themselves to Maltsev.

²⁰³ Mikhail Mikhailovich Shapovalov (11 January, 1898 – 8 May, 1945) was a Major-General of the Red Army, Major-General of the CLPR Armed Forces. In 1939 – 1941, he was Frunze Military Academy student. In August 1941 he was appointed Commander of the 320th Rifle Division deployed near Feodosiya, and later he became Commander of a motorized group near Kerch. On 2 June, 1942, he was appointed Deputy Commander of the Special Army 1st Rifle Corps, and on 2 July, 1942, he became commander of the corps. The Corps was formed in April 1942 in the North-Caucasian Military District and decimated near Armavir. On 14 August, 1942, he surrendered to the 16th Wehrmacht Motorized Infantry Division. In 1943, he became head of Abwehr Sonderstab "P" operational department in Warsaw. Later he was appointed chief of a POW camp. In December 1944 he was promoted to the rank of Major-General of the CLPR Armed Forces. In February 1945, he became Commander of the 3rd Infantry Division of the CLPR Armed Forces (700th Infantry Division according to the German numbering system). On 8 May, 1945, he was executed by a firing squad of Czech resistance fighters.

²⁰⁴ The Third Army was reactivated on 9 August, 1932. After the United States entered WW2, the Third Army took on the role of training some of the huge numbers of recruits. By the end of 1943, the Third Army was shipped to the United Kingdom. From 1 August, 1944, it took part in action in France. December 1944 – January 1945, it repelled German offensives in the Battle of Bulge. After crossing the Rhein, it occupied southern areas of Germany and the western part of Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Commanding Generals: Lieutenant General Walter Krueger (May 1941 through February 1943), Lieutenant General Courtney Hicks Hodges (February 1943 through January 1944), Lieutenant General George Smith Jr. Patton (January 1944 through October 1945).

²⁰⁵ The history of negotiations between the 1st Division of the CLPR Armed Forces and the Czech National Council in Prague is described in detail in the Ivan Stjvicek article "Transcript of the Czech National Council meetings 4 – 9 May, 1945," *Historieavojenstvi*, № 6 (1967): pp. 979-1019.

²⁰⁶ Refers to Army Group Centre, created on January 25, 1945, by renaming Army Group A.

Ferdinand Schörner (1892 – 1973) was the Commander of the Army Group Centre from 25 January through 11 May, 1945. He was a Colonel General and later Field Marshal (1945). Since October 1941, he was fighting against Soviets in Northern

Finland. On 15 January, 1942, he was appointed Commander of 19th Mountain Corps “Norway.” In November 1943 he became Commander of 40th Panzer Corps in Ukraine. Later, under his command was created the “Army Group Nikopol” or “Schörner Group,” which included 30th, 17th, and 4th Corps. On 18 February, 1944, he was appointed the Chief of National-Socialist Leading Headquarters of the Army. From February 1944 through 31 March, 1944, he was cmmmander of the 17th Army; on 10 March, 1944; he became Commander of the Army Group South Ukraine; on 25 July, 1944, he became Commander of Army Group North. On 17 January, 1945, he was made Commander of Army Group Centre, defending Czechoslovakia. After its defeat he flew to Austria, where he was arrested by the Americans on 17 May, 1945, and on 26 May, 1945, he was extradited to the Soviets. On 7 January, 1955, he was allowed to leave for West Germany and released.

²⁰⁷ The 1st Ukrainian Front was founded on October 20, 1943, by the General Headquarters order of 16 October, 1943, on renaming the Voronezh Front. The armies that were part of the 1st Ukrainian Front included: 13th, 27th, 38th, 40th, 47th, and 60th Armies, 3rd Guards Tank Army, and 2nd Air Army. Later the following Armies were added: 1st, 3rd, 5th Guards Armies, 6th, 18th, 21st, 28th, 31st, 52nd, and 59th Armies, 1st, 3rd, and 4th Guards Tank Armies, 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 6th Tank Armies, 8th Air Army, 2nd Polish Army. In November 1943, in the course of an offensive, the Front forces liberated Kiev, in December 1943 – January 1944, the Front forces launched an offensive in the area of Zhytomyr, and in January – April 1944, the Front forces, jointly with the forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, defeated German forces in the area of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, and then they defeated the main forces of Army Group South. By the end of April, the Front forces reached the Carpathian Mountains. In the summer of 1944, they defeated the troops of Army Group Northern Ukraine, crossing the Vistula in the area of Sandomierz. In January 1945, the Front forces crossed the Oder using the Sandomierz bridgehead, and in February – March 1945 they occupied the Lower and Upper Silesia and reached the Neisse. In April – May 1945, the Front forces took part in the Battle of Berlin and defeated the enemy in Czechoslovakia.

On 10 June, 1945, in accordance with the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters of 29 May, 1945, the Front headquarters formed the Central Group of Forces of the Red Army.

Commanders: General Nikolai F. Vatutin (20 October, 1943 – 2 March, 1944), Marshal Georgy K. Zhukov (2 March – 24 May, 1944), Marshal Ivan S. Konev (24 May, 1944 – 6 June, 1945).

²⁰⁸ In his report to G. M. Malenkov, G. F. Alexandrov, and F. F. Kuznetsov of 14 May, 1945 about the capture of A. A. Vlasov, the deputy chief of the Political Department of the Red Army F. Shikin indicated that Vlasov had “an American passport issued in his name, his old Communist Party membership card and a copy of the order to his troops to cease hostilities, lay down their weapons and surrender to the Red Army. According to Vlasov’s testimony, he intended to get to the territory occupied by our allies.” (See: The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. F. 32. Op.11289. D. 677. L. 210).

